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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this study was to expose how the ineffectiveness of the anti-corruption 
measures contributed in delaying the right to housing, as proffered by the Constitution of 
South Africa, to the impoverished population at large. The result of this study has shown that 
the available resources of the state were not sufficiently protected against malfeasance in the 
public service. 
 
The plethora of anti-corruption measures has not deterred wayward public officials from 
personally abusing the ‘available resources’ earmarked for housing. Stark evidence of 
corruption was revealed by the SIU Reports (2011, 2012, and 2013) that confirmed endemic 
proportions of corruption in the public housing programme that had seen housing projects 
delayed, half-completed and not built.  
 
The point is, that the right to housing is not necessarily delayed by a lack of economic 
resources as often claimed by the government, but rather that those resources are available, 
but not amply protected against corruption  by the anti-corruption measures and agencies in 
place, to do this. Procurement processes are undermined by public officials, including 
management, who by-pass laws that govern public finance. This behaviour has been 
pervasive in the human settlement programme since 2007 when the SIU embarked on its 
proclamation to investigate corruption in the social housing programme.  
 
Exacerbating the abuse of available resource is the first citizen, the President who the 
Constitutional Court found has unlawfully benefited from security upgrades at his private 
home, Nkandla. Thus the public service suffers from an acute lack of ethical behaviour and 
thereby good governance and this has made the government vulnerable to breaching 
international treaty obligations insofar as realisation of the minimum core in housing and 
protecting the maximum available resources for housing against malfeasance in government. 
Instead that government realises the right to housing for the impoverished soonest, the 
government was rather pre-occupied with abusing state funds earmarked as such and thereby 
deprived the right to enjoy access to housing, in particular to the homeless and the most 
desperate. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
 
The National Planning Commission maintains that: 
‘South Africa suffers from high levels of corruption that undermine the rule of law and 
hinder the state’s ability to effect development and socio-economic transformation.’1 
 
After labouring under non-democratic apartheid rule, the victory of democracy for the South 
African people came with the hope of access to socio-economic rights (SERs) which were in 
short supply for the majority during the apartheid years. One of the major devastations of the 
deprivation of SERs was the lack of public housing for the impoverished. For this reason this 
South Africa included enumerated SERs in its constitution to ensure that these rights apply to 
everyone and particularly the impoverished.  
 
The Constitution
2
 of South Africa provides explicitly for the right to housing. To give 
credence to this, over the last 22 years, the government embarked on a zealous programme for 
public housing to make up for the neglect during apartheid. Despite the government’s 
enthusiasm complemented by the Constitutional Court (CC) giving credence to the 
justiciability of SERs,
3
 and interpretation of the government’s duties, housing the most 
desperate is still a huge challenge.  
 
The biggest hurdle for the court is to determine whether resources for SERs are being 
appropriated effectively. For instance does homelessness prevail whilst those in basic shelters 
receive upgraded adequate accommodation?  The CC in its reasonableness review has not 
come up with any meaningful approach to determining whether reasonable measures are 
being undertaken to protect the available resources and whether the allocated resources are 
                                                 
1National Planning Commission. ‘National Development Plan—Vision for 2030’ Pretoria November (2013) 
410. 
2
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) s26. See chapter 3 for 
detailed discussion on s26. 
3
See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the amended text of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC). 
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efficiently used.
4
  The closest that the CC has come to doing this is in Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others,
 5
   finding that a reasonable 
programme must ‘ensure that the appropriate financial and human resources are available’.  
 
The discourse on the state’s duty to provide housing for the impoverished has shown that 
economic resources are imperative in the realisation of SERs. It is the importance of this 
element that is the focus of this dissertation, in that without it the right to housing may be 
delayed or not materialise for some or at all. Thus, due to the importance of budgeted 
resources to realise SERs, government has an obligation to safeguard these resources against 
malfeasance on the part of the state. In order to make this connection the link between 
corruption and human rights is explored to raise awareness on how corruption in the public 
service can censure the rights of the individual, in that corrupt acts have the potential of 
denying and interfering with the availability, accessibility and quality of public housing.
6
  
 
The anti-corruption measures that ring-fence the international community, enjoy scrutiny to 
show South Africa’s obligations in terms of combating corruption. The primary concern of 
this study is the approach of government in applying the anti-corruption laws and measures to 
stifle corruption in the delivery of public housing. It is the view of this study that the 
omnipresence of corruption in the public housing programme of South Africa, delays access 
to housing and thereby deprives the individual of his or her rights.  This delay occurs due to 
funds earmarked for housing being misappropriated by those who are entrusted to exercise 
their powers in line with the Constitution. This dissertation is not about analysing corruption 
in the public sector, but rather the right to housing and how corruption negatively affects 
delivery by eroding the ‘available resources’ earmarked as such. 
 
This study explores the fact that a fair share of the non-delivery in public housing is because 
of corrupt practices plaguing the public housing programme.
 7
 Good governance, ethical and 
honest behaviour on the part of entrusted public officials
8
 is marred by endemic corruption. 
                                                 
4
See chapter 2 for discussion on the United Nations’  history of  the phrase ‘available resources’. See chapter 5 
for discussion on the reasonableness review of the CC 
5
2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 39 (hereafter Grootboom CC). See chapter 4 for discussion on this ground 
breaking case dealing with the right to housing under the Constitution. 
6
This dissertation explores public and not private corruption which is perpetrated by those in government and 
could be in collaboration with a private person or business. 
7
See chapter 5 for the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) Report on this. This Unit has been instructed by the 
President, through proclamation in 2007 to investigate corruption in the public housing programme. See 
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1.2 The adoption of socio-economic rights in South Africa 
 
Socio-economic rights have through decades emerged and become an integral area of 
international law chiefly through the acceptance of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) by the international community.
9
  
 
In this jurisdiction a new constitution came about through the National Assembly and Senate 
sitting together as the Constitutional Assembly (CA) in the drafting process during 1994. The 
CA initiated a public participation programme in which all South Africans had the 
opportunity to express their views about the content of the new Constitution, on paper. The 
overwhelming response was requests for rights to jobs, houses and education. The new 
Constitution ended decades of authoritarian parliamentary sovereignty based on colonial 
practice and transformed South Africa to adopting constitutional supremacy. The result of this 
was that this jurisdiction boasts a constitution with an enumerated Bill of Rights (BoR) that 
binds all organs of state including the legislature, executive and the judiciary.
 10
 The reason 
the Constitution includes such an explicit BoR was to address the most compelling socio-
economic needs of the overwhelmingly impoverished South Africans.
 11
  Moreover, the courts 
were given wide powers of interpretation and are required to apply and develop law to be 
compatible with the BoR.
12
 Despite these progressive strides the needs of the impoverished 
are still dominated by the lack of adequate shelter, inter alia.  
 
The rights under section 26 of the Constitution follows with an inhibiter from the ICESCR
13
 
which states that governments have an:  
                                                                                                                                                        
Proclamation R7 of 2007, published on 25 April (2007) see 
http://www.siu.org.za/sites/default/files/documents/SIU%20INTERIM%20REPORT%201June%202012.pdf 
8Is the same as ‘public officer’ means any person who is a member, an officer, an employee or a servant of a 
public body, and includes- 
(a) any person in the public service as contemplated in s8 (1) of the Public Service Act 103 of 1994. 
(b) any person receiving any remuneration from public funds. 
9
 See chapter 2 for discussion on this instrument. 
10
 Constitution s8 (1). Also see Dlamini C  ‘The South African Law Commission’s Working Paper on Group and 
Human Rights: Towards a Bill of Rights for South Africa’ (1990) S A Public Law 96; Didcott J ‘Practical 
Workings of a Bill of Rights’ in Van der Westhuizen J & Viljoen H (eds) A Bill of Rights for South Africa 
(1988). 
11
 See Haysom N ‘Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-Economic Rights’ (1992) 8 
SAJHR 451; Mureinik E ‘Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 
464. 
12
Constitution s39. See chapter 4 for discussion on the judiciary interpreting SERs. 
13
Article. 2(1). Also see Sepúlveda M The Nature of the Obligations Under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2003). 
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‘ Obligation  to  take  steps  to  the  maximum  of  their  available  resources  with  a  view  
to progressively achieve the full realisation of economic, social, and cultural rights.’  
 
Thus the right to housing and its progressive realisation is underpinned by the ‘available 
resources’ of the government. 14  Therefore, this dissertation expounds on the importance of 
the ‘available resources’ to the realisation of the right as explained in  chapter two by tracking 
the history this term into the field of  human rights. The reason for this exploration is to 
illuminate the importance of this resource in bringing about public housing and for this 
reason, point out the importance of protecting it from abuse in the public service. The thrust 
of this dissertation is to highlight that corruption is one of the main obstacles that frustrates 
the optimal delivery of housing, in South Africa. A housing project tainted by corrupt 
procurement procedures, easily falls prey to no or poor delivery and the end result affects the 
individual right to access.  
 
1.3 Endemically corrupt practices in South Africa (and Africa) 
 
Corruption in the public service in South Africa is of great concern.
 15
 It is alleged at various 
levels, including the public housing programme, due to the large budgets made available for 
public housing projects.  
 
In Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
16
 the CC pointed out: 
‘That corruption has become a scourge in our country and it poses a real danger to our 
developing democracy in that it undermines the ability of government to meet its 
commitment to fight poverty and to deliver on other social and economic rights guaranteed 
in our Bill of Rights.’ 
                                                 
14
Section 26(2). See chapter 2 on the origin of the phrase ‘available resources’. 
15
Also see Lodge T ‘Political Corruption in South Africa’ (1998) 97 African Affairs 157; Mbaku J Bureaucratic 
and Political Corruption in Africa: The Public Choice Perspective (2002). 
16
2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) para 58.This case challenged the decision of the South African government to disband 
the  anti-corruption agency, Directorate of Special Operations (the Scorpions) which was situated in the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and replace it with the Hawks  which is  under the control of the South African 
Police Service (SAPS). The CC held that the Hawks under the SAPS control is not sufficiently independent from 
political interference and this should be rectified as South Africa no longer had an independent anti-corruption 
agency in place.
 
The legislature was ordered to amend the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995(amended 
by Act 83 of 1998) to change this. It obliged with the South African Police Service Amendment Act 10 of 2012 
published in GG 356632012 of 14 September 2012. As far back as 1989 authors predicted that corruption would 
loom large in the ‘new’ South Africa. See Wilson  F & Ramphele M Uprooting Poverty in South Africa: Report 
for the 2nd Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in South Africa (1989); Ladikos A ‘Corruption: The 
Enemy from Inside’ (1999) 12 Acta Criminologica 28-36; Sangweni S & Balia D Fighting Corruption: South 
African Perspectives (1999). 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Therefore, Aristotle argues  ‘to protect the treasury from being defrauded, let all money be 
issued openly in front of the whole city, and let copies of the accounts be deposited in various 
wards.’ 17  
 
Needless to say accountability is pivotal to good governance and inspires trust on the part of 
the populous. As it is, corruption often thrives where there is apathy or ignorance of laws, 
regulation and accountability in the public service. This is exacerbated by conflict of interest 
and failure to adhere to fiduciary duties whereby accounting officers are tardy with oversight. 
South Africa’s standing on the international stage is blemished by its high-ranking on 
Transparency International’s list of perceived corruption, so much so that South Africa ranks 
61 out of 168 countries on the 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).  Notwithstanding 
this, 114 African countries score below 50 on the CPI, indicating serious levels of public 
sector corruption on this continent.
18
 Amplifying this bleak picture is the fact that 68 percent 
of countries worldwide have a serious corruption problem, of which 50 percent are from the 
G20.
 19
  
 
Adding to this perception are the statistics revealed by the African edition of the Global 
Corruption Barometer (GCB) 2015 where key findings are that corruption is on the rise; most 
governments do not meet citizen’s expectations in fighting corruption and many people feel 
helpless in fighting corruption.
20
 Moreover, the survey found that 83 percent of South 
Africans believed that corruption was increasing and 79 percent believed that government 
was doing a poor job in combating corruption.  The main finding of the GCB is that Africa is 
overwhelmed by weak performance on anti-corruption measures across the continent. The 
comparison between countries showed that people in South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria 
perceived that corruption had risen in 2014 (12 months prior to the survey).
 21
   South Africa 
is amongst the countries where four in five people believe government’s anti-corruption 
                                                 
17
Clayton E ‘Aristotle (384 -322 B.C.E.)  ‘The Politics: Book VI The Best Kind of Democracy Internet 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (no date) para 12 (b) available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-pol/#H7 (accessed 
on 10 March 2015). Also see Antonia L Locke’s Moral Man (2012). 
18
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015 available at 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 (accessed on 28 February 2016). 
19
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. 
20
People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015, Global Corruption Barometer, Transparency International and 
Afro Barometer (hereafter People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015) available at 
http://www.wathi.org/people-and-corruption-africa-survey-2015-global-corruption-barometer-transparency-
international-and-afrobarometer/ (accessed on 20 February 2016). 
21
See Lawal G & Tobi A ‘Bureaucratic Corruption, Good Governance and Development: The Challenges and 
Prospects of Institutional Building in Nigeria’ (2006) 2 Journal of Applied Science Research 642. 
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efforts are doing badly.
 22
 The Ibrahim Index for African Governance, released on the 15 
October 2012 reveals that some of Africa’s regional powerhouses, Nigeria and South Africa, 
show unfavourable governance performance, largely due to corruption and 
maladministration.
23
 Nigeria is loses hundreds of millions of dollars due to various practices 
including allowing oil ministers to award contracts at their own discretion without an attempt 
being made at a formal tender process.
 24
  
 
The trend of corruption in South Africa is also confirmed by the South African Social 
Attitude Survey (SASAS) conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in 
2011, which reported that 74 percent of South Africans believed that the incidence of 
corruption had increased in this jurisdiction. Furthermore, the report revealed that 63 percent 
of South Africans believed that politicians (government and Parliament) do not do enough to 
fight corruption and 33 percent believed there is no real punishment for corruption.
25
 Olutola 
believes that in both South Africa and Nigeria the leaders are not leading by example.
 26
 
Kgosimore explains that white-collar crime
27
 is ingrained in the fabric of the ‘new’ South 
African society but it dates back to long before democracy.
28
 Friedrichs depicts political 
white-collar crime as an illegal and improper activity by a government or political party 
officials for personal gain instead of advancing government/political ideology.
29
   
 
The realisation of housing is very dependent on economic resources; therefore good 
governance that protects those resources against malfeasance is key to delivery. Due to 
resources at their disposal public officials are under temptation to bow to corruption whereby 
                                                 
22
People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015. The other countries are Benin, Liberia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. 
23Ibrahim M ‘Nelson Mandela 11th Annual Lecture: Building Social Cohesion 17 August 2013 Dialogue for 
Justice, Annual Lecture 2013 available at: https://www.nelsonmandela.org/news/entry/11th-nelson-mandela-
annual-lecture-transcript-of-dr-mo-ibrahims-speech (accessed 01 March 2016). 
24
Ridabu N ‘Nigeria: How to Lose $35bn’ The Guardian Nigeria/OnlineInsider 13 November 2012 available at 
https//wwwtheguardian.com/2012/nov/13/Nigeria-oil-corruption-ridabu (accessed on 25 November 2014). 
25
Human Sciences Research Council 2011. 
26
Olutola A A Long-term Crime Prevention and the Criminal Justice Systems of Nigeria and South Africa: A 
Hopeless Hope? (2012) 2 Acta Criminologica: CRIMSA 17-30. See chapter 5 discussing the President and 
Parliament flouting constitutional obligations in abuse of state funds found by the Public Protector. 
27
White-collar crime includes public officials, politicians, businesspeople and professionals, who, violate trust 
placed in them or act in an unethical manner. 
28Kgosimore D ‘White Collar-crime: A Phenomenon of Post-apartheid South Africa?’ (2001) 20 Politeia 91. 
Apartheid government corruption extends amongst others to Hennie van der Walt deputy Minister of 
Development and Land Affairs sentence for five years imprisonment of theft involving R800 000, Louis Nel 
Minister of Information resigned after bidding to buy prime land owned by the Department of Foreign Affairs in 
Tokyo, Pietie du Plessis was sentenced to nine years imprisonment for fraud and Leon de Beer was sentenced to 
two years imprisonment for election fraud. 
29
Friedrichs D White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society (1996) 143. Also see Croall H White Collar Crime: 
Criminal Justice and Criminology (1992) 8.  
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they enter into private deals by providing or withholding services in exchange for bribes, 
kickbacks and personal advantages.
30
 This action continues in the embezzlement of funds or 
awarding of government contracts by not following the laws in place. Furthermore, 
corruption that has been exposed in the public administration includes the use of public office 
by some officials to run their own affairs, social-housing fraud and irregularities in state and 
government procurement, to name but a few.
31
  
 
Some authors are of the view that even though Grootboom was a successful litigation insofar 
as public housing, the socio-economic conditions of the impoverished communities have not 
improved dramatically.
32
  Much of this delay in access to housing is as a result of corrupt 
activities that are endured in the public housing programme through manipulation of public 
procurement and thereby of state funds. 
 
The Auditor-General (AG) confirms that key areas such as quality of financial statements and 
supply-chain management are where corruption flourishes.  This is exacerbated by the high 
level of tolerance for audit disclaimers by the AG against local, provincial and national 
government. This shows that there is a high potential for illegal expenses or attempts to hide 
illegal activities involving fiscal resources.  At the end of the day the irregular use of 
economic resources  leading to corruption goes against the grain of the obligation  under the 
ICESCR 
33
to  use  the ‘maximum  of  its  available  resources’  to  achieve  the  full  
realisation  of  SERs  rights. An end to this behaviour will not find closure in ‘change-
management’ but rather in the soul of entrusted public officials.  
 
1.4 Hypothesis 
 
On the one hand the government allocates ‘available resources’ to realise public housing 
which resonates with their constitutional obligations.
34
 On the other hand the housing so 
envisioned does not always materialise due to malfeasance in the public housing programme. 
Investigations into this behaviour by public officials have proved positive but the necessary 
                                                 
30
Also see Cohen A & Short R Jr ‘Crime and Delinquency’ in Merton R & Nisbet R (eds) Contemporary Social 
Problems (1976). 
31
See chapter 5 on the SIU Reports exposing this behaviour. 
32See Pillay K ‘Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights’ 
(2002) 2 Law, Democracy and Development 225. 
33
Article 2 (1).   
34
Section 26. 
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sanctions are not consistently applied. Thus the obligations contained in the domestic and 
international laws to realise SERs and combat malfeasance in government, do not prove to be 
optimally used. As a result of this void, corruption in the government’s housing programme 
has been allowed to erode the resources for housing which results in delaying access to public 
housing and thereby the enjoyment of the right to housing. 
 
1.5 Research question 
 
The general question is whether government has optimally used the state machinery such as 
the three branches of government, (legislation, regulations, policies and agencies), in the 
realisation of housing and the fight against corruption in the public housing programme. 
Flowing from the general question is how important the available resources are to the 
realisation of public housing. Therefore, the jurisprudence of the phrase ‘available resources’ 
is tracked for this clarification; how the three branches of government (legislative, executive, 
and judiciary) have performed  their constitutional obligations to realise the right to housing, 
is explored. This will entail looking at how progressive the government’s plans are to house 
the most desperate. To complement this question, how proactive is the judiciary in its 
interpretation of the right to housing?  Similarly, the approach from the bench on the 
preservation of the available resources for housing from malfeasance in government is 
questioned.  
 
To round off this research begs the question of which lessons pertaining to housing and anti- 
corruption measures can enrich the South African jurisdiction.  This question is answered in a 
comparative review of the Indian judiciary and their liberal approach to the interpretation of 
SERs and experiences in combating public corruption through social-action litigation. 
 
1.6 Aims of the study 
 
The aim is two-fold:  first to point out the importance of economic resources to the realisation 
of public housing. In this pursuit this study will illuminate the historical journey of the term 
‘available resources’ into the human rights lexicon and into the South African jurisdiction. 
The three branches of government are discussed to elucidate their role and duties in the 
delivery of housing. The relevant laws and policies regarding housing are discussed.  
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Secondly, the focus of this study is on the effect that corruption has on the non-delivery of 
public housing and thereby on the realisation of the right thereto. Hence this study seeks to 
evaluate the practical soundness of the anti-corruption measures in place, to combat 
corruption in the public service. The reason for this exploration is to demonstrate how 
malfeasance has negatively influenced progressive realisation of housing in that available 
resources allocated for public housing are not optimally used to realise these rights. 
Demonstrative of this is the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) reports discussed in chapter five, 
which show the omnipresence of corruption in the government’s human settlement 
programme. 
 
In conclusion, a comparison is drawn with India in judicial enforcement of human-rights 
standards (housing) and anti-corruption measures because this jurisdiction is rich in 
experience on how to hold the government accountable in this regard. 
 
1.7 Significance and objectives of the study 
 
This study attempts to draw attention to the importance of the ‘available resources to the 
realisation of housing on the one hand and to elaborate on how corruption is eroding access to 
public housing, on the other. The reason for this focus is to draw attention to the fact that 
corrupt activities in the public housing programme have resulted in non-delivery of housing 
despite the fact that public funds have been ‘allocated’.  
 
Knowing the importance of available resources to delivery in public housing, in 2007 the 
government instigated investigations into alleged claims of corruption in the public housing 
programme countrywide. These investigations are pending completion, but various 
preliminary reports have been presented to Parliament and the President. These reports forms 
a basis for the analogy that the state is failing in its duty to protect the available resources for 
housing against abuse by public officials. Malfeasance in government is witnessed by citizens 
unable to act against the state’s inability to contain the scourge. The most vulnerable and poor 
experience the effect of corruption  first-hand  in that corrupt activities in the public housing 
programme have deprived them of access to a basic home. This is so because corruption in 
the public service has been allowed to erode the available resources earmarked for public 
housing which in turn has an extremely negative impact on the individual’s access to a home. 
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This study attempts to show that the fiscus makes, as expected provision for those resources 
but these are not optimally used to progressively realise the right to housing.  
 
1.8 Literature review 
 
The literature on the right to housing is rich with arguments on how the right should be 
realised and how the courts should give content to the right through interpretation.  
Liebenberg, Bilchitz, Brandt and Dugard have provided the academia with insurmountable 
input on these issues. In an attempt to enrich this discourse, a comprehensive research is 
explored as to the effect that corruption has on the economic resources, for public housing 
and the realisation of the right to housing. 
 
This research draws attention to the fact that there has been very limited interrogation of the 
importance of economic resources to the realisation of housing.  Due to the importance of 
economic resources in the delivery of housing, the focus will be on accountability in the 
distribution and management of these resources. The academic discourse embraces the link 
between corruption and the realisation of human rights, but does not interrogate how 
corruption contributes to the on-delivery of SERs. Attention is drawn to Malherbe’s academic 
contribution as to the plight of corruption on social security.
35
  This dissertation thus brings a 
novel argument in contribution to the discourse on housing. Most notable is that the analysis 
of the SIU Reports into corruption in public housing will enrich this contribution in that the 
findings in these reports have not been recorded in the legal academic discourse.
36
 
 
The literature kaleidoscope that will make up the tapestry of this study, will confirm the link 
between corruption and the under or non-delivery of housing and thereby the suppression of 
the fulfilment of a human right. Further enriching the reading will be the anti-corruption 
measures that the international community embraces in the fight against corruption and South 
Africa’s response in this regard.  
 
 
                                                 
35Malherbe K ‘Stretching Solidarity Too Far: The Impact of Fraud and Corruption on Social Security in South 
Africa (2001) 5 Law Democracy & Dev. 107.  
36
See chapter 5. 
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1.8.1 Corruption the antithesis of the fulfilment of human rights 
 
Those  who hold office have to provide  account for their activities at regular intervals ‘where 
the city's funds came from, where they went, what actions they took, and so forth’. 37 
Furthermore, the improper and unlawful enrichment of those entrusted with public power 
erodes the rule of law and thereby leads to denial of human rights due to the hindering of 
socio-economic development of a country.   
 
Corruption and human rights are separate areas of law the procedures of which should always 
be respected and rights of due process should be observed. However, corruption threatens 
both democracy and development because it erodes the capacity of states to ensure 
sustainable livelihood for their citizens. Corruption impedes the state’s ability to use its 
available resources optimally. This is because there are instances where national resources are 
diverted for personal gain or development aid is mismanaged, misused or misappropriated. 
The UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) maintains that corruption is a hydra-
headed monster that remains one of the deadliest enemies of the translation into reality of the 
potential with which humanity is endowed.
38
  
 
Corruption is a global pandemic with some 6 billion people around the world living in 
countries tainted by the scourge.
 39
 The negative effect of corruption on SERs was a concern 
raised at the UN which led to the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights being tasked in 2002 to prepare a comprehensive study on corruption in its 
impact on the full enjoyment of human rights, in particular SERs.
 40
 The report focused on the 
effect of corruption on the institutions necessary to sustain democracy, namely political 
parties and Parliament. The study emphasises the problem posed by political corruption, 
focusing on developing countries. In this regard the study illuminates that political parties are 
often seen to abuse their powerful positions and parliamentarians compromise their 
legislative, oversight, financial control and representative roles. The working paper submitted 
to the Sub-Commission noted that corruption should be condemned and that those guilty of it 
                                                 
37
Clayton E The Politics: Book VI ‘The Best Kind of Democracy’ para 12 (b). 
38
Commission on Human Rights 57
th
 session 22 June 2005 UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/18.(hereafter 
Commission on Human Rights 57
th
 session). 
39
See Transparency International available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 (accessed on 14 February 
2016). 
40
Commission on Human Rights 57
th
 session.  
 
 
 
 
12 
 
should face international justice if they escaped national retribution.
41
 The Commission raised 
the crucial role played by the judiciary and law enforcement agencies in the fight against 
corruption to root out its negative impact on the full enjoyment of human rights.
42
 
 
The face of a well ordered state is where the government regards human rights as guiding 
principles of good governance. Moreover, states are internationally responsible to combat the 
violation of human rights which is given recognition as a branch of public international law 
and can bind states and change domestic laws. Notwithstanding this the pacta sunt servanda 
rule applies whereby states are bound by treaties they ratify; therefore states have obligations 
to uphold human rights in good faith.
43
 Most notably, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) provides that ‘all human beings are endowed with reason and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’.44 Megret affirms that international 
human rights appear as the cement that binds groups of states together in a collective that is 
domestic, transnational and supranational.
45
 According to the Human Development Report 
1997, law enforcement must play a pivotal role in ensuring the protection of fundamental 
human rights in a democratic society. 
 
Annan confirms that the presence of this evil phenomenon is found everywhere but it is in the 
developing world where its effects are most destructive, through the diversion of funds 
intended for development which in turn undermines the government’s ability in providing 
basic services. 
46
 The consequences of this are diminished economic development which 
affects social equality.
 47
  In the 21
st
 century government’s monopoly of economic activities 
combined with systemic maladministration and political soft-pedalling in developing 
countries, provide fertile ground for corruption which breeds widespread poverty and 
                                                 
41
The Sub-Commission at its 55
th
 session UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/18. 
42
Commission on Human Rights 57
th
 session. See chapter 6 for discussion on how the judiciary in India deals 
with public corruption. 
43
Also see Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (New Application: 1962) 
[1970] ICJ Rep 3 para 33. 
44
Article 1. 
45Megret F ‘Nature of Obligation’ in Moeckli D Shah S & Sivakumaran S (eds) International Human Rights Law 
(2010)125, 130. 
46Press Release Annan K ‘Secretary-General Lauds Adoption by General Assembly of UNCAC’ 31 October 
2003 available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sgsm8977.doc.htm (accessed on 27 February 2015). Also see 
Wraith R & Simpkins E ‘Corruption in Developing Countries’1963. 
47See Delaney P ‘Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Borders’ (2007) 47 VA. J. INT'L L 413; 
Kaufmann D ‘Human Rights, Governance and Development: An Empirical Perspective’ (2006) Development 
Outreach World Bank Institute 19. 
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economic inequalities. This behaviour stunts development thereby leaving the rights holder at 
a loss.  
 
De Beco contends that accountability is key to human - rights monitoring because the purpose 
is to hold the duty-bearers accountable to their human rights commitments.
48
 Transparency 
International believes that poverty can be halved if efforts are coupled with better 
governance.
49
 Moreover, the misappropriation of state wealth denies the indigent of life-
saving, SERs.
 50
 In order to protect the available resources earmarked for SERs it has become 
necessary to establish a framework for monitoring corruption from a human-rights 
perspective.
 51
  This is to assist in preventing human rights violations from occurring, through 
the corruption of state economic resources. It stands to reason that to fast track the realisation 
of housing, acts of corruption which infring on this right should fall under amplified scrutiny. 
 
1.8.2 What is understood  by ‘corruption’? 
 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) warns that: 
 
 ‘Corruption is the thief of economic and social development; stealing the opportunities of 
ordinary people to progress and to prosper.’52  
 
The scourge of corruption has been haunting society for centuries; Plato said in the fourth 
century ‘like illness, corruption will always be with us.’ 53  Authors on the discourse of 
                                                 
48
De Beco G (2011) 1117.  
49
Transparency International press release on Millennium Development Goals, 19 January 2005 
available at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/endorse_TI_19Jan05.pdf (accessed on 10 April 
2015). According to Eigen, Chairperson of Transparency International Berlin the success of the MDGs was 
under threat due to corruption. 
50Greenwood E ‘Corruption and the Corruptibility of Logos in Greek Historiography’ (2011) 4 Acta Classica 63. 
51See Nowicki M & Fialova Z ‘Human Rights Monitoring’ Warszawa: Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights 
(2001) 15;  Landman T ‘Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice, and Policy’ (2004) 26 Human Rights 
Quarterly 923; Krommendijk J ‘The Impact and Effectiveness of Non-Judicial Mechanisms for the 
Implementation of Human Rights’ (2011)5 Human Rights and International Legal Discourse 264. 
52
Yury Fedotov Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)  in his address to the Fifth 
Session in Panama City, 2013 available at  
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2015/November/eliminating-corruption-is-crucial-to-
sustainable-development.(accessed  on 27 February 2016). 
53
See Hamilton E & Cains H (eds) Plato The Laws: Book 12 (1961) section d; Serfontein J ‘Corruption and 
Fraud in the Empire of Constantine the Great between AD 327 and AD 337’ (2011) 17 Fundamina: A Journal of 
Legal History 127. 
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corruption agree that corruption is immemorial, as old as government itself.
54
 In the 
fourteenth century Abdul Rahman Ibn Kaldun said the main cause of corruption is ‘the 
passion for luxurious living within the ruling group’.55 Ameresekere argues that in order to 
meet the expenditure on luxury the ruling group resorted to corrupt dealings.
 56
 This 
dissertation does not seek  a ‘new’ definition on corruption,  merely to examine the diverting 
of public funds from government for personal gain, as opposed to service delivery. There has 
been corruption in ancient times  in  Elizabethan England,  Europe and present day USA, 
China, India and Japan: corruption does not pertain to culture or region.
57
   
 
It is trite law that there is no universally accepted definition for corruption. The commonly 
understood definition for corruption is ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ which 
basically translates into the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. The most agreed upon 
explanation of corruption is the embezzlement of public funds, assets or the acceptance of 
bribes by a public official. The simple dictionary definition of corruption is ‘dishonest or 
illegal behaviour especially by powerful people (such as government officials or police 
officers)’.58 
 
The Southern African community boasts a most apt definition provided by the Southern 
African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (SADC Protocol):
59
  
 
‘Corruption’  means  any  act  referred  to  in  Article  360  and  includes  bribery  or  any  
other behaviour  in  relation  to  persons  entrusted  with  responsibilities  in  the  public  
and  private sectors which violates  their duties as public officials, private employees,  
                                                 
54
Also see Klitgaard R Controlling Corruption 1988; Noonan J Bribes 1984 tracing the concept of bribery to the 
Middle East and finding out that in Mesopotamia and Egypt, from the fifteenth century B.C. on, there has been a 
concept that could be rendered in English as ‘bribe’ a gift that perverts judgment; Bardhan P ‘Corruption and 
Development: A Review of Issues’ (1997) XXXV Journal of Economic Literature. 
55Ameresekere N ‘Corruption: Causes, Consequences & Control’ Session Two – ‘Entrepreneurial Vision on 
Corruption and the Global Mandate’(2013) available at 
http://pp.lao.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Entrepreneurial-Vision-on-Corruption-and-the-Global-
Mandate.pdf  (accessed 20 Feb 2015). 
56
Ameresekere N (2013). For a comprehensive take on both private and public corruption see  Khan M ‘A 
Typology of Corrupt Transactions in Developing Countries’(1996) 27(2) Institute of Development Studies 
Bulletin 12. 
57
See Porta D & Meny Y (eds) Democracy and Corruption in Europe 1997; Heidenheimer A & Johnston M 
(eds) Political Corruption, Concepts and Contexts (3ed) 2001. 
58
Miriam Webber Dictionary (2015). 
59
(2001) s1. 
60
SADC Protocol. 
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independent agents or other  relationships of  that kind  and  aimed  at  obtaining undue  
advantage of  any  kind  for themselves or others.’ 
 
The World Bank (WB) provides a commonly accepted definition for corruption as ‘the use of 
public power for private benefit’. The World Bank Institute and Institute for Contemporary 
Studies also lend their opinion to public office corruption labelling it as a crime of calculation 
and not of passion.
61
 Transparency International terms corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain’.62 Grubiša argues that corruption, is the cancer of most political 
systems but foremost of democracy.
63 
Van Klaveren maintains that a corrupt civil servant 
regards his public office as a business, the income of which he will seek to maximise and thus 
the office then becomes a maximising unit.
64
 Public officials engage in political corruption by 
manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources. 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in 
corruption cases involving the public sector, at least one perpetrator comes from the ranks of 
persons holding a public office. 
65
 
 
 
Most anti-corruption measures refer to a non-exhaustive list of acts that comprise corruption, 
but no universal general definition of the scourge. Moreover, international conventions do not 
define or criminalise corruption; instead it lists criminal acts amounting to corruption.  
Nonetheless, corruption does not refer to a particular behaviour but rather to a group of 
criminal acts in parallel with an abuse of entrusted power, such as embezzlement and bribery 
to name but a few.  According to TI, sadly not a single country, anywhere in the world, is 
corruption-free and poor countries lose up to USD1 trillion per year to corruption. No matter 
how corruption is described, it is a known fact that it engenders the denial of SERs which 
mainly affects the poor. Therefore cognisance should be taken of  the fact that, if  public 
officials at any level engage  in wrongdoing or mismanagement, they should be liable for 
                                                 
61
The World Bank Institute and Institute for Contemporary Studies, Washington (2007) 28 available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/KFDLP/Resources/461197-1199907090464/BuildingKEbook.pdf (accessed 
on 20 March 2015). 
62
Transparency International  available at http://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption/#define (accessed 28 
February 2016). 
63Grubiša D ‘Political Corruption in Transitional Croatia: The Peculiarities of a Model’ (2005) XLII Politička 
Misao 58. 
64Van Klaveren J ‘The Concept of Corruption’ in Heidenheimer A Political Corruption: Readings in 
Comparative Analysis (1978) 26.  
65
OECD ‘Specialised Anti-Corruption Institutions: Review of Models’ (2008) 17. 
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prosecution because it is the fear of this prosecution that will keep them honed and ensure 
that they act according to the wishes of the democracy.
66
  
 
1.8.3 The link between corruption and human rights  
 
The economic resources used for SERs emanate from the large budgets that governments 
control and the lack of effective oversight can lead to reckless expenditure, by unethical 
government employees who do not follow the letter of the law. For this reason it is important 
to highlight the link between the realisation of SERs and corruption, which erodes the 
available resources. 
 
The international image of governments depends to a great degree on their respect for human 
rights and whether they obey the obligations set out under the international instruments, in 
particular the international bill of rights, the UDHR, ICESCR and ICCPR.
67
 Today, 
international human rights law represents the standard by which the conduct of a state may be 
judged.  
 
Scholars who have examined the links between corruption and human rights generally hold 
the view that corruption violates human rights.  Delaney notes that the negative flows from 
corruption diminish economic development and increase social inequality.
68
 Sandgren states 
that ‘corruption is now seen as a cause of poverty, not merely a consequence.’69 Bacio-
Terracino argues that there is a lack in showing a detailed manner in the ways the rights are 
infringed upon by various corrupt practices.
 70
  This dissertation attempts to bridge this gap by 
researching the effect that corruption has on the available resources for public housing and 
thereby on the access to the right to housing. It inevitably has a negative knock-on effect. 
 
                                                 
66
Clayton E The Politics: Book VI ‘The Best Kind of Democracy’ para 12 (b). 
67
See chapter 2 for this framework. The UDHR influenced the Constitution of Organisation of the African Union 
(OAU) of 1963, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981 (ACHPR), the European Convention 
on Human Rights 1950, European Commission and Court of Human Rights 1969, the Organisation of American 
States Convention of Human Rights 1969 and the human rights chapter of the constitutions of the Asian states. 
68Delaney P ‘Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Borders’ (2007) 47 VA. J. Int'l L 413, 419. Also see 
Kaufmann D ‘Human Rights, Governance and Development: An Empirical Perspective’ (2006) Development 
Outreach World Bank Institute 19. 
69Sandgren C ‘Combating Corruption: The Misunderstood Role of Law’ (2005) 39 INT'L L 717. 
70
Bacio-Terracino J ‘Corruption as a Violation of Human Rights’ Geneva: International Council on Human 
Rights Policy (2008) Corruption and Human Rights: Making the Connection’ available at 
http://www.ichrp.org/en/projects/131 (accessed on 20 January 2015).  
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Considering that the delivery of public housing is dependent on economic resources, corrupt 
acts that erode these resources, can have a direct connection in delaying accesses to housing. 
Therefore corruption has an undeniable connection with individuals and their inherent human 
rights; by taking a social approach to the scourge places emphasis on the rights-holder who 
suffers the consequences.
71
 Kumar believes that the problem of corruption can be addressed 
by framing it as a human rights violation.
72
 If corruption is seen as a violation of human 
rights, the victims will be empowered to look for redress. For instance, victims should be able 
to approach a court when housing projects are delayed due to corrupt practices in the 
government that led to the available funds for a housing project, being diverted for self-
interest and not the fulfilment of the right. Key to this pattern is complacency in the 
application of laws, policies and regulations by public officials.
73
  
 
 
The ICESCR
74
 provides for the right to adequate housing, which is a component to an 
adequate standard of living as espoused by the UDHR.
 75
 The state is obliged to provide the 
core components of SERs regardless of its available resources.
76
 This indicates that a certain 
degree of legal security of tenure should be afforded to the impoverished. What constitutes 
adequate housing is dependent on various factors such as social, economic and certain 
minimum elements that underpin the right. These attributes are violated through corruption 
and thereby restricted, leading to the infringement of a human right. Furthermore accessibility 
may also be affected through corruption, in that, although housing should be available for all 
disadvantaged groups, a bribe may get a person a higher place on the housing list, ahead of, 
for instance a disabled person.
77
 
 
The international community have generally taken a ‘silo’ approach in the discourse on 
human rights on the one hand and anti-corruption measures on the other. Corruption again 
came into sharp focus internationally during the 1990s, which gave rise to the OECD creating 
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the first international corruption convention, the Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
78
 The main impetus of this 
awareness was aimed at anti-corruption measures to eradicate the global economy of corrupt 
transactions.
 79
  Thus the focus was nowhere near how corruption affects human rights. Not 
only the recognition of corruption as the converse to human rights but also the integration of 
legislation and policy is necessary for improving governance, the rule of law and the 
minimising of corruption. Thus the fight against corruption is not just to curb public power 
used for personal benefit, but also to protect human rights. 
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) decries the serious problems posed by 
corruption in that it ‘endangers the stability of societies, undermines the values of democracy 
and morality, jeopardises social, economic and political development’.80  This Council 
crystallises the universality of the phenomenon of corruption and makes the clear link 
between the undermining effects of corruption to the developmental efforts of developing 
countries; the poor being the most vulnerable are the likely victims of corruption due to the 
negative consequences of corruption on SERs. The UNCHR 
81
 underlines the importance of 
‘political leadership in the fight against corruption: highlighting the role of asset–recovery 
provisions; adopting national anti-corruption mechanisms and legislation; and of cooperation 
among countries in fighting corruption, including prevention, investigation and the 
prosecution of offenders’.82 In essence the international community is frightfully aware of the 
profoundly negative effect corruption may have on governance. 
 
The WB submits that there is a link between the existence of corruption and the lack of socio-
economic development in that corruption is an obstacle to the fulfilment of SERs.
 83 
An 
example of this is where economic resources, earmarked for public housing development, are 
diverted to contractors sporting ill credentials, and entrusted powers benefitting thereby.  
Funds are either paid before completion of development or contractors get paid without 
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having delivered the agreed quality or quantity of housing.
84
 Thus corruption usurps the 
available resources for housing and thereby delays access to the just recipient. 
 
In its latest attempt at raising awareness on the negative effects of corruption on human 
rights, the UNODC expressed in November 2015 that corruption undermines democratic 
institutions, slows economic development and thereby proves to be a key obstacle to progress 
and prosperity for the poor.
85
 This awareness-drive was preceded by the General Assembly 
(GA) in September 2015 setting out 17 sustainable Development Goals aiming to create a life 
of dignity for all by 2030. 
86
 Goal 16 aims to promote the building of effective, accountable 
institutions and reducing all forms of corruption and bribery. The barriers to achieving these 
targets include corruption which the UN admits threatens the erosion of social and economic 
development and human rights, and flourishes where rule of law is weak and administration 
of  criminal justice ineffective.
87
 
  
Ongoing research states that corruption disables a state from meeting its obligations to 
respect, fulfil, and protect the human rights of its citizens. 
88
 These attributes are the essence 
of human rights in any jurisdiction. Hence, where a state does not conform to these elements 
a breach of human rights occurs.  This is to say that the non-delivery or poor workmanship 
for public housing by contractors appointed by government officials through adverse means, 
points to corruption being used to directly to violate the realisation of the right to housing and 
thereby affecting the fulfilment of the right.  This action does not gel with the obligation to 
fulfil as the delivery has been stunted by corruption in government; the available resources 
were not sufficiently guarded and thereby the obligation to protect human rights, suffers. 
Moreover, respect for human rights is flouted through the flagrant disregard of laws and of 
anti-corruption measures in place. As it is, where funds for housing projects are stolen by 
                                                 
84
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entrusted public officials, the resources are not being used to their maximum in the realisation 
of SERs.
89
  
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health warns that when a state does not reach its 
goals in progressive realisation due to corruption, then the state has failed to comply with its 
treaty obligations concerning the right.
 90
 The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child has referred to the fact that corruption has a negative effect on the level of resources 
available for the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
91
  Therefore, 
states cannot  comply  with  their  obligation  to  implement  the SERs of  children  to  the 
maximum  extent  of  available  resources  as  provided  under  Article  4  of  the  
Convention.
92
 
 
The government is obliged to protect economic resources earmarked for the realisation of 
SER programmes against public officials who abuse their power. Failing to take appropriate 
action against wayward public officials, whose acts lead to deprivation of human rights, 
culpably exposes the government to human rights violations. Therein lies the link whereby 
corruption violates human rights namely where corruption causes the failure to meet the 
obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. Regrettably, the recognition of 
corruption as a threat to human rights and thereby the enjoyment of SERs has been static in 
not receiving the zealous support it deserves from the international community. This may be 
due to the fact that the international community had not bargained for the unforeseen negative 
consequences corruption would impart on the delivery of SERs. As it is, a clean human rights 
record is now used as a condition to allow states to become members of international 
organisations such as the European Union or the World Trade Organisation. Furthermore, 
TI’s Corruption Perception Index also illustrates the monitoring of corruption internationally. 
It is evident that the fight against corruption cannot ignore the latter’s negative implications 
on human rights. 
 
                                                 
89
 See chapter 2 for discussion on the ICESCR espousing the maximum use of the available resources for 
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90
Hunt P ECOSOC Report of the Special Rapporteur on the ‘Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the  Highest 
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health’  U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/48 (3 March 2006) para 40. 
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Therefore the relationship between corruption and human rights should be monitored in order 
to curb the undermining of the realisation of SERs. This will mean providing early warning 
measures where funds are at risk of being abused. Ignoring corruption on the part of 
government would amount to trivialising international instruments aimed at combating 
corruption in the public service. The inevitable negative link between corruption and non-
delivery of human rights cannot continue to be ignored.
93
 
 
1.8.4 International anti-corruption measures 
 
1.8.4.1 Human rights obligations for international banking organisations  
 
It is important to note that in delivering on it SERs obligations, states must, if necessary, 
obtain funding from the international community. 
94
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the WB are international financial institutions providing assistance to developing 
countries. The WB is a multilateral organisation with annual funding that reaches USD 43 
trillion. The economic resources provided by these institutions can fall prey to corruption and 
thereby the anticipated development is impeded. The WB acknowledges the importance of 
anti-corruption measures. In this regard it developed the Governance and Anti-corruption 
Strategy.  This strategy was introduced because corruption and poor governance significantly 
undermine the Bank’s poverty reduction mission; these undermine the legitimacy of the 
institution and its programme, divert resources from priority sectors and increase the debt of 
developing and countries in transition.
95
 The WB has played a very active role in fighting 
corruption and since 1996 it has supported more than 600 anti-corruption programmes.
 96
  
 
In its 2015 anti-corruption brief the WB submitted that the reforms on fighting corruption 
were build on the idea that corruption was a dysfunction of public administration and could 
be curbed by accountability and transparency.
97
 Furthermore, the WB believes that attacking 
corruption is critical to the achievement of the Bank’s overarching mission of poverty 
reduction. The Bank is clear that its development finance must be corruption-free. In 2007 the 
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Bank adopted the strategy ‘Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance 
and Anti-corruption’ (GAC).98  This has lent investigative and preventive measures to reduce 
the risk of fraud and corruption in Bank-financed projects. Through the GAC initiative the 
WB has debarred many firms and individuals found to be corrupt, but the Bank is yet to find 
any wrongdoing by a government and debar it as such.  
 
In 2010 the Bank launched the International Hunters Alliance, a network of 286 anti-
corruption officials from 134 countries, aimed at strengthening global anti-corruption efforts 
in a parallel fashion.
99
 This is all good and well but the Tilburg Guiding Principles on the 
WB, IMF and Human Rights
100
 warns that it has become urgent that the WB and IMF 
integrate human rights considerations into all aspects of their operations.
 101
 Frankly these 
financial institutions’ macro-economic policies should take into account their impact on 
human development, including human rights.
102 
 
 
The Tilburg Principles relate to human rights obligations for the international financial 
institutions such as the WB and the IMF, which links legal obligations to the field of human 
rights to economic and political realities. The Principles state that the WB and IMF have 
international legal obligations in taking full responsibility for human rights situations, whence 
their own programmes undermine the fulfilment of human rights. This the possible redress for 
the impact of adverse human rights on the activities of the financial institutions. Thus the WB 
policies should be enabled to include international human rights law when reviewing Bank 
actions.
103
 Furthermore, the sharing of information with the ECOSOC is recommended.  
 
Regrettably the Tilburg Principles have not been accepted by these institutions. The IMF has 
refrained from enforcing human rights conditions on its assistance to members. A big void is 
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that the WB does not in any of its programmes explicitly recognise human rights in 
governance. The WB clarifies that it is not an enforcer of human rights, although it 
acknowledges that there is a link between development and human rights.
 104
 The World 
Bank’s Governance and Anti-Corruption strategy has not been fully taken up across 
institutions and the way it deals with whistleblowers has come under scrutiny by outside 
watchdogs.
105
 
 
The importance of available economic resources to the realisation of housing makes it 
imperative upon these financial institutions to take the impact of corruption on the fulfilment 
of these rights, more seriously. The WB has a responsibility to acknowledge the harm done to 
victims by corruption and should take governments to task in this regard in its relief efforts.  
Importantly, the GA in its 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development 
106
 maintains that 
the denial of human rights is an obstacle to development therefore equal attention must be 
afforded to the implementation, protection and promotion of human rights. In this regard the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) attempts to provide guidelines to 
outlaw and sanction those public officials corrupting the available resources from the state 
coffers.   
 
1.8.4.2 United Nations Convention against Corruption: measures to curb corruption in 
the public service 
 
1.8.4.2.1 Corruption and public procurement 
 
Public procurement is a hive where corrupt activities flourish due to the large amounts of 
public funds available for buying goods and services.  Moreover, corruption occurring in 
public procurement is arguably the most pervasive type of corruption in the public service.
107
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Therefore it is important to highlight the place of public procurement in the chain of wayward 
behaviour by public officials.
108
   
 
The negative synergy between corruption and public procurement
109
 deserves scrutiny, before 
explaining how the UNCAC is geared at dismantling this relationship. In buying goods and 
services it has been shown that different branches of government pay very different prices for 
the exact same products or services. Therefore public procurement is the means used by 
government to ensure goods and services are procured in the most cost-effective manner.
110
 It 
stands to reason that the available resources for public housing development projects are 
limited and need to be protected in that public officials should follow procurement processes, 
ensuring transparency in awarding contracts to service providers who can deliver on the 
mandate.  
 
The reason public procurement is one of the key areas where corruption thrives is due to large 
sums of money that is available for infrastructure development such as public housing.
 111
 
Despite the legislative protection against mischief in the public service, procurement 
processes for public housing projects are often tainted by corruption.
112
 Where there is 
transgression of procurement laws it leads to the awarding of housing contracts to contractors 
who deliver shoddy work or do not complete the contract but get paid regardless.
113
  
 
Public officials in charge of procurement processes have the discretion to take procurement 
decisions that could affect the credibility of the process by favouring contractors who have 
dubious credentials. This happens where corruption taints public procurement for housing 
projects, through bribery in the selection of contractors and which may result in sub-standard 
housing or no delivery at all.  This way corruption taints the financing of housing which is 
essential for delivery. Through this action entrusted power has a direct hand in the non-
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delivery of a right due to the bias of personal interest. Hence corruption in procurement has a 
direct link to the non-supply of housing.  Worldwide, procurement corruption also taints 25 
percent of medicine procurement representing approximately USD 12.5 billion.
114
 Price-
fixing and ‘tender-preneurships’115 are realities of the world in that they runs into estimates of 
USD 80 billion a year which is roughly the amount the UN believes is needed to eradicate 
global poverty.
 116
  
 
The occurrence of human rights violations could be reduced if there were sharp focus on how 
public officials attended to the distribution of resources earmarked to realise SERs. 
117
 In 
order to protect the available resources for housing there should be a keen focus on 
accountability at the relevant institutions that provide the delivery of the right.
118 
At hand is 
an international treaty dealing with the scourge of corruption in the public service and 
procurement, which is explore below. 
 
1.8.4.2.2 United Nations Convention against Corruption 
 
In 2003, the UNCAC was opened for signature. It entered into force in 2005 and has become 
one of the most widely ratified international instruments, with 176 signatories as of 1 August 
2015.
119
  Complementing this initiative is the United Nations Anti-Corruption Day
120
 which 
raises continued awareness in bringing the issue of corruption to the fore. The global effort to 
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combat corruption is evident by the signatures to the UNCAC by the international 
community. The UNCAC was brought about in the quest to stymie corruption in the public 
service as an international collective initiative and it singles out corruption in public 
procurement specifically.  
The UNCAC notes in its preamble that the key reasons in addressing corruption are: 
‘The undermining of institutions, values of democracy, ethical values, justice, 
jeopardising sustainable development and the rule of law. Furthermore to promote 
integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property.’ 
 
Although there is no single comprehensive list of universally accepted acts constituting 
corruption, UNCAC provides the broadest international anti-corruption convention which 
contains what is generally accepted as ‘corrupt acts’. 
 
The international community is keenly aware of the malfeasance that taints the purchasing of 
state goods and services in government and therefore UNCAC makes provisions on how to 
hinder this practice.
121
 International scrutiny through UNCAC
122
 requires the maintenance of 
transparent, competitive and efficient public procurement systems to combat corruption in 
this system.
123
 As a starting point public officials have to make declarations to appropriate 
authorities regarding, inter alia, ‘their outside interests,124  employment, investments, assets 
and substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest may result with respect to 
their functions as public officials’.125 This means that public officials dealing with 
procurement for public housing should not do business with the state in this regard.
126
 
Notwithstanding this, such officials must follow the laws that govern public procurement 
including the laws pertaining to public financial management. UNCAC criminalises illicit 
enrichment, bribery and embezzlement in the public service.
 127
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Preceding the adoption of UNCAC, other international and regional efforts at combating 
corruption were effected through the GA adopting the International Code of Conduct for 
Public Officials
128
 and the United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in 
International Commercial Transactions.
129
 These instruments, although non-binding, are 
politically relevant as they represent a broad agreement by the international community on 
these matters. 
 
A fatal flaw in the UDHR, ICESCR and the UNCAC is that it does not include the right to be 
free from corruption in the realisation of SERs.
 
Although the mischief of public officials is a 
point of focus in UNCAC, it fails to tackle political corruption; it refrains from mentioning 
any political system and therefore omits the importance of parliaments in holding their 
governments to account.
 130
 Another bone of contention is the lack of mandatory language in 
UNCAC. It is recommended that efforts of states to combat corrupt practices should go in 
concert with the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery for Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions and countries should be encouraged to ratify this 
Convention as well.
 
 Otherwise the instruments fail in their purpose and thereby rendering 
them ineffective. However as the guardian of the UNCAC, UNODC is committed to 
promoting good governance, integrity and transparency to help countries achieve the 
Sustainable Development Goals. The African continent is also under scrutiny through 
regional anti-corruption instruments which will be explored below.   
 
1.8.5 Regional anti-corruption measures: The African Union Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC)  
   
Corruption comes at great costs to economic development and the African Union attests that 
25 percent of the continent’s GDP (about USD150 billion) is lost to corruption.131 Needless to 
say these lost billions could have improved on the African continent’s record of slow delivery 
on SERs. The UNODC reports that corrupt acts cost some UDS1.26 trillion per year for 
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developing countries. The AUCPCC 
132
 recognises the effect of corruption on SERs and 
proffers in its preamble that it is: 
 
‘Concerned about the negative effects of corruption and impunity on the political, 
economic, social and cultural stability of African States and its devastating effects on the 
economic and social development of the African peoples.’  
 
This untenable situation can be eased by improving rule of law, oversight and accountability. 
It therefore became necessary to provide for an instrument that would assist in fighting 
corruption because the backlog in the delivery of SERs has resulted in a growing 
disenchantment with government performance in Africa. 
133
 Following the example of 
UNCAC,
 134
 the AUCPPC also acknowledges the embezzlement of state funds through public 
procurement and seeks to thwart it.
 135
 In this regard and to protect the economic resources on 
the African continent, the AUCPPC also recognises the mandatory declaration of assets of on 
the part of public officials to assist in combating undue enrichment derived from state 
resources.
 136
 Where there is negation of procurement processes, the AUCPPC promotes the 
recovery of assets.
 137
 In this vein the instrument promotes repatriation of stolen or ill- 
acquired assets or money. 
138
  
 
Although the preamble, recognises the negative effects corruption has on socio-economic 
stability and development in Africa.  Surprisingly, the loss of SERs experienced over time 
and the endemic corruption in Africa did not encourage the AUCPCC to characterise 
corruption as a direct assault on human rights.
139
 Another damper is that this Convention does 
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not provide a framework to remedy the violation of the rights of individuals or groups, as a 
result of corruption.  The AUCPCC instead only provides for criminal sanctions which 
exclude victims who are denied access to compensation and restitution.  Other weaknesses 
include the fact that access to information is too limited, there is no provision on statutes of 
limitations and there is a lack of resources for follow-up mechanisms.  Kiwinda contends that 
the regional human rights system in Africa is stuck between the gap of promise of human 
rights and their actual realisation.
140
 
  
Following in the tracks of the UNCAC other regional regimes on corruption also do not 
mention the violation of human rights by this scourge. A case in point is the Inter-American 
Convention that has already celebrated its 20-year anniversary, and which implemented its 
Follow-Up Mechanism and yet still has not included human rights into its regime.
141
   
 
1.8.6 The South African response to corruption 
 
1.8.6.1 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act  
 
The preamble of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (Corruption Act)
 142
   
is in sync with the international community’s sentiments on corruption  and the devastating 
effects thereof, as it proffers that:  
 
‘corruption and related corrupt activities undermine the said rights, endanger the stability 
and security of societies, undermine the institutions and values of democracy and ethical 
values and morality, jeopardise sustainable development, the rule of law and the credibility 
of governments, and provide a breeding ground for organised crime. The illicit acquisition 
of personal wealth can be particularly damaging to democratic institutions, national 
economies, ethical values and the rule of law.’ 
 
It is evident in the preamble of the Corruption Act of 2004 that the South African government 
has no excuse not to be aware of the devastation that corruption wreaks in the national 
economy. The common law name for corruption was known as bribery which could only be 
                                                 
140
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141
For more on this convention see Sutton R Controlling corruption through collective means: Advocating the 
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committed by or through state officials. In South Africa the common law crime of bribery has 
been repealed and replaced by the Corruption Act of 1991 (as amended by the 2004 Act). In 
its quest to stymie and combat corruption the legislature sought relief through the Corruption 
Act
 
 which establishes an all-encompassing offence of corruption in section1. This is the 
primary national anti-corruption legislation seeking to combat public sector corruption in 
government in recognition of the UNCAC.
 143
  
 
The available resources in the public purse, in this jurisdiction, should enjoy the ‘protection’ 
of this Act against malfeasance generally and against members of the public service 
specifically. The aim of the Corruption Act to root out corruption can be derived from its 
legislative prescripts. It pertinently prohibits corrupt activities in public procurement and 
creates offences that are relevant to this process.
144
 The prudent use of resources in the state is 
protected through this legislation which aims to combat particularly, procurement corruption 
in the public service.  
 
Section 4 Offences in respect of corrupt activities relating to public officers 
 
This section deems corruption to be: the aiding, assisting or favouring of any particular 
person in the transaction of any business with a public body; aiding or assisting in procuring 
or preventing the passing of any vote or the granting of any contract or advantage in favour of 
any person in relation to the transaction of any business with a public body.
 145
 The legislators 
deemed it necessary to single out specific offences relating to public officers.
146
 In this regard 
the Act refers to offences of corruption relating to contracts.
147
  This is a clear indication that 
the lawmakers intended to protect state resources against reckless contracting by public 
officials. This Act is furthermore embellished by the provision for offences in respect of 
corrupt activities relating to procurement and withdrawal of tenders.
148
 The Act also prohibits 
the promotion, execution or procurement of any contracts with a public body, a public official 
                                                 
143See Preamble providing ‘and whereas the Republic of South Africa desires to be in compliance with and to 
become Party to the United Nations Convention against Corruption adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on 3 1 October 2003. South Africa signed UNCAC on 9 December 2003 and ratified on 22 
November 2004. 
144
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(or private person) who from being at liberty to accept or agree or offer to accept any 
gratification
149
 from another person for reciprocal gain. 
150
  
 
Thus, public officers are warned by the Act not to act in a manner that amounts to the misuse 
of legislative duties, which in turn is tantamount to abuse of position. 
151
 The Act proscribes 
public procurement irregularities
152
 leading to corruption and any public official found in this 
position, is liable to a fine or imprisonment of up to 18 years.
153
 This will apply where a 
public official is found to have appointed contractors and made disbursements to contractors, 
irregularly by disregarding legislation and policy guidelines, unduly gained thereby.
154
 
Furthermore the Corruption Act explicitly prohibits a public official from acquiring a private 
interest in a contract connected with the public body in which he is employed and the Act 
details penalties regarding this violation.
155
  
 
In terms of this Act
156
  it is also an offence when a tender has been awarded to a pre-
designated entity. A very important section is the Act provides for the establishment of a 
register for tender defaulters.
 Williams argues that the World Bank’s rejection and debarment- 
measures represent a watershed in corruption control by a developmental institution.
 157
  Alas, 
the register for tender defaulters in South Africa is non functional and the national treasury 
website claims that there are no tender defaulters currently, despite the fact that the register is 
operational since 2004.
158
  The paucity in names is due to the very few convictions being 
secured for tender-corruption under the Corruption Act. In the main it is due to the difficulty 
of detecting corruption and tardiness in investigating public procurement corruption all of 
                                                 
149
Section 2 (3)(a)to accept or agree or offer to accept gratification includes (i) to demand, ask for, seek, request, 
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150
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151
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which tests the public service regularly. The Corruption Act 
159
 comprehensively covers all 
persons including private persons, public figures extending to public officers, members of the 
legislature, judiciary and members of the prosecuting authority. Whilst there have been 
several court challenges
160
 on public procurement irregularities, these cases have not  lead to 
any public officials being criminally charged under the specific provisions of the Corruption 
Act of 2004. Most notable is the lack of political will in enforcing the anti-corruption 
measures, particularly the Corruption Act against public officers. 
 
1.8.6.2 Case law of public officials charged under the Corruption Act 
 
The obligation to fulfil is only complete when legislation promulgated to assist in the fight 
against corruption is tried and tested against the people it is aimed at, should transgression of 
such law happen. This is to instil deterrence in the hope of reaping the desired effect of 
enforcing compliance. 
 
The high profile case of S v Shaik and Others 
161
 was the most prominent case with a 
conviction under the Corruption Act of 1992 which exposed public sector corruption. This 
case proved the fraudulent and corrupt relationship between a business person and a South 
African politician, anti-apartheid leader, the deputy president of the country at the time, now 
President, Zuma. 
162
 
 
The issues before the court were whether a benefit was given to induce this senior politician 
to use his influence in favour of the accuser’s interests and whether the intervention sought 
involved the politician exercising his duties as a minister in the provincial government of 
KwaZulu-Natal or, later as deputy president of the Republic of South Africa. Evidence 
revealed four instances where this senior politician intervened to protect assist or further the 
interests of the accuser’s business enterprises.163 Thus the procurement process for contracts 
was compromised in favour of the accused’ companies and thereby the constitutional 
principles of transparency, competitiveness, cost-effectiveness, fairness and equitability,
164
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For the latest case on this see: Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief 
Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency and Others 2014 (4) SA 179 (CC).  
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2007 (1) SACR 142 (D). 
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See chapter 4 for discussion on pending corruption charges against Zuma. 
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were compromised. Furthermore it was a textbook case for the Corruption Act in its aim to 
stunt public sector corruption. 
 
It was found that the accused and his companies, from October 1995 to September 2002, 
made some 238 payments of money to this politician, with the object of inducing him to use 
his name or political influence in favour of the accused’ businesses, or as a reward for having 
done so, which amounted to corruption. The accused was charged with corruption in 
contravention of the Corruption Act of 1992
165
  which sets out that the granting of a benefit is 
corrupt when it is done with intention of influencing the recipient of the benefit to perform or 
disregard his duty. Furthermore, the Court argued that even if the payments could be regarded 
as loans, despite all the evidence to the contrary, the basis on which they were made 
unarguably amounts to a ‘benefit’ within the Corruption Act of 92. 166 
 
An aggravating factor was that payments were not made to a low-salaried bureaucrat.
167
 The 
Court was at pains in emphasising that corruption at the highest level of government should 
accordingly be sanctioned by imposing the ‘maximum’ sentence prescribed.168 An effective 
sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment was imposed in terms of the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act.
169
 Axiomatic is that the higher the status of the beneficiary of corruption the more 
serious the offence.  
 
The evidence revealed that the corruption constituted a violation of the human rights of 
people who experienced it, since it discriminates against those people who could not afford to 
resort to it, or who would not do so.
 170
  The Court said that it left citizens with the perception 
that it was futile to deal with government through the official channels and if so others could 
pre-empt them through bribery or the use of connections.
171
 This applies where public 
officials do not follow procurement laws and award contracts illegally to undeserving 
businesses leaving honest service providers at a loss. The funds earmarked for public 
procurement were compromised and thereby the optimal use of the available resources for 
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SERs left the rights-holder unfulfilled. The Shaik judgement and the new Corruption Act 
have been heralded as redefining the boundaries of those morally reprehensible in society. 
 
Despite the evident collusion between the accused and the senior politician in Shaik, the 
accused faced the wrath of the law without his ‘counterpart’ in high office also facing the 
same fate.
172
 In essence the Corruption Act 1992 was used against the corruptor but not 
against the corruptee.
173
 This,  despite the Court acknowledging that Zuma acted on a quid 
pro qui basis by using his influence for gain to Shaik’s companies.174  
 
The Corruption Act has not found zealous application as an anti-corruption measure against 
public sector corruption. Despite conclusive reports on corrupt activities in the public housing 
programme, there is a tardy response from the NPA in prosecuting these public officials.
175
 
Moreover the Corruption Act is used inconsistently in protecting state funds against abuse. 
For example the Act has been used against a police commissioner and sentenced him as such, 
but not for procurement of contracts but rather for an unholy relationship with a private 
person of ill repute.
176
 Furthermore, there are cases of low-end public service workers who 
have been convicted under the Corruption Act of 1992.
177
 In S v Davids
178
 an accused prison 
warder was convicted of corruption in terms of this Act
179
 for agreeing to accept a bribe from 
a prisoner in return for assisting his escape. The warder was sentenced to four years 
imprisonment. In the matter of S v Mogotsi 
180
 a traffic officer accepted R100 from a motorist 
for cancelling a traffic summons and was found guilty of corruption. He received a sentence 
of four years’ imprisonment wholly suspended for five years.  
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However, senior figures although implicated and prosecuted, remained in office 
throughout.
181
 Misconduct on procurement processes worth millions perpetrated by the police 
commissioner who succeeded Selebi has been rewarded with employment as a deputy 
minister.
 182
 The Department of Correctional Services (DCS) has suffered media exposure and 
an investigation by the SIU who established large scale procurement corruption by their 
biggest service provider, Bosasa.
183
 Despite the proven allegations of corrupt relationships 
between public officials and Bosasa, by the SIU report, Bosasa continues to provide services 
to DCS.
184
 The ex-minister of communications was found guilty for having wilfully misled 
Parliament regarding a tender that benefited her life-partner by more than R6 million. This 
minister was given the punishment of forfeiting one month’s salary. The Public Protector is 
inundated with allegations of corruption in various enclaves of government, including public 
housing.
185
 This office noted with concern that ‘post-independence Africa and certainly in 
South Africa the accumulation of riches is recognised even in the absence of visible means of 
accumulating the riches.’186 Moreover, the Court warns that corruption is a pervasive and 
insidious evil and the interests of a democratic people and their government require its 
rigorous suppression.
187
 This pursuit should be without fear or favour, unfettered by rank- 
and- file positions. 
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1.8.7 Role of civil society in combating and preventing corruption 
 
Civil society has a definite role to play in the enforcement of anti-corruption measures.
188
  
This is particularly important where civil society raises awareness around malfeasance.  At its 
third session in 2009 the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (CoSP)
189
 discussed the role of civil society on the review of the 
implementation of UNCAC.  State parties were not of one mind on whether NGOs should be 
allowed and a compromise was reached in that they could attend as observers.
190
 The report 
of the fifth session of CoSP noted that ‘all speakers agreed that civil society had an important 
role to play in the fight against corruption, the Conference and its subsidiary bodies.’191 
In 2014 the disagreement on the proper role of NGOs in the review mechanism continued.
 192
 
Pakistan expressed concern over this and confirmed the important role of civil society in the 
efforts to prevent and combat corruption and in assisting state parties in the effective 
implementation of the UNCAC.
 193
 Moreover the CoSP confirmed to the UNCAC in 2015 the 
usefulness of civil society
194
 in cooperation with government on local or national level, in 
prevention and control of corruption. During the review process it was established that the 
engagement of civil society was a good practice.
 195
  
 
The Preamble of the Corruption Act also recognises the importance of support and mutual 
cooperation between public officials and groups outside the public sector, such as organs of 
civil society, NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs), in pursuit of effectiveness 
and efficiency.  Therefore NGOs and CBOs should be encouraged to participate in the anti-
corruption strategies that government wished to pursue.
196
 As it is, civil society has a vested 
interest in the safe-keeping of state funds earmarked for socio-economic relief. To 
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complement this quest, various anti-corruption NGOs also highlight the trail of destruction 
that corruption wreaks.
197
  
 
It should be accepted that the embezzlement of funds destined for social programmes is a 
violation of human rights and that corruption reinforces the exclusion of vulnerable groups to 
those rights.  Therefore, the obligation to realise SERs begs the inclusion of anti-corruption 
measures that become a strategy that forms part of the day-to-day operations in government. 
 
1.9 Research methodology 
 
This research is approached through empirical document analysis. This includes primary 
sources and secondary sources. Primary sources such as the United Nations reports are 
examined for the discussions of state parties in the development of the ICESCR and the 
inclusion of the term ‘available resources’ in this instrument. These discussions will be 
enriched by various academic writings on the topic. Case law on SERs and corruption form 
part of the tapestry of primary sources. Legislation and government reports further enrich the 
primary source list. Secondary sources are books, academic journal articles and reports from 
various authors on university databases which includes Sabinet, Hein-on-line, Jutastats and 
NexisLexis. The SIU Reports will be used for factual data on corruption in the human 
settlement public housing programme. The preliminary reports to Parliament and to the 
President form part of the exploration.  Internet sources and the mass media play a pivotal 
role in reporting public sector corruption. Therefore this source and newspaper articles are 
used to supplement for information in this regard.  
 
1.10 Limitations of this study 
 
This study is limited to the abuse of public economic resources pertaining to the delivery of 
public housing as a constitutional obligation. This dissertation will not expound on the 
attributes of adequate housing which the literature on housing covers sufficiently. 
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Although private office for private gain is included in the act of corruption, the purview of 
this study is limited to the abuse of public office for private gain. Therefore the numerous 
forms of corruption will not be scrutinised but rather the action of public officials who by-
pass the rule of law to engage in corrupt activities which in turn usurp the available resources 
earmarked for realising public housing. Furthermore, crime statistics in the civil service are 
not a focus of this study.  
 
1.11 Overview of chapters 
  
Chapter 1 
 
The background to the study is set out in this chapter. This is complemented by the aims, 
significance and the questions the study purports to answer. This chapter also provides for a 
comprehensive literature review on corruption and its links to the realisation of human rights. 
The link between human rights and corruption is explored to illustrate the importance of 
safeguarding the ‘available resources’ against corruption in the public service. This 
discussion will include examining the relevant international and regional instruments on anti-
corruption measures in the public service, including the UNCAC and the main anti-corruption 
legislation in South Africa. 
 
Chapter 2  
 
To demonstrate the importance of economic resources to the realisation of housing, the 
archives of the UN will be examined to see what led to the inclusion of SERs in a covenant. 
Most, importantly this chapter analyse how the term ‘available resources’ came to be 
accepted as the key to unlock access to housing. Thus, this chapter covers the general 
framework of international law on SERs, including the UDHR and ICESCR. In doing so, it 
tracks the origin of the phrase ‘available resources’ as to its route through the UN treaty body 
discussions. The sessions of the treaty bodies on the terms and the general comments thereto 
will be explored in its original narrative. The African regional instruments relevant to the 
phrase ‘available resources’ are discussed to explore this continent’s approach to realising 
SERs. This chapter concludes with the Constitutional Court’s response to the available 
resources at the disposal of government in order to realise SERs. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The role of the South African government including the Executive and Parliament is analysed 
to present how these branches of government have fared in implementing the right to housing. 
Particular attention is paid to constitutional obligations and how the most desperate have been 
catered for in legislation versus delivery on the ground in order to point out the relative 
failure of government to progressively realise this right within its available resources. 
Furthermore, the duty of Parliament as representatives of the people is scrutinised as to 
whether it has adequately kept the Executive in check on how it fares on its budget spent for 
housing. 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Following on from what the government has achieved in the delivery of public housing, this 
chapter explores how the judiciary has interpreted the right. This is to establish the degree to 
which the judiciary is compliant in its duty to transform society in terms of the Constitution. 
Various case law including Grootboom, receives attention to highlight the Constitutional 
Court’s interpretation on the right to housing and its reasonableness approach to the 
realisation of SERs. Included in this chapter is the approach of the judiciary against public 
corruption in protection of the available resources for SERs against malfeasance in 
government. This analysis includes the Public Protector’s powers and the abuse of state funds 
by the President. 
 
Chapter 5 
 
The relevance of this chapter is to demonstrate that there is misuse of the ‘available 
resources’ earmarked for housing which leads to delay in the delivery of public housing. This 
chapter further unpacks the anti-corruption regime in South Africa with a focus on public 
procurement as this is where corruption in housing is most prevalent. This chapter is further 
enriched with an analysis of the SIU investigations into malfeasance in the public housing 
programme. The role and objectives of the SIU and analyses of the reports to Parliament and 
the President on the uncovering of corruption in public housing will be illustrated.  
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Chapter 6  
 
 
This chapter presents a comparative study with India so as to see whether it may be useful in 
the South African context. This is done by highlighting the judicial ‘activism’ pursued by the 
Supreme Court of India (SCI), in the quest to hold government to account in its duties 
towards SERs and in fighting corruption. Included in this analysis are the interpretations of 
the right to housing by the SCI and its interpretation as to how the anti-corruption agencies 
should deal with public sector corruption.  India has a very robust civil society and media 
with a progressive judiciary that works together to see that corruption in the public service is 
brought to book. The Indian system is not the panacea for how to fight corruption and realise 
the right to housing, but lessons can perhaps be learned from this populous jurisdiction.  
 
Chapter 7  
 
Conclusion and recommendations 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Provenance of the Term ‘Available Resources’ – the Tool to Realise Socio-
Economic Rights 
 
2.1Introduction 
 
Economic, social and cultural rights (SERs) have had a contentious route in their quest for 
recognition and implementation, through a period of 20 years (1946-1966). The acceptance of 
the ICESCR
198
   by the international community was the acknowledgment that certain SERs 
cannot be realised without the available resources so required. Therefore the maximum of 
available resources has to be set aside by governments in order to deliver on its international 
obligations in terms of SERs. This phrase ‘available resources’ has come to underscore the 
realisation of SERs (including the right to housing) and this important qualifier to SERs needs 
closer scrutiny.  
 
The recognition of SERs has been deliberated on by the UN since the development of the 
UDHR.  It was these discussions that led to a separate covenant for SERs (as distinct from 
civil and political rights). During the deliberations of member states it was recognised that the 
progressive realisation of SERs would be dependent on the ‘available resources’ of the states 
parties.  Thus there was a consciousness around the importance of available resources in 
realising SERs, from the start.   
 
This chapter will trace the historical discussions by member states and UN treaty 
organisations to show how the expression ‘available resources’ came into the lexicon of 
SERs. In doing so, this chapter will narrate in real term the discussions that took place in 
terms of realising a covenant for SERs. The reason for exploring the history of the term   
‘available resources’ is to highlight the important role that economic resources play in the 
realisation of  SERs and the right to housing, in particular.
 199
 To complement this, the main 
international instruments will be explored, particularly those protecting vulnerable groups,
200
 
                                                 
198
South Africa ratified on 12 January 2015. 
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which promote the realisation of SERs. This is to give insight into the way the UN Treaty 
Bodies incorporated the phrase into subsequent treaties and general comments. The focus will  
examine the general comments
201
 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR/Committee), in particular General Comment no 3.
 202
 
 
The African continent’s approach to the ‘available resources’ insofar as vulnerable groups are 
concerned will also enjoy focus. This will be done through the relevant regional human rights 
instruments in Africa. Further enriching this chapter is the Constitutional Court (CC) of South 
Africa’s view on the available resources. In summation, international obligations towards 
SERs are discussed. 
 
2.2 The evolvement of human Rights instruments 
 
The starting point of the history of codified human rights is typically taken to be the Magna 
Carta of 1215 
203 
 but it is the English Bill of Rights of 1689 that is considered the foundation 
stone upon which the introduction of human rights was built.
204
 The UN
 205
  emerged after the 
Second World War by 51 countries committing to maintaining international peace and 
security; developing friendly relations among nations; and promoting human rights which 
include social progress and better living standards for all humans. This was codified in the 
UN Charter 
206
 as the first universal multilateral treaty with human rights provisions and the 
                                                 
201
 A general comment is the most authoritative statement that the CESCR is able to adopt on any matter and this 
Committee is the most authoritative body which monitors the ICESCR. The CESCR was established under  the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 1985/17 of 28 May 1985 to carry out the 
monitoring functions assigned to the ECOSOC in Part IV of the Covenant. States parties are obliged to submit 
regular reports to the CESCR on how the rights are being implemented. The Committee examines each report 
and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the state party in the form of ‘concluding observations’. 
202CESCR General Comment No 3: The Nature of the States Parties’ Obligations (Art 2 para 1 of the ICESCR) 
14 December 1990 UN Doc E/1991/23 (hereafter GC 3) available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838e10.html (accessed 20 January 2015). 
203
 Britain's King John was forced by his lords to sign the Magna Carat acknowledging that free men are entitled 
to judgment by their peers and that even a sovereign is not above the law available at 
http://www.udhr.org/history/timeline.htm (accessed on 23 March 2013). Also see The UDHR: ‘A Magna Carta 
for All Humanity’ (1997) United Nations Department of Public Information available at 
http://www.un.org/rights/50/carta.htm (accessed on 12 April 2013). 
204It established the rights of the ‘House of Commons’ to limit the king's actions and even remove him from 
power if he should act against their interests. 
205
Principal organs of the UN are: General Assembly (GA), Security Council, ECOSOC, Trustee Council and 
Secretariat.  
206
Signed at San Francisco 26 June 1945 entered into force on 24 October 1945 when ratified by the five 
permanent members of the Security Council and the majority of other signatories  available at 
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/1941-1950.shtml#content (accessed on 12 April 2013) 
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foundation for large bodies of international human rights laws.
207
 The UN Charter is 
considered a prelude to the UDHR. 
 
 
Needless to say the promotion and protection of human rights is the cornerstone of the work 
of the UN around the world. The UN Charter and UDHR have been lauded as part of the 
constitutional structure of the world community and as international customary law it binds 
all states irrespective of membership or not of the UN.
 
Since the adoption of the UDHR a 
network of human rights instruments and mechanisms have been developed to safeguard 
human rights and eliminate human rights violations.
 208
  
 
The making of the UDHR proliferated into the expanded hard law versions of the ICESR
209
 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
210
 which forms part of 
the International Bill of Human Rights. The focus of this chapter  is  on SERs (housing) 
therefore the history depicting the inclusion of these rights in the UDHR is scrutinised to 
show how a separate instrument, the ICESCR, came about and where we encounter the 
phrase ‘available resources’ for the realisation of SERs .  
 
2.3 History on including socio-economic rights in the UDHR 
 
The ECOSOC 
211
 created the CHR
212
 which was charged with dealing with the development 
and implementation of an ‘international bill of rights’ (bill of rights).213 The Drafting 
Committee held its first session from 9-25 June 1947 
214
  to deliberate on the draft outline of 
this bill of rights. At these discussions, the inclusion of SERs as part of international human 
rights instruments, posed a strong global and regional tendency that wanted to limit the 
entitlements associated with SERs. Moreover the inclusion of SERs in the UDHR was not 
                                                 
207See Vijapur A & Savitri K ‘International Covenants on Human Rights: An Overview?’(2006) 62 India 
Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 4. 
208See Elliott M ‘The Institutional Expansion of Human Rights 1863–2003: A Comprehensive Dataset of 
International Instruments’ (2011) 48 Journal of Peace Research. 
209
 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by GA resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
1966 entry into force 3 January 1976. 
210
Adopted by the GA  on 19 December 1966. 
211
ECOSOC was established under the UN Charter article 7(1) as the principal organ to coordinate economic, 
social, and related work of the 14 UN agencies, 10 functional commissions and five regional commissions. 
212
The CHR was established by ECOSOC acting under article 68 of the UN Charter, at its first meeting on 10 
December 1946. The CHR has been dissolved and the Human Rights Council, established by GA resolution 
60/251 15 March 2006, is now charged with addressing human rights violations. 
213
Discussion on the international bill of human rights covenants took place from the first to the 9
th
 session of the 
CHR. 
214
UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/11. (4 June 1947). 
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taken very seriously and various positions were put forward by predominantly four groups of 
states in the debates.
215
 States parties did eventually agree that a declaration should be 
accompanied or followed by a convention on specific groups of rights.
216
 
 
Pursuant to this, drafts for a bill of rights declaration were submitted by the UK, Northern 
Ireland, US and France.
217
 Significantly, the French proposal was without reference to 
housing or shelter. France was against including SERs in the UDHR and argued that SERs 
were simply thought to symbolise a stage in development.
 218
 The suggestions that the UK 
submission ‘be submitted to the CHR as possibly forming the basis of a draft convention’, 
was rejected for alluding to SERs in a vague manner.
219
 
 
Argentina
220
 maintained that SERs was part of modernity or progress and the US
221
 argued 
that personal liberty required some form of economic security. Eventually, the SERs 
proclaimed in the UDHR were a compromise, based on the firm position of the Latin 
American delegates and the equally firm position of the US in supporting or moderating 
contributions by European, Asian, and Arab delegates. The fruits of their labour resulted in an 
article protecting SERs as follows: 
 
‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services.’ 222  
 
Nonetheless, the CHR was responsible for the hard drafting work on the international bill of 
human rights and envisaged a ‘civil and political rights’ bill that would include ‘economic 
and social rights’ or  simply ‘social rights’. However, the question of two covenants, one for 
SERs and the other for civil and political rights came under scrutiny.    
                                                 
215
The groups are the Latin American states, the US and its Western European allies, the Eastern European 
countries, the Arab and Asian states. 
216
CHR first session International Bill of Human Rights 9-25 June 1947 para 12 UN Doc E/CN.4/21 (1 July 
1947). 
217CHR first session UN Doc A/2929 (1 July 1947) para 4; also see UN Doc E/CN.U/21 annexes А, В, С and D. 
218
Rene Cassin of France CHR third session UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.72 (14 June 1948) 8. 
219CHR first session ‘Draft Convention’ UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/4 Annex 1 (1 July 1947). 
220
Enrique V Corominas of Argentina UN GA third session UN Doc E/CN.U/21 (30 September 1948) 35. 
221
Eleanor Roosevelt of the US CHR third session UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.64 (8 June 1948) 5. 
222
Article 25. SERs are enshrined in articles 22 to 28 of the UDHR. 
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2.3.1 Why two covenants? 
 
The ECOSOC was conscious of the two different streams of rights they were including in one 
covenant and asked the GA to consider two covenants.
223 
The GA acceded to this at its 
session in 1952 asking for proposals on two drafts: one to cover civil and political rights and 
the other to cover economic, social and cultural rights.
224
 It also requested that ‘the two 
covenants contain, in order to emphasise the unity of the aim in view and to ensure respect for 
and observance of human rights, as many similar provisions as possible...’ 225   
 
It is no secret that the journey to the implementation of a separate ICESCR was long and 
winding.  The CHR at its first session (1947) on the draft covenants recognised that 
observance of human rights could not be completely ensured unless conditions of social 
progress and better standards of life were established in larger freedoms.
 226 
On this 
contentious route the Latin American states took the lead in making a strong call in favour of 
a new set of rights in a single convention. The US also punted for a single instrument and 
stipulated that text on SERs should be limited to general language relating to the development 
of socio-economic principles rather than actual enforceable rights.
 227
 Moreover the 
obligations relating to civil and political rights were believed to be binding in nature whereas 
SERs were deemed declarations of intent only.
 228
 This is due to SERs not being justiciable 
rights and their method of implementation being different.’229  
 
India disagreed with a single covenant and argued that ‘the economic, social and cultural 
rights are equally fundamental and therefore important, and should form a separate category 
of rights from that of civil and political rights’. 230 For these reasons India asked that SERs not 
be included in the civil and political instrument, but form a separate covenant. This 
recommendation was rejected by Chile, China, Egypt, France, Guatemala, Lebanon, Pakistan, 
Sweden, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and the UK. 
231
 Those 
                                                 
223
ECOSOC thirteenth session (30 July 1951). 
224
GA (November 1951-February 1952) Resolution 543 (VI) of 5 February 1952. 
225
GA sixth session (10 May 1952). 
226CHR first session ‘Draft Convention’ (1 July 1947) para 20. 
227
CHR seventh session UN Doc E/CN.4/539/REV.1 (25 April 1951).  
228
CHR seventh session (25 April 1951).  
229
CHR seventh session UN Doc E/CN.4/619 (10 May 1951). 
230
CHR seventh session (10 May 1951). See chapter 6 for discussion on the progressive Indian judiciary in the 
realisation of SERs and in the combating of public corruption. 
231
One abstention (Australia) UN Doc E/CN.4/635/ADD.3 (18 May 1951). 
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states in agreement of this recommendation were Denmark, Greece and India. Thus the 
majority of states did not opt for a separate covenant for SERs, but rather the consideration of 
including SERs in one instrument which contains civil and political rights.  The CHR was 
also not content with two instruments as they believed separate covenants might weaken the 
international significance of the documents.
 232
 
  
The GA put an end to the debate by adopting a resolution calling for two covenants by a close 
call of votes.
233
 What won the order of the day was that the GA recommended that the CHR 
draft two separate covenants which would be submitted and opened for signature at the same 
time. This apparently split not only the conventions in two but also the UN.
234
 Although the 
full text of both covenants was revealed to the GA at its ninth session, 1954, it would be 
another 12 years (1966) before the ICESCR and the ICCPR became two separate legal 
instruments. 
 
2.3.2 Economic, social and cultural rights: the proposed covenant 
 
Proposals for the inclusion of SERs in the bill of rights were mainly discussed during the 
seventh session of the CHR. At its second session the CHR decided that the term 
‘international bill of rights’235 would apply to the entire series of documents in preparation, 
namely a declaration on human rights and a convention or covenant on human rights. The 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) argued that the drafting of a covenant was 
premature before the text of the declaration on human rights had been written.
 236
 The GA 
declared that civil, political and SERs were interconnected and interdependent and decided to 
include in the covenant a ‘clear expression of economic social and cultural rights’237 
 
The CHR observed that a more effective method for establishing human rights would be to 
embody them in a convention whereby signatories recognise them as international law.
238
 On 
                                                 
232
The draft resolution was rejected in a roll-call vote by 9 votes UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.390. 
233
GA Resolution 543 (vi) accepted by 27 to 20 votes with 5 abstentions. 
234
See Humphreys J P ‘Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure’ (1984). 
235
GA tenth session UN Doc A/2929 (1 July 1955) para 6.  
236
CHR second session UN Doc E/600 (17 December 1947) 38 they voted against  taking any decision  on the 
draft covenant 
237
UN Doc 421 E (v) A/C.3/L.78, 81, 91 (Rev.l) and 93.  
238CHR first session ‘Draft Convention’ (1 July1947) para 20. 
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the day the UDHR
239
  was accepted, the GA requested the CHR to prepare as a priority, a 
draft covenant on human rights and draft measures for implementation. It was agreed that the 
proposals by member states for SERs be discussed at the seventh session of the CHR, and be   
used as such.
240
  
 
Debates on the ICESCR differed from the debates on the UDHR in that specialised 
agencies
241
 particularly the ILO,
 242
 the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation and the 
World Health Organisation also participated in the discussions, not just member states. The 
GA requested that ‘member states and appropriate specialised agencies submit drafts or 
memoranda containing their views on the form and content of the proposed covenant on 
SERs, to reach the Secretary-General before 1 March 1952.’243  
 
As early as session two of the deliberations on a bill of rights, Lebanon proposed that 
‘maintenance food, clothing and shelter be included in the single proposed draft covenant’. 
This motion was defeated at the, time but Lebanon wished that the amendment be considered 
further in the future.
 244
 Cuba
245
 and Panama
246
 wanted the inclusion of adequate food and 
living conditions with regard to housing.
 
 Panama suggested the inclusion of an article on 
‘food and housing,’ stating, firstly, that ‘[e]very one has the right to adequate food and 
housing’ and secondly, that it was the state's ‘duty to take such measures as may be necessary 
to [e]nsure that all its residents have an opportunity to obtain these essentials’.247 The Eastern 
European countries were ad idem with the stance of Panama, but the US fought off attempts 
                                                 
239
CHR second session (2-17 December 1947) UN Doc E/600 (17 December 1947) 4. The Commission decided, 
by a majority vote of 10 to 4 with one abstention, to proceed without delay to the consideration of the articles 
suggested for inclusion in an International Declaration of Human Rights, contained in Annex F of the Report of 
the Drafting Committee  UN Doc E/CN.4/21 
240
April-May 1951. 
241
The specialised agencies gained significant influence on the final wording of some rights, such as the right to 
social security. 
242
The CHR agreed that fleshing out the content of ‘social security’ was basically to remain the business of the 
ILO. That is why the ICESCR art 9 contains but one brief sentence: ‘The States Parties . . . recognise the right of 
everyone to social security, including social insurance.’ 
243
GA sixth session November 1951-February 1952 resolution 543 (vi) of 5 February 1952 ‘Draft Resolution 
Concerning Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ submitted by Denmark, Egypt, France and Lebanon UN Doc 
E/CN.4/485 (10 May 1952) (hereafter GA sixth session); also see CHR sixth session ‘Amendments and Votes’ 
UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.187 (11 May 1952). 
244
CHR second session UN Doc E/600 (17 December 1947) 39.  Their wish was realised at the seventh session. 
245CHR ‘Draft Declaration on Human Rights’ transmitted by letter 12 February 1946, Cuban Delegation to the 
President of the ECOSOC UN Doc E/HR/1 (22 April 1946). 
246GA ‘Statement of Essential Human Rights Presented by the Delegation of Panama’ (hereafter Panama draft) 
UN Doc A/148 (24 October 1946). 
247
Panama draft. 
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to specify state duties insofar as SERs were concerned. In this endeavour the US filed four 
drafts proposing the  inclusion of ‘food and housing’ but insisted that the declaration be 
confined to enunciating rights and not try and define the methods by which governments were 
to realise these rights.
248
   
 
Despite the US opposition, the delegates agreed that SERs necessarily involved state duties 
and should be specified to some extent.
249
 The UK believed that the granting of civil and 
political rights would serve economic and social rights.
250
 The Eastern European 
representatives were not in favour of this and fought fiercely to get more elaboration on the 
realisation of SERs.
 251
 Embellishing this was India which voiced the need for various social 
rights including ‘the right to housing, health and food’.252  France proposed a general clause 
for economic, social and cultural rights ensuring amongst others, ‘shelter and adequate 
standard of living’.253 The ILO suggested that articles on SERs should be simply stated 
without too much detail. Moreover, specific obligations should be placed on governments 
ensuring certain conditions for the enjoyment of these rights. Furthermore the latter work had 
to be carried out by the specialised agencies concerned.
254
 
 
Significantly, the proposal by the Soviet Union was rejected, in that it stated that ‘the state 
shall take all the necessary steps, especially legislative measures, to ensure to everyone living 
accommodation worthy of man,’ (instead of adequate housing).255 The same fate was suffered 
by the Chinese proposal, which wanted to add the words ‘with special reference to housing, 
food and clothing’.256Australia’s proposal of ‘the state parties to the covenant recognise the 
                                                 
248United States, represented by Eleanor Roosevelt, who was also chairing the CHR.  See first draft ‘United 
States Proposals Regarding an International Bill of Rights’ UN Doc E/CN.4/4 (28 January 1947); second draft 
UN Doc E/CN.4/17 (6 February 1947); third draft UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/8 (11 
June1947); fourth draft UN Doc E/CN.4/36 (26 November 1947). 
249
 See the various statements of the delegates to the CHR seventh session UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.216 (27 April 
1951). 
250
CHR second session UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.42 (16 December 1947) (Lord Dukeston, UK). 
251
CHR second session (16 December 1947).  
252CHR third session ‘India and the United Kingdom: Proposed Amendments to the Draft’ UN Doc 
E/CN.4/SR.49 (27 May 1948). 
253
CHR seventh session France UN Doc E/CN.4/618 (9 May 1951) para 1. French proposal adopted by 11 votes 
to none with 6 abstentions. 
254CHR seventh session UN Doc E/CN.4/635/Add.l (18 May 1951). Also see Seymour JR ‘Economic and Social 
Human Rights and the New International Economic Order’ (1986) 67 AM. U. J. Int’l L. & POL'Y 1 contending 
that progress was achieved through the work of specialised agencies, such as the ILO or the FAO, rather than 
through human rights bodies. 
255
By 6 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions see CHR seventh session UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.14/2/add.3, section V (I2 
May 1951). 
256
Rejected by 7 votes to 3, with 5 abstentions CHR seventh session UN Doc E/CN.4/635/Add.l (18 May 1951). 
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right of everyone to an adequate standard of living,’ prevailed and was adopted.257 Article 
11(1) of the ICESCR, ‘the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing’ also corresponds to the Latin American drafts of 1946. Nonetheless, the 
article is based on the draft filed by the US,
258
 the result of which was that article 11 (1) of the 
ICESCR resonated with article 25 of the UDHR. 
 
2.3.3 Adoption of the phrase ‘available resources’ 
 
Various proposals by member states on SERs were underscored by the presumed availability 
of resources. Panama recognised that SERs rights had developmental implications.
 259
 The 
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia also alluded to ‘the available resources’ for SERs ‘in 
accordance with the level of their economic development’.260 The US ostensibly responded to 
the proposals put forward by both the Soviet Union and Australia which suggested a text that 
simply highlighted a number of policy goals formulated as state ‘undertakings,’ to be 
dependent upon the organisation of the state and the ‘resources available’. 261 After three 
rejected proposals the US forwarded a fourth proposal in April 1951, stating, inter alia: ‘each 
state party to this covenant undertakes, with due regard to its organisation and resources, to 
promote conditions of economic, social and cultural progress.’262   This US draft invoked 
criticism from Chile and Egypt for avoiding language referring explicitly to ‘rights’.  The 
Egyptian delegate observed that the US refers vaguely to progress and development, which 
was different from defining rights.
 263
  
 
France  proposed the notable article ‘the state parties to the present covenant undertake to 
take steps, individually and through international co-operation, to the maximum of their 
available resources with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights 
                                                 
257
The Australian proposal was eventually adopted by 14 votes to none with 4 abstentions UN Doc 
E/CN.4/635/Add.l (18 May 1951). Researching these sessions proves that unanimity of the votes was extremely 
rare; also so see CHR seventh session UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.223 (2 May 1951). Draft article 24 of the Covenant 
then read: ‘The States Parties to the Covenant recognise the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living 
and the continuous improvement of living conditions.’  
258Adopted by 6 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions CHR seventh session ‘Working Group on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Compilation of Proposals Relating to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ UN Doc 
E/CN.4/AC. 14/2/Add.3 (27 April 1951). 
259
Panama draft.  
260
CHR seventh session UN Doc E/CN.4/609 (5 May 1951). 
261
CHR fifth session 9 May- 20 June 1949 UN Doc E/1371 (23 June 1949). 
262
Adopted by 6 votes to 5 with 7 abstentions. CHR seventh session UN Doc E/CN.4/539/REV.1 (25 April 
1951).  
263
Statement of Mahmoud Azmi Bey, Egypt CHR seventh session, first meeting UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.14/SR.1 
(26 April 1951) 23. 
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recognised in the present covenant.’264  The word ‘available’265 did not receive a unanimous 
vote and neither did the phrase ‘to the maximum of their available resources’. 266 There were 
a rather high number of abstentions.
 267
 Be it as it may ‘available resources’  form an integral 
part of  the realisation of SERs and the allocation of economic resources were to remain in the 
sphere of the political branches of government, where the courts continue to be  reluctant to 
tread.
268
 
 
2.3.4 Adoption Implementation of the ICESCR 
 
The CHR returned to the drafting process of the covenants during its eighth, ninth and tenth 
sessions, between 1952 and 1954.  The report of the eighth session
269
 of the CHR contained 
the text of the draft provisions on SERs consisting of a preamble and three parts, part III 
setting forth certain economic, social and cultural rights (section A). The ECOSOC requested 
the CHR to completion of its work on the ICCPR and the ICESCR at its ninth session.
270
  
 
Taking heed of this the full text of both covenants was conveyed to the GA during its ninth 
session, in 1954.
271
 Considerations were made of the two draft covenants at the GA’s tenth 
session, in 1955. The Third Committee’s debate in 1957 was effectively the final discussion 
on the provision of SERs, although the GA revisited the ICESCR twice in following years,
272
 
before formally adopting the full convention in 1966.
273
 The ICCPR and the ICESCR were 
thus adopted on 16 December1966 and entered into force on 26 March 1976 and 3 January 
1976 respectively. Although the text of the UDHR and the ICESCR are very similar it was 
                                                 
264CHR seventh session ‘Draft International Covenant on human rights and measures of implementations’ UN 
Doc E/CN.4/L.55 (25 APRIL 1952). 
265
11 votes to none, with 7 abstentions. 
266
CHR seventh session UN Doc E/CN.4/612 (8 May 1951) para 4,  adopted by 12 votes to none with 6 
abstentions. The first clause, reading ‘undertake to take steps, individually and through international 
cooperation’ was adopted by 12 votes to none with 6 abstentions. The word ‘progressively’ was adopted by 11 
votes to 5 with 2 abstentions. The Egyptian amendment to add the words ‘if necessary’ after the word 
‘progressively’ was rejected by 7 votes to 6 with 5 abstentions. 
267
CHR seventh session UN Doc (E/CN.4/618) (9 May 1951). 
268
 See chapter 4 for discussion on the  South African judiciary’s approach on the available resources for SERs.  
269
CHR ninth session 7 April - 30 May 1953 UN Doc E/22S6 Annex I. (6 June 1953). 
270
CHR ninth session UN Doc E/2447 E/CN.4/689 (6 June 1953). 
271
CHR ninth session UN Doc E/CN.4/689 9 (6 June 1953). 
272
In 1962 to discuss articles 2-5 and in 1963 to introduce the explicit right to freedom from hunger. Cultural 
rights were only discussed at the twelve session of the CHR. 
273See‘Drafting History of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ UN Doc 
E/C.12/2000/15 (9 October 2000). 
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conceded that a covenant was a very different kind of document because it was legally 
enforceable.
 274
  
 
The text of the draft covenant was examined and revised, on the comments received by 
governments and suggestions by specialised agencies. Based on this, the CHR drafted 14 
articles on economic, social and cultural rights. This culminated  in an ICESCR with core 
rights  such as social security and an adequate standard of living being included, starting with 
a preamble and 16 articles adopted for the draft ICESCR.
275
 The end result was an ICESCR 
with an ‘umbrella’ article 2 (1) stating:  
‘Each State Party hereto undertakes to take steps, individually and through international co-
operation, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognised in this Covenant by legislative as 
well as by other means.’ 276 
According to Robertson this phrase establishes the tangible response states must make to the 
challenge of realising the rights in the ICESCR.
277
 Following on to the ICESCR is General 
Comment no 3 which elaborates on the states’ obligations in terms of SERs, which is 
discussed next.  
 
2.3.5 CESCR General Comment No 3: The nature of the states parties’ obligations in 
terms of article 2 (1) 
 
The scope of the ICESCR is impressive, but suffers from the fact that its terms are phrased in 
an excessively general manner. For example, the European Social Charter has extensive 
articles dealing with the right to social security
278
 and pertinently refers to the prevention and 
reduction of homelessness with a view to gradual elimination.
 279
 Significantly, this Charter 
280
 advocates housing for those without adequate resources and makes no mention of the 
                                                 
274
UN Doc E/C.12/2000/15 (9 October 2000) paras 4-5. 
275
Part I (Article 1): The Right of Self-determination; Part II (Articles 2-5): General Provisions; Part III (Articles 
6-16): Economic, Social and Cultural rights. 
276
UN Doc E/2256. ICESCR art 2(1); economic, social and cultural rights are expressed in arts 1-15 (emphasis 
added). 
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278
Articles 12-17. 
279
Article 31.2. 
280
Article 31.3. 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
state’s available resources. The reason for the general wording of the ICESCR was to avoid 
restricting the scope of the articles and thereby preventing conflict with standards established 
by the specialised agencies,  for example the ILO.  It is precisely the generality and breadth of 
the ICESCR’s terms that contribute to its longevity by providing scope for a dynamic inter-
pretation of its provisions. The CESCR endeavours through its general comments to enlighten 
states parties through its experience gained by examination of state party reports.
 
 
 
The CESCR responded to an invitation from the ECOSOC to prepare general comments 
based on the various articles and provisions of the ICESCR in order to assist state parties to 
fulfil their obligations. The CESCR, starting from its third session, established the practice of 
adopting a general comment on one aspect of the ICESCR.
281
 This was done to give a greater 
understanding of the meaning of the rights contained in the ICESCR. The main purpose of the 
general comment is to assist states parties to report effectively on their SERs’ progress.    
 
During its discussions on General Comment 3 the CESCR observed that homelessness and 
inhuman housing conditions were increasing in virtually every state, both North and South.
282
 
As a prelude to General Comment 3 the Committee stated that the need for greater precision 
and enforceability of housing rights and adopting further standards clearly existed.
283
 Calls 
were made at all levels to develop further standards focusing on the right to adequate housing. 
The CESCR has paid increasing attention to the right to housing at each of its successive 
sessions, devoting an entire day to holding a ‘general discussion’ on this right in early 1990. 
284
 
 
The CESCR at its fifth session with 97 states parties in attendance adopted General Comment 
3 as regards states parties’ obligations in terms of the ICESCR article 2(1). The CESCR also 
drew on the expertise of the specialised agencies such as the ILO, FOA, WHO and Habitat. 
Furthermore, it drew advice from selected experts on housing and human rights issues.
285
 
Importantly, General Comment 3 elaborated on how states parties should realise the 
undertakings of the umbrella clause in article 2 (1).  
                                                 
281
See CESCR fifth session 21 November – 14 December 1990 ‘Official Records of the Economic and Social 
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Whilst the ICESCR art 2 (1) qualifies the realisation of SERs with available resources, 
General Comments 3 provide clarity to what extent the term ‘available resources’ applies, so 
much so that it provides that states must endeavour to apply their available resources 
expediently to ensure that core obligations are delivered.
 286
  For instance, the economic 
resources earmarked for public housing should at least realise housing to the most desperate, 
living in intolerable conditions.  Although the Comment clarifies that states must decide 
which means are the most appropriate under its own circumstances, the ultimate 
determination as to whether all appropriate measures have been taken will rest with the 
CESCR.
 287
  What would not be deemed appropriate measures is in cases where the 
government spend available resources on ‘better’ housing for people who are in adequate 
shelter already; at the expense of the homeless remaining as such and then maintaining that 
resources are exhausted. This would in effect not resonate with using available resources to 
their maximum to provide core obligations.
288
 As it stands there should always be 
programmes and strategies realising SERs and resource constraints should adapt to 
accordingly.
 289
 Therefore low-cost targeted programmes must be employed to protect the 
vulnerable members of society, particularly during economic recession.
290
 Important to note 
is, when measuring state resource allocation, that there is a distinct difference between ‘steps’ 
and ‘economic resources’. For instance steps towards realising the right to housing would be 
appropriate laws and economic resources being used for the delivery of housing to fulfil the 
right. Thus taking steps will be meaningless without making the necessary the budgetary 
allocations.  
 
In addition to General Comments  3, two pertinent documents of influence are the Limburg 
Principles
291
  which build on the application of the ICESCR and elaborate on the use of 
‘available resources’ and the Maastricht Guidelines292 which identify violations of the 
ICESCR.
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2.4 What are the ‘available resources? 
 
Resources include economic and human resources, information-sharing and technology
293
 to 
attain for example the right to housing. Alston and Quinn state that the reference to resources 
is taken to mean the real resources of the country which include budgetary allocations, 
technical assistance and international co-operation.
294
 Notwithstanding this, economic 
resources are at the heart of realising these rights without which delays may ensue.  
A point of focus is where there is extreme deprivation and the legitimacy of non-ICESCR 
expenditures such as on arms, debt reduction and the need to balance long-term economic 
investments against short-term social expenditure.
295 
As it is spending more on the military 
than on housing, health and education is indicative of non-compliance with using the 
maximum available resources for realising SERs. 
296
 That said, international bodies cannot 
determine resource allocation for governments but it can check whether decision-making 
demonstrates awareness and respect for ICESCR rights. For example, historically the CESCR 
criticised Canada for unacceptable levels of homelessness and inadequate living conditions 
and despite this spending only 1.3 percent of government expenditure on social housing.
297
  
 
Thus the misappropriation of economic resources for public housing would be in conflict with 
General Comment 3 because this action results in non-delivery or under-delivery.
298
 This will 
go against the grain of using the maximum of available resources in realising the minimum of 
the right to housing. Furthermore, available resources refer to those economic resources 
                                                 
293
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existing within a state as well as those available from the international community through 
co-operation and assistance as outlined in the ICESCR
299
  and followed on in General 
Comment 3.
300 
 Problematic is that according to General Comment 4 on housing,
 301
 
traditionally less than five percent of all international assistance has been directed at human 
settlement.  
 
The CESCR is criticised for not providing any indication of the level of economic resources 
that should be spent on public housing, either as a percentage of government expenditure or 
as a percentage of a broader measurement, like Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
302
 According 
to Dowell-Jones the CESCR has failed to articulate standards of state performance due to the 
daunting challenge that universal standard-setting presents in this regard.
 303
 For example, 
Hong Kong, one of the world’s richest economies with massive financial reserves, still has 10 
percent of its population living in abject poverty.
 304
 On the flip side of this is the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) with its economic destroyed by civil war.
305
 The Committee failed 
to address the real economic costs underlying its recommendations in its review of the DRC 
during the civil war.
306
  It was borne out to the Committee by the IMF, WB, ILO and the 
FAO that the country  was in severe economic, social and political crisis and any ‘available 
resources’ for the purpose of article 2(1) were minimal. 307  
 
In order for state parties to take the ICESCR seriously the CESCR should be armed with a 
comprehensive awareness of economic realities and how these influence progressive 
realisation of ICESCR standards.
 308
 However, this will not be easy to determine because 
enquiring into a state’s economic wellbeing can bear on its sovereignty. In the meantime 
states should be cognisant of General Comment 4 
309
  urging that a substantial proportion of 
financing be earmarked to create a higher number of people being adequately housed. 
                                                 
299
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(2001) 1 Hum. Rts. L. Rev.12. This author is an economist and previous banker. 
304
Dowell-Jones M (2001) 13. 
305
Dowell-Jones M (2001) 13. 
306
Dowell-Jones M (2001) 16. 
307
Dowell-Jones M (2001) 16. 
308
Dowell-Jones M (2001) 33. 
309
CESCR General Comment No 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant) adopted at the 
Sixth Session of the CESCR 13 December 1991 UN Doc E/1992/23) (hereafter GC 4) para 19. 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
Robertson argues that both private and state resources previously used for other purposes 
should be employed to deliver ‘core’ entitlements.310  Moreover, if austerity measures are 
necessary, ‘available resources’ for the delivery of basic shelter for the homeless should not 
be compromised.  
 
2.4.1 How should the available resources be applied and measured? 
 
The CESCR states that: 
 
‘.... In order for a State to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core 
obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been 
made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of 
priority, those minimum obligations’. 311 
 
A common misunderstanding to the right to housing is that it does not impose immediate 
obligations, but in reality the state must make every possible effort within its available 
resources to realise the rights and take steps in that direction, without delay. General 
Comment 4
312
 provides that the measures taken should be sufficient to realise the right of 
each individual in the shortest possible time within the maximum of available resources. 
 
The CESCR states that despite times of severe resource constraints, the vulnerable members 
of society must be protected.
313
 Furthermore, notwithstanding externally caused problems, the 
obligations under the ICESCR cannot be compromised by austerity measures.
314
 This attests 
to the fact that the right to housing entails a certain degree of security of tenure for the most 
desperate and the available resources must include those deliverables. Moreover, 
homelessness should be addressed immediately to provide access to basic shelter to the most 
                                                 
310
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desperate communities.
315
 These groups must be protected through low-cost targeted 
programmes as provided for in General Comment 3. 
316
 Key to this is to distinguish whether 
actions or omissions amounting to violation of SERs is the inability or the unwillingness of a 
state to comply with its treaty obligations.
 
It should be highlighted that state parties are to 
refrain from adopting lending and debt- relief programmes that do not contain adequate social 
safeguards. For the failure to repay debt may lead to even greater adverse consequences for 
SERs.
317
  
 
There is also a rebuttable assumption that if every state is sufficiently aggressive in resource 
acquisition it possesses sufficient resources for subsistence purposes.
318
 Moreover, applying 
available resources in a fruitless manner by building inadequate public housing, due to bad 
workmanship should be seen as a dereliction of the duty to deliver housing.
319
 This action 
should be viewed as deliberately retrogressive and has to be justified in the context of the full 
use of the maximum available resources.
320
 Moreover, according to the Maastricht
321
 
guidelines, the failure to utilise the maximum of available resources towards the full 
realisation of  the ICESCR amount to being an act of violation through omission.  
 
2.5 Progressive realisation: determined by available resources 
 
 The ICESCR states that:  
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.’ 322 
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To give credence to  continuous improvement of living conditions, the principal obligation of 
results reflected in the ICESCR  article 2 (1) is to take steps ‘with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised’.323  
 
The concept of progressive realisation constitutes a recognition of the fact that full realisation 
of all SERs will generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of time. To this extent  
at the CHR sixtieth session, Portugal maintained  that progressive realisation should not take 
as long as the state can, but should rather be fully realised  within a reasonably short time.
324
 
Mexico agreed that the obligations of progressive realisation of SERs compelled states to take 
steps immediately to the maximum of their available resources, devoid of justified 
regression.
325
 The Netherlands added that progressive realisation does not diminish the value 
of SERs and confirmed that their realisation was linked to the availability of resources.
326
 
 
In 2011 the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing pointed out that ‘current indicators from 
diverse sources show regressive results such as: reductions in public housing, soaring private 
rental rates, an acknowledged housing affordability crisis and no real reduction in the number 
of people who are homeless in Australia.’327 This behaviour negates the principle of 
progressive realisation.  The Rapporteur also urged the federal authorities of Canada ‘to adopt 
an official definition for homelessness and to gather reliable statistics in order to develop a 
coherent and concerted approach to this issue’.328 South Africa signed the ICESCR in 1994 
but only ratified it in 2015 therefore this jurisdiction has not been obliged to report on its 
SERs legacy to the Committee. Parliament failed in its oversight, namely to ensure that the 
most important treaty for SERs was ratified.
329
 The result of which is that this jurisdiction 
was not obliged to give to the Committee the statistical analyses of its homelessness during 
the 21 years.
330
 
 
Furthermore, progressive realisation is not uniform or universal but rather specific to each 
state’s resources and development. Although the ‘appropriate’ measures to realise SERs are 
                                                 
323
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incumbent on the states parties, the CESCR will be the final arbiter as to whether the 
measures employed were appropriate, or not. For instance, if there had been regression of 
SERs during a period of economic expediency, this would prima facie indicate that a state is 
not complying with its obligation in terms of progressive realisation of key rights within the 
maximum of available resources. Moreover, retrogression such as repetitive socio-economic 
disadvantage due to the accumulative effect of historic discrimination in the provision of 
housing should not be tolerated. The continued contemporary deprivation of basic shelter in 
South Africa is reminiscent of the deprivation of SERs during the apartheid era.  
 
Progressive realisation should not be seen as being without content.
 331
 Rather it should be 
seen in the context of a necessary flexibility, reflecting the realities of the real world.
332
 That 
is, resources do have a role to play when for instance basic shelter has to be realised at a 
minimum and progressively so, to attain adequate access, at large. That is why a decrease in 
budget allocation may indicate a failure to take steps towards the progressive realisation of a 
particular right.
333
 Moreover, the obligation of progressive achievement exists independently 
of the increase in resources but rather requires the use of the available resources effective.
334
  
 
Sweden raised concerns to the CHR that the ICESCR was unclear on the principle of 
progressive realisation of SERs and the meaning of the words ‘to the maximum of its 
available resources’. 335 De Beco believes that human rights practitioners have difficulty in 
defining precisely what the obligation entails to ‘progressively realise’ SERs within a state’s 
maximum available resources. 
336
  The lack of definition to progressively realise SERs 
according to the available resources has negative consequences for their justiciability in that 
there is a reluctance to bring cases to court that challenge the state’s choosing to give 
preference to certain rights.
337
  In essence, courts have been reluctant to determine concrete 
thresholds below which states may not fall when dealing with SERs.
338 
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As it is, progressive realisation is underpinned by timing and prioritisation. Thus it must be 
determined how the state should realise SERs and which SERs should take preference in lieu 
of core deliverables. In reality a state should prioritise, for example, homelessness and replace 
this with basic shelter as urgency and thereafter progressively take steps to improve this to 
adequate housing. Therefore, if the government continued to improve basic shelter into 
adequate housing for certain communities whilst homelessness remained at issue, this would 
not resonate with progressive realisation and neither with minimum core obligations. 
 
2.6 The minimum core obligation: what does the concept feature? 
 
In applying the available resources, a minimum of SERs must be realised. Therefore the 
backbone of the ICESCR is that there be a minimum core that each right contains, and which 
states are obliged to fulfil. To this effect the CESCR states that: 
 
‘a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party…If the Covenant  
were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would 
be largely deprived of its raison d‘être.’ 339 
 
In anticipation of General Comment 3, the CHR suggested to ECOSOC, the use of indicators 
within the field of SERs that could contribute to realisation in a variety of ways.
340
 The CHR 
drew from the basic needs as spelt out by the  World Employment Conference of the ILO in 
1976 which defined basic needs as constituting two elements: ‘First, they include certain 
minimum requirements of a family for private consumption that link to adequate food, shelter 
and clothing, as well as certain household equipment and furniture. Secondly, they include 
essential services provided by and for the community at large, such as safe drinking water, 
sanitation, public transport, and health, educational and cultural facilities’. 341 The  CHR also 
confirmed that the minimum content was conceived as ‘a group of fundamental rights when 
society is threatened with poverty or social exclusion and this minimum might bring them 
back into society with their heads held high, such minimum could be an instrument for 
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promoting human rights’. 342 On the issue of indicators the CHR observed that instead of 
referring to the minimum content of human rights, one should rather speak of ‘spring-board’ 
rights.
 343
   The dynamics of this is that ‘spring-board’ rights should be the driving forces of 
development and thereby form the basis for combating poverty.  For example, basic shelter 
can be the launch of access to work or primary health care.
344
 Ultimately, this would start 
with guaranteed security for the family (a home) as a spring-board to access the larger 
freedoms of human rights. Moreover, if the minimum core did not start with access to basic 
shelter at least the right to food, health, education and dignity becomes quite meaningless. In 
applying the minimum core, the CHR confirms that this should not create spatial social 
segregation and belittle the aim of development of human dignity, to which it should 
contribute.
345
  
 
The CESCR echoed the CHR and appealed to member states, that the minimum core concept 
should not belittle the aim of the development of human dignity.
 346
 Therefore, to fulfil 
obligations under the ICESCR cognisance must be taken of General Comment 3, providing 
that the available resources that the state earmarks for SERs, must at least realise the 
minimum of SERs that allows a person to live in dignity. On the discourse on minimum 
obligations, Ssenyonjo agrees that the minimum standard entails a basic level of subsistence 
necessary to live in dignity, ie the base-line below which states must not fall and should 
endeavour to rise above.
347
 Young proffers that a determinable standard for the minimum 
core should be the minimum requirements for survival, ie the basic needs of the rights-
holder.
348
 It stands to reason that whatever the budgetary allocations for SERs, there must be 
a minimum realisation of SERs. To this end General Comment 3 provides that as a start states 
parties must give due consideration to social groups living in unfavourable conditions. 
349
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Therefore, adequate use of the available resources must result in providing these groups with 
the ‘minimum essential levels of each right which requires the satisfaction of essential 
foodstuffs, essential primary health care, basic shelter and housing and basic education’. 350  
 
Furthermore, as a rule the available resources must cover the bare minimum of basic shelter 
as a core requirement to give credence to the core reason for the ICESCR.  This means 
homelessness should not be tolerated. The CESCR was at pains in stressing that beyond 
Europe, thought must be spared for the appropriate thresholds applicable to developing 
countries, for subsistence minimal in a number of spheres, which entitles free minimum 
consumption of housing, energy and health care.
 351
 Not adhering to this bare essential, for a 
significant number of people, would prove prima facie failure under the ICESCR.
 352
 In 
monitoring state reports the CESCR can require states to show that adequate consideration 
has been given to apply the available resources to satisfy the minimum of SERs.   
 
The CHR observed that in determining whether adequate measures had been taken, attention 
should be paid to equitable effective use of access to the available resources as espoused in 
the Limburg Principles.
353
 Thus, a state that does not sufficiently protect the available 
resources for SERs, against state abuse, makes itself liable for dereliction of its duties in 
realising minimum core obligations.
354
  
 
During 2001 the CESCR confirmed that core obligations were non-derogable and therefore 
continued to exist in situations of conflict, emergency and natural disaster.
 355
 On its austerity 
measures report the UNHCHR indicates that states will not have justification for the adoption 
of austerity or other measures that limit existing minimum levels of enjoyment of SERs.
 356
 A 
joint NGO statement reiterated the view of the CESCR that the Covenant’s raison d’être was  
that the rights it promoted had a minimum core that should be realised.
357
 It must be noted 
that the minimum core obligation is an ‘absolute international minimum’ no matter the state’s 
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level of development and available resources.
 358
 It boils down to  the fact that states parties 
must make  every effort to use what is at its disposal to attain minimum obligations, as a 
matter of priority
 
. 
 
The CESCR reaffirmed the maintenance of a minimum core content of the rights, especially 
for disadvantaged and marginalised groups no matter the resource constraint.
 359
 The 
UNHCHR maintains that this can be achieved through the establishment of a ‘social 
protection floor’ to ensure protection of this core content at all times. Such a social protection 
floor ensures access to basic social services, shelter, food, health and empowerment and 
protection of the poor and vulnerable.
 360
 
 
The Committee expressed concern at the disproportionate curtailed enjoyment of rights by 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups.
361
 The CESCR recommends that states parties ensure 
all austerity measures adopted must reflect the minimum core content of all the ICESCR 
rights. This means that all appropriate measures must be employed to protect the core content 
for disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups.
 
 Moreover, the Committee 
recommends that developed states parties redouble their efforts to increase official 
development assistance to at least 0.7 percent of GDP in line with the goals assumed at 
international level.
362
 
 
2.7 Other UN Treaty Bodies’ approach on the phrase ‘available resources’ 
 
2.7.1 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child  
The importance of available resources also came under scrutiny of the Committee on Rights 
of Children (CRC). Following in the footsteps of the ICESCR, the UNCRC
363
 provides for 
the collective and individual obligation of states to realise the SERs of children, to the 
maximum of their available resources. In article 4 it states as follows:  
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‘States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other 
measures for the implementation of the rights recognised in the present Convention.  With 
regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake such measures 
to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the 
framework of international co-operation.’ 364 
 
In order to elaborate on how the available resources should meet the needs of children, the 
CRC drafted General Comment 5 which outlines the states parties’ obligations to develop 
‘general measures of implementation’ in terms of article 4.365  In adding content to the 
requirement of article 4, General Comment 5 requires that: 
 
‘[N]o State can tell whether it is fulfilling children’s economic, social and cultural rights 
“to the maximum extent of … available resources”, as it is required to do under article 4, 
unless it can identify the proportion of national and other budgets allocated to the social 
sector and, within that, to children, both directly and indirectly.  Some States have claimed 
it is not possible to analyse national budgets in this way. But others have done it and 
publish annual “children’s budgets’’.’ 366  
In this regard the Committee recommended that states parties clarify the amount of the 
budgetary allocations (for children) for social services and to ensure that these allocations are 
to the ‘maximum extent of ... available resources’, in accordance with article 4 of the 
UNCRC.
 367
    
In its concluding remarks the CRC observed that the overall standards of living of many 
children was very low in terms of access to housing, water, sanitation and education. 
368
 
Responding to state reports the Committee regretted that data lacked specificity regarding the 
amounts allocated to the children from the budget. The CRC further observed that some states 
                                                 
364
Article 4 is similar to art 2 of the ICCPR and art 2 of the ICESCR. See CRC thirty-first session 16 September-
4 October 2002 UN Doc CRC/C/119 para 17 where the CRC expressed the wish to pursue the elaboration of 
general comments based on the various principles and provisions and principles of the UNCRC.  
365
CRC thirty-fourth session 19 September-3 October 2003. General Comment No 5: General Measures on the 
Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/5 (27 November 2003) 
(hereafter CRC thirty-fourth session). Also see Rishmawi M A Commentary on the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child: Article 4: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (2006) 27.  
366
CRC General Comment 5 paras 51-2.  
367
CRC thirty-fourth session  para 113 (Greece). Also see CRC ‘Reporting Guidelines Regarding the Form and 
Contents of Periodic Reports to be Submitted by States Parties’ para 35; UNCRC art 44 para1(B) adopted by the 
CRC at its first session October 1991;  AfCRWC art 43 and AfCHPR art 62. 
368
CRC thirty-fourth session para 2. 
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devote too little of their budgets to primary needs in SERs.
 369
  In this regards the Committee 
raised concern that insufficient attention was being paid to article 4 of the Convention. The 
Committee drew attention to the need to respect the provisions of article 4, which emphasise 
that SERs should be implemented to the maximum extent of the available resources, 
regardless of the economic model followed by the state,
 370
 thus emulating General Comment 
3. 
371
 Furthermore it expected states parties to describe the action taken in response to article 
4 in its endeavours for progressive realisation of SERs for children and the resources thus 
employed.
372
 
In light of article 4,  General Comment 5 encourages the states parties to clearly identify their 
priorities in respect of child rights issues to ensure that funds are allocated ‘to the maximum 
extent of available resources where needed for the full implementation of SERs for 
children’.373 The CRC stressed that ‘even where the available resources are demonstrably 
inadequate, the obligation remains for a state party to strive to ensure the widest possible 
enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances …’374 To this extent 
planning and decision-making, including budgetary decisions, are made within the best 
interests of children, focusing on the marginalised and disadvantaged being protected from 
adverse effects of economic policies or financial downturns. 
375
  
In essence, governments are to respect children’s’ rights to housing as an individual group 
and not in parallel with their parents. Moreover, the economic resources for children should 
enjoy special scrutiny in order to comply with international treaty obligations. The CRC 
called on states to show a willingness to prioritise politically the human rights of children.
 376
  
Despite, this in the developing, world budgets has not been prioritised to accommodate 
children.
 377
 Exacerbating this situation is the fact that the CRC lacks effective enforcement 
mechanisms in holding state parties accountable for non-compliance. In addition, states 
                                                 
369
CRC thirty-fourth session para 118 (Gabon), para 266 (Mozambique), para 338 (Chile), para 393 (Malawi).  
370
CRC thirty-fourth session para 14 (Indonesia) para 46 (Lebanon). 
371
GC 3 paras 11, 12.  
372
CRC thirty-fourth session para 2. Also see Rishmawi  M A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child: Article 4: The nature of States Parties’ Obligations (2006) 27.  
373
CRC thirty-fourth session para 393. 
374
CRC thirty–fourth session  para 8. 
375
CRC GC 5 paras 8, 51. Also see GC 3 para 11. 
376
CRC GC 5 para 10. 
377
CRC GC 5 para 10. 
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parties are obligated by the Committee to raise funds for children’s rights, but donor states 
have no such reciprocal legal obligation.
378
  
Thus the obligation under the ICESCR to seek international funding when domestic resources 
are limited is not necessarily easily accessible. This does not bond well with the responsibility 
of the international community in fulfilling their treaty obligations, stemming from the 
ICESCR and various other instruments that specify that international funding should be 
applied to assist developing countries in fulfilling their minimum of their SERs.
379
 
 
2.7.2 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women  
 
The CEDAW
380
 was drawn up to protect women in as much as they constitute a vulnerable 
group.  The Committee on CEDAW adopted a plethora of general recommendations on 
implementation and states parties’ obligations under this Convention.381 At its 20th session 
this Committee made general recommendations as to the obligations of states as regards to 
women and health, in terms of the Convention.
 382
  Through these general recommendations 
for health the Committee obliges states to take all appropriate measures to ensure adequate 
living conditions, particularly housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply. 
383
 Noted is 
that CEDAW 
384
 makes this provision, concerning the housing problems rural women face in 
their role in the economic survival of their families.  Senders maintains that female-headed 
households in rural areas experience problems more frequently as regards physical housing, 
equality and affordability than any other kind of household due to the economic constraints 
                                                 
378
Sloth-Nielson J et al ‘Available Resources: The African Context, An African Perspective’ Committee on the 
Rights of Child General Day of Discussion on: Resources for the Rights of the Child: Responsibility of States 21 
September 2007 para 24. Africa continues to be the continent with the highest proportion of children, with more 
than 50% of the population aged below the age of 18 years, para 9.  
379
 See GC 4 para 14 stating that international assistance is the responsibility of the international community at 
large. Also see the Vienna Declaration (1993) urging for this. See this chapter  para 2.10 discussing international 
funding obligations. 
380
 The CEDAW adopted on 18 December 1979 entered into force on 3 September 1981. On 6 October 1999, the 
GA adopted an enforcement mechanism the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW entered into force on 22 
December 2000. It is a stand-alone treaty that can be signed or ratified by countries that are not party to the main 
treaty. 
381
See General Recommendations made by the Committee on the CEDAW 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm (accessed on 23 October 2015). 
382
General Recommendation No 24 (20th session 1999) adopted by the Committee at its 24
th
 meeting on 11 
August 1983 available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm (accessed 
on 23 October 2015). See CEDAW art14 (2) (h). 
383
General Recommendation No 24 (20th session 1999).  
384
Article 14. 
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they live under and diminished  financial security.
385
 However, the provision of CEDAW falls 
short in that the provision for housing does not concern itself with urban women living in 
intolerable conditions.
386
 
 
The Committee makes a recommendation on preferential or quota systems to advance 
women’s integration into education, the economy, employment and politics.387 Unfortunately, 
none of the general recommendations reflect the duty of the states to provide available 
resources to realise housing for women in need, generally. Thus CEDAW promotes the 
advancement of women through a practice of non-discrimination, but this instrument missed a 
core objective in that it does not provide the international community with a platform that 
promotes housing holistically to this vulnerable group.  
 
This is regrettable because the international community has over many decades seen that 
women remain the primary care giver to another vulnerable group, namely children. Thus, 
where women suffer intolerable living conditions without basic shelter there you will find 
children also sharing in this hardship. Therefore, the creation of an international instrument to 
protect women is notable, but essentially vacuous in not protecting women’s interest by ring-
fencing available resources for their public housing. The Committee’s silence on the absence 
of provision for impoverished women in state budgets and government’s application of the 
‘maximum of its available resources’, to promote SERs for impoverished women, leaves a 
lacuna in treaty obligations.  
 
Unlike the UNCRC following on to the ICESCR’s General Comment on the importance of 
available resources to realise housing for children, specifically, the Committee on CEDAW 
missed this point as regards women in its various general recommendations. This means that 
to date, this Committee has not taken cognisance of General Comment no 7 
388
  on forced 
eviction, for example. This General Comment protects women and provides that states ensure 
                                                 
385
Senders M ‘Women and the Right to Adequate Housing’ (1998)16 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts 182.  
386See ‘Alternative Report for Consideration Regarding Israel’s Fifth Periodic Report to the United Nations 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women’ 17 January – 4 February 2011 available at  
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/WCLAC_for_the_session_ISRAEL_CEDAW48.pdf 
(accessed on 21 January 2015) where the  Committee in Israel for the first time made explicit reference to 
women’s right to adequate housing and to forced eviction and house demolitions negatively impacting on 
Palestinian and Israeli Arab women. 
387
General Recommendation No 5 (seventh session, 1988) recalling article 4.1 of the CEDAW available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm (accessed on 23 October 2015). 
388‘The Right to Adequate Housing (art. 11(1) of the ICESCR): Forced Evictions’ adopted by the CESCR at its 
sixteenth session on 14 May 1997 UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/4. 
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to the maximum of their available resources, adequate alternative housing, resettlement or 
access to productive land, be available.  Neither has the Committee considered Comment no 3 
obliging the state to apply the maximum of its available resources to realise progressively 
housing to vulnerable groups. The Committee is not in sync with the essence of the ICESCR 
in article 11 (2) and General Comment 3 paragraph 2 (1) which protects the right to housing 
and the allocation of the maximum available resources to realise the right. It would be 
prudent if the Committee could adopt general recommendations in this regard for 
impoverished women. This aim would be best served where the Committee on CEDAW were 
to gives sufficient attention to the problems that women encounter in exercising their right to 
adequate housing and how the available resources of the state should be applied to accelerate 
access. This would assist NGOs and human rights institutions in their endeavours to hold the 
state accountable to house vulnerable women, as a priority.  
 
South Africa lags behind in its application of paying special attention to impoverished 
women. This is crystallised by the vulnerability women continue to suffer from due to a lack 
of adequate shelter and having to live in shack-dwellings, in both the city and in rural 
areas.
389
  The knock-on effect is that children remain disadvantaged by not being able to 
access adequate shelter because their primary caregiver is also deprived. This was 
demonstrated by the Grootboom case.
390
 
 
Furthermore due to the global financial crisis there has been a global dereliction in human 
rights standards. This has led to women being marginalised in all matter relating to housing 
programmes.
391
 A sterling example of this is the cut made in the US of billions of dollars 
from its federal housing programmes which affected women-run households the hardest.
 392
 
These points to gender inequality because of the scant attention paid to the effect of economic 
contraction on women in comparison to men. In addition the Limburg Principles
393
 echo that 
discrimination occurring as a result of unequal enjoyment of SERs should be brought to a 
speedily end.  
                                                 
389
See chapter 3 for discussion on how the South African government has fared with access to housing. 
390
See para 2.9 below for details on this case. 
391Rolnik R‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate 
Standard of Living and on the Right to Non-discrimination in this Context’(2011) para 17 available at 
http://advocacyaid.com/images/stories/rrdownloads/UN_Report_Women_and%20_housing_26122011_2012.pd
f  (accessed on 28 January 2015). 
392
Rolnik R (2011) para 13. The US cut US$2.8 billion. 
393
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There is a need to put more haste into prioritising the allocation of public housing for women 
who bear the brunt of income disparities and who are stymied by inaccessibility to financial 
resources. The absence of impoverished women’s interest in the state budget can be remedied 
through political will and legal enforcement by adopting specific budgetary measures that 
favour such women. This means that women should be active participants in the budgeting 
process relating to all aspects of housing programmes. Rolnik argues that such gender-
sensitive budgets will ensure better accountability of states in meeting their international 
obligations to realising gender equality and in directing the maximum of available recourses 
towards advancing women’s right to adequate housing. 394  
 
The CEDAW is described as a blunt instrument unable to further the rights of women.
 395
 
Added to this is that the Committee on CEDAW has been criticised in being unable to 
enforce its own pronouncements. A visible obstacle is sovereignty, which leaves compliance 
to the political will of state parties. The Committee on CEDAW should perhaps follow the 
UNCRC and remedy the shortcomings in housing by adopting a general comment that ring-
fences a portion of state budgets for housing impoverished women.  
 
2.8 Regional instruments relevant to Africa on ‘available resources’ 
 
2.8.1 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights  
 
Annan states that human rights are African, Asian, European and American rights, they are 
not limited to a continent and belong to no government because they are fundamental to 
humankind itself.
396
 On the African continent, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (the African Charter) is the principal human rights instrument
397
  and it confirms in its 
preamble that ‘fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human beings’.  
                                                 
394
Rolnik R (2011) para 61. 63(g). 
395
China and Saudi Arabia poses poor records as such see Schein V (2007) ‘Women in Management: Reflections 
and Projections’ (2007) 22 Women in Management Review 6 – 18.  
396Annan K ‘The opening of the 54th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights ’ Geneva Press Release 
(16 March 1998). 
397African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted by the Eighteenth Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the OAU, Nairobi July 1981 (entered into force 21 October 1986). All 53 members of the 
African Union (AU) out of 54 African States have ratified the Charter (Morocco withdrew from the AU in 
1985). The rights of individuals have first been contained in the Charter of the OAU adopted on 23 May 1963 at 
Addis Ababa (entered into force  13 September 1963) see text in UN Treaty Series vol 479 No 6947. The AU, 
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Some of the Charter’s provisions equate to the ICESCR but there are significant differences 
between these two instruments. As it is, the ICESCR defines SERs as being realisable 
through ‘progressive realisation’ and ‘available resources,’ but in contrast article 1 of the 
African  Charter enjoins all state parties to adopt legislative and other measures to give effect 
to the rights it protects. There is no qualification of SERs through progressive realisation or 
within available resources.The framers intended that all categories of rights, that is civil, 
political and SERs are enforceable in the same manner. This means that the African Charter 
promotes the immediate realisation of SERs regardless of economic restraint. 
 
Nonetheless, the African Charter must be interpreted by observing international instruments; 
therefore inspiration must be drawn from the ICESCR as far as SERs are concerned. Dugard 
commends South Africa on its diligence in subscribing to the norms and standards contained 
in the ICESCR through its ratification of the African Charter.
398
 Then again the African 
continent does not boast an exemplary record of realising SERs and critics are abound with 
criticism on the weak enforcement mechanisms because the African Charter relies on the 
African Commission instead of a court to promote its obligations.  How the African 
Commission fares as custodian of the Charter is explored next.  
 
2.8.2 The efficacy of the African Commission 
  
The African Commission, a quasi-judicial organ, is charged with monitoring the 
implementation of the African Charter,
 399
  the enforcement of SERs and hearing complaints 
regarding violations of human rights. In elaborating on the African Charter this Commission 
confirms that resources are needed to realise both SERs and civil and political rights.  The 
Commission acknowledges that the rights and obligations in the Charter are immediate, thus 
                                                                                                                                                        
founded in July 2002, is the successor of the OAU. Modelled on the European Union (but currently with powers 
closer to the Commonwealth of Nations) its aims are to help promote democracy, human rights and development 
across Africa, especially by increasing foreign investment through the New Partnership for Africa's 
Development program available at 
http://archive.transparency.org/global_priorities/international_conventions/conventions_instruments/au_conve
ntion#sthash.SxGHU5RX.dpuf (accessed on 3 July 2013). For other regional treaties see White R & Ovey C 
(eds) The European Convention on Human Rights (2010) 5ed; Pasqualucci J The Practice and Procedure of the 
Inter-American Court on Human Rights (2013) 2ed. 
398Dugard J ‘The Future of International Law: A Human Rights Perspective – With Some Comments on the 
Leiden School of International Law (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 729. The African Charter 
was signed by South Africa on 9 June1986 and ratified on 9 June 1996. 
399
Articles 47, 55, 56.  For more elaboration on their role see Bello A ‘The Mandate of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1988) African Journal of International Law 31. 
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they must be implemented instantly, irrespective of hostile economic conditions. This tie in 
with the provisions of the ICESCR.  
 
The African Commission has established multiple special mechanisms to assist in protection 
and promotion of human rights.
400
 The Commission has been enhanced, in that since 2014 
there are seven working groups, five Special Rapporteurships, a working group on SERs, two 
committees and one advisory committee. The mandate of the Commission is to consider cases 
alleging violations of the African Charter, known as ‘communications’. The Commission 
issues ‘recommendations’ on the appropriate remedies. The Commission takes a realistic 
approach in confirming that states can allege the lack of resources as a defence to non-
compliance in the realisation of SERs. 
 
In Purohit and Moore v the Gambia
 401
 the Commission pointed out that we cannot turn a 
blind eye to the scarcity of resources in Africa when defining the SERs in the Charter. 
However, the Commission read into article 16 the obligation on state parties to take concrete 
and targeted steps and when they do so they must take full advantage of their available 
resources ensuring the full realisation of the right to health, in this case.
402
 This case clarifies 
the availability of resources being a relevant factor in determining the states’ violation of the 
right to health. It is noted that the case does not establish who must prove the availability of 
resources or the lack thereof. The Commission is known for its  sound approach to housing 
rights as ordered in Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic 
and Social Rights v Nigeria.
403
 In the latter case the Commission found that whilst the right to 
adequate housing was not explicit in the African Charter, this should be inferred from the 
other rights espoused in this Charter.
404
  
 
                                                 
400
See article 45 of the African Charter. 
401
Communication No. 241/2001, Sixteenth Activity report 2002-2003, Annex VII (hereafter Purohit) available 
at https://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/401249 (accessed on 20 November 2014).In this case provisions of the 
Lunatic Detention Act of the Gambia and the manner in which mental patients were being treated amounted to a 
violation of various provisions of the African Charter articles 16 and 18(4). 
402
Purohit para 84. 
403
2002 (Communication No. 155/96) (hereafter Serac case) available at https://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/404115 
(accessed on 20 November 2014). 
404
It was noted that the combined effect of articles 14, 16 and 18 (1) reads into the right to housing. 
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Further reference to ‘available resources’ is found in the African Commission’s Principles 
and Guidelines
405
 which are similar to the UN treaty bodies’ general comments as regards 
promoting the principle of progressive realisation. These Guidelines spell out that progressive 
realisation dictates an ‘obligation to constantly move towards the full realisation of SERs, 
within the resources available to a state, including regional and international aid.’ 406 To this 
effect, the nature of the member states’ obligations must include the provision of protection 
and realisation of SERs through constitutional rights, institutions, legislation, policy and 
budgetary measures.
407
 In keeping with the international Convention, the Guidelines also 
prioritise appropriate services and resources for vulnerable and disadvantaged groups insofar 
as socio-economic development is concerned.
 408
 The Guidelines also acknowledge that states 
need sufficient resources to realise SERs
 
 progressively. 
409
 
 
The Commission has a rich jurisprudence on SERs,
410
 but the enforcement of its 
recommendations seems tenuous.
411
 Wachira and Ayinla   maintain that decades after the 
inauguration of the African Commission, effective execution of its mandate is debateable.
412
 
The authors, arguing from an insider’s perspective, having worked within the African 
Commission commends the strides made by the Commission
413
 but warn that their 
recommendations have been largely ignored by states parties, with no consequences.
 414
  This 
                                                 
405African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘ Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (hereafter African 
Commission Principles and Guidelines) para II art 2 available at 
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/economic-social cultural/achpr_instr_guide_draft_esc_rights_eng.pdf  
(accessed on 20 November 2015). This is in accordance with the African Charter articles 61-2. 
406
African Commission Principles and Guidelines Part III para 13. 
407
African Commission Principles and Guidelines para II para 2. 
408
African Commission Principles and Guidelines Part III paras 12, 14. 
409
African Commission Principles and Guidelines Part III para 15. 
410
See Balogun V & Durojaye E ‘African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Promotion and 
Protection of Sexual and Reproductive Rights’ (2011)11 AHRLJ 68  
411
See Murray R & Long D The Implementation of the Findings of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights (2015). 
412
Wachira  G M &  Ayinla  A ‘Twenty Years of Elusive Enforcement of the Recommendations of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Possible Remedy’ (2006) 2 AHRLJ 465.  
413
The few instances of compliance with the African Commission's recommendations would include Modise v 
Botswana (2000) AHRLR 25 (ACHPR 1994); Pagnoulle (on behalf of Mazou) v Cameroon (2000) AHRLR 57 
(ACHPR 1997). Also see Dankwa V 'The Promotional Role of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights' in Evans M & Murray R (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: The System in 
Practice, 1986-2000 (2002). 
414
See OAU 'Non-Compliance of States Parties to Adopted Recommendations of the African Commission: A 
Legal Approach' 24th ordinary session OAU DOC/OS/50b (XXIV) (1998)  para 2 reprinted in Murray R & 
Evans M (eds) Documents of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, on Compliance of State 
Parties to Adopted Recommendations of the African Commission: A Legal Approach (2001); Gutto S 'The 
Compliance with Regional and International Agreements and Standards by African Governments with Particular 
Reference to the Rule of Law and Human and Peoples' Rights' in  Anyang Nyongo P et al (eds) New Partnership 
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has left victims of human rights violations without recourse to justice and sends a message 
that undermines the credibility of the Commission as an effective protector of the rights 
enshrined in the African Charter.
415
 In other words the Commission does not live up to its 
treaty obligations. However, despite the lack of enforcement mechanism, states are obliged to 
comply under the pacta sunt servanda principle which binds parties to implement treaty 
obligations in good faith.
 416
 
 
Although the African Charter
417
 empowers the African Commission to make 
recommendations on state communications, the Commission’s enthusiasm is stifled by the 
lack of political will of state parties to implement its recommendations, all of which is 
exacerbated by the lack of good governance.
 418
 The most debilitating is that the 
recommendations are non-binding and this in turn hampers enforcement.
419
 Much of the 
‘disregard’ of the Commission’s recommendations are due to the fact that neither the African 
Charter nor the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission
420
 defines the status of the 
Commission's recommendations. Naldi argues that the recommendations of the Commission, 
despite being non-binding have persuasive powers akin to the opinions of the UNHRC. 
421
 In 
addition the work of the Commission is noted by the positive strides it made in considering 
communications and making recommendations that form important case law jurisprudence.
422
   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
for Africa's Development (NEPAD): A New Path? (2002); Viljoen F & Louw L 'The Status of the Findings of 
the African Commission: From Moral Persuasion to Legal Obligation' (2004) 48 Journal of African Law 2. 
415
See generally Institute for Human Rights and Development Compilation of Decisions on Communications of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: 1994-2001 (2002) 3-7. Despite the decision in Serac 
there are continued media reports of human rights violations in the Ongoni Region, leading to unrest, see the 
Niger-Delta Development Commission  http://www.nigeria-law.org/Niger-DeltaDevelopmentCommission 
(Establishment%20etc)Act2000.htm (accessed on 25March 2016). 
416
See Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia (2001) AHRLR 84 (ACHPR 2001) paras 59-60. 
417
Article 53. Also see  Österdahl  I 'Implementing Human Rights in Africa: The African Commission on Human 
and Peoples' Rights and Individual Communications' (2002) 15 Swedish Institute of International Law Studies in 
International Law.  
418Viljoen F & Louw L ‘The Status of the Findings of the African Commission: From Moral persuasion to Legal 
Obligation' (2004) 48 Journal of African Law 9-10.  
419
See Odinkalu C 'The Role of the Case and Complaints Procedures in the Reform of the African Regional 
Human Rights System' (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal 225. 
420
Adopted at Second ordinary session Dakar 2-13 February 1988 revised during the 18
th
 ordinary session held in 
Praia 2-11 October 1995 available at  
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/rules-of-procedure-2010/rules_of_procedure_2010_en.pdf 
421
G Naldi 'Future Trends in Human Rights in Africa: The Increased Role of the OAU' in Evans M & Murray R 
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State Law Review 685-686; 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
In order to curb the violations of human rights, an African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights with binding judgements was sought.
 423
 Recently, the Commission demonstrated a 
proactive stance by referring a case concerning gross human rights violations in Libya to the 
African Court.
424
 A further contentious issue in Africa is the plight of its children which is 
discussed below. 
 
2.8.3 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child   
 
Responding to the plight of children in Africa the AfCRWC
425
 is the only regional instrument 
focussing on the welfare of one of the most vulnerable groups in society. The Preamble notes 
with concern that: 
 
 ‘the situation of most African children, remains critical due to the unique factors of their 
socio-economic, cultural, traditional and developmental circumstances... .’  
 
It is the only regional instrument in the world that focuses on the welfare of children and it 
aims to incorporate the universalist outlook of the UNCRC in the African context.
 426
 A 
monitoring body, the Committee of Experts was established in 2001 to navigate the 
implementation of this instrument and to examine state reports.
427
  There are four pillars that 
                                                 
423
Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, on 
9 June 1998 OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT (111), entered into force on 25 January 2004. However the 3rd 
ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU decided to integrate it with the 
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424
 African Court on Human Rights decision in African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights v Great 
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Application 004/2011 delivered on 25 March 2011. 
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CAB/LEG/24.9/49. Signed by South Africa on 10 October 1997 and ratified on 7 January 2000. The South 
African’s Children’s Act also heralds this instrument in its preamble. Also see Getachew A ‘The Contribution of 
the African Children’s Charter and its Monitoring Committee in the Advancement of Children’s Rights in 
Africa: A Critical Reflection’ (2011). Also see Chirwa D ‘The Merits and Demerits of the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) International Journal of Children’s Rights 131. 
426
 Also see Kaime T ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Chile: A Socio-Legal Perspective’ 
(2009) PULP 132; Lloyd  A ‘The African Regional System for Protection of Children’s Rights’ (2008) in Sloth-
Nielsen J  (ed) Children’s Rights in Africa: A Legal Perspective 33. 
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dominate the AfCRWC, most notably the best interest of the child
428
 and participation in state 
budgets.
429
  
 
Similar to the UNCRC article 27 the AfCRWC
430
  points out that the primary responsibility 
for children lies with the parents and other persons caring for the child in providing a standard 
of living within their abilities and financial capacities. The AfCRWC 
431
 like the UNCRC 
obliges the state to assist parents in meeting their responsibilities, including the provision of 
material assistance and support programmes in terms of food, clothing and housing.
432
 Van 
Bueren hails this as the most progressive of the treaties pertaining to the rights of the child.
433
 
Gose submits the AfCRWC follows a more human-rights centred approach in conferring the 
rights directly upon the child.
434
   
 
However, despite the rights contained in the AfCRWC being almost identical to the UNCRC, 
it does not contain the right of children to an adequate standard of living, for the child’s 
development and neither the right of parents to social security necessary for maintaining the 
standard of living of the child. Another notable omission in this instrument is absence of 
direct protection of the right to a home for children, separate from parents, which the UNCRC 
cites.
 435
 Instead, the instrument provides for a child’s right to a family home. 436 This means 
that children’s access to a home is dependent on whether their parent has a home.  This is 
disappointing, in light of the prevalence of displacement due to war on Africa’s children.437  
 
                                                 
428
Article 4. 
429
Article 7. 
430
Article 20 (1). 
431
Article 20(1). 
432
UNCRC art 27 (2) and AfCRWC art 20(2). Also see Viljoen F 'The African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child' in C Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (2000). 
433
Van Bueren G The International Law on the Rights of the Child (1995) 402. Also see Hodgkin R & Newell P 
'Child's right to an Adequate Standard of Living' (1998) in Hodgkin R et al (eds) An Implementation Handbook 
on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
434Gose M ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 17-18. 
435
See art 27. Also see Olowu D 'Protecting Children's Rights in Africa: A Critique of the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child' (2002) 10 The International Journal of Children's Rights 127-136.  
436Article 10 provides ‘No child shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family 
home. 
437
See Machel G ‘Impact of Armed Conflict on Children’ stating that ‘At least half of the estimated 57.4 million 
people displaced by war around the world are children, and millions of those children have been separated from 
their families, according to a new UN report. It calls for policies to be more sensitive to the specific needs of 
unaccompanied children in wartime’ available at www.unicef.org/graca/alone.htm (accessed on 20 January 
2015). 
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Further provisions are ‘to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, conditions of 
living necessary to the child's development’.438 The provisions encompass primary health care 
through financial means and community resources.
439
 Most notably article  20(2) provides 
that ‘states parties to the present Charter shall in accordance with their means and national 
conditions take  all appropriate measures,’ but the Charter stops short of qualifying that  
available resources be allocated to children’s SERs. The AfCRW440 instead provides for 
material assistance to parents and other persons responsible for the child, particularly with 
regard to nutrition, health, education, clothing and housing.   
 
The UNCRC pertinently points out that ‘the maximum extent of their available resources’ 
should be extended to the child.
441
 The AfCRWC which intended to espouse the rights 
contained in the UNCRC could have followed suit. Instead, it proffers that ‘states parties to 
the present Charter shall ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the survival, protection and 
development of the child and this will be the performance of duties on the part of 
everyone’.442 By not conforming the child’s wellbeing to the ‘maximum available resources’ 
creates a void that does not complement the best interest of the child
443
 (one of the four 
pillars) and participation.
444
 This should arguably start with providing adequate resources to 
at least an individual right to basic shelter for children and their representation in budget 
allocations.  
 
Sloth-Nielson et al maintain that governments, donors and civil society organisations should 
be held accountable in the allocation and utilisation of both internal and external resources in 
the best interest of children through universally established mechanisms.
445
 This resource 
allocation should be monitored and include participation by beneficiaries, especially 
children.
446
 Therefore the CRC is urged to lead in the development and adoption of a global 
                                                 
438
Article 20 (1) (b). 
439
Article 14 (2) (j). 
440
Article 20 (2) (a). 
441Article 4. Also see art 20 (2) provides that ‘States Parties to the present Charter shall in accordance with their 
means and national conditions take the all appropriate measures.’ 
442
Article 2 and preamble. 
443
Article 4. 
444
Article 7. 
445
Sloth-Nielson J et al  (2007) para 5. Also see Sloth-Nielsen J & Mezemur B ‘A Dutiful Child: The 
Implications of Article 31 of the African Children’s Charter’ (2008) Journal of African Law 166. 
446
Sloth-Nielson J et al (2007) para 5. 
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measurement framework for available resource allocation for children and to monitor and 
evaluate progress in the delivery of children’s SERs. 447 
 
Presently in South Africa, the Children’s Act448 is the primary legislative measure giving 
effect to the constitutional imperatives on children. The Constitution
449
  provides children 
with a right to shelter, unconditionally. That is, without qualifying that the right is subject to 
the available resources of the state. According to the Children’s Institute, although the 
Constitution contains clear rights for children to shelter, there is still uncertainty as to how 
these rights should be interpreted, what the context of each right is and what the nature and 
obligations of government are, to translate the same into practical delivery.
450
 
 
The most recent reports (2015) from member states to the CRC cover all the vulnerabilities 
that children in Africa and the world experience, but does not address any concerns as to 
access to adequate basic housing and the resources thereto.
451
 This is worrisome because all 
the other aspects of vulnerability points to education, health, welfare, sanitation and water 
which are underpinned by a child’s access to basic shelter. Moreover, African countries, 
despite their wealth in minerals and other resources, have not employed these benefits to 
children in them being particularly vulnerable.
 452
 It is clear that the AfCRWC recognises the 
importance of economic resources to realise SERs, but neglects to ensure that the ‘maximum 
of available resources’, be earmarked for realising children’s rights. Not confining the 
development of the child to the necessary economic resources leaves these rights dormant. 
 
2.8.4 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (the Protocol) 
 
                                                 
447
Sloth-Nielson J et al (2007) para 16. 
448
 Act 38 of 2005. 
449
Section 28 (1) Every child has the right- (e) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social 
services. 
450See Rosa S & Dutschke M ‘Child Rights at the Core: A Commentary on the use of International Law in South 
African Court Cases on Children’s Socio-economic Rights’ (2006) A Project 28 Working Paper Cape Town: 
Children’s Institute, University of Cape Town. 
451CRC ‘Examines Reports of the Gambia, Tanzania, Sweden’ January 2015 see more at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15491&LangID=E#sthash.VpR2ysxR
.dpufhttp://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15491&LangID=E (accessed on 
15 January 2015). 
452
Sloth-Nielson J et al (2007) para 14. Also see African Child Policy Forum, (2006) ‘Discussion Paper: 
Economic Policy and Child Rights’.  
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The reason for this Protocol
453
 is that the African Charter was fell short in its protection of the 
rights for women in Africa. This Protocol expresses the determination of the AU member 
states ‘to ensure that the rights of women are promoted, realised and protected in order to 
enable them to enjoy fully all [of] their human rights’.454 In parallel with international 
instruments, the Protocol affirms women’s rights as being integral to human rights and 
confirms the inalienability thereof and indivisibility in accordance with other international 
and regional human rights instruments. 
455
 With regards to the right to adequate housing the 
Protocol proffers:  
 
‘Women shall have the right to equal access to housing and to acceptable living conditions 
in a healthy environment. To ensure this right, States Parties shall grant to women, 
whatever their marital status, access to adequate housing.’ 456 
 
Furthermore article 26 (2) of the Protocol pertinently provides for states parties having to 
adopt all the necessary measures and in particular ‘shall provide budgetary and other 
resources for the full and effective implementation of the rights herein recognised’. 
 
In reality the other rights in the Protocol would be very difficult to achieve if women were not 
able to access at least basic shelter.
457
 Article 22 gives further protection to elderly women, 
which is unique but again without pertinently giving them preference to housing and available 
resources to realise this, thus leaving this very vulnerable group exposed to the elements in 
poverty stricken Africa. So yes, this Protocol protects women on paper, but what does it 
really do?
458
 The UNHCHR echoes this concern by submitting that, despite the ratification of 
                                                 
453
Adopted by the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government in Maputo, Mozambique 11 July 2003, 
entered into force 25 November 2005. Signed by South Africa17 December 2004 and deposited with the 
Secretariat of the African Union on 14 January 2005. 
454
See Preamble. 
455See Preamble. Also see art 9(2) ‘States Parties shall ensure increased and effective representation and 
participation of women at all levels of decision-making.’  
456
Article 16. 
457For more on  women’s rights see Mujuzi J ‘The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa: South Africa’s Reservations and Interpretative Declarations’ (2007) 
Law, Democracy & Development 133. Also see Mashood B & Manisuli S (2010) 'Development of International 
Human Rights Law before and after the UDHR' (2010) in  Mashood B & Manisuli S (eds) International Human 
Rights Law: Six Decades after the UDHR and Beyond 3-27. 
458
Also see Baderin M ‘Recent Developments in the African Regional Human Rights System’ (2005) 5 Human 
Rights Law Review 117. 
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the African Charter and other international human rights instruments, women in Africa still 
continue to be victims of discrimination and harmful practices.
459
  
 
2.9 The South African courts’ interpretation of the available resources 
 
The ICESCR
460
 guarantees ‘the right of everyone to ... adequate housing and uses the 
qualifier ‘appropriate’ when describing the means that must be taken to achieve SERs. 461 
Measures considered ‘appropriate’ include, inter alia, administrative, financial, educational 
and social.
462
 The CESCR reaffirms though that the rights recognised in the ICESCR are 
realisable within the context of a wide variety of economic and political systems.
463
 Therefore 
account must be taken of the resource constraints within the country concerned, when 
observing whether the state has discharged its minimum core obligations.
 464
  
 
The Constitution of South Africa
465
  guarantees everyone the right to access adequate housing 
and synonymously to the ICESCR, qualifies the obligation of the state in that it ‘must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of this right.’ 
 
In its General Comment 3
466
 the CESCR considers SERs to be justiciable. The CC 
467
 has 
proven that these rights are indeed so, but in its adjudication of SERs the CC has used the 
reasonableness
468
  of the government’s programme in this regard and not the minimum-core- 
obligations approach.
 
 In using the reasonableness approach the issue of available resources is 
not explored as a rule. There have been several cases before the CC, the most prominent of 
which being in the field of SERs will be used to explain how the available resources in terms 
of SERs, are interpreted. 
                                                 
459
Office of the UNHCR available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/protchart.htm 
(accessed on 20 November 2014). 
460
Signed by South Africa on 3 October 1994 ratified on 12 January 2015. 
461
ICESCR arts 2(1) and 11. 
462
GC 3 para 7. 
463
GC 3 para 8. 
464
GC 3 para 10. 
465
 Section 26(1) and (2) emphasis added. Several constitutions explicitly refer to the right to adequate housing, 
Belgium, Seychelles, Uruguay. See also the constitutions of Ecuador, Haiti, Mali, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Peru, Portugal, Russian Federation, and Sao Tome and Principe. 
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Paragraph 5. 
467
See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). 
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See chapter 4 on this approach by the CC. 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
Starting with  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal,
469
 this applicant suffered 
from a fatal kidney disease and needed daily dialysis to stay alive. The provincial government 
on health refused to give him this treatment due to resource constraints in the public health 
system. The applicant asked for this medical assistance in that the Constitution provides that 
‘no one may be refused emergency medical treatment.’470 The Court felt that emergency 
medical care did not extend to prolonging the life of somebody with a fatal disease as this 
would prejudice the needs of others.
471
  The CC scrutinised the budgetary priorities of the 
government and due to the latter’s limited resources the Court did not want to interfere with 
their ‘rational’ decision in how this should be done. 472 This approach of the CC begs the 
question, namely how does this decision blend with dignity and substantive equality whereby 
we look at the circumstances of the individual and his historic past of deprivation of 
economic wellbeing?
473
 At the end of the day, the lack of money cannot hold as an argument 
to end life. If so, those with money have the right to prolong life and those without could die 
an early death. Soobramoney suffered the fate of neglect during apartheid which had deprived 
him of economic access; therefore who knows if he might have had the economic means, he 
could have prolonged his life. The state should protect the dignity of each individual and 
letting a person perish due to resource constraints cannot be viewed as good governance. 
Again, good governance dictates that the South African government make the necessary 
contingency plans regarding economic resources to avoid failing in its minimum obligations 
of providing adequate shelter to those in desperate need or medical attention for that matter. 
The same principle applies whether medical attention or housing is at issue. 
 
In Grootboom and Others v Oostenberg Municipality and Others 
474
  the applicants were 
living in intolerable conditions on a sports field in makeshift sheltes. These applicants 
approached the court to compel government to provide them with basic shelter. The High 
Court (HC) found that the government’s plan for public housing was reasonable, but stymied 
by inadequate economic resources.
475
 It needs to be said that a plan that does not cater for 
                                                 
469
1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (hereafter Soobramoney). 
470
 Section 27 (3). 
471
 Soobramoney para 28. 
472
 Soobramoney para 29. 
473
In Grootboom CC para 22 the Court observed that ‘rights also had to be understood in their social and 
historical context’. Also see Liebenberg S ‘The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights 
(2005) 25 Journal on Human Rights 517-545. 
474
2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C). See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion on this case in explaining why South African 
courts use the reasonableness test. 
475
 Grootboom paras 286 H-I. 
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those who are basically homeless cannot be deemed reasonable if a resource void is given as 
a reason for non-compliance with the minimum core obliged by the ICESCR.  
 
The HC in Grootboom quite rightly pointed out that the parents had been ravaged by unequal 
economic access that prevailed during apartheid. This prevented them from providing 
adequate shelter for their children.
476
 This Court undertook a supervisory jurisdiction by 
ordering government to bring relief by means of temporary accommodation and report back 
to it on the implementation of the order.
477
 But this was not to be. On appeal by government 
the CC overturned the court a quo’s decision, giving a declaratory order finding the housing 
plan unreasonable for not catering for those living in extreme conditions of poverty, 
homelessness or intolerable housing. 
478
  The CC referred the case back to the government to 
devise a reasonable plan which included these groups of vulnerable people.
479
 This obligation 
was to devise and implement a coherent and co-ordinated programme, designed to provide 
access to housing, healthcare, sufficient food and water and social security to those unable to 
support themselves and their dependants. The result of which was that the status quo 
remained for the overwhelming part of this community, in that basic shelter was lacking and 
so too the minimum core obligations. This, despite the argument put forward by the Amicus 
that the minimum core provides a level of minimum compliance to which resources have to 
be allocated as a priority.
 480
  
 
The CC did confirm that the foundational values of dignity, equality and freedom had been 
denied to those who lacked access to SERs which stunted the achievement of their full 
potential.
481
 However, the CC did not want to impose a minimum core due to the variation in 
application of fulfilling SERs.
482
 The Court acknowledged that available resources were an 
                                                 
476
 Grootboom paras 289 C-D. 
477
Grootboom para 293 A. 
478
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) 
(hereafter Grootboom (CC) para 24. 
479
See chapter 3 discussing the implementation of legislation that includes these groups as a result of 
Grootboom.  
480
Heads of Argument on behalf of the Amicus 10 September 2002 para 27 available at 
http://communitylawcentre.org.za/court-interventions/minister-of-health-v-treatment-action-campaign (accessed 
on 20 November 2014). 
481
Grootboom CC para 23. 
482
Grootboom CC paras 32,33 the Court could not determine the minimum core content in this case because it 
maintained that it did not have the comparable information, income, unemployment., availability of land, 
poverty, difference between city and rural communities, economic and social circumstance and history. See 
more on this in chapter 3 discussing why SA courts use reasonableness and not the minimum core. 
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important factor in determining reasonableness
483
  and that effective implementation required 
budgetary support by the national branch of government. 
484
 However, the Court did not want 
to venture into the allocation of resources for housing, maintaining that it would require 
complex calculations. Liebenberg criticises the CC’s justification for having rejecting the 
minimum core obligations on the spurious basis of complexity. 
485
 According to the author, 
accepting the minimum core obligations did not require the court to define the precise basket 
of goods and services to be provided. 
486
 A better approach would be to define the general 
principles underlying the concept of minimum core obligations in relation to SERs and apply 
these contextually, case-by-case.
 487
 There should be no reason why the  CC cannot in  future 
compel government to deliver housing to the most desperate, community by community and 
if not, report to the court how much of its available resources have been spent 
appropriately.
488
 Thereby,  the court can make an assessment as to whether the maximum of 
available resources have been spend to house the most desperate (as a priority) against what 
has been spend on other housing requirements. Furthermore progressive realisation promotes 
the idea that the state minimise all hurdles, including financial, over time.  Despite 
progressive legislative and policy measures,
 489
 homelessness and inadequate shelter still 
loom large in this jurisdiction. 
 
The CC took  a ‘different’ approach’ in  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action 
Campaign and Others (No 2) 
490
 where the applicants were pushing for drugs to be provided 
to pregnant HIV positive females in order to combat mother-to-child infection.  The CC 
ordered the government to roll out this programme to all females that fit this description, 
despite the state crying woe on its limited economic resources. This said, the CC clarified that 
it is ‘impossible to give everyone access even to a “core” service immediately’491 instead the 
CC again brought the purview of reasonableness to the fore and on that basis allowed the 
extension of the programme to all impoverished women.
492
  The Amicus in the case argued, 
that denying access to the drugs, to those who are too poor to afford it would be a failure to 
                                                 
483
Grootboom CC para 46. 
484
 Paragraphs 66-69.  
485Liebenberg S ‘South Africa's Evolving Jurisprudence on Socio-economic Rights: An Effective Tool in 
Challenging Poverty?’ (2009) Law Democracy & Development 172. 
486
 Liebenberg S (2009) 174. 
487
 Liebenberg S (2009) 174. 
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 See chapter 5 on the progressive approach of thr judiciary in India  in interpreting SERs. 
489
 See chapter 3 for these measures. 
490
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 TAC para 35. 
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 TAC para 73. 
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respect their dignity and intrinsic worth as human beings but the CC again did not want to be 
drawn into the question of allocation of resources by government.
493
  
 
The CC progressed on this attitude in its approach in Khosa and Others v Minister of Social 
Development and Others, Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social Development.
 494
  Here 
the Court urged that the available resources had to be extended to include these applicants as 
recipients of social security because their exclusion was unreasonable in that the denial to 
them of child grant infringed on the rights of children.
495
 The CC took this stance in spite of 
the government’s argument as to how this will strain the public purse.  The CC again took the 
‘reasonable approach’ and did not want to be drawn into the question of available resources in 
terms of the minimum core obligations. 
 
In Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers Saratoga Avenue and Another 
496
 the 
HC, Supreme Court of Appeals (SCA) and the CC took a more progressive stance on how the 
government (the City ) should budget and plan in relation to the right to housing. This case 
concerns the conflict between the constitutional right to adequate housing and an owner’s 
right to develop private property. The owner sued to evict illegal occupants who argued that 
the city had an obligation to provide them with temporary housing before eviction, citing the 
Constitution
497
 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of, Land 
Act.
498
 The HC granted the eviction and ordered the City to provide the occupiers with 
adequate alternate housing. In the meantime, the City had to pay to the Applicant an amount 
equivalent to the fair and reasonable monthly rental of the said premises, until eviction. 
499
 
The importance of NGO assistance in realising SERs is noted in this case in that COHRE 
conducted a study determining the approximate cost per month for a basic room.
500
 This no 
                                                 
493
 TAC para 60. 
494
2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (hereafter Khosa) The applicant were permanent residents in South Africa but national 
of Mozambique who challenged provisions of the Social Assistance Act that reserved the child support grant for 
South Africans citizens only, thus excluding permanent residents with children born in South Africa. The 
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495
 Khosa paras 56, 86. For a comprehensive review on social security in South Africa see Dawson  H 
‘Monitoring the Right to Social Security in South Africa  An Analysis of the Policy Gaps, Resource Allocation 
and Enjoyment of the Right’ (2013) Monitoring Progressive Realisation of Socio- Economic Rights Project 
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(accessed on 20 December 2014). 
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497
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doubt made it easier for the Court to make a determination as to how much economic 
resources the City would need to house the occupiers.  
 
The City submitted that it did not provide accommodation to indigent people living on private 
land and facing eviction.
501
 This is so because the City maintains it only had funds to provide 
emergency and temporary accommodation to those threatened with eviction from government 
land as oppose to private land.
 502
 The City made this submission in spite of the fact that the 
National Housing Act
503
 makes provisions for emergencies similar to what the occupiers 
faced. Moreover, local government has a primary responsibility to manage its administration 
and budget to give priority to the basic needs of the community, to promote social and 
economic development.
504
 
 
The Court rejected the City’s argument that it did not have adequate financial resources to 
provide the alternate housing.  The City was not at ease with this and appealed to the SCA in 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
and Another 
505
 against the order, in terms of which it was required to accommodate the 
occupiers and the associated monetary orders. The SCA confirmed the order of the HC and 
directed the City to provide temporary emergency accommodation. After another forum 
challenge in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 
(Pty) Ltd and Another 
506
 the CC confirmed the SCA holding that municipalities had an 
independent obligation to plan and budget for the emergency accommodation needs of people 
evicted from private property. This means the City is obliged to budget for minimum core 
provisions, when faced with an emergency that harbours the threat of homelessness. Bearing 
in mind that this temporary accommodation should give access to adequate housing on a 
progressive basis.
507
 Therefore once people are temporarily housed the government cannot 
release those people back onto the street. Progressive realisation demands that government 
move them to permanent basic shelter, at least. 
 
                                                 
501
Blue Moonlight HC para 4. 
502
Blue Moonlight HC para 32.4. 
503
Section 12. See chapter 3 for discussion on this legislation. 
504
Constitution s153. Also see Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and 
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The SCA rejected the City’s submission which cited lack of resources and noted that the 
City’s record showed that it had been operating in a financial surplus for the previous year. 508  
The City’s defense did not comply with the international instruments which are at pains to 
urge states to use the maximum of its available resources to realise SERs.  The SCA was not 
convinced by the City’s explanation of its budgetary constraints and labelled it as vague.509 In 
fact most of the affidavits the City deposed were devoted to the cost of providing permanent 
housing. 
510
Thus the City was not following a progressive plan that sees to the plight of the 
most desperate first, as was the order in Grootboom. The Court was at odds with this, citing 
that it is clear that the City could have adopted a long-term strategy which included financial 
planning dealing with such exigencies.
511
 This meant the City lacked good governance which 
resulted in its unpreparedness to deal with these occupiers. 
512
  
 
 
Ironically, the City argued that it is not obliged to go beyond its available budgeted resources 
to secure housing for the homeless in that this would amount to unauthorised expenditure.
513
 
By using the reasonableness purview the CC determined that measures within available 
resources could not be restricted by budgetary and other decisions that resulted from a 
mistaken understanding of constitutional or statutory obligations.
514
 In other words the CC 
made it clear that not budgeting for something was not reason enough for not meeting its 
obligations in that it should have planned and budgeted for the fulfillment of its 
obligations.
515
 
 
The SCA held that proportionality is key when dealing with the limits of judicial intrusion 
and the reality of the available resources, if balanced against the assertion of SERs a court’s 
role can be rightly described as ‘the art of the possible’. 516  In taking this approach perhaps 
the CC will in future be more open to inquire into how the available resources are applied 
when faced with desperate applicants in need of basic shelter. This would bring the Court 
closer to giving content to the minimum core obligations spelt out by the various General 
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Comments. Perhaps in the wake of South Africa’s ratification the ICESCR (in 2015) the CC 
will use this international instrument more effectively in domestic statutory and policy 
obligations in its interpretation of SERs. 
 
Although there have been other more recent cases where SERs were adjudicated by the court, 
the legal precedent that these cases provided has been followed and thus there is yet to be a 
case in which the CC will read into SERs the minimum core obligations as spelt out by 
General Comment 3. Viljoen asserts that if the justiciability of SERs is used effectively it 
would go as far as exposing the distortion in state budgetary priorities. 
517
 This is particularly 
important where a state does not allocate the maximum of its available resources in an 
adequate and progressive manner to SERs. Following international treaty obligations and 
particularly the ‘raison d’être’ for the ICESCR, the CC is under pressure to look at how the 
available resources have been applied to provide the minimum core obligations in the 
realisation of SERs.
518
  
 
This study recognises that the balancing of rights is a challenge, but the management of the 
available resources to realise SERs should equally be scrutinised by the courts and human 
rights bodies. This is necessary to ensure that the funds for realising SERs are appropriated as 
such and not subject to abuse by public officials and thereby stunt realisation. 
 
2.9.1 Consideration of international law in adjudicating SERs 
 
The ICESCR
519
  coaxes states to use international law when interpreting SERs and the CC in  
S v Makwanyane and Another said that: 
 
 ‘Within the limits of the appropriate exercise of their functions of judicial review, courts 
should take account of Covenant rights where this is necessary to ensure that the State’s 
conduct is consistent with its obligations under the Covenant. Neglect by the courts to do 
so is incompatible with the principle of the rule of law.’520 
 
                                                 
517
Viljoen F International Human Rights Law in Africa (2007) 570. 
518
 See chapter 4  discussing  transformative judiciary. 
519
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This holding by the CC elaborates on the Constitution
521
 which provides that, when 
interpreting law the courts should refer to international instruments where necessary. 
Furthermore, South Africa has ratified the UNCRC and the ICESCR thus it must give effect 
to the provisions of these treaties.
522
 The CC noted international treaty law in Grootboom,
523
 
but paid scant attention to the use of the UNCRC and ignored the regional instrument, the 
AfCRWC, despite the fact that the applicants included a number of children.
524
 The better 
approach would have been to use all the relevant instruments such as the ICESCR, UNCRC 
and AfCRWC in reaching a conclusion. Bilchitz says that the CC erred by not considering 
these key international instruments which were relevant to the case.
525
 The obligations to 
uphold international human rights should be incumbent upon the judiciary in South Africa   
and in doing so they should consistently take into account international treaty obligations 
together with domestic law, when interpreting law. 
 
In Khosa the court simply ignored the existence of international law.  In this regard the Court 
ignored the best interest of the child as promoted by the UNCRC. 
526
  The UNCRC
527
 
recognises the right of every child to benefit from social security and the AfCRWC
528
 obliges 
the state to assist the family.  All in all, the UNCRC and the AfCRWC address all the rights 
of children holistically, ie SERs and civil and political rights.
529
 Therefore South African 
courts would enrich their jurisprudence in using these instruments when interpreting SERs for 
this vulnerable group. 
 
In using the minimum core approach that the ICESCR provides, the applicant merely has to 
prove the lack of access to basic subsistence requirements which are neither physically or 
economically accessible.
530
 This means the government has to prove that every effort has 
                                                 
521
Section 233 Application of International Law; S39 Interpretation of Bill of Rights. 
522
See s231 International agreements: Also see Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective (2000) 
53. 
523
Yacoob J in Grootboom CC para 26. 
524
See Grootboom CC para 75. 
525
Bilchitz D 'Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future Socio-
Economic Rights Jurisprudence' (2003) 19 SAJHR 2. 
526
UNCRC art 3(1) and CRC GC 5 para 12. See CRC GC 5 paras 53-5 in determining what is in the best 
interests of the child, the views of the child should be considered where this is possible when policies and 
programmes are designed. 
527
Article 26. 
528
Article 18(2). 
529
See also Liefaard T & Doek J E (Eds) Litigating the Rights of the Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child in Domestic and International Jurisprudence (2015). 
530
 Liebenberg S (2009) 177. Also see Mc Murray I & Jansen van Rensberg L ‘Legislative and Other Measures 
Taken by Government to Realise the Right of Children to Shelter (2004) 7 PELJ  54-69. 
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been made to use all its available resources to satisfy the minimum socio-economic need as a 
matter of priority.
 
Enriching this is General Comment 14 
531
 providing that the function of the 
minimum core concept is to assist in the adjudication of SERs in domestic and supranational 
tribunals, by direct reference to the Covenant.  
 
2.10 International obligations towards available resources for SERs 
 
In its concluding observations on state reports, the CESCR said that the term ‘available 
resources’ was intended by the drafters to refer to both the resources existing within states 
and those available through the international community by international co-operation and 
assistance.
532
 During the fifth session of the CESCR, Jordan and Ecuador stated their concern 
for a lack of available resources to provide fully the rights envisaged, in particular education 
and housing.
533
 Ecuador argued that international co-operation was miniscule in relation to 
their current reserve of resources, thus there is a need for improved transfer of resources.
 534
  
 
The ECOSOC submitted that growth would be linked to the availability of finance and 
stressed that a durable solution to debt crisis was required.
535
 Therefore, it warned that there 
was a need for international action to stimulate growth. Concern was raised that current levels 
of official development assistance might not be adequate for developing countries. The 
ECOSOC sought renewed commitment from the international community to support Africa 
and refocus world attention on the socio-economic difficulties the continent faces.
 536
 
Notwithstanding this, the UN New Agenda for the Development of Africa reflects a mutuality 
of commitment and accountability on the part of Africa and the international community.
 537
  
Furthermore, the Vienna Declaration clarifies that least developed countries committed to the 
process of democratisation and economic reforms in Africa, should be supported by the 
international community so as to succeed in this reform.
538
 Thereby the international 
                                                 
531
General Comment No 14 Right to Health paras 10, 60. 
532
CESCR fifth session 21 November – 14 December 1990 UN Doc E/1991/23 Annexure III para 12 (hereafter 
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533
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534
CESCR fifth session para 131.  
535
ECOSOC substantive session 29 June-31 July 1992 ‘African Economic Recovery and Development’ UN Doc 
E/1992/11 (1 April 1992) para 2 (hereafter ECOSOC substantive session). Also see ECOSOC Progress Report 
on the Implementation of the System-wide Plan of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 
UN Doc E/AC.51/1996/6 (15 May 1996). 
536
ECOSOC Substantive session  para 12. 
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538
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community is urged to make every effort to help alleviate the external debt burden of 
developing countries in order for those countries to attain the full realisation of SERs for their 
people.
539
 Moreover, governments, the UN and other multilateral organisations are called 
upon to increase their contributions through larger allocations from the UN regular budget 
and through voluntary contributions.
 540
   
 
Decades later the plight of impoverished Africa in delivering on housing for the most 
desperate remains stark. It is argued that in its struggle for economic liberation, the obligation 
of international co-operation has mostly been philanthropic.
 541
 Africa continues to be seen as 
the object of charity and therefore humanitarian relief is bestowed on her at will rather than as 
a partner in a developmental programme sanctioned and defined by international legal 
obligations.
542
  Important to this is that the GA in 2003 identified the allocation of 0, 7 
percent of the GDP to overseas development aid as a target for international aid, provided for 
in art 2 (1) of the ICESCR.
 543
  In 2007 for instance, the CESCR recommended that Belgium 
raise its budget for development co-operation in order to meet the 0, 7 percent target set by 
the GA and reaffirmed in section 42 of the Monterrey Consensus.
544
 The Committee stressed 
that the increase must be real. As it is, the debt relief afforded to the Congo by Belgium did 
not in reality include any further development funding.
 545
   
 
The majority of African governments lack sufficient available resources to implement SERs 
programmes, therefore the multinationals, donors and international agencies continue to be 
key in ensuring available resources. To complement this, ethical behaviour in the public 
service is pivotal in overseeing the available resources. Needless to say, a state party that 
allows its economic resources to be eroded through corruption instead of earmarking 
resources to realise public housing, would find it difficult to look to the international 
community for assistance.  
                                                 
539
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540
Vienna Declaration (1993) para 34. 
541
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2.11 Conclusion 
 
The UDHR sets the tone on the importance of an adequate standard of living for all. The 
subsequent international treaties are aimed at elaborating on what this standard of living 
entails. To this extent the history on the making of the covenant for SERs shows that member 
states were cognisant that these rights would need economic resources for realisation. The 
ICESCR confirmed the importance of available resources to realise SERs rights and this 
phrase is given ample coverage by the human rights treaty bodies and through general 
comments.  
 
The idea of applying available resources to realise minimum core obligations is to get closer 
to realising a happy and dignified life for all. What it boils down to is that in taking steps, 
states should bring more to the table than legislating on SERs, by making vulnerable groups 
visible in state budgets. This goal would be served by those living in intolerable conditions 
being represented when procurement of contractors are secured to build their homes. This 
representation should oversee the project from beginning to end. The importance of the 
available resources in ensuring core deliverables, calls for this kind of oversight in order to 
ensure delivery to the just recipients in a progressive manner.  
 
As seen from the South African CCs point of view, the court is reluctant to be drawn in on 
how the state should apply its available resources in that it deems (albeit erroneously) that the 
government is in a better position to make that call. Therefore the onus is on a diligent 
government, respecting and understanding constitutional obligations, acting accountably by 
prudently using the available resources budgeted for SERs. 
 
The importance of treaties is that it binds states through the force of their ratification, 
accession processes and customary international law, to certain standards and duties. An 
exemplary public servant will follow treaty obligations, domestic legislation, codes of 
conduct, policy and legislative measures that are in place, in order to realise the rights under 
his or her watch.  Furthermore, the obligation of progressive realisation requires expeditious, 
constant and efficient supervision and action to realise the minimum of SERs rights.  Such 
minimum core obligations should make provision for resources to house the homeless as soon 
as possible. The next chapter will explore how the government of South Africa has fared in 
realising social housing to the impoverished. 
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Chapter 3 
 
How the Executive and Legislature fare in the realisation of Housing 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Hay states that: 
‘In the happiness of the subjects lies the happiness of the king; in their welfare, his own 
welfare. The welfare of the king does not lie in the fulfilment of what is dear to him; whatever 
is dear to the subjects constitutes his welfare.
 ’546 
Therefore only true philosophers who are fully proficient in dialect and painter of 
constitutions can bring about a virtuous city.
 547
 Moreover it is not the consciousness of man 
that determines his existence; rather it is his social existence that determines his 
consciousness.
 548
 Thus the state should endeavour to make its people both virtuous and 
happy.
549
 
 
The post-apartheid dream of the indigent was to be ushered into a world where access to 
SERs would realise into a decent home as a start to a better life. However, South Africa’s 
second decade into democracy has seen its citizens increasingly disillusioned by not only the 
lack of access to adequate housing, but more so, access to at least basic shelter and services 
such as sanitation and water.
550
  The access gained by a few cannot disguise the fact that 
poverty and inequality are on the rise and continue to plague the majority of the population. 
This parlous situation prevails despite the fact that the Constitution
551
 of South Africa was 
drafted to assist in  combating  poverty and inequality by including SERs as one of its most 
                                                 
546
Popper Karl R The Open Society and its Enemies Complete: Volumes I and II (1962) 47, 92 available at 
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547
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Lippman W The Good Society (1944) 290. 
549
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550
See poor service delivery cases such as Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) (hereafter 
Mazibuko); Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2010 4 BCLR 312 (CC) (hereafter Nokotyana). 
Also see E-News Channel Africa (ENCA) ‘Protest Nation’ available at http://www.enca.com/coverage/spotlight-
service-delivery-protests (accessed on 30 September 2014). Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v 
Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) (hereafter Joe Slovo); Western Cape Provincial Government: In re DVB 
Behuising (Pty) Ltd 2001 1 SA 500 (CC). 
551
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access housing, s27 right to access health care, food, water and social assistance and security, s28 (1) (c) 
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notable features in its BoR. Moreover, the Constitution provides the state with clear 
instructions on how to conduct itself in its duty to realise SERs. 
 
Furthermore, there is a broad acceptance that, under a democratically representative 
government, the legislature has the role of creating the law, the executive implements it and 
the judiciary adjudicates/interprets the existing law.
552
 This places collective responsibility on 
the three branches of government in the realisation, interpretation and development of SERs. 
The relative failure by government to deliver housing has borne a negative effect on the most 
desperate such as the homeless and those living in intolerable conditions. Their plight has not 
been progressively relieved. The partial success of delivering homes to some people pales 
into insignificance because the most impoverished still bear the brunt of pre-apartheid living 
conditions. The reason for this delay is perhaps polycentric, but the proper application of laws 
and economic resources should form the basis for success in the public housing programme. 
The application by government of the available resources for housing development is 
questionable in that delivery has fallen far short of capacity.  
 
The responsibility of the executive and Parliament regarding their obligations and duties to 
realise public housing will be examined in this chapter. This is to crystallise how these 
branches of government are delivering on their constitutional duties regarding the right to 
housing. This chapter will commence with the constitutional jurisprudence in the context of 
how the right to housing should be realised and government’s role in this regard. Thereafter, 
this chapter will dissect the role of the executive and the legislature in executing the 
constitutional demands regarding housing. This analysis will include how the government 
uses its available resources to realise housing to those in need.  
 
3.2 The Constitution:  pioneer to the right to housing 
 
Due to South Africa’s dolorous past it was crucial that the Constitution usher in rights that 
would transform the everyday lives of those who suffered exclusion from accessing rights. In 
the preamble to the Constitution the country as a whole promises to:  
 
                                                 
552
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‘[h]eal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social 
justice, fundamental human rights and to improve the quality of life of all citizens...’ 
In pursuit of a quality life for all, the final Constitution of 1996 places a duty upon the state to 
realise the right to housing.   
 
To this effect the Constitution provides in section 26:  
 
‘(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.’ 
 
Section 26 rights are qualified SERs, in that the rights are fettered with commands on how to 
achieve them. In this regard they impose both positive and negative duties on the state to 
provide access by ‘taking reasonable steps, within available resources, progressively’.553 Thus 
it can be said that the constitutional SERs create direct entitlements to the material conditions 
for human welfare.
554
 These rights are pertinent to food, water, health care services and 
shelter, as  distinct from to rights to vote, or freedom of expression. In society SERs enjoy 
relevance as the talisman to eradicate poverty; therefore government should provide access to 
basic housing and services as a prelude to its duties. Notwithstanding this, access to housing 
occurs  not on demand but rather at the state’s pace, depending on its economic resources. 
 
The inclusion of SERs in the Constitution was not without contestation because parties 
differed on whether SERs should be included in the BoR and this resulted in the interim 
Constitution 1993 only including civil and political rights.
555
 Objection was raised on the 
inclusion of SERs because they were not considered as universally accepted fundamental 
rights. Moreover, there was fear that the inclusion of SERs would lead to an overlap in the 
separation of powers
556
 because the judiciary will have to encroach upon the terrain of the 
legislature and the executive which, in turn, might result in the court dictating to the 
                                                 
553
Other qualified SERs are in s27, s24, s25 (5) and s29 (1) (b). Unqualified SERs which are not formulated 
through access or qualified through reasonableness, available resources and progressive realisation are: s29 (1) 
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554
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2009) 78. 
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government how to allocate public resources.
557
 The CC put paid to the argument  and SERs 
were thus included in the final Constitution and confirmed to be justiciable in Ex Parte 
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa.
558
 The result of this is that South Africa boasts a Constitution 
second to none which embraces SERs and which is in line with international human rights 
law.
559
  
 
3.2.1 Section 26: understanding the meaning of ‘within available resources’ in the South 
African Context  
 
The constitutional right to housing is not enforceable in the self-executing way other rights 
are. This right is expressly qualified by resource constraints in that the state must realise the 
right within its available resources. However, the CC noted in the Certification case that the 
need for economic resources to enforce civil and political rights was no different from the 
resources needed to enforce SERs.
560
 Moreover, the Constitution demands a sound public 
administration governed by democratic values and principles which include efficient and 
effective use of economic resources.
561
 
 
The ICESCR recognises the right to SERs insofar as family, housing, food and clothing,
562
 
must be complemented by measures that have to be put in place to the extent of a state’s 
maximum available resources.
563
 It is noted that the right in section 26 (1) extends to ‘access 
to adequate housing’ which is distinct from the ‘right to adequate housing’ as provided by the 
Covenant. Moreover, the Constitution obliges the South African government to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures whereas the Covenant obliges states parties to take 
appropriate steps which must include legislation. Thus the word reasonable is not included in 
                                                 
557See Courtis C ‘Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Comparative 
Experiences of Justiciability’ (2008) ICJ 15.   
558
1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) (hereafter Certification case) para 78 the CC said the fact that SERs will almost 
inevitably give rise to budgetary implications does not seem to be a bar to their justiciability. At the very 
minimum, SERs can be negatively protected from improper invasion.  Also see De Villiers B ‘Social and 
Economic Rights’ in van Wyk D Dugard J   & De Villiers B (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism: the New South 
African Legal Order (1994). 
559
The Constitution promotes the right to housing as espoused in the ICESCR. 
560
Paragraph 77. 
561
Constitution s195 (b). 
562
 Article 11.1. 
563Article 2.1. See chapter 2 for detailed discussion on the ‘available resources’. 
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the ICESCR.
564
 The UNDP clarifies that economic and social rights cannot be fulfilled 
without higher and more equitable budgetary allocations for basic social services.
565
 In 
addition litigation in various states in the US ordered the state’s legislatures to redesign 
budgetary allocations to fund public education.
566
 This action did not limit the separation of 
powers doctrine. 
 
Over the years the South African government has cited constraint on the available resources 
as the primary reason for its inability to meet the SERs needs of the poor. However, the 
positive economic growth that South Africa experienced over the years has not translated into 
faster delivery of housing.
567
 In fact, delivery has slowed down judging from the Universal 
Periodic Reports (UPR) of South Africa.
568
 This is not in line with the optimal use of 
available resources which should be applied in prioritising the housing needs of the most 
desperate and poorest.  
 
Constitutional
569
 duties demand that national, provincial and local government co-operate and 
use resources optimally to collectively provide access to social housing for the poor. 
Moreover constitutional duties would be undermined if the available resources were not 
guarded against mismanagement.
570
 Therefore ‘national, provincial and municipal budgets 
and budgetary processes must promote transparency, accountability and effective financial 
management of the economy, debt and the public sector’.571 Moreover, the obligation of 
progressive achievements exists independently of the increase in resources and rather requires 
effective use of the available resources, in terms of the Limburg Principles.
572
 
Efficacy is thus key in that budgets on each level of government must provide the sources of 
revenue and consequently the manner in which the proposed expenditure complies with 
national legislation must be monitored.
573
 To oversee the financial control of state resources 
the National Treasury must enforce compliance measures on state expenditure and has the 
                                                 
564
 See chapter 4 for discussion on reasonableness. 
565
 UNDP 2000b Human Development Report (2000) 79. 
566
See Reed D S ‘Twenty-Five Years after Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation and the Impact of the New 
Judicial Federalism (1998) 17 Law and Society Review; Banks J ‘State Constitutional Analyses of Public School 
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567
See para 3.3.1 on how the executive have delivered on housing. 
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570
See chapter 5 on mismanagement by government of resources for housing. 
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power to stop the transfer of funds to any organ of state that commits serious or persistent 
material breach of those measures.
574
   
 
McLean argues that the obligation to realise housing relates to the means of realising the 
right, the rate of realisation and budgetary restrictions.
575
 Thus, when determining what the 
available resources are it is important for the court to assess whether the state made a suitable 
budgetary allocation to realise the right in question.
 576
 However, in deciding whether the 
government’s measures are reasonable the court may take into account the available resources 
of the government. Thus budgetary limitations can play a mitigating role in the states duty, 
for instance acts of God or war, the war ravaged DRC being a case in point.
577
 Nonetheless, 
where budgetary allocations for SERs are diminished, the court is well placed to enquire into 
the states’ budgetary allocation.578 In this regard the court has the power to enquire whether 
the allocated funds for housing have been optimally used.
579 
 Although the available resources 
was not necessarily in issue, Grootboom demonstrates that the government did not use its 
available resources optimally to include those in immediate and desperate need such as the 
homeless and those living in intolerable conditions.
580
 This point to prima facie evidence of 
the government not fulfilling its obligations under the ICESCR.
581
  
 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations on housing 
 
The co-operative nature of governance makes it necessary for fiscal policies to embrace 
economic growth which in turn advances opportunities for the indigent to participate 
meaningfully in the economy. These policies should promote the availability of resources for 
the realisation of SERs. This is best served by adequate resources being progressively 
increase so as to access these rights. 
 
                                                 
574
Constitution s216. 
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576
 McLean K (2009)195.  
577
See chapter 2 for discussion on the African Commission confirming that budgetary constraints may be used as 
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578
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In government, fiscal policy determines how resources are appraised.
582
 A reasonable housing 
programme must have an intra-governmental fiscal relationship which allocates 
responsibilities and tasks to different spheres of government and ensures that the appropriate 
financial and human resources are available.
583
 The Division of Revenue Act (DORA) is 
enacted annually to set out the revenue allocations for each sphere of government.
584
 This is a 
consultative process which includes consultation with the Financial and Fiscal Commission 
(FFC)
585
 and the South African Local Government Association (SALGA).  
 
The Constitution
586
 provides that budgetary allocations may be enacted only after considering 
and taking into account national interest, economic disparities within and among the 
provinces and ensuring provincial and local government are able to provide services and 
functions. According to the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) this is best 
served by the government devising sound macroeconomic, fiscal and monetary policies.
 587
  
This would lead to maximising the revenue pool earmarked for the delivery of SERs and 
manage public finance in an efficient and accountable manner.
588
  
 
The National Treasury maintains it has strengthened the monitoring of expenditure patterns 
and financial management by introducing a centralised electronic system producing accounts 
and the management of procurement of goods.
589
  This includes a new information system 
developed to facilitate better financial management.
590
 In essence these measures are well and 
good but why are these measures not reaping the desired results, whereby housing budgets are 
used effectively and delivery is on time? Indicative of the fact that financial management 
systems are still found wanting are incidents where resources were allocated for housing and 
                                                 
582
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583
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contractors paid in full but no, or partial delivery of housing took place.
591
  Thus 
constitutional obligations are not receiving optimal implementation, leaving the rights holder 
at risk of not enjoying the right to housing. 
 
3.3 Constitutional obligations on the government in realising the right to housing 
 
Further to realising housing rights as demanded by section 26, the founding provisions of the 
Constitution dictate that the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled diligently and without 
delay.
 592
 This should require the government to have the realisation of housing at the 
vanguard of its progressive plans which should tie in with the other SERs. The Limburg 
Principles demand that the obligation for progressive realisation of SERs by the state must 
move as expeditiously as possible.
593
 Moreover, the state cannot unreasonably delay housing 
due to lack of available resources without ensuring that those resources are adequately 
protected against mischief by public officials. Thereby protecting the lofty ideals promoted by 
the Constitution. 
 
The Constitution promotes the BoR as the cornerstone of South Africa’s democracy and 
compels the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil these rights.
594
 In addition the BoR 
binds the three branches of government namely, legislature, executive, judiciary and all 
organs of state.
595
 When it comes to the realisation of social housing, the Constitution
596
  
allocates powers and functions amongst the three levels of government, namely national, 
provincial and local, emphasising their obligation to co-operate with one another in carrying 
out their constitutional tasks. Thus, a co-ordinated state housing programme must be a 
comprehensive one determined by the three levels of government in consultation with each 
other. The duties of the state must be bolstered by an administration that develops human 
resources with the necessary skills, to be accountable, transparent and development-
oriented.
597
 Notwithstanding this, at the coalface of housing delivery is local government 
which has the obligation to ensure that services are provided in a sustainable manner to the 
                                                 
591
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communities they govern.
598
 This requires full co-operation between the three levels of 
government for optimal delivery in housing. 
 
The White Paper on Local Government (1998)
599
 proposes a variety of ways to accomplish 
service delivery that is accessible, affordable, of high quality and accountable. This 
White Paper sets the pace for developmental local government and supports the local 
economic development mandate which advocates community interaction. This means, local 
government must pursue expanded involvement with the local community which includes 
consultation about the type of municipal service such as services in respect of water, 
sanitation and electricity and who is to provide the said services.
 600
 
 
The Housing Act
601
 and the National Housing Code
602
  fulfil the constitutional demands for 
national legislation governing national housing in general. This legislation is further enhanced 
by promoting the upgrade of informal settlements
603
  and emergency housing.
604
 The Housing 
Act 
605
 legally entrenches the principles outlined in the White Paper of 1994
606
 and aims to 
eliminate and prevent slums and slums conditions. In the wake of Grootboom the Court 
unanimously agreed that the legislative and other measures webbing the state’s housing 
programme, failed to provide for those people in desperate and crisis situations.
607
 This was 
due to the existing programme not meeting a coherent, co-ordinated plan that adhered to its 
section 26 obligations by looking at the most desperate, first.
 608
 This Housing Act is silent on 
groups living in intolerable conditions and on the homeless. These are the groups that 
                                                 
598
Constitution s152 (1) (b), read with s152 (2) and s153 (a).  
599
 White Paper on Local Government - South Africa (1998) available at  
www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/whitepaper_0.pdf (accessed on 20 November 2015). 
600
Housing Code para 13.7.1, Housing Act s9 (1). See Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000; Municipal Structures 
Act 117 of 1998 and Municipal Demarcations Act 27 of 1998. 
601
Also see National Division of Housing (NDoH), Breaking New Ground (BNG): A Comprehensive Plan for 
the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements (September 2004) available at  
www.capegateway.gov.za/Text/2007/10/bng.pdf (accessed on 20 March 2014).For more on the Housing Act and 
Breaking New Ground, see SERI ‘A Resource Guide to Housing’ available at 
http://www.urbanlandmark.org.za/downloads/SERI_Housing_Resource_Guide_Feb11.pdf (accessed on 25 
March 2014). Also see Western Cape Housing Development Act, 1999.  
602
Published in 2000 pursuant to section 4 of the Housing Act and amended in 2009.  See  NDoH, National 
Housing Code (2000 revised in 2009). 
603
National Housing Code: chap 13. Informal settlements typically can be identified on the basis of the following 
characteristics: Illegality and informality; Inappropriate locations; Restricted public and private sector 
investment; Poverty and vulnerability; and Social stress.  
604
 National Housing Code: chap 12. 
605
Section 1 (e) (iii). 
606
 White Paper: A New Housing Policy and Strategy for South Africa (1994). 
607
 Grootboom CC paras 51, 61-65.  
608
 Grootboom CC paras 91, 95. 
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Grootboom ordered must be housed soonest. Informal settlements and emergency housing 
that the Act protects, do not pertinently refer to these desperate groups. This is a shortcoming 
in the housing legislation. 
 
The Housing Act
609
 urges government on all levels to give priority to the needs of the poor 
through meaningful engagement in respect of housing development. Furthermore, the three 
levels of government are to work towards the common constitutional goal of providing access 
to adequate housing. 
610
  In this regard local government, through its municipalities, is tasked 
with the planning and implementation of the national housing programme.
 611
  Despite local 
government 
612
 being at the coalface of the delivery of housing and its related services there 
should be collaboration with provincial and national government when faced with service 
delivery problems. To this end all three levels of government bear responsibility insofar as 
upholding the BoR is concerned and thereby ensuring the realisation of housing. 
 
To keep the public service in check the Public Service Commission (PSC) is required to 
promote ethics and act as a watchdog for effective and efficient performance within the public 
service.
 613
 Central   to the promotion of a sound public administration is that the PSC should 
exert oversight on the performance by public officials in the housing programme.
614
 Such 
diligence demands that the PSC monitor large housing projects. The lack of proper oversight 
by senior public officials sees housing projects delayed or not executed due to procurement 
irregularities and malfeasance.
615
 Therefore, the PSC enjoys a collective duty to ensure that 
the available resources and the progressive plans of government deliver the much needed 
housing. 
 
The financial management of state funds in the national and provincial sphere is governed by  
the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA)
616
 giving effect to the Constitution
617
 and 
                                                 
609
Section 2 (1) (a), (b).  
610
Section 7. 
611
 Constitution s156 (4). Housing Act s10. 
612
See Housing Act s9 (1) for role of municipalities in delivery of housing. 
613
Constitution s197 (1) ‘within public administration there is a public service for the Republic, which must 
function, and be structured, in terms of national legislation, and which must loyally execute the lawful policies 
of the government of the day.’ 
614
See para 3.5 for a discussion on parliamentary oversight in housing. 
615
See chapter 5 for SIU uncovering corruption in the social housing programme in all provinces, through 
procurement violations. 
616
Act 1 of 1999 as amended by Act 29 of 1999. The Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (MFMA) 
covers financial transactions in the sphere of local government. 
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requires national legislation to ‘establish a National Treasury and prescribes measures to 
ensure transparency and expenditure control in each sphere of government.’ This legislation 
defines financial misconduct and the procedures for disciplining those public officials guilty 
of financial misconduct, including a provision for criminal prosecution where there is gross 
financial misconduct.
618
 Although the PFMA covers all the bases insofar as how public funds 
should be spent, many public officials by-pass these measures.
619
 They violate public 
procurement processes that are in place by allocating contracts for the construction of 
housing, without following protocol.
620
 As such they make payments to contractors without 
following the PFMA or MFMA. The result of this is non-delivery, partial delivery and 
shoddy workmanship.
621
 
 
Furthermore the delivery of housing must resonate with sound administrative action
622
 by 
government underwritten by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).
623
 As a 
matter of fact, PAJA forms the basis for review of administrative action in that it creates 
procedures for people to follow when their rights are directly or indirectly affected by 
decision taken by government.
624
 This legislation dictates that government action towards its 
citizens should be lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair and that citizens have a right to be 
given written reasons for administrative action.
625
 The aim of PAJA is to promote and 
encourage the culture of accountability and transparency when exercising public power such 
as realising state housing.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
617
Section 216(1). 
618
See PFMA ch 10. See Chapter 4 for a discussion on malfeasance in the housing programme. 
619
 See chapter 5 for discussion on how public officials abuse procurement laws for personal enrichment. 
620
 See chapter 5 for discussion on procurement processes. 
621
 See para 3.3.1 for discussion on the rectification programme for housing. See chapter 5 for SIU Report on 
corruption in public housing. 
622
Administrative action is when a department or body takes or does not take a decision that negatively affects 
your socio-economic rights. 
623
Act 3 of 2000. Also see Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2007). 
624Also see De Villiers N ‘Social Grants and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 
320. 
625
See cases involving access to housing  and water respectively that were in part decided on the basis of 
administrative justice rights: Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v 
City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC)(here after Olivia Road) (held that a decision to evict was an 
administrative decision and so subject to the PAJA and if that the decision was taken without considering 
relevant circumstances,  it could be set aside) and Mazibuko decision of local authority to install pay-per-use 
water meters set aside on procedural fairness grounds; City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and 
Others 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA). Also see Quinot G ‘An Administrative Law Perspective on “Bad Building” 
Evictions in the Johannesburg Inner City’ (2007) 8 ESR Review 25.   
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Government had its task made easy by a Constitution and legislation which clearly spelt out 
its duties. The legislative demands of the Constitution insofar as housing is concerned have 
been implemented, but proof of the success of this feat is dependent upon the levels of 
government to deliver on their obligations or risk being in breach of constitutional duties.  
 
3.3.1 The executive: realising the right to housing 
 
In 1994 the newly elected democratic government was tasked with addressing a housing 
backlog of 1.5 million and this was estimated to increase by 178 000 households per year.
626
 
Although more than 3 million housing units have been provided, the housing backlog is now 
bigger than in 1994.
627
 This is on the back of government spending R125 billion over 20 
years on public housing.
 628
  
 
The zealous implementation of legislation for housing has not translated into equally zealous 
access to housing for the most desperate. Inadequate shelter/housing is still one of the 
hallmarks of pervasive poverty and inequality in South Africa. Researching the current 
backlog on housing reveals that the need for adequate housing remains great. The 1996 
national census revealed that the number of shack/informal dwellings stood at 1.4million.
629
 
This figure increased in the 2011 census confirming 1.9 million inadequate dwellings for 
those vulnerable groups.
630
 The SA Institute of Race Relations shows that the number of 
households living in shacks grew by 41, 6% to 2million between 1996 and 2013; that includes 
informal settlements that have expanded from 300 to 2 225.
631
 Tomlinson argues that the 
backlog in statistics are not systematically compiled and not located in a single place, thus 
opening it to varying interpretations.
 632
 The Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa 
                                                 
626Department of Housing ‘White Paper on a New Housing Policy and Strategy for South Africa’ (1994) GN 
354 in GG 16178 of 23 December 1994. See Cohen T‘Land and Housing’ (1995) SAHR. Y. B 131, summing up 
the Reconstruction and Development Document in GG 16085 of 23 November 1994. 
627Tomlinson M ‘South Africa’s Housing Conundrum’ (2015) 4 @Liberty International Race Relations 6. 
628
 Tomlinson M (2015) 6. 
629
 See Census 1996 available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-02-16/Report-03-02-16.pdf 
(accessed on 10 April 2016). Wilkinson K ‘Factsheet: The housing situation in South Africa’ (2014) available at 
https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-the-housing-situation-in-south-africa/#sthash.jZU1ZTgR.dpuf 
(accessed on 10 April 2016). 
630
See Census 2011 available at www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03014/P030142011.pd  (accessed on 10 
April2016). Also see Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council District Demographic and Socio-
Economic Indicators: Census 1996; 2001; 2011 available at 
http://www.ecsecc.org/files/library/documents/ECSECC_Census.pdf (accessed on 10 April 2015) 
631
Tomlinson M (2015) 6. 
632
Tomlinson M (2015) 6. 
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(SERI) also pointed out that the housing figures from different government sources were 
often contradictory.
633
 
 
In its State’s Vision 2030 Strategy, provision for housing, the government and human 
settlement stakeholders have committed to deliver 1.5 million housing opportunities by 
2019.
634
 This commitment is detailed in the Social Contract for the Development of 
Sustainable Human Settlements.
635
 Housing the poor where the bulk of the housing backlog 
exists is the foremost plan of the State’s Vision 2030 Strategy in its ‘bottom-most’ 
approach.
636
 The government confirmed that it would cost approximately R800 billion to 
eradicate the housing backlog by 2020.
 637
 
 
These plans seem ambitious in that it would require the building of 375 000 houses in each of 
the next four years. As it is, the state has only built the maximum of 235 600 in a single year 
when it was delivering at its best.
638
 Significantly the most recent official statistics on public 
housing construction show an average of 118 200 houses per year.
 639
  This was confirmed by 
the minister of Human Settlements in 2015 that delivery of housing has slowed down in that 
over the last six years, government had delivered almost half of the number of houses they 
delivered at the height of delivery.
640
 Needless to say, this went against the grain of 
                                                 
633
 SERI Report 2013  available at http://www.seri-sa.org/index.php/research-7/research-reports (accessed on 
10 April 2016). Also see Tissington K ‘A Review of Housing Policy and Development in South Africa since 
1994’ SERI September 2010 available at http://spii.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/review-of-the-right-to-
housing.pdf (accessed on 10 April 2016). 
634South African Government ‘Human Settlements Vision 2030’ available at http://www.gov.za/about-
sa/housing (accessed on 10 April 2016). 
635
Signed at National Human Settlements Indaba and Exhibition held at the Sandton Convention from 16 to 17 
October 2014. See ‘Stakeholders Recommit to Sustainable Human Developments’  available at  
www.sanews.gov.za/.../stakeholders-recommit-sustainable-human-develo (accessed on 12 April 2016). 
636
 See Pocket Guide to South Africa Human Settlement 2014/15 available at 
http://www.gcis.gov.za/sites/www.gcis.gov.za/files/docs/resourcecentre/pocketguide/PocketGuide-house.pdf 
637Du Toit C ‘ANC Accedes Land, Housing Challenges: Sets out its Action Plan’ SABC News 9 October 2015 
available at http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/afacc7004a24d83da31ceba53d9712f0/ANC-accedes-land,-housing-
challenges;-sets-out-its-action-plan-20150910 (accessed on 10 April 2016). 
638
 Tomlinson M (2015) 10. 
639
 Tomlinson M (2015) 10. 
640
Minister Sisulu: Annual Govan Mbeki Award South African Government 13 Aug 2015 available at 
 http://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-lindiwe-sisulu-annual-govan-mbeki-award-13-aug-2015-0000 (accessed 
on 11 April 2016). Also see COHRE (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions) ‘Business as Usual? Housing 
Rights and Slum Eradication in Durban, South Africa’ (2008) 104 available at 
http://www.cohre.org/sites/default/files/south_africa_-_business_as_usual_-
housing_rights_and_slum_eradication_in_durban_sept_2008_.pdf  (accessed on 10 April 2016) estimates that: 
‘between June and December 2006 the Municipality was only able to build 4 402 houses – indicating a slow 
down to a rate of around 8 000 houses a year.’ See also Goldstone ‘Building 2.4m units by 2014 will need a 
miracle’ The Mercury 6 March 2007.  
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progressive realisation in that this action resonated with retrogressive measures which 
compromised the continuous delivery of minimum core obligations.
641
 
 
Amidst all the ‘successes’ in delivering millions of  much needed housing,  the  Department 
of Human Settlements (DoHS) submitted to Parliament that they embarked on a  National 
Housing Rectification Programme (NRP).
642
 The NRP is aimed at correcting the defects of 
subsidised public housing resulting from poor workmanship not meeting the technical 
requirements specified by the South African National Standards (SANS) and the National 
Home Builder Registration Council (NHBRC),
643
 as applicable at the time of construction.
644
 
Major structural defects led to demolitions and rebuilds at an estimated cost of R85 468 per 
house. The parliamentary committee warned that the DoHS omitted to provide a plan on 
compliance and consequences for non-compliant contractors, non-performing officials and 
preventing recurrence of these defects.
645
 Important to this is that public officials have been 
found to flout legislation and policies, particularly in procurement processes for public 
housing development, thereby, squandering from the fiscus large sums of money on 
fraudulent housing programmes,  resulting in poor delivery from unfavourable contractors.
646
  
 
The DoHS submitted that they were working with the National Treasury and the SIU to start 
blacklisting companies found to be involved in corrupt practices and the delivery of poor 
quality work.
647
 It is regrettable that the DoHS did not provide any explanation as to what 
measures are employed to relieve the department from public officials found working with 
these ‘ill-suited’ companies. The DoHS confirmed to Parliament in 2011 that the rectification 
costs stood at R58 million.
648
 The NRP has spent more than R2bn on fixing badly built public 
                                                 
641
 See chapter 2 for discussion on progressive realisation and minimum core obligations. 
642See Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) ‘National Housing Rectification Programme: Briefing by 
National Department of Human Settlements’ 11 September 2012 (hereafter PMG ‘National Housing 
Rectification Programme’) available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/14832/ (accessed on 10 April 
2016). 
643
See chapter 5 for discussion on how public officials breach this legislation. 
644
The factors which contributed to the defects included, but were not limited to: poor workmanship, the use of 
inferior and inappropriate material, deviation from specifications, poor project management, lack of supervision 
and unscrupulous contractors. 
645PMG ‘National Housing Rectification Programme’ 2012. 
646
See chapter 5 discussing the SIU Report which found public officials engaging in this manner. 
647
See chapter 5 analysing the SIU reports which have not been implemented since 2014. Also see chapter 5 for 
discussion on the Tender Register for defaulters, which has no names listed, currently. 
648PMG ‘National Housing Rectification Programme (2012).The number of units covered by the rectification 
programme for 2012/13 was: Eastern Cape had 5 700, Free State 1 076, Gauteng 20 004, KwaZulu Natal 3 249, 
Limpopo 881, Mpumalanga 120, Northern Cape 180, North West 1 285 and the Western Cape 1 734. The total 
number of units were 34 229 with a total budget allocation of R929 750 000. This total amount was 6% of the 
Human Settlements Development Grant. 
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housing by 2015.
649
 This is a searing indictment of government’s performance in this regard. 
Parliament lamented that the DoHS was negligent in that it failed to monitor the housing 
programmes thereby burdening the government with spending billions on a rectification 
programme.
650
 However, Parliament in its oversight capacity did not compel the DoHS to 
give direction on how this would be prevented in the future or how the public officials 
responsible would be sanctioned. Thus Parliament also failed in its oversight duty as 
representative of those citizens in need. 
 
This programme was terminated in 2015 obliging beneficiaries of public housing to fix their 
own houses as part of their maintenance obligation.
651
 This is despite the fact that much more 
rectification still remains to be done and many of the problems lie beyond the capacity of 
beneficiaries to address.
652
 Again, the government is not adhering to the constitutional 
obligations in ensuring adequate housing for the poor in a progressive manner. Government is 
not exerting sufficient oversight in the construction of public housing; instead it is allowing 
substandard work to delay access to adequate housing. So much so, between 2002 and 2009 
the Statistics SA General Household Survey revealed that 31 percent of 1.8 million people, 
who received subsidised public houses, regarded their houses as substandard and 
uninhabitable.
653
 
 
This situation exists in spite of the Breaking New Ground Policy (BNG)
654
  which aimed to 
eradicate informal settlements by 2014.
655
 This BNG was introduced to ‘fast track’ housing 
delivery by introducing more effective and responsive housing programmes. To realise this, 
the BNG focuses on the quality of housing products and development of sustainable human 
settlements. It is problematic that the BNG has not brought any relief on substandard work 
and the contracting of ill-suited contractors. 
                                                 
649
Makatile D ‘Poor workmanship halts housing delivery IOL News 17 May 2015 available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/poor-workmanship-halts-housing-delivery-1859513 (accessed on 12 April 
2016). 
650PMG ‘National Housing Rectification Programme’ 2012. 
651
Makatile D (2012). 
652
Makatile D (2012). 
653
Statistics SA General Household Survey 2009 available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P03182009.pdf (accessed on 12 April 2016). 
654
Breaking New Ground 2004 - Housing Development Agency available at 
 http://www.thehda.co.za/uploads/files/BREAKING_NEW_GROUND_DOC_copy-2_1.pdf (accessed on 11 April 
2016). Most important is that the housing subsidy through the BNG increased from R12 500 per household to 
R160 500 per household.  
655South Africa is also a signatory to the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals which targeted ‘slum-
free’ cities by 2014. 
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This is not the action of a diligent government set on delivering housing for the poor. Instead 
this is the action of an uncaring government not upholding international treaty obligations by 
not prudently using the maximum of available resources to realise housing. In this way 
government is acting irresponsibly. The government rather throws good money after bad by 
having to reinvest money in already budgeted SERs projects, due to lack of proper oversight 
and malfeasance. The failure by the DoHS to monitor compliance through the NHBRC and 
SANS has left the available resources vulnerable to abuse which flies in the face of good 
governance. 
 
The Minister of Finance
656
 announced in 2015 that the estimated housing development budget 
will continue to grow by an average of 8.5% over the next three years, reaching R201, 58m 
by 2018. However, government’s increased spending on uplifting informal settlements has 
yet to make a marked dent in the housing backlogs.
657
 Moreover, these funds remain 
vulnerable to abuse by public servants, something which has not been dealt with decisively.
658
  
 
The steady decline of housing expenditure by the state over the years is a bone of contention 
which needs urgent attention in order to honour constitutional rights and treaty obligations.
659
 
Chetty warns that the cuts in housing expenditure are retrogressive and that the state is in 
breach of meeting its obligations in terms of section 26(2) of the Constitution.
660
  To this end 
economic resources for housing should increase and not decrease, at least until all those 
indigent people, unable to house themselves are in basic shelter. 
 
3.3.2 Minister of Human Settlements: how progressive are the plans for housing? 
 
                                                 
656
Budget Speech 2015 - Parliament available at  
www.parliament.gov.za/content/speech~11.pdf (accessed on 12 April 2016). 
657See  Muller J ‘Human Settlements: New Plans to Dent Housing Backlog Financial Mail 27 February 2015 
available at  
http://www.financialmail.co.za/specialreports/budget2015/2015/02/27/human-settlements-new-plans-to-dent-
housing-backlog (accessed on 10 April 2016); Wertman A ‘There's No Place like Home: Access to Housing for 
all South Africans (2014) 40 Brook.J.IntlL 719. 
658
See chapter 5 on public abuse of social housing allocated budgets. 
659
National Treasury Report (2001) 347 states that housing expenditure declined from R4.5 billion in 1997/8 to 
3.7 in 98/99 to  R3.5 in 1999/200 to R3.4 in 2000/01 to 3.7 in 2001/2 to 3.9 in 2002/3 to R4 billion in 2003/4. 
See chapter 2 for discussion on the international treaty obligations regarding retrogressive measures. 
660Chetty K ‘The Public Finance Implications of Recent Socio-economic Rights Judgments (2009) Law, 
Democracy & Development 246. 
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Currently the national competency of public housing rests with the minister of Human 
Settlements who aims to meet government’s obligation in ensuring that every South African 
has access to permanent housing, providing secure tenure, privacy, protection from the 
elements and access to basic services.
661
 In terms of the Housing Act the DoHS has the 
responsibility to monitor and verify the implementation and performance of human 
settlements programmes and projects country-wide. In tandem with this is the Housing 
Consumers Protection Measures Act
662
 which provides that all new homes must be enrolled 
for inspection 15 days prior to construction. The reason for this being that a minimum of four 
inspections on houses so enrolled is conducted by the NHBRC.
663
 Thus all subsidised public 
housing units countrywide should be inspected by the NHBRC in order to mitigate the risk of 
possible future rectification by government. In this respect a total of 179 930 inspections were 
conducted by the NHBRC for the year 2012/2013.
664
 This should be seen in the context that a 
total of 6 801 units were produced in 2012/13 financial year.
665
 Despite these inspections the 
DoHS’s NRP666 has spent billions on repairing public housing due to poor workmanship and 
thereby exploiting the Human Settlement Development Grant
667
 the funds of which is 
earmarked for building new housing.
668
 This is not a progressive plan that is reasonable 
because due to lack of proper oversight economic resources are spent on substandard work 
and thereby delay others access to housing.
669
  In effect this is a remedial plan. 
 
                                                 
661
Strategic Statement of the Department of Housing available at 
http://www.dhs.gov.za/Content/The%20Department/Strategic%20Statement.htm (accessed on 20 April 2014) 
662
Act 95 of 1998. This Act makes provision for the protection of housing consumers and to provide for the 
establishment and functions of the National Home Build. 
663
 NHBRC s14. 
664
Department of Human Settlements (DoHS) Annual 2012/2013 Report 83 (hereafter DoHS Annual 2012/2013 
Report) available at http://www.gov.za/documents/department-human-settlements-annual-report-20122013 
(accessed on 28 September 2014). 
665
DoHS Annual 2012/2013 Report 47 confirms the following units: 1 628 in KwaZulu-Natal, 673 in Gauteng, 
450 in North West, 2 750 in Mpumalanga and 1 300 in the Western Cape. 
666
See the DoHS National Rectification Programme 2013 available at 
www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/120911nrpimplement_0.doc (accessed on 28 September 2014). 
667
See Human Settlements Development Grant 1st quarter 2013 spending: National Treasury & Department 
Human Settlements briefings September 2014 available at  
 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20130910-human-settlements-development-grant-1st-quarter-2013-spending-
national-treasury-department-human-settlements (accessed on 30 September 2014). 
668
Democratic Alliance ‘R2.129 billion spent on repairing defective RDP Houses’ available at  
http://www.da.org.za/2014/08/r2-129-billion-spent-on-repairing-defective-rdp-houses/ (accessed on 30 
September 2014). Also see South African Government News Agency ‘R1.3bil to be spent on rectifying poorly-
built houses’ (2013) available at  
 http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/r13bil-be-spent-rectifying-poorly-built-houses (accessed on 
29September 2014. 
669See chapter 4 for the judiciary’s reasonableness approach to SERs adjudication. 
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Additional oversight at the DoHS is ostensibly provided by a Risk Management Committee 
charged with assisting the accounting officer in addressing accountability and risk 
management.
 670
  This is done by the Committee evaluating and monitoring the institution’s 
enterprise risk management objectives, strategy and policy at management and operational 
levels. This important Committee has not been optimally functional due to a lack of 
participation from the risk owners (government). Moreover, the fraud risk assessment on the 
DoHS for 2012/2013 has yet to be done.
 671
 Notwithstanding this, since 2007  the SIU has 
been investigating  fraud, corruption and maladministration in respect of the development and 
delivery of public housing in South Africa, by national and provincial departments, local 
authorities (and agents) and Housing Development Boards.
672
 The SIU investigations also 
seek to civilly prosecute and recover monies lost by government as a result of fraudulent 
allocation and accommodation of social housing by government officials who are ineligible to 
receive social housing.
673
 The ongoing investigations into criminality on completed housing 
contracts has not prevented this practice because there is still lack of project application and 
appropriate contractual agreements in compliance with the Housing Act and Housing Code, 
including the progress of payments and tranche payment regimes.
674
  
 
Further transgressions include non-compliance with the prescripts relevant to subsidy 
instrument utilisation; irregular awarding of tenders to service providers; contractual non-
compliance and inadequate monitoring of contractual terms.
 675
 The DoHS Annual 2012/2013 
report also exposes inadequate fiscal control by government, which has a negative impact on 
the use of the available resources. This has a knock-on effect on the delivery of housing, in 
that it stunts progressive realisation to the most desperate and thereby depriving them the 
enjoyment of this right. 
 
3.3.3 How soon will  the most desperate be adequately housed? 
 
                                                 
670
DoHS Annual 2012/2013 Report 96.  Interesting is that this report makes no provisions to minimise conflict 
of interest. 
671
 DoHS Annual 2012/2013 Report 96. 
672
In terms of Presidential Proclamation R.7 of 2007, which was extended by Proclamation R.35 of 2010 and 
R.15 of 2012? See Chapter 5 for an analysis on the SIU Report into housing. 
673
 DoHS Annual 2012/2013 Report 96. 
674
 DoHS Annual 2012/2013 Report 97. See chapter 5 exposing such payments in breach of this legislation. 
675
 DoHS Annual 2012/2013 Report 97. 
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Since 1994 the government, through it National Housing Subsidy Scheme, has delivered 
more than 2 million social houses.
676
 Despite making strides in the delivery of housing to the 
poor there is still a substantial ‘housing backlog’ which has been a bone of contention 
amongst those in desperate need of adequate housing. According to Tissington et al although 
we are made to believe by government that there is a waiting list and people must wait 
patiently for their names to come up in order to get access to a home, this waiting list is a 
façade.
677
 The reality is that there is not a single queue or waiting list, it simply does not exist. 
There are rather a range of different policies and systems in place responding to different 
housing needs. This includes housing-demand databases and the National Housing Need 
Register which allocate housing to qualifying beneficiaries by arbitrarily.
 678
  
 
The facts are that there are numerous entry points for getting state-subsidised housing 
including: informal settlement upgrading; the emergency housing programme which sees to 
housing crises due to eviction or natural disaster; partially state-subsidised rental housing; 
social housing and public rental housing. Moreover, none of these policies consider the length 
of time someone has been on a waiting list. The upgrading of informal settlements and 
emergency housing programmes cater for people irrespective of how long they have been 
registered for a housing subsidy or if they are registered at all.  
 
The public housing projects do not prioritise the poorest and in some instances it depends on 
beneficiaries demonstrating stable employment and income, there is no registration needed 
for this. A serious negative is that a large percentage of people, who received state-subsidised 
housing, either rent or sell their houses for cash and move back to backyard dwellings or 
informal settlements closer to economic and social opportunities. A 2013 investigation 
pointed to shortcomings in the DoHS’s progressive plan to housing. 679 This included the lack 
of clear policy directives between the tiers of government; the lack of systems for early 
detection of public officials doing business with government; the dysfunction of the ward 
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Tissington K  Munshi N Mirugi-Mukundi G &  Durojaye E ‘Jumping the Queue, Waiting Lists and other 
Myths Perceptions and Practices Around  Housing Demand and Allocation in South Africa’ Centre for 
Affordable Housing Finance in Africa July 2013 available at 
http://www.housingfinanceafrica.org/document/jumping-the-queue-waiting-lists-and-other-myths-perceptions-
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Tissington K et al (2013). 
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Tissington K et al (2013). 
679Business of Parliament News ‘Policy Gaps Impact Negatively on Human Settlements Delivery’ (hereafter 
Policy Gaps in Human Settlements) August 2013 available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=3836 (accessed on 29 September 2014). 
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committee system which is key to public participation; and most notable the flawed resource 
utilisation remains a serious obstacle. 
680
 These actions go against the grain of co-operative 
governance. 
 
Most disturbing is that corruption plagues the housing programme due to public servants 
allocating to themselves, state-subsidised housing intended for people in desperate need.
 681
  
This also includes political inspired ‘invasions’ of housing and the payments of bribes to 
access housing.
682
 The perception of corruption also includes opacity, confusion and 
capriciousness that exist within the programme.
683
 
 
3.3.4 South Africa’s Universal Periodic Review on Socio-economic Rights to the 
UNHRC 
 
South Africa is now obliged to report on its progressive realisation of housing to the CESCR 
since ratifying the ICESCR in 2015.
684
 However, since the introduction of the UPR, South 
Africa, under the auspices of being a UN member, has been compelled to report on how it is 
faring in its human rights obligations. At its first appearance before the UNHRC in 2008 the 
government boasted an impeccable track record on their progressive plan and the use of its 
available resources in realising SERs.
 685
 The government was proud to announce that since 
1994, the national housing programme delivered 2.8 million new housing units
686
  (which 
translates to 200 000 units per year until 2008). Noted is that over the last four years (2008 to 
2012) there were only 400 000 new housing units built thus ‘progressive realisation’ slowed 
down. 
687
  
 
In response to the government’s report, the UNHRC and various NGOs submitted criticism 
on the delivery of SERs; in particular housing and related services came under sharp 
                                                 
680
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681
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682
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683
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684
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scrutiny.
688
 UN-Habitat pointed out that although millions of people had been housed with 
access to water, millions remaining in informal settlements are angered and are protesting 
against the long wait for service delivery.
689
 According to Holness this radical participation is 
the only remaining option of a frustrated and disappointed electorate.
690
 Furthermore UN-
Habitat submitted that over 5,279 rural land restitution claims are still outstanding, many of 
them community claims involving thousands of residents.
691
 They reported a failure at all 
levels of government to provide adequate post-settlement support for new settlements which 
lack the most basic supports services such as proper sanitation, water, access to schools, and 
access to livelihood options.
692
 
 
The Special Rapporteur on adequate housing acknowledges the efforts made by South Africa 
to deliver some 30 percent of housing to women-headed households. But the lack of 
affordable housing, lack of timely access to public housing and the inadequate government 
provisions for long-term safe and secure housing remains stark.
693 
 It was noted that too few 
mechanisms were in place to ensure that policies were implemented therefore large numbers 
of people lived in inadequate conditions. In addition there is insufficient support in access to 
housing and related services for the most vulnerable groups (including the homeless, persons 
with disabilities, those living with HIV/AIDS, women, orphans and older people).
 694
 In 
summation the SAHRC
695
 pointed out that it was deeply troubled by reports of government 
corruption because it ‘substantially interfered with the exercise of SERs and also contributed 
                                                 
688
Human Rights Council Report: Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review South Africa Eighth 
Session Agenda Item 6 (23 May 2008) para 1 available at http://www.upr-info.org/en/review/South-
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Western Cape (2012) 13  ESR Review : Economic and Social Rights in South Africa 12. 
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to the poor and the vulnerable being unable to access government services.’ 696   The result of 
this is the right to housing is delayed to these groups.
  
 
On 31 May 2012 South Africa returned for its second session under the UPR which was met 
with states and NGOs, alike, expressing concern about South Africa’s lack of commitment to 
the UPR.
697
 Recommendations generated by states at the second UPR related to: 
‘[e]mpowerment and protection of vulnerable groups; promotion, protection and fulfilment of 
SERs; guarantee universal access to clean drinking water and sanitation; marginalisation, 
social exclusion and economic disparities; attainment of social cohesion and social 
transformation. 
698
 In reply, the South African government submitted that most of the rights to 
be attained were in the rubric of SERs and therefore required the availability of adequate 
resources, which are limited and that therefore these rights would be realised progressively in 
accordance with constitutional imperatives.
699
 Although infrastructure development is 
earmarked to grow the economy,
 700
 there are no pertinent references as to how slowness in 
delivery of housing and related services is to be eliminated. There is also no commitment as 
to how to deal with corruption in the housing programme. This is evident by the delayed 
response by government to the SIU  findings on corruption in housing.
701
 A stark reality of 
state abuse is the current debacle whereby the President abused state resources to fund non-
security features at his private residence, Nkandla.
702
 
 
Notwithstanding international scrutiny under the UPR, the legislature has a constitutional 
obligation of oversight over the executive which is next explored. 
                                                 
696See Wilson ‘Officials took housing for the poor’ in Business Day 23 April 2008 reports that 31 000 
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%202030%20-lo-res.pdf (accessed on 20 June 2014). 
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3.4 The Legislature (Parliament): oversight and accountability in public housing and 
available resources 
 
‘Every legislature in a free society under the Rule of Law should endeavour to give full 
effect to the principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’ 703 
 
The vision of South Africa’s Parliament is: 
 
‘To build an effective people’s Parliament that  is responsive to the needs of the people and 
that is driven by the ideal of realising a better quality of life for all the people of South 
Africa.’ 704 
In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 
705
 the CC confirmed that it accepted that ‘the 
major engine for law reform should be the legislature and not the judiciary’. 706 Parliament707 
is empowered to legislate and ensure that all national organs of state and the executive are 
accountable for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions.
708
  This is 
done by Parliament ensuring government develop strategic objectives that translate into 
programmes with set timelines, objectives and outcomes and the allocation of sufficient 
resources to achieve the outcomes.
709
  
 
Needless to say members of Parliament (MPs) should be familiar with the immediate needs of 
their constituencies and thereby be able to pursue policies and programmes specific to the   
needs and interests of the people. Through its oversight role, Parliament has an important 
function in bringing public participation closer to communities through outreach programmes. 
                                                 
703
This statement was adopted by the ICJ Congress in Delhi 1959. See chapter 6 for discussion on the judiciary 
in India. 
704Parliament of the Republic of South Africa  ‘Our Vision’ Cape Town 2010 available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Category_ID=12 (accessed on 30 September 2014) 
705
 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 36. 
706
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707
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Constitution s55, s92. The Constitution ch4 gives both the NA and the NCOP the power to consider, pass and 
reject legislation and hold the executive accountable.  
709See Whiting S A &  Salmon A ‘ Parliament’s Role in Overcoming Inequality and Structural  
Poverty in South Africa Conference Paper Johannesburg 20 September 2010 available at  
http://www.plaas.org.za/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/whiting%20%26%20salmon.pdf (accessed on 30 
September 2014). 
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Thus rural and urban communities must be engaged by Parliament on a regular basis to assist 
with the participation of the indigent in legislation, policies and other processes that affect 
their lives. In Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others
710
 
and in Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the RSA   and Others,
711
 the court 
found that Parliament had an obligation to facilitate public participation in its legislative 
processes. 
 
Despite public participation being a fundamental attribute that Parliament (provincial and 
local government) must ensure, this is not always the case and often laws are passed without 
adequate public participation.  In fact public participation is one of the key ingredients for the 
realisation of housing but government is often found lacking in this regard. The CC concurs 
that the government does not fare well in engaging the communities in the planning of their 
homes.
712
 The stark reality in practice is that policies do not provide for satisfactory 
implementation in terms of aims and objectives to be met and timelines.
713
   
 
The National Council of Provinces, since 2002 embarked on a programme called ‘Taking 
Parliament to the People’ (TPTTP) where communities enlist on issues relating to access to 
water, sanitation, housing and electricity. This programme invokes criticism from 
communities as to the lack of follow-up visits to sites visited by MPs, after TPTTP events.
714
 
In addition, Parliament is busy establishing Parliamentary Democracy Offices (PDOs) in all 
nine provinces.
 715
 These offices aim to realise the public participation objectives of 
Parliament, create immediate parliamentary presence in all provinces, create efficiency in 
accessing communities, as well as providing ground support for parliamentary programmes. 
 
For this to happen Parliament must encourage and aid the public in tabling public 
participation and public petitions on issues that affect people’s lives negatively such as lack 
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of shelter. To this end the executive must provide Parliament with full and regular reports 
concerning matters under their (the executive) control. Thus the minister of Human 
Settlements should be keeping Parliament informed as to the progressive realisation of 
housing and how they are faring in delivery.
716
 Cognisance should be taken of the fact that the 
legislature has yet to question the adequacy of the government’s progressive plans for 
housing, despite the many protests against slow delivery of housing and poor service delivery. 
This point to a failure of oversight. 
 
3.4.1 Parliamentary control over the executive’s spending of public funds 
 
The central question to consider is how far Parliament contributes to a system of 
‘representative and responsible’ government. 717 Tomkins argues that we should abandon the 
notion that Parliament is principally a legislator and instead see it as a scrutiniser or as 
regulator of government.
718
 
 
Parliamentary control over the executive’s spending of public funds has remained a central 
feature of the constitutional dispensation in South Africa over decades. This is the function of 
the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA).  This is fashioned on the  British 
constitutional law, the Bill of Rights of 1688 which not only ensures that the executive is 
subject to the rule of law, but also limits the crown’s prerogative to raise and spend public 
funds without having to account to anyone.
719
 To this extent Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures exercised control over the expenditure of money by their respective executives 
since the Union of South Africa in 1910. Moreover, when South Africa became a democracy 
these provisions were enacted in the Constitution.
720
 Notwithstanding this, Parliament has no 
relationship of financial control regarding local government contracts.
721
 Although the rule of 
                                                 
716
See Department of Human Settlements Annual 2012/2013 Report. Also see Human Settlements Budget 2014 
available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2014/enebooklets/Vote%2031%20Human%20Settle
ments.pdf (accessed on 28 September 2014); Legacy Report of the Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements 
on its activities undertaken during the 4th Parliament (May 2009 – March 2014) 13 March 2014 available at  
http://www.pmg.org.za/legacy-report-portfolio-committee-human-settlements-its-activities-undertaken-during-
4th-parliament-may-2009-march-2014-dated-13 (accessed on 28 September 2014). 
717
 Leyland P The Constitution of the United Kingdom: A Contextual Analysis (2012) ch5 para v. 
718
 Tomkins A ‘What is Parliament for’ in Bamforth N & Leyland P Public Law in a Multilayered Constitution 
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parliamentary control of public funds has been restated in both post 1994 constitutions, the 
PFMA
722
 is the statutory provision for the appropriation of payments of all contractual debts 
in national and provincial government.  
 
As it stands, parliamentary scrutiny mainly focuses on the executive’s broad strategy for 
public expenditure and it very seldom scrutinises the individual items of departmental 
expenditure.
 723
 Therefore the effectiveness of parliamentary control is also in doubt because 
it is very difficult to prove that adequate funds are not appropriated because of the fact that 
appropriations are voted for under broad heads.
724
  There is a need for Parliament to pay 
closer scrutiny to the obligations of the executive in its duties to realise housing. The MPs are 
accountable to their constituents and should have their best interests at heart insofar as access 
to housing. In this regard Parliament has the power to call the executive to account on their 
deliverables. This power should be effectively used to enquire into national government’s 
progressive plans for housing, particularly due to the fact that housing delivery is lagging. 
 
McLean argues that the dominance of the executive in national government undermines 
Parliament as merely rubber stamping executive policy by enacting legislation.
725
 Floyd 
concurs that the effectiveness of parliamentary financial control is particularly questionable 
when the executive has the support of the majority in the legislature.
726
  Moreover, due to its 
one-party majority, Parliament and the executive branch is never in conflict and contested 
laws by opposition parties fail, leaving democratic processes vulnerable to neglect of proper 
oversight by Parliament. 
 
Most notably, the requirement of parliamentary appropriation of funds provides a large 
measure of protection for public funds and is in the public interest.
727
 In this regard 
parliamentary financial control is still the most important form of control over the executive 
in many modern democracies.
 728
  This means Parliament retains control over the executive 
and is free to refuse to appropriate funds for a specific contract.
 
Arrowsmith argues that 
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parliamentary appropriation should include all processes which pursue government 
procurement.
 729
 This oversight will go far in procurement of contracts to build public housing 
which often is the subject of irregular payments.
730
 Crucial would be parliamentary 
monitoring and evaluating of development, spending and the implementation policies and 
programmes on SERs, over a long time. This would be a Parliament living up to its 
constitutional obligations. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The positive strides that government has made in the delivery of housing cannot be disputed. 
Nonetheless the zealous delivery of housing at the start of democracy has dwindled into lack 
of cohesion between the levels of government, whether in policy or available resources. The 
three levels of government have to constantly strive to realise SERs and there can never be a 
moment where the state can be passive bystanders, let alone direct beneficiaries of the public 
purse. 
 
Most national housing programmes take the integrated residential development programme 
approach, which comprises of planning, services and upgrading informal settlement. There is 
no sharp focus to particularly house the most desperate first, as such their plight remains 
prolonged. There is a definite need to change focus on the progressive plan by providing 
basic shelter soonest for those living in intolerable conditions. The lack of available resources 
cannot serve as a reason for delaying core-minimums, especially in light of the rampant abuse 
of public funds. As it is, there are sufficient economic resources which are abused in the sense 
that government has spent billions on rectifying poor workmanship. This situation prevails 
because the government fails to  exert proper oversight through its own mechanisms put in 
place for this very reason such as, the NHBRC and the SANS. 
 
The evolution of SERs should be monitored on an ongoing basis by institutions such as the 
SAHRC in order to evaluate the state’s continuous performance in the implementation.  Such 
monitoring should be spearheaded by Parliament in its oversight role as representative of the 
people. Therefore public participation in the planning and development of housing should be 
encouraged and monitored as an integral part of the progressive realisation of housing. As 
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things stand now Parliament in effect is playing a more reactive role as oppose to a 
supervisory or proactive role. 
 
Such a proactive role will include a more serious look at ethics and conflict of interests which 
is an albatross around the neck of social progress in the housing programme and should be at 
the forefront of parliamentary inquiry. In this regard Parliament should be executing 
passionate oversight over the available resources for SERs to keep the progressive realisation 
of housing on track and thereby keep their constituents happy. In a constitutional democracy 
this oversight should be without fear or favour of political affiliation and be in line with 
constitutional obligations. The people deserve no less than a Parliament that represents the 
realisation of their constitutional rights and what could be more dignifying than a home when 
there is none. 
 
How the judiciary, the third branch of government is faring in interpreting the right to 
housing, is discussed next. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Judiciary: Conservative or Progressive Interpreter of the Right to Housing 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
State institutions must be strengthened to prevent the state from illegitimately gaining 
economic power which may lead to an increase in state power and thereby arbitrariness of the 
state in performance of its duties. In order to combat such arbitrariness the progressive 
realisation of housing is ideally collective effort by the three branches of government. 
Following on from chapter three, the role of the executive and Parliament in their duties to 
effect the right to housing, this chapter aims to analyse how the judiciary has interpreted the 
state’s duty towards the realisation of the right. This would entail looking at the 
transformation that the Constitution envisages for South Africa. Thereafter this chapter will 
explore whether the judiciary is embracing the constitutional obligations in transforming its 
approach towards the interpretation of SERs and more particularly the right to housing. In this 
endeavour the constitutional obligations of the judiciary are explored.  
 
The judiciary has been commended around the world for its liberal approach in the 
justiciability of SERs generally and specifically in housing through the landmark Grootboom 
judgement. This has opened the door to various court challenges in the realisation of housing, 
endowing the court with rich jurisprudence on the interpretation of the right. Despite this 
tapestry the challenge that needs to be met is the fact that the realisation of housing the most 
desperate remains elusive, although the court has compelled government to implement certain 
aspects of housing soonest to vulnerable groups.  The aim is to establish whether the judiciary 
has used its prowess a as voice for the indigent and vulnerable to keep government in check 
on its promised progression in delivering social housing. 
 
The discourse on how the judiciary interprets SERs is contested by those who argue that more 
could be done to give content to, for example the right to housing. This chapter aims to 
elaborate on how the judiciary has interpreted the right to housing through the reasonableness 
test. The idea is to see whether the court’s approach could be widened to embrace a more 
flexible approach to the interpretation of the right to housing that would accelerate the tardy 
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response by government in its delivery.  This would also assist in bringing the judiciary in 
line with the vision of transformation as espoused in the Constitution. 
 
Further scrutiny will be given to the role of the court in curbing public sector corruption in 
order to protect the available resources for SERs, from graft in government. To give clarity to 
this the Public Protector’s report investigating the abuse of state resources by the President, 
also receives scrutiny. To complement this, attention is given to the subsequent CC challenge 
to compel the President to comply with the findings of the Public Protector (PP) depicting the 
unlawful enrichment of the President through undue benefits derived from the state’s 
economic resources, for personal gain. 
 
Light will also be shed on judicial scrutiny as regards the way in which the government 
response to court orders and particular with regard to housing. Whilst on this topic the NPA’s 
reaction to judicial process into corruption charges of the President is also elucidated in order 
to highlight the prosecution’s tardiness on tackling public office corruption, in a quest to 
protect the available resources for SERS. 
 
4.2 Transformative constitutionalism 
 
The South African government has transformed from parliamentary sovereignty with a 
mostly positivist judiciary applying discriminatory apartheid laws prior to 1994, to a more 
natural-law approach judiciary informed by a transformative Constitution.  Therefore, at the    
heart of the Constitution is the dismantling of systemic discrimination aimed at social and 
economic disadvantage of the majority, which had maimed equality and dignity as set out in 
the Constitution.
731
 Due to this discriminatory legacy the Constitution aims at transforming 
the lives of the majority in order to restore equilibrium and thereby attempt to heal the 
divisions of the past. This makes the Constitution a bridge from an authoritarian past to a 
democratic future which must lead to a culture in which every exercise of power is expected 
to give account of itself.
732
  De Vos argues that the constitutional text itself in particular the 
sections dealing with rights, points to the transformative nature of the obligations imposed by 
                                                 
731
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example, must be understood against our legacy of deep social inequality.’ Also see Preamble of Constitution; 
Sunstein C Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (2001). 
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the Constitution’s various provisions.733  This vision of a transformative nation should be 
seen in the light of a political remodelling that envisages facilitating and enhancing the 
country’s social and economic dialogue.  
 
Du Plessis presents redress and transformation in two approaches, namely monumental and 
memorial constitutionalism.
734
  Monumental constitutionalism ties in with the preamble of the 
Constitution by invoking the past but recognises the limits of law and constitutionalism.
 735
 
The monumental approach views transformation and redress as a procedural process and 
focuses exclusively on material needs.
736
 This approach is instrumental and functionalist and 
concerned with implementing policies, programmes and legal rules designed to eradicate 
racialised inequality, discrimination and injustice.
 737
  This approach points more to formal 
equality and does not embrace the effect that the past policies and laws still have on the 
indigent. A memorial approach is open to multiple directions and movements, and recognises 
both the material and non-material needs of people.
738
 This approach resonates with victims 
of gross human rights violations, socio-economic inequalities and injustices in their daily 
lives.  This approach is in parallel with substantive equality which recognises the existence of 
past inequalities as indicated by the Constitution in the equality clause.
739
  It is with this 
historical approach in mind that the Constitution should be applied and in doing so the 
judiciary must promote substantive equality.  The Constitution facilitates transformation 
through the memorial approach and thus operates in the historical context of South African 
society and thereby places a duty on the state to hasten this transformation.
 740
  
 
In order for all to live in dignity the Constitution should be the blueprint for poverty 
eradication and economic transformation. Section 7 (2) is part of the transformative ethos of 
the Constitution which demands  that the state respect, protect,  promote and fulfil those 
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rights in the Bill of Rights (BoR).
 741
 This point to the fact that all laws must answer to the 
BoR whereby the prevailing laws must produce constitutionally accepted distribution of 
basic, life-sustaining goods.
 742
 Should the state violate the Constitution, it should undertake 
to rearrange the background rules in order to yield a constitutionally adequate level of access 
to the minimum components of human welfare.
743
 Thus, a transformative government 
committed to social change.  
 
Van Marle’s view on transformative constitutionalism, which is compared to Brazil’s 
reconstructive attempts, shows the tension between the ideal, dream and reality.
744
 The author 
draws attention to the constitutional promise of Brazil which envisaged the development of a 
new urbanism, promoting collective consciousness in pursuit of detaching from the 
inegalitarian past. However this utopia failed to be achieved because social integration 
failed.
745
 Despite the ethical limitations and complexities of law, transformative 
constitutionalism dictates that the law should be broadened by interpretation and thereby 
promotes a natural-law approach which embraces law and morality as one.
746
 In promotion of 
substantive equality the law must be developed to advance equality through access to SERs, 
in order for the divide between rich and poor to wane. This is the core reason why the 
Constitution has to be underscored with historical interpretation to accentuate those past 
injustices. Quintessentially, the judiciary is the custodian of this transformative constitution 
and possesses the prowess to hold government accountable on its implementation. 
 
4.3 Transformative judiciary  
 
Budlender maintains a key theme of the Constitution is that the transformation is yet to 
come.
747
 Therefore, for transformation to happen judges are compelled to facilitate the 
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creation of the kind of society that the Constitution envisages.
 748
 Needless to say such a 
society would embrace access to all human rights. Therefore the interpretation of the 
Constitution must accelerate transformation envisaged to bring about economic and social 
liberties so as to invoke social justice.  
During apartheid, the judiciary generally applied the law mechanically and thereby 
perpetuated the discriminatory laws which manifested the social inequalities still prevalent 
today. According to Dugard, historically the judiciary adopted an excessively ‘positivistic’ or 
‘literal’ approach towards interpretation of statutes.749 Contemporary South Africa boasts a 
judiciary unfettered by parliamentary influence and strengthened by the supreme law of the 
Constitution.  Thus the judiciary should embrace the transformative Constitution and thereby 
dispense with a positivistic approach which does not bode well with substantive equality. The 
Constitution invites a new imagination about legal method, analysis and reasoning.
750
 Davis 
and Klare decry that jurists continue to deploy traditional methods of legal analysis despite 
the existence of a transformative Constitution accentuated by social independence
751
  and 
substantive equality.   
 
In contrast to Klare’s view, Roux reasons that transformative constitutionalism is but one type 
of interpretation of the Constitution amongst other plausible reading strategies.
752
 This author 
believes that transformative constitutionalism is highlighted by politically engaged and 
transparent methods of constitutional interpretation.
753
 This means that judges will have to 
consider post-liberal readings as an ideological project and which they have a duty to promote 
through the process of adjudication.
754
  Modiri on the other hand, has a distrust of formal 
legal reform and its capacity to effect real and substantive change because there remains a 
racial underclass in the most progressive of constitutional democracies.
755
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Waldron argues that judges have to be concerned about the courts’ legitimacy in settling 
disputes over complex moral issues.
 756
 Therefore, judges make their decisions based on 
theories of interpretation rather than direct argument involving moral issues. In saying this, 
cognisance should be taken of the fact that it is more difficult for judges to defend their 
legitimacy because unlike elected legislators,
757
 judges do not hold their positions through 
adult suffrage. Therefore a single meaning cannot be attuned to transformation. Rather it is a 
process which includes the appointment of judges, diversification of the judiciary, changing 
attitudes of the judiciary and the need to foster greater judicial accountability.
758
  
 
Transformation means there must be an improvement from the state of affairs that had existed 
previously under apartheid. The need is for a judiciary that not only sympathises with the 
plight of the poor, but holds government to account for their promises of delivery. 
Progressive realisation insists on a judiciary that interrogates the delayed delivery of social 
housing.
759
 
 
Unlike before, the appointment of judges is subject to constitutional prescripts whereby the 
Judicial Service Commission advises the President, who in turn makes appointments on these 
recommendations.
 760
  The transformation of judicial attitudes has on the whole been positive. 
This is apparent in  the judiciary morphing from not effectively curbing abuses of power by 
branches of government prior to 1994, to a judiciary that treasures its institutional 
independence and uses its power to test government conduct and legislation against the 
Constitution.
 
Notwithstanding this, the judiciary has been urged by various authors to 
transform from a legal culture of conservatism to transformative constitutionalism.
761
 The 
contention is that conventional   legal culture has the potential to constrain the transformative 
project.
762
  
 
Klare sees the South African legal culture as conservative, not in a political sense but in terms 
of ‘traditions of analyses.763  This legal culture is steeped in the common law and Roman-
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Dutch traditions influenced by decades of apartheid-rule.
764
 The common law prior to 1994 
was developed under a regime tainted with apartheid laws. Now the common law should be 
developed by the court in a substantive manner, thereby creating access to rights previously 
deprived from certain population groups.
765
  Moreover the CC declared that the common law 
should not be trapped in the past, but rather be ‘revisited and revitalised’ in full regard for the 
purport and objects of the BoR.
766
 this attitude will feed into the creation of realistic equality.  
In order to create realistic equality, the delivery of social housing to the most desperate must 
receive priority and the tardy realisation of government in this regard should fall under 
judicial scrutiny.
767
  
 
Moreover, oversight over the available resources for housing should not be left solely to 
Parliament and the executive which have not only exercised grotesquely poor management 
but have also shown disregard for legislative prescripts. This is all the more damaging in light 
of the fact that the legal prescripts were formulated post-1994 by legislators which include 
member of the ruling party. Therefore a more transformed judiciary should adopt new and 
innovative ways to hold government to its obligations to protect the available resources 
against malfeasance on the part of the state. This is a task the judiciary is obliged to take on if 
it is to assist in the realisation of the constitutional obligations to housing, fully, and thereby 
subscribe to the transformative nature of the Constitution.  Moreover in light of the poor 
performance of the executive the role of the judiciary is all the more vital. 
 
Regrettably the judiciary in lower courts is not seen as being sufficiently assertive in ‘pushing 
the transformation envelope’ in particular in bringing about a more equitable distribution of 
resource.
 768
 The judiciary is obliged to give meaning to the right to housing and when faced 
with such a challenge it should evaluate how the government complies with its duties insofar 
as reasonable legislative measures and progressive realisation are concerned. In this 
evaluation it is incumbent upon the judiciary to enquire into the time delays in delivery and 
other underlying factors that retard for instance the delivery of social housing. This would 
lead to decisions that are rooted in the constitution, as opposed to being rooted in personal 
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benefits as displayed by members of government.  Such decisions must translate into 
achieving sustainable development of living conditions and the overall quality of life to 
ensure the happiness of the human family.
769
 All in all, we seek a judiciary that adopts a 
progressive approach to achieve goals that the Constitution promotes. Moreover, 
interpretation of the Constitution should embrace a transformative approach and thereby 
guard against a mere inclusionary approach.
770
 It therefore makes sense that decision making 
through the judicial branch should incorporate international legal rules. 
 
Dugard argues that the judiciary ‘remains institutionally unresponsive to the problems of the 
poor and it fails to advance transformative justice’.771 This sentiment is further given 
prominence by Bilchitz who notes that the court’s analysis is often at a level of abstraction far 
removed from the actual suffering of individuals, which leads to a jurisprudence that places 
deference to the government above vulnerability of individuals.
 772
 Where the state fails to 
perform its legislative and constitutional duties towards realising SERs, the court should be 
petitioned to intervene and strike a balance between its own sphere of influence and its duty 
to keep the state accountable and answerable.
773
 Transformation demands that the courts do 
more than deference, by supervising implementation of its orders. For the sake of continuity 
the progressive realisation of SERs should be monitored by the courts over a long period of 
time. Davis maintains that the Court engages in old style legal methodology and the more 
radical transformative possibilities of SERs are placed upon the jurisprudential backburner.
774
 
To this end the broader historical lessons informing the reason for social change were 
hampered and transformation slowed down.  
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Although the judiciary is not the panacea for the realisation of SERs, it is the only forum that 
can truly sanction the government for dereliction of its constitutional obligations and duties. 
The conservative rule-bound approach of the judiciary of the past should be energised by a 
judiciary that observes the rules but also cares that the past imbalances be equalised. This 
would complement the transformation envisaged by the Constitution. In these endeavours it is 
naturally important to preserve the sanctity of the separation of powers. 
 
4.3.1 Is separation of powers threatened by a transformative judiciary? 
 
One of the cornerstones of democracy is the separation of powers doctrine which sees 
government’s power spread over the legislative, executive and judicial branches of 
government. According to Locke this doctrine combats the over concentration of state power 
in that it promotes that none of the three institutions of government is paramount.
 775
 In 
essence the executive should possess the expertise to give effect to the rights espoused by the 
Constitution and the judiciary should give real content to, for instance, the right to housing. 
Burns argues that responsive governance refers to a government that ‘is alert to the needs of 
its people and addresses those needs’.776 
 
 
Although judges are not elected by the public, unlike the members to the legislature, the 
judiciary is the interpreter of the Constitution and thereby ideally should function as the voice 
of the poor. It thus stands to reason that we should not let separation of powers stunt the 
ability of the judiciary to protect those in desperate need of housing, due to inadequate 
governance.  In TAC the CC stated that the observance of respect for the branches of 
government did not mean that that the courts cannot and should not make orders that have an 
impact on policy.
777
 The best way to do this is where there is a dereliction of constitutional 
duties in terms of SERs; the court has to do more than deferring to the executive. They can do 
this by compelling report backs on progress of implementation of court orders concerning 
SERs.
778
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There are a number of cases that indicate that the separation of powers is not absolute.
779
 If 
the state neglects its constitutional obligations, the judiciary is mandated by the Constitution 
to intrude for effective relief that may affect policy and legislation, thus meaning it is not 
limited to a declaratory order,
780
 as in Grootboom.  A typical example where the judiciary 
should provide guidance to the executive is where there is misuse of authority and abuse of 
available resources which consequently lead to delay in access to housing.  Such guidance 
should lead to an attitude in favour of protecting public resources and of obeying 
constitutional obligations. Failure to do this renders judicial review of public administration, 
meek and does not bode well for the aspirations of transformative constitutionalism which 
South Africa seeks. Moreover, separation of powers is not threatened by a transformative 
judiciary because the court is not asked to second guess the state. When tasked with the 
adjudication of the violation of the right to housing, the court is there to assess the time-
frames that have lapsed and how ‘reasonable’ the progressive plan is.781 Should this inquiry 
not happen then the many waiting for social housing are at the mercy of the government’s 
time-frames which is shameful, judging from the large numbers that are still living in 
intolerable and desperate situations despite the court orders in Grootboom.
782
 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) held that a court of law must interfere in appropriate 
cases when an organ of state is consistently failing in its functions and obligations, 
particularly, insofar as it affects the plight of poor.
783
  An example of this is where public 
officials launched an unnecessary appeal against a case that they did not have sufficient 
evidence for.
784
 The SCA lamented the abuse of state funds and made a de bonis propriis  cost 
order against the said officials. However, the CC was not in agreement with this order on a 
technicality and thereby did not deem it correct to personally hold the abusive public officials 
accountable for costs.  
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Nonetheless, where the indigent is failed by the executive due to undue delays of access to 
basic SERs, a court must come to their assistance.
785
 This would be well served by mandatory 
or supervisory orders to force government to respond speedily to provide a plan of action with 
time-frames in compliance with the court order. To achieve this, the court should prescribe 
the consequences for state omissions and cases of non-implementation. As such, the court 
should direct compliance to government and monitor the implementation of those directions. 
Such monitoring is best suited to the SAHRC which is empowered by the Constitutions in 
terms of chapter nine to do just that.  Moreover the doctrine of separation of powers would 
not protect the executive where there had been a clear dereliction of its constitutional powers 
and duties which warrants a mandatory order.
 786
  The flagrant disregard on the part of 
government of constitutional obligations demands a more proactive involvement of the 
courts. In essence the court should act decisively to protect the rights of those affected by 
such disregard or breach of duty. 
 
4.3.2 The Constitutional Court jurisprudence on SERs: the reasonableness test  
 
Generally the courts control the lawful application of political power and the protection of 
individual and minority rights as provided by the Constitution or other legislation. In the 
adjudication of SERs, judges generally assess government’s compliance in measuring it 
against constitutional or statutory standards which include reasonableness, adequateness, 
proportionality, rationality, equality and non-retrogression. Reasonableness is a requisite of 
section 26 (2) which requires the state to take 'reasonable legislative or other measures, within 
its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right'. Section 26 (2) 
requires the state’s positive duty to be reasonable and a reasonable housing policy should 
target those who can afford to pay for affordable housing and those who cannot.  
 
Roux’s view is that the CC has ‘managed its role with the Legislature and the Executive by 
sometimes compromising on legal principle in the long-term interest of the constitutional 
project’.787 The CC in its reasonableness approach rather focuses on procedure instead of 
substance by pointing to administrative law, in the few adjudicated SERs cases. The South 
African courts contend that they employ a sui generis concept of reasonableness, best for the 
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adjudication of SERs with emphasis being on human dignity and equality.
788
 However, 
criticism is aimed at how easily reasonableness descends into mere deference to the 
executive.
789
 This tendency to defer to the executive has exacerbated the stark inequality 
relating to SERs amongst the citizenry.  
 
 
In South Africa the judicial discourse on SERs started through four different judgements.
 790
 
First, the Certification case where the Court affirmed the inclusion and the justiciability of 
SERs.
 791
  Second, in Soobramoney the question of reasonableness reared its head in 
challenging a SER relating to health.  This was the first major case where access to SERs was 
contested in the CC.  The Court used the reasonableness test and found that the state’s refusal 
to give daily dialysis was not a limitation on the right to health but should rather have been 
seen as a case of equal access being given to everyone due to the ration on access to 
resources.  Hence the Court found the health policy to be reasonable.
792
  The Court did not 
want to substitute its view with that of the medical staff who is in a better position to judge 
who needs medical care and when. Basically the CC adopted a rational approach which 
deferred to government, thereby sending the problem back to government who created the 
void in resources in the first place. Instead of providing a formula that enabled the 
government to renege on it responsibilities, human rights activists and NGOs expected the 
Court to pressurise the government to progressively realise SERs. 
 
Third, Grootboom is the first case contesting the right to housing, for a community of 900 
shack-dwellers which included an overwhelming amount of children.
793
  The claim to the 
court rested on two provisions of the Constitution. First, section 26 which provides for access 
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to housing for everyone, thereby placing a positive obligation upon the state. Secondly, 
section 28(1) (c) which provides for children to have the right to shelter, unconditionally. The 
CC set out that a government plan for housing had to be reasonable in both design and 
implementation; should not exclude a significant segment of the population; it had to be 
coherent, setting out clear tasks for the three levels of government; and had to ensure the 
required human and financial resources being made available to implement the programme.
794
 
Using the reasonableness test as a barometer, the Court found the housing plan including the 
legislative measures of government to be unreasonable.
795
  The Court found that  the 
legislative demands of s26 (2) were not met because the Housing Act 
796
 made no express 
provision to facilitate access to temporary relief for those in desperate need, namely those 
with no access to land, no roof over their heads and living in crisis conditions due to natural 
disasters. Because of the absence of appropriate legislative measures this group’s immediate 
crisis was not dealt with because housing authorities could not state when adequate housing 
would become available to this community. 
 
The reasonableness test makes a number of enquiries on progressive realisation by looking at 
the comprehensiveness of the measures the government has put in place. This includes the 
financial prudence, time-lines for completion of plans and flexibility measures which respond 
to short-term crises and changes.
 797
 When enforcing the right to housing the court is required 
to look at the state’s  positive action first to determine the steps that have been taken and if 
those were the appropriate steps. The reasonableness of the steps and how they will be 
implemented is the primary enquiry of the court. Therefore, the CC pointed out in Grootboom 
that the housing programme would require continuous review because conditions do not 
remain static.
798
 Nonetheless, after using the reasonableness test and thereby deferring the 
Grootboom community to the government, the CC had not lived up to its own 
recommendations namely, continuous review of the housing programme. 
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The outcome of Grootboom frustrated the attainment of progressive realisation of the 
nationwide housing programme.  The Court was criticised for giving a declaratory instead of 
a supervisory order, thereby leaving the state to remedy its own shortcomings.
799
  
Notwithstanding this, shortcomings such as homelessness and inadequate basic shelter test 
the desperate and vulnerable to date. This shows that although government updated the 
legislation to housing to include prioritising housing for these groups, their programme for 
delivery is still not reasonable as it lacks time-frames as to when it will house the most 
desperate.
800
 Thus the reasonableness test does not suffice. 
 
Fourth was the TAC case which contested access to health in the form of anti-retroviral drugs 
in order to prevent mother to child infection of HIV/AIDS. The Court used various aspects of 
reasonableness to reject the government’s justifications and found that the policy was not 
reasonable because it was inflexible and did not take into account a significant segment of 
society.
801
 This progressive approach the Court took was welcomed as it directed the 
government to roll-out these drugs to all in such need, despite monetary constraints. 
However, the CC stood steadfast on its reasonableness approach and did not consider that 
their order pointed to a minimum that the government must do for this group. 
802
 A better 
reasoning for the Court would have been to use the minimum core approach which would 
have indicated that at least pregnant women should be afforded the drugs that prevented 
mother-to-child infection of HIV.  
 
Davis observes that the influence of legal cultures is pivotal to the jurisprudential process.
803
  
It is a conservative legal culture that led to the court opting for the traditional reasonableness 
approach in SERs cases, which favours deferment to the executive and legislature and thereby 
setting innocuous precedent. In this light it can be said that a conservative legal culture has 
brought about marginal change, instead of reconstructive change to the entire legal system in 
South Africa. 
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McLean notes that the reasonableness test has permitted courts largely to avoid substantive 
engagement with the content of the right and rather to focus on the reasonableness of the 
state’s action in fulfilling the right. 804 The immediate consequences thereof are delayed 
delivery and the perpetuation of undignified housing conditions.  In other words the court 
effectively diminished its own social role which in turn is detrimental to the poor in South 
Africa.
805
   This can be seen in the effect of deference to government which the 
reasonableness test provoked and which was employed in adjudicating Grootboom. This 
would not have been the case if the CC had used the jurisprudence derived from international 
precedent as regards the minimum core, instead of the reasonableness test.
806
 
 
4.3.3 The appropriateness of the reasonableness test (as opposed to the minimum core) 
 
Davis maintains there should be a far more rigorous deconstruction of all legal principles 
which entails a more critical promise of social and economic transformation as contained in 
the constitutional text.
807
 According to Pieterse, judicially enforcing SERs is difficult but if 
tensions are approached pragmatically, the courts would be able to strike an appropriate 
balance between vigilance and deference.
808
 To achieve this court were to consider the 
historically induced deprivation of housing in the context of which minimums should be 
delivered soonest. This would echo the natural law character of the Constitution. 
 
Notwithstanding this the reasonableness test as applied by the court has not brought about 
prudence by government when it comes to housing the homeless and those living in 
intolerable situations. Government is lagging behind on housing the neediest and therein lies 
the criticism of the court for not having looked at the minimum social needs of the 
impoverished.
809
 The result of this is that the court has not given content to SERs because no 
minimum requisite was earmarked to house homeless and desperate people. This is despite 
that the ICESCR
810
 protects the minimum core as its raison d’être.  
 
                                                 
804
Mclean K Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2009) 211. 
805
Mclean K (2009) 211. 
806
 See chapter 2 for discussion on the minimum core as the reason d’etre of the ICESCR. 
807
 Davis D M (2010) 110. 
808
 Pieterse M 'Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights' (2004) 20 SAJHR 417. 
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 See chapter 2 for discussion on the minimum core. 
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The term ‘minimum core content’ is considered as the intrinsic value of SERs in that it is the 
essential element that gives the rights their substance. For example for an illustration on the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health, the following constitute core obligations: ‘to 
ensure access to basic shelter, housing including sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe 
and portable water’.811 This minimum core is the floor beneath which the conduct of the state 
must not drop in compliance with its obligation towards each right.
 
This means that in the 
right to housing the state should at least ensure that access to the indigent without homes or 
those in intolerable circumstances are prioritised within the resources available for housing. 
Doing so will speak to the minimum core approach.  
 
To this end where any significant number of individuals is deprived of basic shelter, which is 
the current situation in South Africa, the state is prima facie failing in its obligations under the 
ICESCR.
 812
 Moreover a state party failing to meet its minimum obligations must demonstrate 
that every effort has been made to use all resources that are available, optimally.
813
 South 
Africa’s government is not faring well in this endeavour because it has not used its resources 
optimally: the social housing programme is tainted with corruption in the public service, by 
the very people entrusted to manage the resources.
814
 
 
Sepulveda and Nyst argue for a social protection floor limit in that this can assist states in 
fulfilling their human rights obligations under international and regional human rights 
instruments in ensuring the enjoyment of minimum levels of SERs.
815
 The reasonableness test 
does not allow for such a floor limit in the fulfilment of rights.  The promotion of a minimum 
social protection is to extend the rights so as to guarantee effective access to goods and 
services for all throughout their life cycle.
816
 This follows, because a social protection has the 
potential to assist in realising the right to an adequate standard of living, including rights to 
adequate food and shelter.   
                                                 
811
CESCR General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (2000) para 43. 
812
GC no 3 (1990) para 10.  
813
GC no 3 (1990) para 10. See below at  para 4.4.1for discussion on how the President failed in this endeavour. 
814
See chapter 5 for a discussion on the SIU investigations into corruption in housing. 
815
See Sepulveda M & Nyst C The Human Rights Approach to Social Protection (2012). 
816
See Social Protection Floor for a Fair and Inclusive Globalization (2011) ILO. In 2012 the ILO Conference 
adopted a recommendation (No. 202) for nationally defined minimum levels of income security in the form of 
various social transfers which include universal, affordable access to essential social services.  Also note the UN 
adopted a Global Initiative, the Social Protection Floor Programmes (SPFs) in 2009 which  envisaged the 
eradication of poverty as its main goal and six targets for social upliftment,  namely food security, housing,  
health care, education , social security, water and sanitation. The UN Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty 
recommends the adoption of SPFs in all countries for sustainable development. 
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In the Southern African context, the minimum social protection floor should be defined as a 
basic floor of social protection beneath which no one falls. For instance the Grootboom 
community was a case in point where impoverished people were rendered beneath the 
minimum social protection by losing their humble inadequate shelter. The advantage of 
applying the minimum core obligation ensures satisfaction of at least the very minimum 
essential levels of each right incumbent upon every state party to provide.
 
 
 
Another disappointing judgement was the recent court quest Nokotyana where the inhabitants 
of an informal settlement asked over many years for basic sanitation. Most significant, is that 
the court found the community to be living in ‘no-man’s land’ and therefore they could not 
lay claim to basic services. This is in spite of the fact that the Housing Act promotes the 
upgrading of informal settlements, as per the dictates of Grootboom. In addition, to 
proliferate basic sanitation to all the Water Services Act 
817
 provides for national standards for 
basic sanitation. Thus the CC again avoided in giving real content to the right to housing 
which should include basic sanitation and thereby the Court ignored the bare minimum needs 
of the community.  In the light of Nokotyana the court failed to use the opportunity to uplift 
the poor by not even ordering the minimum in basic sanitation. The court did not want to 
pronounce on the insufficiency of one pit latrine for 10 families. The minimum need of this 
community was simply one toilet per five families, a minimum requirement to uphold their 
inherent dignity. This approach of the court does not blend well with the makings of a 
transformative judiciary. In its reasonableness approach judges have been criticised for 
placing deference to the government above the vulnerability of individuals.
818
 In Mazibuko
819
 
the CC again rejected the minimum core obligations stating that ‘it must fail for the same 
reasons that the minimum core argument failed in Grootboom and TAC’.820  
 
The CC held that as a general rule it would be difficult for an applicant to challenge the 
reasonableness of a government policy based on a particular minimum standard if the 
                                                 
817
Act 108 of 1997. 
818
See Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights: the Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights 
(2007) 160, 162; Steinberg C ‘Can Reasonableness Protect the Poor? A Review of South Africa’s Socio-
Economic Rights Jurisprudence’ (2006) 123 SALJ 264; Young K ‘The Minimum Core of Economic and Social 
Rights: A Concept in Search of Content’ (2008) 33 Yale J Int’L 50. 
819
Paragraph 56. This was the first case in South Africa dealing with the right to have access to sufficient water, 
protected in section 27(1) (b) of the Constitution. The CC found the government’s allocation of water to be 
reasonable. 
820
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reasonableness of that minimum standard were not questioned.
 821
 Lest we forget that the 
delay over 22 years to house the homeless and destitute does not tie in with a plan that is 
deemed ‘reasonable’. These groups live in hope of a minimum requirement for housing, a 
basic shelter. 
 
The CC has been criticised for failing to use the minimum core and seeking refuge instead in 
the reasonableness test and thereby not placing the needs of citizens at the centre of its 
enquiry.
822
 This is so because the state is unduly concentrating on constructing permanent 
houses for as many people as possible over time, instead of adopting a polycentric approach 
which sees to basic shelter for the desperate first, whilst planning ahead for more permanent 
housing. Wesson criticise the CC’s use of administrative law - instead of the minimum core 
approach as promoted by international human rights instruments.
 823
 The author argues that 
the current status of court proceedings begs that if the matter is brought back to court the 
standard would again be that of reasonableness whereby the government would have to 
explain its programme and be subjected to evaluation by the court.
 824
  The problem with this 
procedural approach is that time-frames are left solely to the whims of the government which, 
as mentioned, lacks good track record in delivering of shelter to the most needy timeously, 
thus exacerbating inequality.  
 
The contention that the minimum core is too onerous and needs too much information to 
enforce
825
  is dispelled by that fact that the CC had in fact established the minimum that 
should have been done in the TAC case in that a single dose of drugs had to be given to 
potential mothers in order to prevent mother-to-child infection. This occurred despite the 
resource constraint of the state. This indicates that the CC may perhaps consider the minimum 
core in future cases should sufficient background information be provided to make an 
accurate assumption of the minimum essential level needed, in the context of the 
Constitution.
826
 However by continuing to use the reasonableness test the CC is placing the 
                                                 
821
Mazibuko para 76.  
822
See Bilchitz D `Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future 
Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence' (2003) 19 SAJHR 1, 8, 10. 
823Wesson M ‘Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-Economic Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 284. Also see Hoexter C ‘Judicial Policy Revisited: Transformative 
Ajudication in Administrative Law’ (2008) 24 SAJHR 281. 
824
Wesson M (2004) 284. 
825
Grootboom para 32. 
826
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burden of proof on the claimant. Should the CC use the general limitations clause in section 
36 of the Constitution, this will place the burden of proof of justification on the government. 
 
The unintended consequence of the reasonableness test is that it mostly perpetuates hardship. 
The CC is criticised for ignoring what is the most basic need in each community and thereby 
not assisting in reaching at least an equal minimum for basic shelter.
827
 Moreover the 
provision of a minimum core obligation is not an end-point but a starting point for 
progressive realisation. 
828
 As such, the reasonableness notion leaves us without any clear 
guidance as to how to prioritise needs that are of particular urgency because the court hitherto 
has been unable to pronounce on what constitutes a sufficient amount in terms of core 
minimum requirements.
 
  
 
Failing to establish a minimum protection for the poor is chasing a goalpost for the realisation 
of SERs that will never see the poor reaching at least an equal standard amongst each other. 
Such equality would be attained when everybody in intolerable, desperate situations were to 
gain access to basic shelter. By the government not providing basic shelter to those so 
desperate, it relegates those people to perpetual unfair treatment and disparity whereas those 
who enjoy at least basic shelter are better off.  
 
Thus the call for a minimum core is a call for at least adequate basic shelter from the 
elements. This is a balancing act between whether some should be given adequate housing 
leaving others in the cold and whether everyone should be given temporary shelter pending 
the development of adequate housing for everyone. The CC touched on this, by reasoning that 
in most circumstances it will be reasonable for municipalities and provinces to strive first to 
achieve the prescribed minimum standard before being required to go beyond that minimum 
standard for those to whom the minimum has already being supplied. 
829
 However, essentially 
the court by-passes the minimum core approach, by using reasonableness and thereby gives 
the state the last say on the minimum housing needs. 
 
                                                 
827
See chapter 6 discussing the liberal approach of the apex court in India, meru moto raising issues on  
deprivation of SERs.  
828Bilchitz D ‘what is reasonable to the court is unfair to the poor  BDLive 6 August 2012 available at  
http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2010/03/16/david-bilchitz-what-is-reasonable-to-the-court-is-unfair-to-the-
poor;jsessionid=08D1907847D598F4D1672746FAC9D87C.present1.bdfm   (accessed 6 May 2014). 
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 In order for the state to meet its constitutional obligations insofar as transformation is 
concerned, it has to change its current plans to cater for the most desperate insofar as basic 
shelter,  even if this means delaying the construction of permanent housing for others that are 
not in such a desperate situation. If they fail to meet the needs of the most desperate they are 
acting contrary to ‘the poor [were] particularly vulnerable and their needs require[d] special 
attention’.830  South Africa is obliged to observe the influence of the ICESCR after its recent 
ratification.  As it is, the Constitution recognises the importance of international law, 
therefore the minimum core as espoused as the ‘raison d’être’ for the ICESCR should put 
pressure on the judiciary to give closer scrutiny to the bare necessities of realising housing.  
 
Courtis notes that different constitutional constructions have conceived the minimum core as 
a vital minimum 
831
 or ‘survival kit’ which is not static and which will evolve with time.832 
The German Federal Constitutional Court has developed the doctrine of the ‘vital minimum’ 
or ‘minimum level of existence’ which is ‘the State’s duty to secure the minimum existential 
conditions that make a dignified existence possible’.833 The Swiss Federal Court has found 
that Swiss courts can enforce an implied constitutional right to a ‘minimum level of 
subsistence’ both for Swiss nationals and foreigners.834 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Israel 
ordered that the government arrange its budgetary provisions to accommodate in addition the 
right to free education for children with disabilities in an integrated setting.
835
 Significantly, 
the European Court of Human Rights, whilst having a limited basis to adjudicate directly on 
SERs has applied tests of necessity and proportionality when upholding the protection of 
SERs.
 836
 In this regard, there is a test judges use to assess whether legislation or regulations 
comply or fail with the core content or minimum core duties.
837
 Brazilian courts have 
followed the Europeans in minimum core obligations whereby the state is obliged to ensure 
day care access for children under six as being part of the right to education.
 838
  
 
                                                 
830
Grootboom para 36. 
831
Vital minimum comprises access to food, housing and social assistance to persons in need. 
832
Courtis C (2008) 23. 
833
German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) and German Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG), 
BVerfGE. Also see Article 20 of the German Constitution on vital minimum.  
834
See Swiss Federal Court V. v. Einwohrnergemeine X und Regierungsrat des Kanton Bern, BGE/ATF 121I, 
367 October 27, 1995. 
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See Supreme Court of Israel Yated and Others v the Ministry of Education HCJ 2599/00 August 14, 2002. 
836
See Spadea and Scalabrino v. Italy  September 28, 1995 (protection from eviction for vulnerable 
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Courtis C (2008) 33. 
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A number of US judgments in SERs have been decided with regard to the government’s duty 
to ensure a minimum quality. The Supreme Court of New York and the Appellate Division 
found that the state funding for education did not meet the minimum constitutional 
requirements to meet sound basic education.
 839
 The African Commission also joins the 
international chorus on the minimum core obligations as being the guaranteed minimum level 
for the enjoyment of SERs but stops short of defining the core content of the right.
840
 
Notwithstanding,  that  the CC in South Africa had suggested that there are certain minimum 
levels of social welfare to which every individual is entitled.
841
  However this view links to 
the protection of dignity instead of to the notion of the minimum core obligations.
 
Evidence 
suggests the reasonableness argument is tantamount to an escape hatch to not deliver on the 
minimum core obligations and thereby failing to give content to SERs. 
 
In pursuit of relieving the impoverished from an undignified existence by providing the 
minimum of basic shelter to the homeless person and those living in informal settlements, the 
protection of the economic resources against state abuse is imperative and enjoys attention 
next.  
 
4.4 Role of the judiciary in combating corruption:  can the court assist in protecting the 
available resources for housing against malfeasance in the state? 
 
As a democracy South Africa’s government has put various legislative and institutional 
measures in action to combat malfeasance in government.
842
 Despite these measures the state 
of social housing has been tainted with corruption in all provinces according to the SIU.
843
 
Furthermore the PSC Reports highlight financial misconduct by public officials.
 844
 The PSC 
reports that failure in recovering monies illegally diverted from the state, peaks at over 90 
                                                 
839
See State Supreme Court of New York Campaign For Fiscal Equity v State of New York et al 710 N.Y.S. 2d 
475, January 9, 2001; New York Court of Appeals Campaign For Fiscal Equity v State of New York et al 100 N. 
Y. 2d 893 June 26, 2003; New York Appellate Division, First Department Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. 
State of New York 2006 NYSlipOp 02284 March 23, 2006. 
840
 See African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of 
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discussion on the African Commission. 
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 Khosa para 52; P E Municipality para 29. 
842
 See chapter 1 for discussion on the Corruption Act, the main anti-corruption legislation. Also see chapter 5 
for discussion on anti-corruption measures to combat procurement fraud in particular. 
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percent. The Auditor-General (AG) reports that irregular expenditure at national and 
provincial levels has increased ten-fold between 2008 and 2011.
845
 Furthermore, the 
2015/2016 Audit Report stated that R46 billion has been lost to irregular, wasteful and 
fruitless expenditure mostly incurred in the procurement of goods and services due to  failing 
to adhere to prescribed processes.
846
 This culture of maladministration was underscored by 
inadequate consequences or no consequences within the public service for this behaviour.
847
 
 
The result of which myriad corruption taking place in the social housing programme which 
has delayed housing to, especially the most desperate. Abetting in the mischief is the non-
disclosure of financial interest by senior managers. 
848
 The PSC observes that the perpetrators 
of corruption are increasingly more at senior level, engaging in business with the state in their 
own departments.
 849
  Thus ethical leadership is compromised by the very custodians that 
need to exert oversight and responsibility in detecting and preventing corruption in their own 
departments.  Moreover, in local government, which is at the coalface of service delivery 
including housing, well-paid managers are not necessarily less opportunistic or show greater 
levels of integrity and restraint.
850
 Van Vuuren argues that South Africa is a state that 
functions but with elements of political elite that have anti-democratic tendencies seeking to 
undermine democratic institutions.
851
 This is done by the rule of law being applied 
inconsistently and by poor financial management underpinned by unaccountable governance. 
  
Civil society has actively criticised corruption through court action and protest marches, 
which have brought them into direct conflict with state security forces.
852
 In India, by contrast 
                                                 
845
AG General Report on National Audit Outcomes, 2008-09/2009-10/2010-11.  
846
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See chapter 5 for discussion on the laws governing public procurement. 
847Also see Open Society Foundation for South Africa ‘The Cost of Public Corruption in a Democratic South 
Africa: Money and Politics Project Policy Brief OSF-SA December 2011 available at 
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agencies (accessed on 20 April 2016) 
848See Van der Merwe J ‘How SA’s servants bend the rules’ City Press 2 December 2012. According to the City 
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PSC Reports 2005-2011. 
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Conference Paper 2014 Centre for Development and Enterprise 8. See chapter 5 discussing the SIU findings 
which include municipal managers benefiting from corruption in social housing delivery. 
851
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the robust activism of civil society has assisted the judiciary in its progressive approach to 
social action litigation (SAL).
853
 This action has seen the judiciary inquire into the tardiness 
of anti-corruption agencies and ordering these institutions to investigate the allegations of 
corruption against politicians and senior state bureaucrats.
 854
 
 
Because of South Africa’s history of legislated deprivation, there is a greater urgency in the 
obligation of the judiciary to protect the vulnerable and  marginalised against state 
repression.
855
 Therefore the Constitution
856
  enjoins the judiciary with the other organs of 
state to ensure that the rights of this supreme statute are enforced. Thus the judiciary is in the 
invidious position of  not only having to hold the state accountable in its delivery of public 
housing but also in ensuring that the available resources as spelt out by the Constitution in 
section 26, are protected against state abuse. Moreover, the court is empowered to adjudicate 
on any dispute that can be resolved through application of law and thereby affords the court 
with broad remedial powers for appropriate relief insofar as infringement or violation of a 
right is concerned.
857
 This point to the fact that the courts have extensive powers to enforce 
the realisation of SERs.  Pieterse argues that rights-holders have the option to insist on the 
fulfilment of the rights through the judicial process.
858
 The academic discourse acknowledges 
that the CCs SERs jurisprudence is far from ideal and exacerbating this is the fact that the 
country has to grapple with measures to counter corruption generally but also in the public 
housing programme in particular.
 859
 
 
The link between human rights and corruption cannot be overstated.
860
 South Africa should 
recognise that corruption violates the right to housing in that it erodes the funds that ought to 
                                                                                                                                                        
2012 at almost 22 protests every week across the country; Vally N ‘National Trends Around Protest action: 
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see chapter 6 on the role of civil society in combating corruption. 
853
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Urban Law Journal 612. See chapter 6 for in-depth discussion on public interest litigation  
854
 See chapter 6 for an analysis of the role of the Indian judiciary in protecting SERs and combating corruption. 
855
 Also see Adeleke F A R Olayanju O F ‘Role of the Judiciary in Combating Corruption: Aiding and Inhibiting 
Factors in Nigeria’ (2014) 40 Commw. L. Bull 589. 
856
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realise potential housing.
861
 Kumar argues that the judiciary and human rights commissions 
are best suited in dealing with corruption as a violation of human rights.
862
  This may be a 
long and arduous struggle but it would be worthwhile if human rights were to be protected 
and many people thus dignified in the long run.  Amongst the developing countries, India has 
been most progressive where the judiciary, together with civil society, the human rights 
commission and the media have held government to account by taking a maverick approach 
in relaxing standing in its endeavours to root out corruption in government. 
863
 
 
South Africa labours under paucity on the discourse of judicial invention into public sector 
corruption. The doctrine of separation of powers leads to the judiciary being reluctant to 
advise the government on how their economic resources should be applied and protected. 
However rampant corruption in the public sector which is highlighted by the media, civil 
society and the public service itself, is of concern and needs a different approach, since the 
anti-corruption measures in place have not brought about the desired results.
864
 
 
There has been very little prosecution under the Corruption Act for offenders in public 
office.
865
 A large part of this is a result of the government turning a blind eye to the gross 
irregularities perpetrated by senior public officers, in the procurement for public housing. 
This is noted in the cases of corruption in public housing referred to the NPA for prosecution, 
but these investigations remain just that.
866
 Although the Corruption Act
867
 is geared towards 
deterring public office abuse in public procurement, senior management and accounting 
officers found in dereliction of procurement laws, escape the wrath of this Act.
 
These 
perpetrators are not necessarily brought to book through the NPA as the case should be in 
order for them to have the court and thereby the law determine their fate. This is despite the 
PSC highlighting on a regular basis to Parliament the disturbing figures of financial 
misconduct by public officials.
868
  
                                                 
861
See chapter 1 discussing the link between human rights and corruption. 
862
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in Asia’ (2008)16 Mich. St. J. Int'l L 570. See chapter 1 for discussion on the link between human rights and 
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864
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865
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There is no silver bullet to stunt corruption in the state, but the judiciary can certainly assist in 
holding government accountable by playing more of a watchdog role in how government is 
faring with corruption investigations in the state. Combating corruption could be served 
through the judiciary inquiring into incidents where the state machinery is reluctant to hold 
the perpetrators of corruption in the state accountable.
869
 To combat corruption the judiciary 
does not have to compromise on the separation of powers doctrine. It can simply follow the 
Indian example and enquire into the implementation of the SIU recommendations as to those 
perpetrators of corruption in public housing delivery.
870
 This way the  judiciary is observing 
its constitutional duty by inquiring into the retardation of a right because corruption.  
 
The judiciary is well aware of the omnipresence of corruption in the public service. The 
robust media and civil society make it difficult to ignore the exposure of political 
corruption.
871
 An unintended consequence of the judiciary’s observance of a strict separation 
of powers rule has left the poor vulnerable in that the monetary resources that must realise 
their right to housing is being corrupted and they are unable to do anything about it.  
 
Perhaps the most prominent politician prosecuted in South Africa was the Chief Whip of the 
ruling party in S v Yengeni. 
872
 This was one of the few cases where the accused was charged 
and prosecuted as having violated the Corruption Act of 1992,
873
  resulting in the accused 
being imprisoned for the crime of corruption for having received a benefit in contravention of 
the Act. Although very high profile, this case hardly deterred public sector corruption. 
874
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
amount of money involved hit a high point of almost R1 billion in 2010-11.The previous highest figure was 
approximately one third of that amount, R331.2 million, and recorded nearly ten years ago.  
869
 See chapter 6 for discussion on the Indian judiciary’s approach to political corruption. 
870
 See chapter 6 for the Indian example lessons for South Africa. 
871
 See chapter 6 for discussion on the robust civil society interaction with the judiciary in India. 
872
 (A1079/03) (2005) ZAGPHC 117 (11 November 2005). He was sentenced to four years but served only four 
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873
 Section 1(1) (b) (i). See chapter 1 for explanation of Corruption Act 
874
See National Director of Public Prosecutions v Scholtz and Others (2027/2012) [2013] ZANCHC 48(13 
December 2013) where another a senior politician John Block was convicted for corruption and money-
laundering  for circumventing supply chain processes in order to secure  grossly inflated lease agreements for 
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Van Vuuren argues that the fundamental weakness to tackle corruption lies with the elite 
crime-fighting unit the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, known as the Hawks.
875
 
The reason being that it lacks the investigative and prosecutorial independence enjoyed by its 
predecessor that is crucial to fighting high level political corruption.
876
 However, despite its 
failings these units represent the democratic notions that single anti-corruption agencies are 
more vulnerable to political interference than this ‘multi-headed beast’. 877 
 
High-profile cases of corruption in the public service do not generally end up on the 
prosecution’s list in South Africa but the same goes for the African continent.  Further afield 
in Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa, corruption has permeated the fabric of the 
Nigerian nation.
878
 Although boasting a robust and adequate legal framework on corruption, 
Nigeria is tested by rampant political corruption.
879
 Noteworthy is that the  Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission of that country secured convictions of a handful of senior 
government officials, but regrettably this Commission has been used as a weapon to destroy 
political rivals. 
880
 
 
In Kenya, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) presented to the National 
Assembly that, of the 315 cases investigated only 26 landed up in court.
881
Amongst cases of 
corruption are five Cabinet Secretaries suspected of corruption, who had to relinquish their 
positions, but no formal charges had been lodged.
882
  This includes the former Investment 
Secretary who is alleged to have used her office to deprive former employees of the Kenya 
Railways Corporation of houses set aside for them to buy under a tenant-purchase scheme.
 883
 
The Kenyan government has yet to hand over the Minister of Energy and the managing 
director of the Kenya Power Company, despite arrest warrants in connection with money-
laundering, from a UK court in 2011. They have not been charged in Kenya even though the 
                                                 
875
 Van Vuuren H (2014) 13. 
876
 See Glenister case in chapter 1. 
877
 Van Vuuren H (2014) 13. 
878
 Osipitan T & Odusote A ‘Nigeria: Challenges of Defence Counsel in Corruption Prosecution’ 2014 Acta U. 
Danubius Jur 68. Nigerian officials had stolen or wasted more than $440 billion. 
879
 Osipitan T & Odusote A (2013) 73. 
880
 Osipitan T & Odusote A (2013) 73. 
881
 See Africare View ‘Only 26 graft cases in Kenya have made it to the courts’30 July 2015  available at  
http://www.africareview.com/news/Few-graft-cases-in-Kenya-have-made-it-to-the-courts/-/979180/2813762/-
/weio3x/-/index.html (accessed on 24 April 2016) The current system in Kenya is that investigations are carried 
out by the EACC but prosecutions must be brought by the Director of Public Prosecutions .  
882‘Corruption and its Consequences in Kenya’ Institute for Study of African Realities 
November 2013 available at http://concordis.international/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Corruption-and-its-
Consequences-in-Kenya-Nov-2013.pdf (accessed on 24 April 2016). 
883‘Corruption and its Consequences in Kenya’ Institute for Study of African Realities November 2013. 
 
 
 
 
145 
 
Royal Court of Jersey prosecuted and found them guilty of crimes on solid evidence collected 
over years.
884
 
 
Recently the most high profile case is that of a political party leader/businessman who was 
criminally charged with a multiplicity of cases relating to conspiracy to steal and defraud 
billions of shillings
885
  from the Kenyan government contrary to section 393 of the Penal 
Code. This is pursuant to an investigation of corruption and fraud whereby the Bosire Report 
found him together with others responsible for such acts and omissions, recommending 
criminal or civil sanction.
886
 From 1993 until 2013 the perpetrators escaped prosecution, thus 
for 20 years this political party leader
887
 escaped prosecution. In 2013 on application by him, 
the court rendered further prosecution of the cases as unconstitutional; citing the threshold for 
a fair trial and the principle of equality was not met.
888
 The court found the applicant’s 
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution had been violated by the 
state. An aggrieved prosecution appealed this decision, unsuccessfully.
889
 In this vein the  
Law Society of Kenya has written a letter in protest to the Judicial Service Commission 
                                                 
884Herbling D ‘UK now moves to seize Gichuru and Okemo hidden cash (Kenya) Business Daily Kenya 13 
February 2016 available at https://asokoinsight.com/news/uk-now-moves-to-seize-gichuru-and-okemo-hidden-
cash/ (accessed on 24 April 2016) submits that ‘a court in Jersey issued a warrant for the arrest for Mr Gichuru 
and Mr Okemo on 20 April 2011 – but the duo has challenged the move through multiple legal suits in Kenyan 
courts. The Jersey confiscation proceedings make it the third time this year that Kenyan authorities are being 
shamed for inaction in international corruption cases. ‘Also see  Kamau J ‘Why Moi era billionaire won’t rest 
easy Daily Nation 3 January 2016 available at http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Why-Moi-era-billionaire-
will-not-rest-easy/-/440808/3019382/-/13v5u02/-/index.html (accessed on 24 April 2016); Editorial: ‘It’s time 
Kenya moved to prosecute Gichuru, Okemo’ Business Daily Africa 17 March 2016  
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Opinion-and-Analysis/-/539548/3121662/-/pa9jk5z/-/index.html (accessed 
on 24 April 2016). 
885
Totalling to Shs.5, 782, 655,311.00. 
886
Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair October 2005 available at 
http://fimbo.s3.amazonaws.com/Goldenberg%20report.pdf (accessed on 24 April 2016) 
887
Kamlesh Pattni became chairperson of the  Kenya National Democratic Alliance in 2006 but has not been 
successful to enter political office. 
888
Republic v Attorney General & 3 Others Exparte Kamlesh Mansukhlal Damji Pattni [2013] eKLR 
paras 87-9. Also see  Editorial  ‘How corruption suspects use courts to derail and stop prosecution’ Daily Nation 
19December 2015 available athttp://www.nation.co.ke/news/derail-and-stop-prosecution/-/1056/3003304/-
/11jwr6mz/-/index.html  (accessed on 24 April 2016) states that ‘twenty-five years after the money was stolen 
the case is stuck, halted permanently by the courts. Kamlesh Mansuklal Damji Pattni, the chief architect of the 
scandal who a Commission of Inquiry concluded was a “perjurer, a forger, a fraudster and a thief,” remains a 
free man.’  
889
See Nairobi Civil Application no 105 of 2013 and Civil Application no 168 ‘A’ of 2013 Between Kamlesh 
Mansukhalal Damji Pattni and Director of Public Prosecutions; ‘How Kamlesh Pattni has beaten Kenya’s 
criminal justice system for 20 years’  Nation 27April  2013 available at  
 http://www.nation.co.ke/News/How-Kamlesh-Pattni-has-beaten-Kenyas-criminal-justice-system/-
/1056/1760390/-/i4esx2/-/index.html (accessed on 20 April 2016) 
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asking ‘how yet another Pattni case ended up before Justice Mutava given the Society’s 
earlier complaint to the Commission about his handling of past Pattni cases’.890 
 
The track record of the judiciary in South Africa in holding the government accountable 
regarding public sector corruption is stifled by the lack of prosecutions pursued by those 
responsible for prosecuting. The inconsistent application of laws and policies creates an 
imbalance in government which undermines sound corporate governance, necessary to tackle 
corruption. South Africa’s government needs collective effort to keep the available resources 
for housing in check and away from mischief in the government.  Due to its liberal approach, 
India’s judiciary is riding a wave of positive public sentiment derived from its role in fighting 
public sector corruption.
891
   
 
To live up to this challenge the South African judiciary should not remain passive in the 
knowledge of the presence of corruption testing the delivery of housing, if they remain 
passive, ‘we have a recipe for a constitutional crisis of great magnitude’.892 The constitutional 
promise of a better life for all is at risk if the judiciary does not look out for the poor and hold 
the government accountable by working with the SAHRC, in keeping a watchful eye on how 
the billions of rand for housing are applied. Importantly, the court holds duty to dispense with 
corruption in the public service.  
 
Current alternative dispute resolution forums other than the courts have not reaped the desired 
results when engaging with government on social justice. An example of this is the flagrant 
disregard of the PP’s recommendations and remedial action that the President pay back to the 
fiscus, some of the states available resources which were abused for his private gain on the 
security upgrades at his private home, discussed next.  
 
4.4.1 The independent Public Protector being dependent on the judiciary 
The PP is constitutionally empowered by chapter 9 
893
  to investigate irregularities and 
corrupt conduct in all spheres of government and take appropriate remedial action.
 894
 This 
                                                 
890‘How Kamlesh Pattni has beaten Kenya’s criminal justice system for 20 years’ Nation 27April 2013. 
891
See chapter 6. 
892
Nyathi v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Health Gauteng and Another 2008 (5) SA 94 
(CC) para 80. 
893
The history of the office of the Public Protector, and the evolution of its powers over the years were dealt with 
in two judgments of the SCA see South African Broadcasting Corporation Soc Ltd and Others v Democratic 
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office derives power also from the subsequent national legislation, the Public Protectors Act 
895
 that regulates the PP’s powers. Furthermore the Act896  provides guidelines on how the 
power is to be exercised. The power of the PP is in its protection of the public against any 
state conduct that may result in impropriety or prejudice.
897
 This office has been very active 
in investigating corruption in the public housing programme but nowhere as ‘successfully’ as 
the SIU in its uncovering of malfeasance in the deliverance of social housing projects.
898
 The 
powers of the PP are wide and which include power over the highest chambers of state power, 
including the presidency.
899
  Therefore in execution of duties this office is not to be inhibited, 
undermined or sabotaged.
 900
 For this reason non-compliance with remedial action issued by 
this office is not an option because it exists as a critical and indispensable power in 
facilitating good governance.
 901
 
 
 
The PP trumps the SIU investigations in that it has power to take remedial action whereas the 
SIU reports its findings to the President and Parliament and refers to the NPA for sanction of 
the said perpetrators of corruption. 
902
 Although the PP has wide power to take remedial 
action, this power is not unfettered in that the power is not inflexible but rather situational in 
application and informed by the subject-matter.
 903
 This means that the remedial action taken 
cannot be ignored without there being legal consequences.
 904
 According to the CC this is so 
because no decision grounded in the Constitution or law may be disregarded without recourse 
to a court.
905
 Consequently, the PP does not have the same status as a judicial officer but the 
remedial action to be taken is binding. 
906
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Alliance and Others 2015 (4) All SA 719 (SCA) para 31 and The Public Protector v Mail & Guardian Ltd and 
Others 2011 (4) SA 420 (SCA) para 5.  
894
Nkandla case para 58. 
895
Act 23 of 1994  as amended by Public Service Laws Amendment Act 47 of 1997;Public Protector 
Amendment Act 113 of 1998;Public Protector Amendment Act 22 of 2003  
896
 See s6 where all the powers accord and coexist with s182 of the Constitution.   
897
 Nkandla case para 51. 
898
 Discussed in chapter 5. 
899
 Nkandla case para 55. 
900
 Nkandla case para 54. 
901
 Nkandla case para 56. 
902
 See chapter 5 for the composition of the SIU and its ‘powers’. 
903
 Nkandla case para 71. 
904
 Nkandla case para 72. 
905
Nkandla case para 74. 
906
See Nkandla case 
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The importance of the available resources of the state was put in the spotlight when the PP 
caused an investigation into the costs of the security upgrades by the government at the 
President’s private home ‘Nkandla’. 907 These upgrades became a subject of investigation by 
the PP due to public pressure stating that the costs to the upgrades were excessive.
908
 It is 
important to note that the available resources of the state were put under pressure with costs 
to the upgrades steeping to R246 million.
 909 
  The long and short of the investigation was that 
non-security upgrades amounted to undue benefit and unlawful enrichment of the 
President.
910
 The PP found improper procurement processes to have taken place in violation 
of the prescribed supply chain management framework which resulted in excessive amounts 
of public money being spent, unnecessarily and therefore unlawfully.
911 
 This action violates 
the principle of using the maximum of available resources to realise SERs as espoused in 
international treaty obligations.
912
 
 
 
The result of this investigation was that the costs of the alleged security upgrades were 
excessive and included non-security features such as the visitors’ centre, amphitheatre, cattle 
kraal, chicken run and the swimming pool. Therefore the PP found that the President 
unlawfully benefited from the non-security installations. The PP’s Report criticised the 
President for excessive use of the state’s available resources in a country grappling with 
poverty and the lack of adequate housing.
913
 The PP found the President to have violated 
provisions of the Executive Members’ Ethics Act and the Executive Ethics Code as espoused 
by the Constitution.
914
 The PP found the breach to be in terms of constitutional obligations 
                                                 
907See Public Protector of South Africa ‘Secure in Comfort’ Report no: 25 of 2013/2014 (hereafter Secure in 
Comfort) on an investigation into allegations of impropriety and unethical conduct relating to the installation and 
implementation of security measures by the Department of Public Works at and in respect of the private 
residence of President Jacob Zuma at Nkandla in the KwaZulu- Natal province. The total cost to conclude the 
project was conservatively estimated at R246 million. The investigation was conducted in terms of section 182 
of the Constitution 1996, which gives the Public Protector the power to investigate alleged or suspected 
improper or prejudicial conduct in state affairs, to report on that conduct and to take appropriate remedial action. 
Part of the investigation was also conducted in terms of the Executive Members’ Ethics Act 82 of 1998, which 
confers on the Public Protector the power to investigate alleged violations of the Executive Ethics Code, at the 
request of Members of National and Provincial Legislatures, the President and Premiers.  
908
See Public Protector of South Africa ‘Secure in Comfort’ Report no:25 of 2013/2014 
909‘Secure in Comfort’ (2013/2014) 30. 
910See ‘Secure in Comfort’ (2013/2014). 
911‘Secure in Comfort’ (2013/2014) 30. See chapter 5 for discussion on the procurement laws. 
912
See chapter 2 for discussion on these treaties. 
913See ‘Secure in Comfort’ (2013/2014). 
914
Section 96(1). 
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which provide for the ‘Conduct of Cabinet Members and Deputy Ministers’.915 The President 
and the executive, including deputy ministers, are bound by an oath of office to uphold the 
Constitution.
916
 The PP made recommendations and suggested remedial action to the effect 
that the President had to carry the costs which were abused for non-security features.  
 
 
The PP took remedial action against the President in terms of the Constitution section 182(1) 
(c) and stated that the President had to:  
 ‘Take steps, with the assistance of the National Treasury and the SAPS, to determine 
the reasonable cost of the measures implemented by the DPW [Department of Public 
Works] at his private residence that do not relate to security, and which include [the] 
visitors’ centre, the amphitheatre, the cattle kraal and chicken run and the swimming 
pool.  
 Pay a reasonable percentage of the cost of the measures as determined with the 
assistance of the National Treasury, also considering the DPW apportionment 
document.  Reprimand the Ministers involved for the appalling manner in which the 
Nkandla Project was handled and state funds were abused.  
 Report to the National Assembly on his comments and actions on this report within 14 
days.’ 917 
 
The President refused to comply with the remedial action as set out by the PP.  Moreover 
Parliament in its oversight capacity, by its own findings did not deem that the available 
resources of the state were abused in anyway by the President and therefore there was no need 
to implement the remedial action by the PP. Almost two years after the PP findings the two 
biggest opposition political parties took the matter to court to confirm the powers of the PP 
in:
 
 
 
                                                 
915
Section 96(1), (2) (b) and (c) (1) provides: Members of the Cabinet and Deputy Ministers must act in 
accordance with a code of ethics prescribed by national legislation. (2) Members of the Cabinet and Deputy 
Ministers may not— . . . (b) act in any way that is inconsistent with their office, or expose themselves to any 
situation involving the risk of a conflict between their official responsibilities and private interests; or (c) use 
their position or any information entrusted to them, to enrich themselves or improperly benefit any other person. 
916
Section 95. 
917‘Secure in Comfort (2013/2014) para 11.   
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4.4.2 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; 
Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2016 ZACC 
11
918
 
 
The facts of this case boil down to the investigation of the PP into the financially excessive 
security upgrades at the President’s private home.  Noteworthy is that a week before the CC 
challenge, the  President tried to settle the matter by offering to pay for the undue benefits he 
gained from the upgrades. However, the applicants refused a settlement in that they wanted 
the powers of the PP to be reaffirmed and have the findings made binding by the CC. 
Therefore, the most burning issue in this case was whether the PP’s recommendations and 
remedial action had binding powers.  The CC responded in the affirmative that the PP’s 
remedial action was binding hence the action taken against the President had a binding 
effect.
919
 The CC crystallised the fact that the PP acted against the President himself and not 
the executive or organs of state. Therefore compliance was required by the President.
920
 The 
Court explained that the President had knowledge of the non-security upgrades and did not 
attempt to stop this as his fiduciary duties require.
921
   In this action the President did not 
uphold his constitutional duty in ensuring that nobody profited unduly from state resources.
922
 
Notwithstanding that, the President together with those who deliver public services was 
charged with the duty to ensure that the state resources were only used for the common good 
of all.
923
  
 
The importance of state resources was spelt out by the CC as resources that belonged to the 
public and as such should be used for the greater good and benefit of the public.
924
 Therefore, 
the President’s constitutional obligations are pertinently expressed in the Constitution.925  The 
CC clarified that as head of state and the national executive, the President was uniquely 
positioned to do more than other public office bearers.
926
 For this reason he is a 
‘constitutional being’ and the Constitution927 bears on his office to uphold, defend and respect 
                                                 
918
Hereafter Nkandla case. 
919
Nkandla case para 76. 
920
Nkandla case para 35. 
921
Nkandla case para 35 
922
Nkandla case para 35 
923
Glenister para 176. 
924
Nkandla case para 53. See chapter 2 for discussion on the importance of available resources in realising SERs. 
925
Sections 83 (b). see Constitution chapter 5 for other presidential powers 
926
Nkandla case para 26. 
927
 Section 83(b). 
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his obligations in this regard.
 928
 The Court submitted that in uniting the nation, bearing in 
mind the painful past divisions, the President was required to do all to ensure that South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy thrived. 929 The CC found that the President’s action was in 
contradiction of the Constitution section 96 
930
  which clearly provides that ‘[m]embers of the 
Cabinet and Deputy Ministers may not use their position or any information entrusted to 
them, to enrich themselves or improperly benefit any other person’. The CC reiterated the 
President’s duty to ensure that the state resources were used for the advancement of state 
interest.
931
 Therefore, if risks ensue whereby the President closes his eyes to possible waste 
and thereby derive personal benefit from the indifference; this would violate the Constitution 
section 96.
 932
 Thus the first citizen was in breach of the Constitution.  The CC made it clear 
that as first citizen the President was obligated to lead by example as underpinned by 
constitutional obligations and thereby his irrevocable commitment to serve the people.
933
 
The CC
934
 elucidated that the  power of the PP was to ensure that the ‘efficient, economic and 
effective use of resources [is] promoted, 
935 
that accountability finds expression, but also that 
high standards of professional ethics are promoted and maintained.’936 The point is that 
complaints are lodged with the PP in order to cure or contain, amongst others, unlawful 
enrichment or corruption in government circles.
 937
 In this regard the office of the PP cannot 
realise its constitutional purpose if organs of state may second-guess its findings and thereby 
ignore recommendations.
938
  Hence the Constitution
939
 spells out those remedial powers. 
 
The CC held that the President was the primary benefactor of the non-security upgrades.
 940
 
The Court directed that the President determine the reasonable costs expended on the non-
security features in order to pay back the available resources irregularly spent.
941
 The CC give 
clear orders as to the time-frames of the order  whereby the National Treasury had to  report 
                                                 
928
Nkandla case paras 26, 31. 
929
Nkandla case para 26. 
930
Section 96(2) (c). 
931
Nkandla case para 7. 
932
Nkandla case para 9. 
933
Nkandla case paras 20-1. 
934
Nkandla case para 65. 
935
Constitution s195 (1) (b). 
936
Constitution s195 (1) (a).   
937
Nkandla case para 65. 
938
South African Broadcasting Corporation Soc Ltd and Others v Democratic Alliance and Others 2016 (2) SA 
522 (SCA) para 52. 
939
Section 182(1) (c). 
940
Nkandla case para 35. 
941
Nkandla case para 76.The President was required to provide the NA with his comments and the actions he 
was to take on the Public Protector’s report within 14 days of receipt of that report. 
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back to the CC on the reasonable costs, within 60 days and the President, personally, was to 
pay back the abused resources within 45 days of the approval of the report.
942
 
 
The result of this was that the President has the opportunity to reimburse the state for the non-
security features. Moreover the President must reprimand the executive (the ministers 
involved) for the misappropriation of state resources under their watch.
 943
 Thus the very 
custodians that were to maintain oversight in their senior capacity, allowed the economic 
resources of the state to be abused. The first citizen’s disregard for abuse of the available 
resources of the state was a pattern that is perpetuated by senior public officials at local 
government level in the delivery of social housing, where they diverted funds for payment to 
contractors that did not complete the services if embarked upon at all.
944
  
 
 
The CC lauded the PP as the most invaluable of constitutional gifts for the betterment of 
governance, a gift to the nation in the fight against corruption and unlawful enrichment in 
state affairs.
945
  Moreover, the PP’s office is an alternative dispute resolution enclave which 
the public can approach at no costs, unlike the court. This is all good and well but the fact that 
the PP has to refer to the court for implementation of remedial action against a recalcitrant 
President and Parliament, makes this entity dependent on the judiciary. The apex Court 
confirmed that only the judiciary can set aside the findings and remedial action taken by the 
PP and only then can the President disregard the PP’s report.946 If this chapter nine institution 
had its powers elevated to where it gives orders that must be implemented to the same extent 
as court orders, this would serve as a stronger deterrent to state abuse of resources or powers. 
India boasts an anti-corruption ombudsman that can give orders akin to those of the judiciary.
 
947
 If the PP’s office is not given this power the ultimate guardian of the Constitution and its 
values, the CC, is the only hope for the impoverished to ease their plight timeously in 
accessing their right to housing. This requires a judiciary that holds the government to its 
goals in a proactive manner by mero motu raising socio-economic issues of public concern, 
                                                 
942
Nkandla case paras 5-8. Zuma paid back R7.8 million available at  http://mg.co.za/article/2016-09-12-zuma-
pays-back-the-money-but-where-did-he-get-the-r78-million/ (accessed 18 November 2016). 
943
 Nkandla case para 76. 
944
 See chapter 5 for discussion on the SIU Report on corruption in public housing. 
945
 Nkandla case para 52. 
946
 Nkandla case para 81. 
947
 See chapter 6 for discussion on the Lokpal ombudsman in India having this power to combat corruption. 
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including investigations into corruption which threatens the funds to realise SERs.
948
 This 
action would meet with the constitutional requirement of courts ‘to ensure that all branches of 
government act within the law’ and would fulfil their constitutional obligations. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the CC has exclusive jurisdiction
949
 to inquire into the conduct 
of the President and Parliament, the issue of standing was explained at lengths in the Nkandla 
case.
950
 The gravitas of the abuse of state resources should have urge the judiciary to relax 
rules and get into the arena to ensure the government follow its constitutional mandate, 
particularly where Parliament is found lacking in its duty of oversight.
951
 Granting standing in 
only exceptional cases and whether it be in the interest of justice is good and well. However, 
where the state’s resources are being eroded in a country grappling with housing its 
impoverished, there should be an urgency with which the judiciary approaches such flagrant 
abuse. This would not only be in the interest of justice, but more importantly in public 
interest. If the judiciary does not take this paterfamilias approach on the abuse of state funds, 
recourse for the impoverished in this regard is limited to ineffectual awareness campaigns and 
citizen’s protests which have not had the desired responses from government. 
 
4.4.3 What are the implications of the Nkandla judgement on public office corruption? 
 
The endorsement by the CC of the PP’s recommendations that the President unduly benefited 
and had to repay the money to the fiscus, is an endorsement of the notion that  public office 
abuse will not be tolerated. Not even the highest office, the President, head of the executive is 
above the law but accountable to the Constitution. The implication of the findings of the  PP 
and the CC’s concurrence is a powerful message to effect that public office holders cannot 
behave as they want, but are bound by the Constitution and their excesses can be curtailed by 
the judiciary. 
 
The action of the President is explained by the PP and the CC as amounting to undue 
enrichment and receiving benefit for personal gain. This is pretty much in line with offences 
                                                 
948
 See chapter 6 on how the Indian judiciary do this. 
949
Section 167(4) (e). 
950
 Nkandla case paras 18-19. 
951
 See chapter 3 for discussion on parliamentary oversight. Also see para 4.4.2 in how Parliament failed in 
oversight of the President. 
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that the Corruption Act
952
  condemns in that it prohibits ‘gratification’ which includes money, 
whether cash or otherwise as well as any forbearance to demand any money or money's worth 
or valuable thing. Moreover the Corruption Act
953
 includes ‘a reference in this Act to accept 
or agree or offer to accept any gratification includes demand, ask for, seek, request, solicit, 
receive or obtain’. The President had knowledge of the non-security nature of the upgrades 
and did not attempt to stop this as his fiduciary duties require.
954
  This means the President 
went against the Constitution
955
 which prohibits the executive and deputy ministers to ‘enrich 
themselves or improperly benefit any other person’.  Furthermore, the general offence of 
corruption as espoused by the Corruption Act also finds application in that: 
 
 ‘any person who, directly or indirectly accepts or agrees or offers to accept any 
gratification from any other person, whether for the benefit of himself or herself or for 
the benefit of another person’.956  
This resonates with the President having accepted undue benefits paid by the state for the 
non-security upgrades. 
 
 ‘in order to act, personally or by influencing another person so to act, in a manner that 
amounts to the illegal, dishonest, unauthorised, incomplete, or biased’.957  
The President influenced ministers of his cabinet to agree to his undue benefits in terms of the 
upgrades.  
 
 ‘in order to act, personally or by influencing another person so to act, in a manner  that 
amounts to the abuse of a position of authority; a breach of trust; or  the violation of a 
legal duty or a set of rules, designed to achieve an unjustified result’.958   
The highest office abused position by indulging in undue gratification.  
 
South Africa is a signatory to the UNCAC and thereby is obligated to recognise and take 
charge of corruption in public office, which is the key focus of this treaty.
959
 Moreover, the 
                                                 
952
S1 (a), (f), (j). 
953
Section 2(3) (a) (i). 
954
 Nkandla case para 35.  
955
 Section 96(2) (c). 
956
 Section 3 (a). 
957
 Section 3(i) (aa). 
958
 Sections 3(ii) (aa), (bb), (cc) and 3(iii). 
959
 See chapter 1 for discussion on this treaty. 
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UNCAC criminalises illicit enrichment, bribery and embezzlement in the public service.
 960
 
Regionally the AUCPCC also recognises the threat of public office corruption and promotes 
the repatriation of stolen assets or money. The President of South Africa violated these treaty 
obligations as well, obligations, which seek to stunt the proliferation of corruption, 
worldwide. 
 
It is worth noting although the Nkandla issue was very widely publicised by various sections 
of civil society and the media, but the judiciary did not deem it within their powers to inquire 
into the allegations.
961
  Despite that the state’s economic resources were under threat by abuse 
of the highest public office, the CC kept it distance in terms of separation of powers. A 
transformative judiciary would be open to new ways in holding government accountable on 
its duty of care concerning the available resources for housing and other SERs.
962
  
 
The Nkandla judgement should deter future disregard for the PP’s remedial action and 
thereby deter public office corruption.  
 
4.4.4 How does the Constitutional Court view Parliament’s role in oversight of the 
President (the executive)?  
 
In its oversight role it was expected that Parliament would assist the PP in protecting the 
available resources of the state against abuse. The PP submitted the report to the President 
and the National Assembly/ Parliament in line with the PP’s obligation ‘to report on that 
conduct’ which means to report primarily to the National Assembly (NA).963 This was in 
misguided anticipation that Parliament would provide the necessary oversight as obligated by 
the Constitution and hold the President accountable as head of the executive.
964
 Regrettably 
this was not to be because neither the President nor Parliament complied with the remedial 
action recommended from 2014 until the CC action in 2016.
965
  Parliament owed it to the 
                                                 
960
 Articles 15, 17, 20-1. 
961
 See chapter 6 discussing the liberal approach of the judiciary in India toward corruption. 
962
 See chapter 6 explaining how the judiciary keep government in check on public corruption. 
963
 Nkandla case para 43. Also see Constitution s 182(1) (b). 
964
 See s55 for powers of Parliament. Also see s42 (3) The National Assembly is elected to represent the people 
and to ensure government by the people under the Constitution. It does this by choosing the President, by 
providing a national forum for public consideration of issues, by passing legislation and by scrutinizing and 
overseeing executive action. Also see chapter 3 for discussion on parliamentary oversight in the realisation of 
housing. 
965
See Nkandla case. 
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people to have seen that the President comply with the remedial action and not attempt to 
absolve the President as it did through its own investigation which amounted to second-
guessing the PP. 
 
 
The CC in Nkandla confirmed that Parliament had to ‘act in accordance with and within the 
limits of, the Constitution, and the supremacy of the Constitution
966
 which required that the 
obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled’.967  Therefore the CC posits that the constitutional 
obligations of the NA binds it to hold the President to account by facilitating and ensuring 
compliance with the decision of the PP.
968
 According to the Public Protector Act
969
  the report 
was a high priority matter that required the urgent attention of,  or an intervention by the NA. 
Moreover, the CC confirmed that holding the executive accountable was a primary and 
undefined obligation imposed on the NA.
970
 In essence Parliament is constitutionally obliged 
to scrutinise and oversee executive action and hold the President accountable.
 971
  In this 
regard the NA was duty-bound to hold the President accountable in facilitating and ensuring 
compliance with the PP’s decision.972 In its failure of this oversight, Parliament acted 
inconsistent with the Constitution and unlawfully.
 973
 The CC found that Parliament 
floundered in its oversight role because it did not give urgent attention to the findings and 
remedial action suggested in the PP’s Report, in an appropriate manner.974 Lest we forget, the 
people rely on Parliament in its oversight capacity to ensure that their, the people’s interests, 
are protected by keeping the executive in check.  In this regard Parliament failed the people 
by not upholding its constitutional obligations as representative of those who had mandated 
oversight through adult suffrage. Furthermore this action by Parliament does not blend with a 
government set on making a decisive break from the unchecked abuse of state power and 
resources during the period of parliamentary sovereignty. For this reason the CC is clear in 
the promotion of constitutionalism, accountability and the rule of law which constitute ‘the 
                                                 
966
 Section 2. 
967
 Nkandla case para 97. 
968
 Nkandla case para 97. 
969
 Section 8(2) (b) (iii).  This should be read with the constitutional obligation imposed on the PP by s182 (1) 
(b) and (c). 
970
 Nkandla case para 43. 
971
 Constitution s42 (3) and s55 (2).  
972
 Nkandla case para 97.   
973
 Nkandla case para 99. 
974
 Nkandla case para 81. 
 
 
 
 
157 
 
sharp and mighty sword that stands ready to chop off the ugly head of impunity off its 
stiffened neck’.975 
 
Section 167(4) (e) of the Constitution entrusts the unelected judiciary with the power to 
ensure that Parliament fulfils its constitutional obligations.
976
 It is this muscle that the CC can 
flex and inquire to Parliament as to its constitutional obligations insofar as holding the 
executive to account in its delivery of social housing.  More pertinently the Court can ask 
Parliament on the progress of the SIU Report into corruption in the public housing 
programme.  
 
The blight on government as recalcitrant and reluctant to implement orders that do not favour 
them, is explored next.
977 
 
 
4.5 Non-compliance by branches and institutions of the state with judicial orders  
 
The CC maintains that: 
 
 ‘In a government of laws, existence of government will be imperilled if it fails to 
observe the law scrupulously... government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good 
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example... if the government becomes the 
law-breaker, it breed contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto 
him; it invites anarchy.’978 
 
The separation of powers can only be truly respected if court orders are complied with by 
government in that judicial orders are preludes to the judiciary’s independence and its 
function as interpreter of rights. Ebrahim J opines that 'if the rights of successful litigants 
cannot be enforced then the process of taking disputes to court for adjudication would be 
rendered meaningless.'
979
  
                                                 
975
Nkandla case para 1. 
976See Constitution s55 ‘Powers of National Assembly’. 
977
Another case pending before the CC concerning the PP’s remit, is the PP’s Report ‘When Governance and 
Ethics Fail’ Report No 23 of 2013/2014 dealing with allegations of maladministration and abuse of power at the 
state broadcaster the SABC. 
978
Mohamed and Another v the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC) para 
68.  
979
East London Transitional Local Council v Member of the Executive Council of the Province of the Eastern 
Cape for Health and Others 2000 (4) All SA 443 (Ck) para  449g.  
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The court, when deciding an issue, has the power to make any order which is just and 
equitable,
980
 and order the appropriate relief.  Moreover, the Constitution
981
 states that ‘an 
order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of state to which, it 
applies.’ Furthermore the CC in Nyathi v MEC for Department of Health Gauteng 982made it 
clear that ‘[d]eliberate non-compliance with or disobedience of a court order by the state 
detracts from the ‘dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the Courts.’983 Moreover, 
contempt of court orders invokes criminal sanction for a civil proceeding.
984
 This said, the 
way the common law has developed, the contempt must be deliberate and there must be mala 
fide.
985
 
 
Therefore disdainful behaviour by public officials against court orders should be 
appropriately sanctioned in order to deter disregard for independent judicial decisions which 
pairs with constitutional violation.
986
 
 
Judicial oversight should comfort the public that their SERs are protected in the same way as 
any other rights-challenge that comes before the court. Despite the risk of criminal sanction, 
there is a spectre of executive officers refusing to obey court orders because they think it was 
wrongly granted. 
987
 The SCA stressed that ‘wholesale non-compliance with court orders is a 
distressing phenomenon in the Eastern Cape’. 988 Due to the state’s poor management of 
enforceability of court orders, the CC submitted that it had become necessary for this court to 
oversee the process of compliance with court orders and to ensure ultimately that such 
compliance was lasting and effective.
 989
 Significantly, the judiciary in India keeps 
government in check on court orders by commissioning people from various credible sectors 
                                                 
980
Constitution s172 (1) (b). 
981
Section 165(5). 
982
2008 (5) SA 94 (CC) (hereafter Nyathi CC ) 
983
Nyathi CC (2008) para 44.   
984
See Van Winsen L Cilliers A & Loots C in Herbstein J and Van Winsen L (eds) The Civil Practice of the 
Superior Courts in South Africa 4
 
ed (1997) for more on these procedures.  
985
Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA) para 8. Applicant failed to establish that AG acted 
wilfully or mala fide in failing to comply with a court order. 
986Also see Lawyers and Jurists ‘Judicial Enforcement of Social Economic Cultural Rights (2010) available at 
http://www.lawyersnjurists.com/articles-reports-journals/law-and-ethics/judicial-enforcement-of-social-
economic-cultural-rights/#102 (accessed on 20 April 2014) 
987
S v Mamabolo (ETV and Others Intervening) 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) para 65. 
988
Jayiya v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape & Another 2004 (2) SA 611 (SCA) para 
17 in this case the payment of a social grant was ordered by the court but the provincial government failed to 
oblige. Also see City of Cape Town v Rudoph and Others 2004 (5) SA 39 (C) where the state also failed with 
court orders. 
989
Nyathi CC para 83. The minister was ordered to provide the CC with a list of all unsatisfied court orders 
against all national and provincial state departments by no later than 31 July 2008.  The minister was also 
required to provide the CC with a plan of the steps Government would take to ensure speedy settlement of 
unsatisfied court orders by no later than 31 July 2008. 
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in society to oversee implementation or to investigate the veracity of claims of abuse of SERs 
on the part of public officials.
990
 
 
The PFMA (and its Regulations) contains provisions for internal disciplinary proceedings 
being instituted against public officials and for criminal offences in this regard.
991
 The CC 
found these procedures to be of no assistance in light of the ‘persistent inefficiency within 
state departments’.992 Therefore the CC bemoans ‘the failure of the state to edify its 
functionaries about the very legislation which governs their duties as unacceptable’. 993  
 
The sporadic nature of disciplinary action against defaulting public officials aggravates 
continued ineffective and inefficient administration. Moreover, the PFMA do not deal 
effectively with accounting authorities who disobey court orders.
994
 Non-compliance with 
court orders amounts to a breach of constitutional duty and has the unintended consequences 
of threatening the legitimacy of the BoR as a whole and also the integrity of the judiciary.
995
 
 
Socio-economic rights cases have suffered a fair share of government disobedience when it 
comes to judicial orders.  Although the government respected the order in TAC by supplying 
anti-retroviral drugs to pregnant women, there was real fear that the order would not be 
respected. This was because the minister of health had submitted on national television that 
the courts and the judiciary must also listen to the authorities.
 996
 Nonetheless the CC showed 
its respect for the separation of powers by declining to exercise supervisory jurisdiction on 
the basis that ‘[t]he government has always respected and executed orders of this Court, 
therefore there is no reason to believe that it will not do so in the present case’.997 The CC 
generously gave the government the benefit of the doubt despite the latter’s track record on 
delay or non-compliance with court orders. 
 
                                                 
990See chapter 6 for discussion on the Indian judiciary’s liberal approach in conserving SERs. 
991
See chapter 5 for discussion on this legislation that overarches public spending in National and Provincial 
government. 
992
Nyathi CC (2008) para 72. 
993
Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 (4) SA 446 (Tk) para 452 H (Hereafter Mjeni). 
994
Nyathi CC (2008) paras 70-4. It is not clear whether financial misconduct (as provided for in the PFMA and 
its Regulations) includes failure to pay judgment debts. 
995
Mjeni para 452 H. 
996
SABC available at http://www.journaids.org/politicsofhiv.php#pmtctpolitics (accessed on 1 September 2014) 
the minister was quickly made to retract the statement. Also see T Roux ‘Principle and Pragmatism on the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa’ (2009) 7(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 124. 
997
See TAC paras 107-13 for discussion on the use of structural interdicts in SERs judgments. 
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In contrast, it remains true that the orders issued in the earlier Grootboom to house the most 
desperate first, were not been met and people continue to live in the same intolerable 
conditions.
 998
 The lack of judicial oversight has in effect left the government complacent in 
delivering basic shelter to the most desperate, 16 years since Grootboom. A further example, 
more recently in September 2012 (pursuant to a 2009 order) the HC
999
 granted an order which 
required a mayor, city manager and director of housing to take all the necessary steps within 
three months to provide permanent housing for 37 families. This judgement came in the wake 
of an order granted by the same court on 6 March 2009 to relocate the said families to a 
transit camp, due to road construction, for a period of one year, but two years later the 
families were still living in intolerable conditions. The Court warned that the respondents (the 
government) were ‘constitutionally and statutorily obliged to take all necessary steps’ to 
comply with the 2009 order.  
1000
 Thus the government were in contempt of court for not 
implementing the courts order to move the families back to their original habitat in 2010. 
 
In 2013 the City of Johannesburg’s failure to comply with a court order to house a group of 
people facing eviction from private property, led to the CC issuing a complex order.
 1001
  This 
order attempted to deal with root causes in the general inability of the government to fulfil its 
obligations under section 26. The Court expressed regret over the City’s repeated failures to 
accommodate the occupants who in turn demonstrated a broader failure to implement the 
planning, budget and policy requirements for housing as nuanced in Blue Moonlight.
1002
  
 
A further example where the court was at odds with government for not obeying its order 
occurred in 2006 when the  court stated that the government’s failure to comply with court 
orders seriously undermined the role of courts and threaten to bring about a ‘grave 
                                                 
998
Grootboom, para 97. In Grootboom the CC made an obiter remark that the SAHRC (which appeared as 
amicus curiae in the case) should ‘monitor and report’ on the state’s progress in complying with this judgment.  
However, the Court did not incorporate any oversight measures in its order and as a consequence, when the 
Commission attempted to report back to the Court on the ongoing intolerable conditions still prevailing in the 
claimant community, the Court refused to engage with it. 
999
Mchunu and Others v the Executive Mayor, Ethekwini Municipality and Others 2013 (1) SA 555 (KZD) para 
21 (hereafter Mchunu). 
1000
Mchunu (2012) para 21. 
1001
Hlophe and Others v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and Others 2013 (4) SA 212 (GSJ) 
para 27. This case was one of the first applying the CC‘s holding that the government must budget for those in 
destitute situations, as in Blue Moonlight. See chapter 2 for discussion on Blue Moonlight. 
1002
The CC held that municipalities have an independent obligation to plan and budget for the emergency 
accommodation needs of people evicted from private property (this was already clarified in Grootboom).  
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constitutional crisis’.1003 According to the Court, unless section 3 of the State Liability Act 
1004
 was to be declared unconstitutional, there would be no mechanism to imprison public 
officials for having failed to enforce court orders.
1005
 Felicitously, this desire of the court was 
met in Nyathi 
1006 
 where the High Court declared section 3 of the Act to be inconsistent with 
the Constitution and hence invalid.
 
The following portion of section 3 of the Act was declared 
invalid: ‘no execution, attachment or like process shall be issued against a defendant or a 
respondent in any such action or proceedings or against the property of the State.’1007 The 
State Liability Act was in need of amendment due to the fact that section 3 effectively placed 
the state above the law. The amendment was necessary because the CC concluded that the 
government and its officials often failed to honour their constitutional and moral obligations 
by their non-compliance with court orders.
 1008
 Moreover section 3 limited the rights 
contained in sections 9(1), 10 and 34 of the Constitution.
 1009
  
 
In satisfaction of the judgement, final court orders sounding in money, the substitution of 
section 3 of the principle Act 20 of 57 was amended as follow:
 
 
 
‘An accounting officer of a department who fails to comply with any provision of this 
section, or any applicable regulation, instruction, circular, guideline, reporting rule or 
directive made or issued by the relevant treasury in order to ensure the satisfaction of final 
                                                 
1003
EN and Others v The Government of South Africa and Others (2006) Durban and Coast Local Division, case 
no. 4578/06 (unreported) para 33 (hereafter EN and Others). 
1004
Act 20 of 1957 ss 3(3) (b) (ii) to (16)   apply in respect of a final court order sounding in money against a 
department, the amendment is aimed  at regulating the manner in which a final court order sounding in money 
against the State must be satisfied. 
1005
EN and Others (2006) para 32. 
1006
Nyathi CC (2008) paras 16, 23, 59-63. Mr Nyathi was offered compensation by the court due to negligence in 
a state hospital, leaving him totally and permanently disabled an unable to care for his family. The court ordered 
compensation of R1 496 000 but this relieve was not forthcoming from the state. Nyathi sought an order (a) 
declaring section 3 of the Act unconstitutional; (b) compelling the MEC to comply with the court order within 
three days of said order. The HC found that reasons for not instituting the court order include pure negligence, 
incompetence or laziness paras 13-15. The CC found the state’s conduct was a ‘negligent’ disregard of an 
existing court order. 
1007
Nyathi HC para 30.  
1008
Nyathi CC (2008) para 44.  
1009
Nyathi CC (2008) paras 46 -7, 91; 
 
Also see Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development v Nyathi 
2010 (4) SA 567 (CC) where the minister applied to the CC for an extension of the period of suspension of the 
CC order of constitutional invalidity. The CC in the 2010  case extended the period of suspension of invalidity 
from the initial 31 August 2009 to 31 August 2011.This implied that the necessary national legislation that 
would give effect to the decision in the 2008 CC case had to be enacted, assented to and commence by not later 
than 31 August 2011. Within this context, the State Liability Amendment Bill, 2011 was introduced to the 
Portfolio Committee concerned on 4 February 2011 available at  http://www.pmg.org.za/billsstatus/proceedings 
(accessed on 4 September 2014) also see  Memorandum on the Objects of the State Liability Amendment Bill, 
2011 par 3.2 available at  http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20110622-committee-deliberations-state-liability-
amendment-bill-b2b-2011 (accessed on 4 September 2014). 
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court orders and adherence to this section, constitutes financial misconduct as referred to in 
the PFMA, and is guilty of an offence provided for in that Act.
 
In addition, the accounting 
officer is explicitly prohibited from assigning to any other departmental official, his or her 
duty to ensure the timeous satisfaction of final court order. The accounting officer retains 
full responsibility, accountability and liability as contemplated in the PFMA – also in 
respect of financial misconduct as provided for in clause 16 of the State Liability 
Amendment Act.’1010 
 
Updating legislation in an effort to make government compliant with court orders is 
commendable. Nonetheless, the issuance of contempt of court orders has the potential to 
ensure compliance with court orders. Contempt orders will be valuable in ensuring 
compliance with SERs but will only be useful if the court actually issues such orders.
1011
  
Constitutionally the government fails in its obligations when it finds itself in contempt of 
court orders and consequences should bear on them for their recalcitrance.  
English courts are of the view that the executive can be held accountable for failure to comply 
if it does not follow through with the steps it has taken and promises it made insofar as 
realising SERs for specific groups is concerned 
1012
 Thus, instead of ignoring the fact that 
their orders in Grootboom were not met, the judiciary in South Africa could have taken a 
more progressive and pro-active stance in hold the executive to account.
1013
 This means, 
instead of having to waiting for civil society to raise the issue of non-compliance the CC 
could  mero motu raise a contempt of court order compelling the executive to report on the 
progression of housing for those living in intolerable conditions and thereby hold government 
to its constitutional promises of improving the quality of life for all.
1014
  
 
More specifically, the CC should hold government accountable for not progressively easing 
the plight of the most impoverished as held in Grootboom. Courtis argues that clearly defined 
acts or omissions that are required by a duty, allow for clear judicial remedies without the 
need to consider a variety of policy choices.
1015
  Furthermore in Nyathi the CC stated the fact 
                                                 
1010
State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011 in GG no 34545 22 of 22 August 2011. Also see Olivier N J & 
Williams C ‘State Liability for Final Court Orders Sounding in Money: at Long Last Alignment with the 
Constitution (2011) 32 Obiter 489. 
1011
 See chapter 6 discussing how the judiciary in India has imprisoned a senior minister and public officials for 
contempt of court orders 
1012
 Courtis (2008) 21. 
1013
 See chapter 6 on the judiciary in India’s approach to government’s mischief. 
1014
 See Constitution preamble. See chapter 6 how the judiciary in India does this. 
1015
 Courtis (2008) 84. 
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that ‘some officials do not know what their responsibilities are and legal representatives do 
not know who the responsible functionaries are, does not justify non-compliance.’1016 
Continued disregard of court orders for improvement on SERs is retrogressive and points to a 
failure in good governance.
1017
 
 
4.5 The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and judicial orders 
 
The disobedience of government regarding court orders is not the only thing that this 
jurisdiction grapples with. Malfeasance in the public service is rampant thus leaves the state’s 
economic resources exposed to abuse and impedes access to much needed housing.
1018
 The 
NPA is also under scrutiny for its bias towards the current President in that it has no appetite 
to prosecute him on the 783 charges of fraud, corruption and racketeering.  In addition to the 
first citizen being found to have abused the available resources of the state for personal gain, 
he is also beleaguered with these charges in a separate protracted legal battle. President Zuma 
was indicted and the charges served on him on 28 December 2007.
1019
  
    
4.5.1 Protracted time-line of the NPA keeping the President from answering to criminal 
charges. 
 
This protracted litigation stems from the relationship that Zuma cultivated with Shaik who 
between 1995 and 2002 made numerous payments of money to or on behalf of Zuma.
1020
 
Shaik was charged, trailed and convicted for this ‘unholy’ relationship. Shortly after this 
conviction the NPA announced that it decided to prosecute Zuma and the indictment mirrored 
counts one to three of the charges on which Shaik was convicted in contravening the 
Corruption Act of 1992.
1021
 For the sake of cogency the time-line in attempting to get the 
NPA to prosecute Zuma is narrated as follow: 
 
                                                 
1016
Nyathi CC (2008) paras 79-82 
1017
Also see South African Broadcasting Corporation Soc Ltd and Others v Democratic Alliance and Others 
2015 (4) All SA 719 (SCA). Where the court confirmed that the chief operating officer’ appointment was 
irrational and should be set aside but he remains in office. 
1018
See chapter 5 for discussion on this behaviour in government. 
1019
The President faced charges of fraud, racketeering and corruption relating to an investigation started in 2001 
into to payments Zuma received from Shabir Shaik, allegedly related to the arms deal, where he allegedly 
allowed his name to be used for business deals and agreed to protect one of the companies involved. 
1020
See S v Shaik 2007 (1) SACR 142 (D); S v Shaik 2007 2007 (2) All SA 9 (SCA) and S v Shaik 
2008 (2) SA 208 (CC). 
1021
Section 1(1) (a) (i) and (ii). 
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20 September 2006: S v Zuma and Others (CC358/05) [2006] ZAKZHC 22 (charges struck 
from the roll) 
 
Zuma was indicted on 29 June 2005 on contravening sections of the Corruption Act 12 of 
2004 and Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998.
1022
  However, in the above case 
Msimang J refused the postponement of the prosecution’s case because the state was not 
ready to proceed to trial and therefore the matter was struck from the roll, but the charges 
were not dismissed.
 1023
 The HC struck the matter off the roll in terms of section 342A of the 
Criminal Procedure Act
1024
 and imposed conditions relating to the reinstitution of the 
prosecution.
1025
  The Court said that the NPA was at liberty to re-file the charges at anytime, 
when ready.
1026
 
 
27 December 2007: Zuma re-charged 
 Zuma was re-charged in accordance with charges contained in an indictment of 27 December 
2007 which was served on him on 28 December 2007.
1027
  
 
12 September 2008:  Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions (2008) ZAKZHC 
(charges ‘dismissed’) 
 
Zuma launched a review application in the HC against the decision to prosecute him in terms 
of the Constitution179 (5) (d) which allowed for representations to the NPA by the 
accused.
1028
 Nicholson J ruled in favour of Zuma to have corruption charges dismissed and 
                                                 
1022
Also see  Bhardwaj V ‘Zuma’s corruption charges: A journey through court judgments in Africa Check 31 
May 2005 available at  https://africacheck.org/how-to-fact-check/factsheets-and-guides/zumas-corruption-
charges-a-journey-through-court-judgments/ (accessed on 18 November 2016) 
1023
Page 25. 
1024
Act 51 of 1977. 
1025
Page 3. 
1026
Page 3.Also see Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma versus the National Director of Public Prosecutions 2008 
ZACC 14 (CCT 92/07) paras 41, 75. 
1027
According to the Court in Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 
and Others 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA) para 1 ‘In essence, Mr Zuma is said to have been accused of providing 
political patronage and protection in exchange for financial reward’. The indictment was served on Zuma shortly 
after he had been elected President of the ANC in 2007. 
1028
Section 179(5)(d) which  provides as follow: ‘The National Director of Public Prosecutions—(d) may review 
a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, after consulting the relevant Director of Public Prosecutions and after 
taking representations within a period specified by the National Director of Public Prosecutions, from the 
following:(i)The accused person;(ii)The complainant;(iii)Any other person or party whom the National Director 
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agreed there were signs of a conspiracy. 
1029
 The Court declared that ‘the decision taken by 
the NPA during 28 December 2007 to prosecute Zuma is invalid and is set aside’.1030 The 
Court held that this application dealt with a procedural point relating to the right of Zuma to 
make representations before being charged. Thus Nicholson J set aside the NPA’s decision to 
charge Zuma as invalid in order for him (Zuma) to make representations to the NPA. It is 
important to note that the HC stated that once these matters were cured the NPA has the 
freedom to proceed against Zuma.
1031
  
 
12 January 2009: National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (1) SACR 361 
(SCA) (charges not dismissed) 
 
On appeal against the HC decision to have the prosecution set aside, the SCA held that the 
reliance of Zuma on section 179 (5) (d) was misplaced and the court below relied on incorrect 
principles by having its facts wrong.
 1032
 The SCA purported that most of the allegations were 
irrelevant and based on suspicion and not on fact.
1033
 The SCA overturned Nicholson’s 
judgment and held that the decision not to prosecute is reviewable on the basis of the 
principle of legality.
1034 
Thus effectively the charges were never dropped because the case 
went to the SCA which found different from the HC. In essence, whilst the end of the appeal 
was pending the order of the HC was ‘suspended’ awaiting the outcome of the appeal. When 
the SCA found that the HC had erred, the ‘suspended’ order of the HC was dismissed and 
superseded by the SCA findings. Thus the charges were not dismissed because the Nicholson 
J order could never be implemented. Subsequent to this the NPA took the liberty to drop the 
charges against Zuma. 
 
1 April 2009: discontinuation of prosecution of Zuma 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
considers to be relevant.’ Important is that this section does not deal with the rights of an accused which is 
covered in s35 of the BoR. 
1029
 Paragraph 191. 
1030
 Paragraph 247. 
1031
 Paragraph 246. 
1032
 Paragraphs 75, 82. 
1033
 Paragraph 81. 
1034
 Paragraphs 36-38. Also see Freedom Under Law v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Other 
2014(4) SA 298 (SCA). It is important to note that Zuma was in the running for the national and provincial 
elections which were scheduled to take place on 22 March 2009 and the inauguration of the President of the 
Republic of South Africa would take place on 9 May 2009. 
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The NPA took a decision to discontinue the prosecution against Zuma and announced it 
publicly on 6 April 2009.
1035
 The NPA’s objective in discontinuing the prosecution was 
underpinned by the abuse of power doctrine and in protection of the integrity of the NPA and 
its processes.
1036
 It should be noted that, the NPA relied on the powers they derive to 
prosecute from section 179 of the Constitution read with the national legislation enacted in 
terms of section 179(7) of the NPA Act.
1037
 
 
It is important to pause here to note that subsequently in 2016 the Court maintained that the 
NPA made a half-hearted attempt at investigating and verifying the allegations before having 
taken the decision not to prosecute Zuma.
1038
  The Court said this was exacerbated by the 
NPA having breached the audi alteram partem rule by not having heard the other side’s view 
before making an intervention to drop the charges.
 1039
 The SCA
1040
  explained the powers of 
the NPA in reviewing a decision to prosecute and held that section 179 (5) had no application 
and Zuma’s reliance on it was misplaced.  
 
7 April 2009 Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Others 2016 (2) SACR 1 (GP) (the start of the journey to the main judgement discussed 
below) 
 
The decision to discontinue the prosecution on 6 April 2009 triggered the above application 
in an attempt to review, correct and set aside the decision taken by the NPA to discontinue the 
criminal prosecution of Zuma. The challenge was to get the President to answer questions of 
law relating to the 783 criminal charges. Both the NPA and the ‘accused’ Zuma (President) 
opposed this application. On the seven year journey of this case the following action took 
place: 
                                                 
1035
See main judgement below para 39 for reasons to discontinue the prosecution. Mr Zuma was sworn in as 
President on 9 May 2009, the month after the decision to discontinue the charges was taken. 
1036
See National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) (hereafter NDPP v Zuma 
(2009) SCA) for the manner in which the NPA must approach allegations of abuse of process doctrine. 
Paragraph 37 states ‘A prosecution is not wrongful merely because it is brought for an improper purpose. It will 
only be wrongful if, in addition, reasonable and probable grounds for prosecuting are absent, something not 
alleged by Mr Zuma and which in any event can only be determined once criminal proceedings have been 
concluded..." (Court emphasis) 
1037
Act 32 of 1998, part 5 deals with withdrawal of cases and stopping of prosecutions. 
1038
See Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2016 (2) SACR 1 
(GP) (hereafter DA v Zuma and NPA (2016) GP) para 53. 
1039
See DA v Zuma and NPA (2016) GP para 53. In light of the President making representations to the NPA, the 
DA also asked the NPA for an opportunity to make presentation but was refused. 
1040
NDPP v Zuma (2009) SCA paras 70, 71, 75. 
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8 April 2009: charges against Zuma withdrawn  
 
Whilst the review application was pending the NPA, after announcing that they are dropping 
the charges against Zuma, applied to the Kwa Zulu Natal High Court to have the charges 
formally withdrawn. As such there was no pending litigation before court against Zuma at 
this stage. 
 
20 March 2012: Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA)
1041
  
 
In further attempts to keep criminal prosecution at bay for Zuma, the NPA questioned the 
standing of the applicants in bringing a review application against the dropping of charges of 
Zuma. The SCA had to be approached to clarify that the applicants did indeed have the locus 
standi. The Court referred to the litigation history between the NPA and Zuma as ‘long and 
troubled’ inasmuch as the law reports were replete with judgements in this regard. 1042 The 
SCA reiterated that the reviewability to discontinue the prosecution was considered and dealt 
with.
1043
 The SCA had by then already concluded that the discontinuing of a prosecution was 
reviewable on grounds of legality and irrationality.
1044
   
 
29 April 2016:  Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Others 2016 (2) SACR 1 (GP) (main judgment) 
 
The thrust of the main judgment clarified that the acting head of the NPA, in not referring the 
complaint of abuse of process and related allegations to court, rendered the decision to drop 
the charges against Zuma, irrational.
 1045
 This was exacerbated by him taking the decision on 
his own (on 6 April 2009) and not engaging in discussions with senior members of the NPA 
                                                 
1041
Hereafter DA v Acting NDPP and Another (2012) SCA, on appeal from: North Gauteng High Court 
(Pretoria) (Ranchod J sitting as court of first instance). 
1042
DA v Acting NDPP and Another (2012) SCA para 2. See paras 3-7 for a brief summary and adescription of 
the NPA’s initial decision to indict Zuma in 2007. 
1043
DA v Acting NDPP and Another (2012) SCA paras 23-30. 
1044
For history of reviewability  see  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another In 
Re: Ex Parle the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) and Affordable 
Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC). Also more recently in The 
NDPP v Freedom under Law 2014 (4) SA 298 (SCA) para 29. 
1045
Paragraph 83. 
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in order to obtain their views on this subject.
1046
 This action caused there to be no rational 
connection between the need to protect the integrity of the NPA and the suspension of the 
prosecution against Zuma.
 1047
 The Court held that the decision to stop the prosecution was 
not to be made by the NPA but rather fell in the ambit of a court of law
 
 in determination of 
the principles of abuse of process.
 1048
 The action of the NPA in dropping the charges against 
Zuma was disingenuous because it failed to protect the public from serious crime.
 1049
 Thus 
instead of prosecuting without fear or favour as expected from the NPA, they sought to shield 
the President from prosecution. 
 
The Court stated that the acting head of the NPA did not allow himself enough time to 
consider the question whether the decision he was about to take, could be seen by others 
facing similar charges in South Africa, ‘as a breach of the principles of equality before the 
law’. 1050 Moreover, the Court said that ‘it will be an abuse of process to discontinue charges 
against people of high profile or standing in the community’. 1051 The Court found the NPA to 
have acted under pressure and thereby the decision to stay the prosecution of Zuma had been 
an irrational decision. In making this decision the acting head found himself to be in breach of 
the oath of office which demanded that he acts independently, without fear or favour.
 1052
  
 
For these reasons the Court found that Zuma should face the charges as outlined in the 
indictment.
 1053
  In summation the Court found that the decision taken on 6 April 2009 by the 
acting head of the NPA to discontinue the prosecution against Zuma, should be reviewed and 
set aside.
 1054
 The Court crystallised that the NPA’s decision to terminate the process due to 
the alleged abuse or manipulation of the prosecution process was irrational.
1055
 This boiled 
down to the fact that the 783charges of inter alia corruption, racketeering and fraud against 
Zuma remained and can only be set aside by the court. However the NPA was stead fast in 
their protection of Zuma against prosecution and thereby appealed the decision. 
                                                 
1046
Paragraph 83. 
1047
Paragraph 88. 
1048
Paragraph 65. 
1049
Paragraph 66. 
1050
 Paragraph 90. 
1051
 Paragraph 90. 
1052
 Paragraph 92. See s32 of the NPA Act for the full text of the oath. 
1053
 Paragraph 94. 
1054
 Paragraph 92. Also see DA v Acting NDPP and Another (2012) SCA from para 23 where the reviewability 
of a decision to discontinue a prosecution was considered and dealt with. 
1055
 Paragraph 21. 
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24 June 2016: Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Democratic 
Alliance In Re: Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Others (2016) ZAGPPHC  
 
The NPA continued to collude with the President and appealed against the main judgement, 
which failed in the above case on 24 June 2016 where the Court
1056
  reconfirmed: 
 
‘ ... .The setting-aside of the withdrawal of criminal charges and the disciplinary 
proceedings has the effect that the charges and the proceedings are automatically 
reinstated, and it is for the executive authorities to deal with them...’1057 
 
The Pretoria High Court ruled that the decision to withdraw the 783 criminal charges against 
the President was not justified.  Thus when the North Gauteng High Court in 2012
1058
 
declared invalid the decision of the NPA to discontinue the prosecution of the President, the 
original decision to charge him for corruption, racketeering and fraud was reinstated. 
Therefore, unless the case is appealed, the NPA is now legally obliged to prosecute the 
President for various criminal offences.
1059
 In appealing this case, the NPA will in essence 
confirm that 873 charges do not suffice as sufficient evidence to prosecute. This action by the 
NPA would make a mockery of the use of prima facie evidence which is used to arrest a 
suspect of crime.  
 
In this case an anomalous situation exist whereby the NPA did not work with the court and 
follow through with the prosecution of Zuma as expected, but rather looked into the 
discontinuing thereof. This is a rather bizarre situation in that the mandate of a national 
prosecuting authority would conventionally be to prosecute in light of so many serious 
charges. This is also irregular as the NPA chose to ignore the findings of the SCA stating that 
the charges stood. This, over and above the fact that judicial powers are to be respected by the 
orders they issue. 
 
Needless to say, South Africa now has a sitting President with 783 criminal charges to 
                                                 
1056
Paragraph 31. 
1057
The HC quoted from the NDPP v Freedom Under Law 2014 (4) SA 298 (SCA) para 51. 
1058
DA v acting NDPP and Another (2012) SCA. 
1059
The President has the option to approach the SCA and/or the CC in appeal. The chances of another court 
finding different, is slim. Also see De Vos P blogging under ‘Constitutionally Speaking’. 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
answer for. Whether the NPA will do the right thing and take heed of what the Court 
ordered is difficult to gauge because their quest to prosecute offenders seems to not include 
the President. This rings true by the recognition of the arbitrary and irrational decision in 
the first place to drop the 783 charges. It will indeed be a watershed moment to see if the 
NPA will have the appetite to prosecute the first citizen under the Corruption Act of 
2004
1060
 which makes specific reference to dishonest behaviour by public officers.
1061
  
 
An institution of democracy such as the ‘independent’ NPA is being compromised by 
effectively preventing the prosecution of an accused person with 783 charges. It is not the 
role of the NPA to aid and abet alleged malfeasance. On the contrary. 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
The judiciary should embrace a more progressive stance as protector of the right to housing in 
particular and SERs in general. Whilst the constitutional demands for a transformative society 
are clear, the judiciary has not embraced this vision to its fullest. This is evident in the fact 
that despite the CCs robust orders in Grootboom to house the most desperate first, 
government has not delivered on this order. A judiciary set on transforming deprivation 
regarding the right to housing, should actively seek government to report on its progress in 
this regard. 
 
Contemporary jurisprudence has shown that the reasonableness test shies away from pointing 
out the minimum requirement for a happy life. It is time for the CC to shed its conservative 
approach and challenge government on its tardiness in the progressive realisation of housing, 
to deliver the minimum in basic housing. The approach of the judiciary must be influenced by 
the recently ratified ICESCR which is underpinned by the minimum core approach. 
 
As seen from the PP’s Report and the Nkandla case even the first citizen has managed to 
elevate his private needs above that of the impoverished, by abusing the available resources 
of the state for personal benefit, when desperation for adequate basic shelter still runs high. 
This behaviour shows that the leadership does not necessarily conform to constitutional 
                                                 
1060
Section 4 relating to offences in respect of corrupt activities relating to public officers. This section resonates 
with the Corruption Act 94 of 1992 section 1(1) (a) (i) and (ii) which is the original count one charge on Shaik’s 
indictment. 
1061
 See chapter 1 discussing how sporadic this Act has been used against public officers. 
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obligations or international treaty prescripts. However the CCs response on the binding 
remedial powers of the PP, puts the spotlight on public office abuse and if enacted would 
surely act as a deterrent. The judiciary’s intolerance of public office corruption was 
crystallised in the Nkandla case. The message to the public service was clear to the effect that 
the abuse of the state’s available resources was unconstitutional and perpetrators would be 
sanctioned.  
 
This response by the CC on public office abuse shows that the Court can reprimand the other 
branches of government on its abuse of the available resources for housing. This is the 
oversight required from a transformative judiciary, which is proactive in protecting the 
available resources for housing against malfeasance. The role of the judiciary is all the more 
crucial in light of the view that Parliament is failing in its oversight and there is no other 
impediment to malfeasance on the part of the executive, the President and public officials 
 
Falling short on the court’s recommendations should not be dealt with lightly because this 
indicates a judiciary that is complacent in its dealings with branches of government that 
disregard its independence and  its  custodianship  of a transformative Constitution.  As it is, 
there are no consequences for the flagrant disregard of court orders and this reveals a 
judiciary that tolerates government’s lax time-frames when it comes to housing the indigent. 
Moreover, the institutions of democracy are under severe threat by the disregard for court 
orders something to which the judiciary response feebly.  This is particularly so in light of the 
fact as evidence suggest that the other two branches of government, the executive, including 
the highest office, the President and the Legislature cannot be trusted to uphold the 
Constitution.  
 
The public perception that corruption goes unpunished feeds into the inaction of the NPA to 
prosecute the President. This leaves a public perception that not only is the NPA reluctant to 
prosecute the first citizen but more seriously that the latter is in cahoots with the NPA and 
thereby above the law. This leads to a crippling cynicism with regard to the state and its 
obligations. The NPA cannot ignore the omnipresence of corruption in government, testing 
the country and particularly the public housing programme. Thus the NPA is expected to be 
proactive in rooting out corruption that has the effect of retarding the delivery of SERs. This 
feat should start by the highest office in the land leading by example and if not, public 
morality suffers.  
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Furthermore the CC cannot simply ignore the omnipresence of malfeasance in government’s 
housing programme and the reluctance of the government to act on confirmed cases of 
mischief, as is explored next. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Malfeasance in the Public-sector (housing): South Africa’s Response to Legislative and 
Administrative Measures 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Aristotle submits:  
‘For where the laws do not rule there is no regime.1062 Thus in well-blended regimes, 
one should watch out to ensure there are no transgressions of the laws, and above all 
be on guard against small ones... to have the laws and management of the rest 
arranged in such a way that it is impossible to profit from the offices…’. 1063 
Therefore whatever regime is in power should allow the laws to rule because ruling 
in accordance with ones wishes is one of the hallmarks of tyranny (it is the same way 
masters rule over their slaves).
’1064
 
The importance of economic resources to the realisation of housing makes it necessary to 
explore how the government applies laws that should protect this important component 
against state abuse. It is incumbent on government to protect the resources for public 
spending, through a process of public procurement prescribed by legislation.
1065
 Hence 
government should provide checks and balances on how the economic resources are 
dispersed for housing, for example. As it stands, when a housing project is identified, a 
procurement process is used to secure the service provider who best fits the profile to deliver 
on specifics. This process of procurement is underscored by laws and regulations.
1066
 
These procurement processes for housing have been tainted by ‘irregularities’ that have seen 
public officials falling prey to non-compliance of the laws and the policies in place. The 
result of this has led to economic resources unlawfully being paid for housing projects that do 
not meet the criteria for payment. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the measures in place 
to combat malfeasance, particularly in public procurement (for housing), in order to 
crystallise how public officials fare in the application of these measures.  In the pursuit of this 
                                                 
1062
Clayton E The Politics: Book III ‘Who Should Rule’ para 9(c) (no date). 
1063
Clayton E The Politics: Book V ‘How to Preserve Regimes’ para 11(b (no date). 
1064
Clayton E The Politics: Book V ‘How to Preserve Regimes’ para 11(b). 
1065
 The state spends up to R500 billion on goods and services each year through public procurement. 
1066
 See para 5.3 for these laws. 
 
 
 
 
174 
 
the present chapter will outline the procurement laws and the code of ethics that public 
officials are supposed to follow in order to keep the public service honourable. 
 
Furthermore, allegations of malfeasance in the public housing programme have prompted the 
President to call on the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) to investigate and report to 
Parliament on this situation. This chapter will provide a profile of the SIU, the most notable 
administrative measure used to investigate corruption in public housing. In addition, this 
chapter also attempts to analyse the comprehensive, preliminary reports of the SIU in order to 
highlight the completed findings thus far on these allegations. The ultimate aim is to 
demonstrate that errant behaviour by public officials has led to delay in the delivery of 
housing and thereby suppressed the just recipient’s fulfilment of this human right.  
 
This chapter also examine South Africa’s response to implementation of international 
obligations. Therefore the present chapter touches on how international measures influence 
the prevention and combating of corruption in public procurement. Keeping the international 
comparison in mind, the main anti-corruption legislation and other measures employed by 
India are discussed in an effort to enrich South Africa’s jurisprudence in this regard. The 
discussion on India is a prelude to chapter six that provides an in-depth comparative analysis 
of how the Indian judiciary approaches the enforcement of SERs and the combating of 
corruption in the public sector. 
 
5.2 Good governance and accountability on economic resources  
 
Good governance is broadly defined as the responsible use of political authority to manage a 
nation’s affairs.1067 This includes rule of law in compliance with a constitution, maintaining 
efficiency and accountability, creating awareness in the prevention of corruption in the public 
sector, socio-economic progress and protecting human rights.  Furthermore, in South Africa 
good governance should be underpinned by social justice which lends attention to the 
realisation of SERs. 
 
                                                 
1067Reif L C ‘Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good 
Governance and Human Rights Protection’ (2000) Harvard Human Rights Journal 16. Also see Reagan O R 
‘NEPAD and Good Governance’ 2002 SAJ Int’l Aff 189. 
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The Parliament of South Africa is tasked with an oversight role over the executive and 
thereby Parliament is the main force behind keeping the social justice project alive and 
forward moving.
 1068
  In this endeavour Parliament should ensure that the executive fulfil their 
SERs obligations by delivering social housing timeously. Moreover the available resources 
earmarked to realise housing should be protected against malfeasance in the public service. 
Although the SIU Reports were presented to Parliament, in 2011, 2012 and 2013,
1069
  to date 
this branch of government has not called the SIU to account on the implementation of its 
findings or finalisation of its investigations. The government’s slow response to the 
realisation of housing the most desperate could be improved if there had been a sharper focus 
by government on how public officials attended to the distribution of budgeted resources. The 
importance of accountability and transparency underlined the latest CC ruling in AllPay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the 
South African Social Security Agency and Others
1070
 where the court stated that: 
 
‘The founding values of our Constitution 1071 include a democratic government based on 
the principles of accountability, responsiveness and openness thus the public 
administration must be accountable.
1072
Accountability is ensured by financial compliance 
with the Public Finance Management Act and general ministerial oversight.’ 1073 
 
Furthermore, the importance of accountability has been highlighted by the Institute for 
Security Studies (ISS), illuminating the fact that corruption remains an ongoing obstacle to 
good governance.
1074
 Embellishing this are reports on documented fraud and malfeasance 
                                                 
1068
 See chapter 3 on parliamentary oversight. 
1069
 See para 5.4.3 
1070
 (No 2) 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC) para 50, 65 (hereafter Allpay no 2). This case considered irregularities in the 
competiveness and cost-effectiveness of the tender process in a bid to outsource the payment of social security 
grants on behalf of the South African Social Security Agency. Due to the importance of settling the law on 
procurement irregularities, this case appeared three times before the CC. 
1071
 Section7. 
1072
 Also see Constitution s195 (1) (f). 
1073
 The PMFA 1 of 1999 seeks to regulate financial management in national and provincial government; The 
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (MFMA) functions in the local government sphere. See chapter 
3 for discussion on the PFMA and MFMA. Also see Mubangizi J ‘South African Public Protector, the Ugandan 
Inspector-General of Government and the Namibian Ombudsman: A Comparative Review of Their Roles in 
Good Governance and Human Rights Protection’ (2012) 45 Comp. & Int'l L.J. S. Afr. 304. 
1074
Newham G ‘Why is Corruption Getting Worse in South Africa?  13 December 2013 ISS: Crime and Justice 
Division available at http://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-is-corruption-getting-worse-in-south-africa (accessed on 
3 March 2015) a report by law firm Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs. Also see Tamukamoyo H ‘No Accurate Stats 
for Corruption in South Africa ISS 3 November 2014 available at http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/no-
accurate-stats-for-corruption-in-south-africa (accessed on 8 April 2015) contends that the 2012/2013 national 
crime statistics showed that reported commercial crime cases, which include crimes such as corruption, fraud 
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cases presented to Parliament the amounts involved of which increased from R130 million in 
2006/07 to over R1 billion in 2011/2012.
1075
  Analysts have warned that corruption is the 
single biggest threat to the RDP.
1076
 It is through this programme that government envisaged 
the realisation of the much needed SERs to the population at large.  
1077
 
 
Although corruption in the public service dates back to the apartheid era,
 1078
 the current 
government continues to be tested by persistent dearth of accountability in the public 
administration.
 1079
 Corruption Watch contends that this problem starts in the highest echelons 
of state office which in turn frustrates various efforts by the government to tackle 
corruption.
1080
 The actions of government to curb corruption are countered by continual 
impunity of those who are politically and financially powerful.
 1081
  As a matter of fact, 
reforms of the political system regarding accountability tend to overlook those at the top and 
focuses only on the lower ambit of public office and public service. In some instances senior 
officials and ministers were allowed to remain in office, even with substantial evidence of 
irregularities that they have been involved in or should have been aware of had they 
adequately performed their duties.
1082
 According to the Afrobarometer Survey, perceptions of 
the office of the President being corrupt have more than doubled from a low 13% in 2002 to 
                                                                                                                                                        
and theft, increased by 4% from the previous year to a total of 91 569 incidents. Between 2012/2013 and 
2013/2014 commercial crime incidents decreased by 13.6% (a reduction of 12,460 cases) to a total of 79,109 
incidents. The nature of commercial crimes behind this decrease is unknown. 
1075
 Newham G (2013). See chapter 3 on parliamentary oversight. 
1076
 The RDP is an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework. It seeks to mobilise all South Africa’s 
people and the country's resources toward the final eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, 
non-racial and non-sexist future available at http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=234 (accessed on 10 April 
2015). 
1077See  Camerer L ‘Poverty and Corruption in South Africa: Government Corruption in Poverty Alleviation 
Programmes (1997) World Bank/UNDP Study on Poverty and Inequality in South Africa available at  
http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/1998/poverty/corruption.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015); Rose-Ackerman S 
Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform 1999. 
1078
 For a discussion on pre 1994 corruption see Hyslop J Political Corruption in South Africa: Before and After 
Apartheid (2005) 31 Journal of Southern African Studies 773. Also see Posel D ‘Labour Relations and the 
Politics of Patronage: A Case Study of the Apartheid Civil Service’ in Adler G  (ed.) Public Service Labour 
Relations in a Democratic South Africa  (2000) which elaborates on the same pattern of ill accountability during 
the apartheid regime. 
1079
 See Kamp M (ed) Concepts and Principles of Democratic Governance and Accountability (2011). 
1080
 Newham G (2013). 
1081
Newham G (2013). Also see Transparency International Handbook on Curbing Corruption in Public 
Procurement 2006. 
1082
See Ramphele M in Lock M Das V Kleinman A & Reynolds P (eds) Remarking a World: Violence, Social 
Suffering and Recovery (2001) 3.Also see chapter 6 on how the judiciary in India approach corruption in 
government. 
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35% in 2011.
1083  
The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation reflects that citizens in South 
Africa are less trusting of their national leaders.
1084
 
 
The AG painted a bleak picture in the 2015/2016 Audit, reporting that government entities 
racked up billions of rands in wasteful, fruitless and irregular expenditure.
1085
 Most of the 
irregular expenditure was the result of departments behaving unethically by failing to adhere 
to the laws and policies governing procurement processes.
1086
 The relative failure by 
government to better bookkeeping is attributed to ‘many officials including finance managers 
and chief financial officers, working in the finance and audit units of government departments 
had not achieved minimum competency levels’. 1087 This chapter nine institution reports that 
these billions are lost to the fiscus through mismanagement, corruption, indolence and 
indifference which is exacerbated by poor financial oversight in major procurement 
processes. The AG described that there is a blatant disregard for section 217 the procurement 
clause of the Constitution.  It is significant that public officials receive public service training, 
with integrated ethics training in all their training programmes.
1088
  Despite this, statistics 
from the Public Service Commission show that public sector fraud has increased to R1 billion 
rand in 2011/2012 from an estimated R130.6 million in 2006/2007.
1089
   
 
5.2.1 Government’s response in protecting economic resources from abuse by public 
office 
 
                                                 
1083
Newham G (2013). Also see chapter 4 on the Nkandla case exposing irregular expenditure by the President. 
1084
Newham G (2013).This survey revealed that since 2012 there has been a 10, 8% decrease in citizens' 
confidence in national government. 
1085
Auditor General Report 2015/2016 available at https://www.agsa.co.za/Portals/0/MFMA%202014-
15/Section%201-9%20MFMA%202014-
2015/FINAL%20MEDIA%20RELEASE%20(MFMA%202016)%20FN.pdf  (accessed on 18 November 2016). 
Also see chapter 4.  
1086
See para 5.3 for discussion on the laws governing public procurement. 
1087‘The AG told Parliament’s Watchdog on Public Accounts Committee, Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts (Scopa)’ available at http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2014/02/06/our-bean-counters-arePublic-
hopeles(accessed on 20 March 2015). Also see Legal brief Today – ‘Government Accountants Incompetent - 
Auditor-General’ 6 Feb 2014; International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions 2001: Internal Control: 
Providing a Foundation for Accountability in Government available at www.intosai.org (accessed on 20 March 
2015); Sapa ‘Government bodies wasted R2bn last year, says AG in  Mail&Guardian 05 Feb 2014 available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-05-government-bodies-wasted-r2bn-last-year (accessed 10 September 2014). 
1088
The South African Management Development Institute is responsible for public service training. 
1089
Public Commission Report to Citizens for 2011/2012. 
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It is the responsibility of government through legislative and executive means to take the lead 
in the preventing and combating of corruption in the public service.
1090 
To assist in this regard 
there are various institutions that scrutinise accountability, including chapter nine institutions 
which are constitutional
1091
 mechanisms such as the AG, Public Protector and Public Service 
Commission. 
 
In addition to the Corruption Act,
1092
 South Africa has adopted comprehensive anti-
corruption measures in its fight against corruption in the state. In this regard the government 
adopted the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy in 2002
1093
 which gave rise to the 
Public Service Special Anti-Corruption Unit. To further tighten the laws on ethical behaviour 
in government, the new Public Administration Management Act
1094
 is aimed at building a 
clean and effective public service. This would be given effect by prohibiting public officials 
from conducting business with the state. Thereby, government purports to eliminate 
incentives and opportunities for corruption and unethical conduct.
1095
 To strengthen this 
endeavour, the Act
1096
 demands that state employees declare any business interest in order to 
prevent and eliminate corruption. Failure to comply with this is an offence which attracts 
liability to a fine or imprisonment of up to five years, or both, or may lead to serious 
misconduct findings resulting in termination of employment.
1097
 Significantly, similar 
sanctions are also found in the Corruption Act.
 1098
 The plethora of laws creates the 
impression that the government is doing something about corruption when in fact the lack of 
political will to fight corruption seems to render the promulgation of all these laws an act of 
futility. Thus the laws are rather in effect a cosmetic device to mask the underlying abuse of 
public office. 
 
                                                 
1090
Also see Brinkerhoff D ‘Assessing Political Will for Anti-corruption Efforts: An Analytic Framework’ 
(2000) 20 Public Administration and Development 239; Riley S ‘The Political Economy of Anti-corruption 
Strategies in Africa (1998) 10 The European Journal of Development Research 129; The National Crime 
Prevention Strategy Department of Safety and Security 22 May 1996. The Southern African Development 
Community Protocol against Corruption is the first sub-regional anti-corruption treaty in Africa see chapter 1 for 
discussion on this. 
1091
 See Constitution chap 9. 
1092
 See chapter 1 for discussion on this legislation. 
1093
 Available at wwiv.dpsa.gov.za (accessed on 10 March 2015). 
1094
Act 11 of 2014. Signed into law on 19 December 2014. The Act will be effective on a date still to be 
proclaimed by the President in the Government Gazette. 
1095
 Section 15 provides for a Public Administration Ethics, Integrity and Disciplinary Technical Assistance 
Unit. 
1096
 Sections 8, 9. This is in parallel with the UNCAC arts 7, 8. 
1097
 Section 8 (3). 
1098
 Section 26. See chapter 1 for discussion on this Act. 
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As it stands the abuse of authority and  the violation of a legal duty or a set of rules as 
provided by the Corruption Act,
1099
 do not serve as a deterrent for those officials abusing the 
procurement and supply chain management (SCM) systems. This is so despite the fact   that 
National Treasury claims to ‘value[s] the strategic importance of SCM to service delivery, 
value creation, socio-economic transformation and fiscal prudence’.1100 As it is, although 
being in place since 1994, the Corruption Act resulted in almost no prosecutions or fines for 
non-compliance or for the abuse of the public procurement system. This is regardless of the 
fact that the National Treasury established the oversight of the Office of the Chief 
Procurement Officer (OCPO)
1101
 ‘to ensure that government gets value for money in its 
contracts and to reflect government’s commitment to quality service delivery at the right 
place and time’. 1102 According to the National Treasury this Unit is central to government’s 
plan of realising efficiencies in spending and curbing corruption.
1103
 It must be noted that 
there is no empirical evidence as to the success reaped in reducing corruption in public 
procurement or whether fiscal prudence ensued since the inception of the OCPO.  
 
 
A number of other institutions exist to combat corruption, including the Independent Police 
Investigative Directorate, South African Revenue Services (SARS), South African Police 
Service (SAPS), NPA (specifically the Directorate of Special Operations and the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit), the SIU and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA).
1104
 To further assist in 
combating corruption, the National Anti-Corruption Task Team (NATT) was established to 
coordinate functions across the anti-corruption agencies. Recorded success of the NATT is 
where lower ranking public officials have been convicted on fraud and corruption and named 
by the department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DoJCD).
1105
 However these 
charges are not likely to fall under the Corruption Act.
1106
  
                                                 
1099
 Sections 4(ii) (aa), (cc), 12(1).  
1100
 National Treasury ‘2015 Public Sector Supply Chain Management Review’. 
1101
 Established February 2013. 
1102
 National Treasury ‘2015 Public Sector Supply Chain Management Review’. 
1103
 Creamer T Treasury’s procurement chief outlines far-reaching reform agenda Polity 31 January 2014 
available at http://www.polity.org.za/article/treasurys-procurement-chief-outlines-far-reaching-reform-agenda-
2014-01-31  (accessed on 4 May 2016). 
1104
See Department of Public Service and Administration Report (2003)134-145; Public Service Commission 
Report (2001) 2-5.  
1105South Africa Info ‘SA names, shames corrupt officials’10 June 2013 available at 
http://www.southafrica.info/about/government/corruption-100613.htm#.VSaTOtyUdMs (accessed on 9 April 
2015) according to the DoJCD 42 people have been  named of conviction of fraud and corruption and the names 
of a further 3000 also so convicted is to be released later. Also see National Treasury’ Duty to Report Known or 
Suspected Corrupt Transactions’ 6 September 2011 available at 
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Although the government established the Anti-Corruption Co-ordinating Committee 
(ACCC),
1107
 major weaknesses in myriad anti-corruption measures are the absence of co-
ordination amongst these agencies and no proper delineation of responsibilities. This results 
in the overlapping of the mandates of these agencies which appear not to approach corruption 
with complementary preventative and investigative measures.
1108
  Most noteworthy is that the 
Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements, known as 
BNG,
1109
 requires the National Department of Human Settlements (NDoHS) to establish a 
special investigative unit to deal with fraud and corruption in respect of the implementation of 
the National Housing Programme.  However the BNG has not assisted in prudent fiscal 
spending in the delivery of housing, which should lend itself to public procurement that is 
both competitive and cost effective. 
 
5.3 Corruption and public procurement in housing: legislative and other measures 
 
South Africa engages a preferential public procurement policy which promotes socio-
economic objectives that work in tandem with the immediate objectives of the procurement 
policy itself.
1110
 It is through these procurement processes that the awarding of contracts for 
the construction of public housing takes place. By regulating procurement, government at 
least tries to ensure that it obtains goods or services at the most economical price through a 
process that is transparent, fair and competitive. 
 
Analogous to this, is that the Constitution
1111
 promotes a transparent, fair, equitable, cost-
effective and competitive process for public procurement. According to Bolton a primary 
reason for these five principles is to safeguard the integrity of the government procurement 
process, thereby ensuring prudent use of public resources and to prevent corruption. 
1112
 
Williams and Quinot argue that transparency has anti-corruption implications in that the rules 
that define the procurement process are to be clear and the opportunities for contracting are 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/pfma/circulars/Duty%20to%20Report%20Corrupt%20Transactions.pdf 
(accessed on 10 March 2015). 
1106
 See chapter 1 for discussion on the Corruption Act and the few prosecutions under this legislation. 
1107
See Public Service Commission: Audit of Anti-Corruption Capabilities of Departments (2003A). 
1108
 Public Service Commission Report (2001) 3-5. 
1109
 See chapter 3 for discussion on the BNG. 
1110
Also see the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003. 
1111
 Section 217. 
1112
Bolton P The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa (2007) 57.  
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publicly available, making it difficult to conceal improper practices.
1113
 Moreover, these 
procurement processes are aimed at contracting the supplier with the right credentials as 
spelled out in the procurement specifications in order to save money and time and to gain 
optimal benefit. 
 
To combat corruption the procurement of goods and services in government is underpinned 
by a stringent SCM process as set out in the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 
(PPPFA).
 1114
  This is in collaboration with public officers following the financial guidance of 
the PFMA
1115
  for the maintenance of an appropriate procurement system in compliance with 
all commitments required by legislation. When it comes to the realisation of housing, the 
National Housing Act (NHA) and National Housing Code (NHC) also come into play.
1116
  
The Treasury Regulations
1117
 require the development and implementation of an effective and 
efficient SCM system for the acquisition of goods and services in parallel with the 
constitutional demands for procurement. Moreover, the awarding of a contract constitutes 
administrative action thus the PAJA
1118
 applies, providing for a just and equitable remedy, if 
a procurement process had been unfair.
1119
 The importance of review under PAJA
1120
  arises 
when a procurement process is unlawful in terms of the Constitution.
1121
 In addition to these 
measures to combat corruption in procurement, in 2009 the Minister of Finance established a 
                                                 
1113
Williams S & Quinot G Public Procurement and Corruption: The South African Response (2007) SALJ 345. 
Also see Arrowsmith S ‘Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement' 
(1998) International and Comparative LQ 796. Kelman S Procurement and Public Management: The Fear of 
Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance (1990). 
1114
Act 5 of 2000. Also see Preferential Procurement Regulations 2011; National Treasury ‘2015 Public Sector 
Supply Chain Management Review’ available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/SCMR%20REPORT%202015.pdf    (accessed 3 May 2016). 
National Treasury ‘Supply Chain Management: A Guide for Accounting Officers/Authorities’ available at  
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2016). 
1115
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1116
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1117
Published in GG 27388 GN R225 of 15 March 2005. Treasury Regulations 16A9.1(b) states that an 
accounting officer must ‘investigate any allegations against an official or other role player of corruption, 
improper conduct or failure to comply with the supply chain management system, and when justified― 
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(ii) report any conduct that may constitute an offence to the South African Police Service.’ Also see Regulations 
in terms of the Public Finance Management Act: Framework for Supply Chain Management in GG 25767 of 
5 December 2003 reg 9 stipulates the same measures. 
1118
Act 3 of 2000 s6 (2) (e) (iii). Section 3(1) of PAJA provides ‘Administrative action which materially and 
adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person must be procedurally fair.’ Also see Quinot 
G ‘Administrative Law’ (2010) Annual Survey of South African Law 41. 
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AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
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Multi-Agency Working Group to deal specifically with corruption and irregularities within 
government’s procurement system. 1122  
 
Notwithstanding these measures, the AG bemoans the fact that the current deviations from 
SCM processes are a reflection of a lack of proper and strong internal controls.
1123
  He 
laments the fact that committing corruption through irregular expenditure too often goes 
unpunished and this is a major problem. According to the AG of the 80 percent cases that are 
investigated for maladministration only 20 percent result in disciplinary hearings.
1124
 
 
  In AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v CEO of the South 
African Social Security Agency and Others
1125
  the SCA stated that, public interest dictates 
that a procurement process should not be invalidated for minor, inconsequential flaws. 
However the apex court, the CC
1126
 disagreed with this finding and observed that such an 
approach to irregularities seemed detrimental to important aspects of the procurement 
process. First, it undermined the role of procedural requirements that ensured even treatment 
of all bidders; secondly, it overlooked the purpose of a fair process ensuring the best 
outcome.
1127
  This court also pointed out that the primacy of public interest in procurement 
matters had to be taken into account when the rights of affected persons were assessed.
1128
 
Thus due care and diligence by public officials are expected when overseeing procurement 
processes and disbursements insofar as public housing projects are concerned the lack of such 
due care and diligence does affect the enjoyment of the right to housing.  
 
The CC found that the procurement process in Allpay, was not tainted by corruption but by 
the lack of a proper procurement process which too often deviates from a fair process and has 
                                                 
1122Presidency News ‘The Anti-Corruption Task Team is fully operational’ 27 January 2015 (hereafter 
Presidency News) available at http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=18876 (accessed on 20 March 
2015). 
1123Sapa ‘Corruption goes unpunished too often: AG’ 10 February 2014 available at 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2014/02/10/corruption-goes-unpunished-too-often-ag (accessed on 6 March 
2015). Also see Corruption: Chicago turns the screws on contractors to report wrongdoing  available at Full 
Chicago Sun-Times.com report (accessed on 6 March 2015) reports that  Chicago would become one of the first 
big US cities to require its contractors to report ‘corrupt activity’ by their employees – or be stripped of city 
business.  
1124
Auditor General Report 2015/2016.   
1125
2013 (4) SA 557 (SCA) paras 21, 96. 
1126
AllPay no 1 para 24. 
1127
AllPay no 1 para 24. 
1128
AllPay no 1 para 33. 
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symptoms of corruption in a deliberately skewed process.
1129
 This case is most important in 
highlighting the scant attention that government pays to procurement irregularities. 
Moreover, due to housing contracts involving private sector actors, such contractors have a 
negative responsibility to protect SERs. Breach of this obligation occurs when there is a 
failure to respect rights or when there is a failure to prevent direct infringement by taking 
measures that diminish that protection.
1130
 Thus public officials and contractors that benefit 
from economic gains in housing contracts and do not deliver the services required in terms of 
such contracts, are inflicting harm on the beneficiary’s right to housing. This behaviour 
retards the enjoyment of a human right through malfeasance. 
 
Regardless of all the measures in place, public procurement is an area of pervasive abuse by 
public officials.
1131
  Procurement processes have been tarnished by public officials in charge 
of such processes, taking procurement decisions that affect the credibility of the process, and 
by favouring suppliers that do not sport the correct credentials. The benefit to such an official 
could be in a bribe or perhaps a contract with a company in which he bears a financial 
interest.
1132
 The former head of the SIU reported to Parliament in 2011 that between R25- 
R30 billion was lost to the government procurement budget per year through fraud.
 1133
 
Corruption Watch submits that they received reports from individuals employed in the public 
sector, stating that there was a predominance of procurement related corruption.
1134
  Sadly, 
53% of those assessed in these reports said that although they had reported their cases to 
                                                 
1129
AllPay no 1 para 71, the Court declared the contract invalid but sustained until a fresh tender process finds 
an eligible bidder. Also see Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo 
Province and Others 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA); Premier, Free State, and Others v Firechem Free State (Pty) 
Ltd 2000 (4) SA 413 (SCA). 
1130
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 See para 5.3.3.2 on the SIU investigations. Also see Magoro M J & Brynard P A ‘Difficulties Associated 
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Contract Law Journal 305 argues that the World Bank’s rejection and debarment measures represent a 
watershed in corruption control by a development institution. 
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on 10 April 2015). Also see Staff Reporter ‘Fraud probe looks at thousands of govt officials’ 19 September 
2007; Underhill G ‘Department of irregular expenditure’ 4 November 2011; Sapa ‘SIU uncover massive 
corruption in E Cape Health department 15 May 2012; Zwane T & Mukhuthu Z ‘Contractor under R60m 
housing cloud gets top state job’ 27 June 2014 all available at http://mg.co.za/tag/siu (accessed on 10 April 
2015). 
1134
 Rauch J & Johannes L ‘Citizens Reporting Corruption in South Africa: Reports Received by Corruption 
Watch (2014) available at 
http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/sites/default/files/citizens%20reporting%20corruption%20in%20south%20a
frica%20%282%29.pdf (accessed on 9 April 2015). Also see Kaufmann D ‘Six Questions on The Cost of 
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national and provincial government, the police and other relevant institutions, they had not 
received the assistance they expected. 
1135
 
 
5.3.1 The influence of international measures on the combating of corruption in South 
Africa 
 
Due to the large budgets governments dispose of through public procurement the UNCAC
1136
  
requires the maintenance of an efficient public procurement system to combat corruption in 
this system. The UNCAC
1137
 notes that there is a link between corruption and recruitment, 
promotion and retirement of civil servants.
 Therefore ‘systems for the recruitment, hiring, 
retention, promotion and retirement of civil servants and where appropriate, other non-elected 
public officials, should be based on principles of efficiency, transparency and objective 
criteria such as merit, equity and aptitude’.1138 The UNCAC requires states to promote 
‘integrity, honesty and responsibility among its public officials’ and in doing so it must 
establish measures facilitating ‘the reporting by public officials of acts of corruption to 
appropriate authorities’.1139 Furthermore ‘public officials are to make declarations to 
appropriate authorities regarding, inter alia, their outside activities, employment, investments, 
assets and substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest may result with 
respect to their functions as public officials’.1140 States are also obliged to periodically review 
and evaluate their policies and measures against corruption in order to ensure consistent 
practices.
1141
 South Africa, as a party to UNCAC, has thus a clear direction as to how its 
public officials should conduct themselves and what is more the Corruption Act resonates 
with UNCAC.  
 
The importance of international obligations in combating corruption was spelt out it in 
Glenister. The CC held that the state was required to take account of its international 
obligations in order to curb corruption in society and hence to ensure the creation of an 
                                                 
1135
Rauch J & Johannes L (2014) ‘Also see Kaufmann D ‘Six Questions On the Cost of Corruption, (2004) 
available at www.worldbank.org (accessed 8 April 2015). 
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independent entity which would combat corruption. 
1142
 The CC said the duty to ‘respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil’ the rights in the BoR1143 read with, ‘that all branches of 
government is bound by the rights’ in the BoR,1144 placed an obligation on the state to create 
an independent corruption -fighting unit.
1145
 The CC observed that this was in line with the 
state’s obligation in relation to SERs, particularly those in sections 26 and 27, 1146 ‘to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of these rights’. Thus, combating the scourge of corruption is part of 
the progressive realisation of housing. 
 
The trend to curb corruption in government is followed by various jurisdictions around the 
world including the very populous India which is also a party to the UNCAC.
1147
 Similar to 
South Africa, there is a plethora of legal and administrative measures dealing with errant 
public officials in India.
1148
 A significant addition to the combating of corruption is the 
updated Prevention of Corruption Act
1149
 which criminalises the possession of wealth 
disproportionate to the income of a public servant, in India.  This is the main anti-corruption 
legislation dealing with sanction for public officials. This legislation is much like the 
Corruption Act of South Africa, but without the ‘disproportion of wealth’ section. Currently, 
South Africa attempts to achieve clean governance through the new Public Administration 
Management Act.  
 
The Indian Prevention of Corruption Act, which criminalises disproportionate wealth held by 
politicians, public officials and their families, could if applied to the South African situation 
also act as a deterrent and would serve the anti-corruption measures in a positive way. This 
will be a positive enhancement to the South African Corruption Act which criminalises errant 
                                                 
1142
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1144
 Section 8(1). 
1145
Glenister para 54. Also see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Legislative Guide for the 
Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2006). 
1146
Glenister para 107. See Constitution s 26(2) right of access to adequate housing and s27 (2) right of access to 
health care, food, water and social security.  
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behaviour and sanctions imprisonment for public officials, but has not been used in an 
effective way to convict senior public officials found engaging in corrupt activities.
1150
 Thus 
this South African provision does not act as a deterrent and is thereby ineffective. Other 
examples that could be useful to South Africa is that of the Prevention of Corruption Act 
(India) 
1151
 which lists (a) abuse of authority by favouring or harming someone, (b) 
obstruction or perversion of justice by unduly influencing law enforcement and (c) 
squandering public money. The criminalisation of the squandering of public money in South 
Africa could prove valuable in protecting the available resources for housing against abuse by 
public officials. Furthermore, article 102 of the Constitution of India provides that any 
parliamentarian can be disqualified for holding any office of profit. According to Sondhi 
there have been occasions when a member of parliament was expelled for holding a position 
of profit.
1152
 The Indian system thus promotes a political culture which is seen as a vocation 
and not a mechanism for self-enrichment process. 
 
South Africa has started to implement legislation that discourages public officials from doing 
business with the state.
1153
 This legislation is pending implementation and whilst it is 
welcomed it must be pointed out that its effectiveness will be proved by politicians and public 
officials declaring their business interest and relinquishing such interest while in government. 
As it is in South Africa, those holding public office often fail to declare their interest whilst 
robustly do business with the state.
1154
 Whether this new legislation is going to deter this 
behaviour remains to be seen. 
 
5.3.2 The State accountability in socio-economic rights an accompaniment of anti-
corruption   measures in India 
 
                                                 
1150
See chapter 4 for discussion on this. 
1151
See chapter 6 for discussion on the activist approach of the judiciary in India in relation to SERs and political 
corruption. 
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University of Delhi 45. 
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1154
See Public Sector Integrity Management Framework available at   
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The heightened judicial assertiveness in India post-1990 included not only an oversight 
function of SERs but also of corruption.
1155
 The SCI wanted to dilute the omnipotence of the 
power and influence of politicians and prevent them from exercising   single-minded excesses 
of power.
1156
Activist judges of the SCI imposed a positive obligation on the state to take steps 
in ensuring for the individual a better enjoyment of life and dignity. Sondhi argues that this 
action is necessary because there is a general lack of accountability in the administration at all 
levels of government in India and almost everyone considers themselves above the law.
1157
 
 
The A D Gorwala Report in 1951 is one of the earliest official documents that laid bare the 
problem of malfeasance in the Indian administration.
 1158
 This report clarifies that for the 
public to have confidence that moral standards prevail in high places in government, it would 
mean that no one should be immune from enquiry if allegations are made by responsible 
parties and when a prima facie case exists.
 1159
 Thus there should be no hushing-up for 
personal or political reasons. Administrative reforms and punitive measures against higher 
officials should top the list in the quest for reform against corruption in government.
 1160
 
Furthermore, the Shah Commission of Enquiry bemoaned the role of political leadership in 
aiding and abetting the spread of corruption in India.
 1161
 The South African government has 
not demonstrated an appetite to take punitive measures against high ranking officials, 
although the Corruption Act makes provisions for punitive measures against public-office 
abuse offenses.
1162
   
 
                                                 
1155See chapter 6 for discussion on the Indian judiciary’s response to addressing corruption and accountability in 
realising SERs. 
1156See Trubek  D M ‘Public Policy Advocacy: Administrative Government and Representation of Diffuse 
Interests’ in Cappelletti M & Garth B (eds) III Access to Justice (1979).  
1157Sondhi S ‘Combating Corruption in India: the Role of Civil Society’ (2000) Reader in Political Science 
University of Delhi 20. 
1158
See A D Gorwala Report on Public Administration, 1951 in  Sabharwal M & Berman E M (eds)  Public 
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Effective and Responsive Government: The Conference of Chief Ministers 24 May 1997 New Delhi, 
Department of Administrative Reforms and Personnel Grievances 1997 available at . 
http://www.performance.gov.in/?q=grm (accessed on 30 September 2015). 
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Constituted to inquire into corruption during the period of Emergency (1975-77) Justice Shah reserved his most 
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Accountability in South Africa regarding social housing remains compromised in that the SIU 
Reports on corruption in this matter have not been acted on, despite the occurrence of serious 
abuse of state funds, the relevant officials remain in office. Moreover, no senior accounting 
officer has taken responsibility for the lack of effective oversight. This situation prevails 
despite Parliament and the President bearing conclusive knowledge of the corruption in social 
housing.
1163
 India, in its drive to entrench accountability, has gone as far as listing the names 
of administrative and police service officials on the internet, despite the fact that corruption 
charges are still only pending against them.
 1164
 This action has been introduced to instil a 
sense of responsibility and accountability amongst officials. In South Africa a similar practice 
would go a long way in the fight against corruption, where politicians stay in office despite 
being on trial for corruption, because of the constitutional rule ‘innocent until proven 
guilty’.1165  
 
In modern India poverty is slowly giving way to a confident and inclusively empowered 
India.
1166
 This is evident in Transparency International’s Corruption Index where India’s 
position has improved significantly and according to the Administrative Reform Committee 
(ARC) the vigilance of its enlightened people will ensure continued improvement.
 1167
 South 
Africa by contrast continues to show a rise in corruption on the TI index.
1168
       
                
Institutional/administrative measures against corruption 
 
                                                 
1163
 See chapter 3 for discussion on parliamentary oversight. 
1164
 Sondhi S (2000) 20. 
1165
 See Kwon Hoo S ‘Block took bribes from Trifecta: Judge’ IOL 14 October 2015. Block remaining in office 
during his trial for tender fraud whilst he served as a provincial minister 
available at http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/block-took-bribes-from-trifecta-judge-1.1930110 (accessed 
on 14 October 2015). Cheryl Cwele (director in local government) stayed in office despite being convicted 
available at http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/60496/employment-and-labour-
december-2011 (accessed on 20 September 2015). At its 2015 National General Council (NGC) meeting the 
ruling party the ANC confirmed that corruption is a problem in the public service and bemoaned the fact that 
public officials belonging to the party do not step down voluntarily when tainted by corruption, see NGC 2015 
Discussion Documents - African National Congress available at  
www.anc.org.za/docs/umrabulo/2015/ngc_disc_docsy.pdf (accessed on 10 October 2015); Grootes S ‘ANC 
NGC, Day Two: A different story to tell’ Daily Maverick 10 October 2015 available at 
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-10-10-anc-ngc-day-two-a-different-story-to-tell/ (accessed on 10 
October 2015) 
1166
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In India the Administrative Vigilance Commission (AVC) was created in 1955 in order to 
provide direction and co-ordinate the various efforts of the ministries dealing with corruption. 
This was enhanced by the CVC in 1964, which is independent from the executive, to inquire 
into the conduct of public officials including, the executive.
 1169
 An important development 
was the creation of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in 1963 as the country’s 
investigation and anti-corruption division.
1170
 The CBI is the principal investigative agency of 
the central government in all anti-corruption matters. The CVC advises the Government of 
India on all matters pertaining to the maintenance of integrity in administration, and 
supervises the CBI and other vigilance administration agencies. Thus they have an integrated 
approach in combating corruption. 
 
Alongside its legislation and anti-corruption agencies, the South African setting favours 
setting up ad-hoc commissions or proclamations for the SIU to inquire into allegations of 
state malfeasance. The most prominent was the commission inquiring into allegations of 
corruption into arms acquisition.
1171
  Nonetheless, South Africa still battles against the pros 
and cons of a single entity to fight corruption. Having an independent agency keeping an eye 
on the conduct of public officials including the executive may reduce the proliferation of 
corruption before it reaches a critical stage, where the realisation of SERs suffers. As it is, 
early detection of corruption may create prevention of hardship to the rights-holder thus 
affected. Therefore, exposing senior management and politicians found breaking procurement 
laws, in order to corrupt the housing programme, should serve as a deterrent.  This approach 
favours the promoting of ethical behaviour among lower ranking officials. However this 
action needs political will. Regrettably, the current measures do not seem to act as a deterrent 
to errant public officials. Examples of this errant behaviour are expounded in the SIU 
Reports, below. 
 
5.3.3 The Special Investigations Unit   
 
                                                 
1169
The CVC launched a new portal, VIGEYE (Vigilance Eye), a platform to share information between the 
public government agencies and the vigilance commission. Registered users could upload videos on acts of 
corruption. The Committee on Prevention of Corruption known as the Santhanam Committee recommended the 
set up of the CVC.  
1170
 See Gill S The Pathology of Corruption (1998). 
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5.3.3.1 Composition and objectives  
 
The Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals were established in 1996 by the 
President in terms of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act.
1172
 The 
President may by proclamation in the Government Gazette, establish a SIU to investigate 
matters such as corruption in the public housing programme.
1173
 Needless to say, that the 
head of such a SIU must be South African, experienced¸ fit and proper. The primary purpose 
of the SIU is to recover money which has been lost to the state through unlawful or corrupt 
action. Its multidisciplinary forensic capabilities consist of forensic investigators, lawyers, 
forensic accountants, cyber forensics experts, data analysts and project management 
professionals.  In addition to selected members, officers in the public service may be 
seconded to a Unit. The SIUs are deemed anti-corruption agencies and remunerated from 
public funds.
1174 
Only the President may appoint and at any time remove the head of the SIU 
from office.
1175
 The SIU has been without a head from 2011 until 2015.
1176
 The SIU is 
criticised for lack of independence because it cannot take up cases unless mandated by the 
President. 
 
Nonetheless, the SIU is an independent body that is accountable to the President and to 
Parliament in terms of its activities. The purpose of these special investigating units is to look 
into serious malpractices or maladministration in connection with the state institutions, state 
assets, public money and any conduct that seriously harms public interests.
 
The SIU collects 
and presents evidence in front of a tribunal or court. This Unit is also obliged to report to 
Parliament twice per year on its investigations.
 1177
 At intervals it must report to the President 
on the progress made regarding investigations and on conclusion submit a report to this 
effect. Following the issuing of a presidential proclamation, the SIU has powers to subpoena, 
search, seize and interrogate witnesses.  Thus as a public entity the SIU can give notice to 
                                                 
1172
Act 74 of 1996. This Act has a laudable aim which broadly speaking seeks to address the problem of 
maladministration and corruption in the public or state administration see s 2(2) (a)–(g).  
1173
 SUI Act s2 (1). 
1174
 Also see SIU website available at http://www.siu.org.za/who-we-are (accessed on 20 April 2015). 
1175
 SIU Act s4 (d).  See Sapa ‘Hofmeyr’s removal as SIU head’ The Star 29 November 2011 available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/shock-over-hofmeyr-s-removal-as-siu-head-1.1188927#.VnBETdIrLIU 
1176Monama T ‘New SIU head: I’m not scared in IOL 5 March 2015 available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/new-siu-head-i-m-not-scared-1.1827412#.VnBHf9IrLIU (accessed on 15 
December 2015). 
1177
 SIU Act s4. 
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anybody to appear before it, under oath.
1178
 Its powers cover investigation and civil litigation 
in that it can take civil action to correct any wrongdoing it uncovers in its investigations.  
 
To institute and conduct civil proceedings the SIU Act provides for the establishment of 
Special Tribunals to adjudicate upon civil matters that emanate from investigations by the 
various special investigating units.
1179
 Thus the SIU can refer its civil cases to a Special 
Tribunal or any court of law for any relief to which a state institution is entitled.
1180
 A Special 
Tribunal is empowered to issue suspension, interlocutory orders or interdicts on application 
by the SIU and make any order it deems appropriate including cost orders, similar to the 
HC.
1181
  However although the Special Tribunal performs judicial functions it is not 
established as a court of law with judicial authority in terms of the Constitution.
1182
 The 
presiding members are not appointed in terms of the Constitution as is with the judiciary.
1183
 
Thus it cannot set precedent and it cannot add to the body of law. 
 
Notably the SIU does not have the power to arrest or prosecute offenders where criminal 
conduct is uncovered; it rather refers evidence regarding a criminal offence to the relevant 
prosecuting authority such as the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, as well as to 
the NPA.
 1184
 The SIU also works closely with the Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) in the NPA, 
where its powers are more appropriate or effective in recovering the proceeds of crime. The 
SIU assists departments concerned with cancellation of contracts where the proper 
procurement procedures were not followed and to stop transactions or other actions that were 
not properly authorised.  
 
The SIU is mandated to recover losses suffered by government resultant of maladministration 
and corruption, and to institute civil, criminal and disciplinary action. The Unit’s 
effectiveness in this regard is explored next. 
 
                                                 
1178
 SIU Act s5 (2) (b), (c). 
1179
 SIU Act s8 (2). 
1180
 SIU Act s4 (c). 
1181
 SIU Act s8 (2) (a-c), s9 (7). 
1182
SIU Act s 2(1) (b) of the Act; Also see Constitution of SA s165 (1) and s166 on judicial powers. 
1183
 The Constitution s7 and s174. 
1184
 SIU Act s4 (1) (d). Also see The Constitution s179. 
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5.3.3.2 The Special Investigations Unit:  efficacy in addressing corruption in the 
Department of Human Settlements 
 
The SIU investigation into public housing was first proclaimed in 2007 and the original focus 
was on low-income housing subsidies.
1185
 The investigations have since changed their focus 
to public housing building contracts. The objectives of the investigations are to investigate 
any fraud, corruption and maladministration in respect of the development and delivery of 
social housing within national and provincial departments, local authorities (and agents) and 
former Housing Development Boards.
1186
 
 
Since the inception of these investigations, this SIU presented preliminary reports to 
Parliament in 2011, 2012 and 2013 on malfeasance in the public housing programme.
1187
  
These reports have also been presented to the President. The preliminary findings found that 
billions of rands of resources earmarked for public housing have been misappropriated by 
public officials.
1188
 This practice ensued through by-passing procurement processes and the 
making of irregular payments without following public procurement and PFMA laws. 
Payments were made to contractors that had either not completed the said housing projects or 
had not delivered at all. Thus the mischief amongst public officials extends to a flagrant 
disregard of notable legislation (PFMA, PPPFA, and Treasury Regulations) including section 
217, the procurement clause in Constitution.  
 
The following findings have been presented to the oversight branch of government, 
Parliament and the President (executive): 
 
Irregularities found in awarding of contracts 
 
                                                 
1185
SIU Annual Report (2012 -2013) 22 available at 
http://www.siu.org.za/sites/default/files/documents/SIU%20Contents%20annual%20report%20sml.pdf (accessed 
on 13 March 2015) 
1186
SIU Annual Report (2012 -2013) 22. 
1187Also see Heath W Findings of Heath Special Investigating Unit ‘Human Beings are Greedy by Nature’ 
(1998) 18 Local Government Digest 2-3 observing that ‘corruption in a developing democracy such as South 
Africa constitutes a violation of the most basic of human rights. Corruption deprives people of housing, 
education, medical treatment and their basic human needs.’ See chapter 3 for discussion on the oversight role of 
Parliament. 
1188See ‘Minister Sisulu must release full SIU report on R20 Billion in fraudulent housing projects’ available at 
http://www.da.org.za/2014/09/minister-sisulu-must-release-full-siu-report-r20-billion-fraudulent-housing-
projects/ (accessed on 20 November 2014). 
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Between 2011 and 2013 the SIU presented reports to Parliament on gross irregularities 
regarding the awarding of housing contracts. These unsavoury acts include mischief in 
various housing projects in provinces of the Western Cape, North West, Northern Cape, Free 
State and Eastern Cape.   
 
Western Cape 
 
In the Western Cape, senior public officials holding municipal manager positions were found 
to be abusing the available resources for housing, by making irregular payments and not 
following the MFMA.
 1189
 Amongst these practices, duplicate payments were made to service 
providers.
 1190
 Fraud also ensued through land grants amounting to millions of rands.
 1191
 
Pertinent evidence was found relating to inadequate project monitoring, reporting 
mechanisms and non-compliance with contractual obligations by service providers. Public 
officials certificated housing projects as being complete when in fact it was not performed at 
all.
1192
 Thus the proper checks and balances which are in place in government were 
overlooked.  
 
Exacerbating this trend, in Oudtshoorn municipality managers deliberately and in gross 
negligence failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent irregular expenditure in authorising 
payments amounting to R7 million to a construction company. 
1193
 This included expenditure 
in authorising a duplicate payment of over R378 000 to the construction company concerned 
which paid for a municipal manager’s daughter’s tuition fees. This points to the contravention 
of the Corruption Act
1194
 and this matter has been reported to the NPA but no prosecution has 
ensued to date. 
 
Notwithstanding the bleak picture of housing the most desperate, provincial officials did not 
adhere to the Emergency Housing Programme policy whereby in 167 instances, work was 
                                                 
1189
This amounted to R1.7 million see SIU Interim Report April to September 2011 (hereafter SIU Report 2011) 
Proclamation R7 of 2007, published on 25 April (2007) 11 the SIU found that their conduct justifies the referral 
of the matter to the NPA (via the SAPS), as the evidence points to contravention of section 173 of the MFMA.  
 available at 
http://www.siu.org.za/sites/default/files/documents/SIU%20INTERIM%20REPORT%201June%202012.pdf 
(accessed on 113 March 2015). 
1190
 SIU Report (2011)13. 
1191
SIU Report 2011) 12. 
1192
 SIU Report (2011) 19. 
1193
 In addition, their conduct exposed the municipality to a R2.7 million civil claim (SIU Report 2011). 
1194
 Section 9. 
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performed on houses where no immediate threat to life, health and safety of the occupants 
existed.
 1195
 In these instances government has not observed progressive realisation which 
sees to the most desperate first, as confirmed in Grootboom. 
 
North West Province  
 
In the North West province housing projects were tainted by non-delivery by contractors, 
already paid, causing losses of millions to the provincial housing department.
 1196
 The 
documentation submitted by the contractor was false and misleading and could not be 
reconciled with the actual project costs. This, despite the stringent documentation verification 
required by the public procurement processes. This amounts to flagrant contravention of the 
main legislation dominating the realisation of housing, the NHA, NHC and PFMA.
 1197
 
 
Northern Cape  
 
In the Northern Cape the SIU also found breach of the NHC and NHA whereby formal 
processes requiring a formal project proposal or signed agreement for bulk allocation of 
subsidies for social housing were not met.
 1198
 More transgressions to the NHC came to light 
in projects reflected as ‘completed’ where only 67 houses were constructed and 433 still had 
to be constructed, but payment of R7.9 million was effected for the full project as if it had 
been completed.
 1199
 The department also paid out R3.7 million for this project with no 
beneficiaries identified in 204 sites and 137 where no sites were identified.
 1200
 In addition 
there were over-payments of R3.5 million to service providers without the necessary paper 
trail and fruitless, wasteful expenditure amounting to R8.4 million. This behaviour by public 
officials clearly does not depict the government’s duty to use the maximum of its available 
resources to realise the minimum obligations in the delivery of housing as required by the 
ICESCR.
1201
  
 
 
                                                 
1195
 SIU Report (2011)20. 
1196
 SIU Report (2011)19. The loss amounted to R7.5 million. 
1197
 SIU Report (2011)19. 
1198
 SIU Report (2011)20. 
1199
 SIU Report (2011)20. 
1200
 SIU Report (2011)20. 
1201
 See chapter 2 for discussion on the ICESCR. 
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Free State Province 
 
In the Free State province, incorrect procurement procedures were followed in the 
appointment of construction companies for the construction of 300 low-income housing 
units.
1202
 In this regard the NHC and PFMA
1203
 were flouted by by-passing legitimate 
application procedures which led to advance payments in the millions for incomplete 
work.
1204
 Evidence proved that the accounting officer wilfully, in a grossly negligent way, 
failed to comply with the provisions of the PFMA
1205
 by permitting these payments. 
Furthermore, economic resources were applied and wasted by allocating funds for 71 
foundations and surface beds which were not laid. This action again amounted to the stifling 
of progressive realisation. 
 
Eastern Cape 
 
The waste of millions continues in the Eastern Cape where the DoHS concluded an 
agreement for the development of 1 211 housing units and incurred irregular expenses 
detrimental to the housing project amounting to R74 million.
1206
 Fraudulent activities led to 
incomplete housing projects in this province due to the lack of documents to verify 
contractual activities.
 1207
 Significantly, no action could be taken in some of these instances as 
these officials have left the employment of government. A visible lack in the Corruption Act 
is that criminalisation does not extend to imposing restrictions on public officials joining the 
private sector where their employment relates to conflict of interest directly linked to 
functions held during their tenure in government, as expressed by the UNCAC.
 1208
 
 
Systemic findings 
These SIU interim reports stipulate the same pattern of corruption in the delivery of housing 
which has also been highlighted by the AG and private forensic consulting firms.
 1209
 In the 
                                                 
1202
 SIU Annual Report (2012 -2013) 22.  
1203
 Section 1. 
1204
 Advance payments amounting to R4.9 million and irregular payments to the tune of R12 million. 
1205
 Section 38. 
1206
 SIU Annual Report (2012 -2013) 23-4. 
1207
 SIU Report (2011) 19. R3 million paid for incomplete projects and R26 million was unaccounted, lacking 
documents. 
1208
 Article 12(2) (e). 
1209
SIU Interim Report April – September 2012 Proclamation R7 of 2007, published on 25 April 2007 Extended 
by Proclamation R35 of 2010, published on 30 July 2010 Extended by Proclamation R15 of 2012, published on 
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main, systemic findings point to the irregular awarding of tenders to service providers. This 
includes contractual non-compliance, inadequate monitoring of contractual terms and 
inadequate project-monitoring management. The SIU reports noted that these transgressions 
took place despite that the NHBRC is tasked with overseeing the construction of housing.
1210
 
That is the poor workmanship in the construction of social housing should have been detected 
by NHBRC in the compulsory oversight which underpins its work. Effective use of its 
oversight powers into the construction of housing should have prevented the billions that had 
been spent on the NRP which was aimed at correcting the defects resulting from poor 
workmanship.
1211
 
 
The most pervasive practices involve corrupt activities amounting to gross mismanagement of 
economic resources, identified in instances of non-delivery of housing projects as a result of 
negligence, fraud, corruption and /or other misconduct.
1212
 Findings were also related to: 
fruitless and wasteful expenditure incurred amounting to R615 million (three matters); 
potential losses to the respective provincial departments regarding expenditure incurred 
versus value created on the ground amounting to R37 million (one matter); irregular 
expenditure incurred amounting to R292 million (five matters). These are amounts that cover 
only the matters referred to; there are many others. 
 
The reports reveal that systemic problems are infused with senior accounting officers abusing 
their power by not following the laws in place to safeguard the economic resources. This is 
underscored by irregular payment to illegally appointed contractors. Despite the starting 
threshold for public procurement being R30 000, 
1213
 housing contracts amounting to millions 
are awarded without following the legislative prescripts of the various measures in place for 
SCM, including the PPPFA and PFMA. Exacerbating this is the contravention of the PFMA 
section 86(1)
 1214
 relating to criminal activities. Most unfortunate is that these contraventions 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 March (2012) 9 available at 
http://www.siu.org.za/sites/default/files/documents/INTERIM%20REPORT%20APRIL%20-
%20SEPT%202012.pdf   (accessed on 13 March 2015).  
1210
 See chapter 3 for discussion on the NHBRC. 
1211
 See chapter 3 for discussion on the NRP spending millions to rectify shoddy workmanship in social housing. 
1212
 SIU Interim Report April – September 2012. 
1213
Preferential Procurement Regulations 2011 s5. Also see Draft Preferential Procurement Policy Framework 
Act 2000: Preferential Procurement Regulations 2015 which changes the minimum to R10 million. It should be 
noted that when government purchases goods and services for more than R200 000 it must still follow a public 
procurement process through the SCM process (and not the PPPFA). 
1214
This section deals with offences and penalties. 
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are mostly made by senior accounting officers such as municipal managers and heads of 
departments, who should be guarding the available resources against this kind of abuse. 
 
Further systemic findings are non-compliance with the project payment system in terms of the 
provisions of the NHA and NHC non-adherence to the provisions of section 40(1) (a) of the 
PFMA regarding the retention of documentation and safeguarding of departmental assets.  
According to the SIU these matters have resulted in substantial losses which have brought 
reputational damage to the DoHS.
1215
 
 
It should be pointed out that payments that fail to comply with the PFMA should lead to 
sanctions for public officials under the Corruption Act, but these errant officials have not felt 
the wrath of this law as such. This leaves the housing programme currently vulnerable to 
abuse of the available economic resources and this does not blend at all with the obligation to 
fulfil SERs. 
 
Report on civil cases 
 
The SIU reported that the following number of civil cases was established against public 
officials in the municipalities in these interim reports: 4 829 (2006/7), 9 696 (2007/8), 11 177 
(2008/09), 9 843 (2009/10),   7 654 (2010/11), 6 412(2011/12)   and 3 570(2012/13).
 1216
 It 
should be noted that civil litigation has not been enacted against these perpetrators because 
the SUI did not have the power to do so. The Civil Litigation Unit in the SIU had only been 
established for the 2013/2014 financial year.  
 
Report on criminal cases 
 
The SIU reported that the following number of criminal cases have been reported to the NPA:  
3 302 (2006/07), 4 495(2007/08), 5 545(2008/09), 5 350(2009/10), 4 179(2010/11), 2 499 
(2011/12) and 997 (2012/13).
 1217
 It is important to note that these are criminal cases reported 
but not necessarily prosecuted as evidenced by the fact that very few arrests were noted in the 
SIU report.  
                                                 
1215
 SIU Interim Report April – September 2012. 
1216
 SIU Annual Report (2012 -2013) para 2.2. 
1217
 SIU Annual Report (2012 -2013) para 2.2. 
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Actual arrests: 0 (2006 – 2011), 15 (2011/2012) and 38 (2012/2013). 1218 According to the 
SIU ‘the achievement of these targets show that the SIU is making a significant contribution 
in the fight against corruption, based on the number of arrests that have been made from SIU 
referrals to the NATT.’ 1219 In addition to the SIU report, the DoHS maintain that over 1000 
public servants have been convicted and over R17 million has been recovered.
1220
 Those 
public officials bearing the brunt of the law do not necessarily include senior management 
misdemeanours as uncovered through the SIU investigations. 
 
The investigations of the SIU end up with recommendations to management in government to 
institute disciplinary action while criminal cases are passed on to the NPA for prosecution. 
After recommendations from the SIU these cases should be dealt with accordingly. However, 
ever since the SIU reported on these cases its recommendations have been left in limbo. A 
key reason for this is that the SIU has not as yet finalise the proclamation on housing  
mandate and this provided a reason for management and the NPA to not implement the 
recommendations. Moreover the Unit’s good work has been hampered by the lack of 
permanent leadership.  Between 2009 and 2015 there have been five acting heads trying to 
get the Unit up to speed. The leadership woes ended with a permanent head being appointed 
in May 2016. It remains to be seen whether Parliament is going to hold the SIU to account on 
its finalisation of the investigations into social housing corruption now that there is stability in 
leadership. 
 
Report on disciplinary hearings 
The number of files prepared by the SIU for disciplinary actions against public officials is: 
7 551 (2006/07), 8 627(2007/08), 4 750 (2008/09), 3 870 (2009/10), 2 814 (2010/11), 2 731 
                                                 
1218
 SIU Annual Report (2012 -2013) para 2.2. 
1219
 SIU Annual Report (2012 -2013) para 2.2. 
1220See SA News ‘Dept clamps down on govt housing programme fraud’ 21 February 2013 available at  
http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/dept-clamps-down-govt-housing-programme-fraud (accessed on 9 April 
2015) the DoHS says ‘1 061 public servants from various national, provincial and local municipalities who 
fraudulently benefited from government housing programme were prosecuted between the 2010/11 and 
2011/12 financial years’. The department’s Director General told the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
Human Settlements that ‘a total of 1 002 of these officials were convicted and R17.9 million was recovered. The 
SIU is currently conducting 13 criminal investigations on this matter. It said that potential public funds 
recoverable in this category of an investigation amount to R101 million’; Housing corruption: millions 
recovered 18 August 2010 available  at http://www.southafrica.info/services/government/corruption-
180810.htm#.VQONzz2hf0Q (accessed on 20 November 2014) reports that a national audit task team appointed 
by South Africa's DoHS has recovered R44-million and arrested 1 910 government officials who were illegally 
benefiting from housing subsidies. 
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(2011/12) and 850 (2012/13). 
1221
 According to the Unit the number of disciplinary action 
files drops as the SIU moves their focus away from high yielding processes and hence public 
officials continue with their nefarious business as usual.  
 
Whilst the SIU has made some cash recoveries for social security, their annual report is silent 
on similar recoveries in the public housing programme.
1222
 The most notable disappointment 
is that the final report of this SIU is still outstanding and has been overdue since April 2014. 
In the meantime action against the perpetrators of criminal activities in the housing 
programme is evasive and public officials are left to continue retaining power over available 
resources that in all likelihood will not bear the desired fruit. Whilst the SIU investigation 
into public housing corruption is ongoing, in 2012 the Gauteng provincial standing committee 
on public accounts reported gross irregularities in the provincial housing department and that 
corruption and fraud were rife in the allocation of housing.
1223
 Moreover the PP revealed that 
its office received almost 2000 reports directly related to maladministration in the public 
housing programme.
1224
 
 
5.4 Government’s response to the SIU investigations 
 
In a statement in 2014 the minister of Human Settlements gave a rendition of the 
government’s progress in dealing with corruption but made no mention as to when the 
delayed report from the SIU (due in April 2014) on corruption into public housing would be 
finalised.
1225
 To a question on this in Parliament in 2014 the minister replied that the SIU had 
completed an investigation into 59 fraudulent housing projects worth R20 billion.
1226
  
                                                 
1221
SIU Annual Report (2012 -2013) para 2.2. 
1222
Housing: Minister of Human Settlements Budget Speech 2009 available at https://pmg.org.za/briefing/18736/ 
(accessed on 17 February 2013) during this speech it was reported that a total of 772 public servant have been 
charged, of whom 554 have been convicted. More than 1 600 acknowledgments of debt have been signed in 
respect of non-qualifying government employees with a total value of R19.8m and millions have already been 
collected by the SIU from non-qualifying illegal beneficiaries.  
1223Corruption Watch ‘Low income housing-more transparency needed’ 28 August 2013 available at 
http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/low-income-housing-more-transparency-needed/ (accessed on 20 April 
2015). 
1224Corruption Watch ‘Low income housing-more transparency needed’ 28 August 2013. 
1225
See media statement available at http://www.gcis.gov.za/content/newsroom/media-releases/media-
statements/Inter-Ministerial%20Committee_10 Sep 2014 (accessed on 15 December 2015). 
1226‘Minister Sisulu must release full SIU report on R20 Billion in fraudulent housing projects’ August 2014. 
Also see South African Government media statement 2 Aug 2012 available at http://www.gov.za/public-
protector-advocate-thuli-madonsela-engages-north-west-communities(accessed 20 November 2014) community 
members in North West brought several allegations of fraud and corruption regarding the procurement of RDP 
houses to the Public Protector. A former Councillor, who was now a Member of the Mayoral Council, was 
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Notwithstanding this lackadaisical approach from the executive, Parliament in its oversight 
role has not called on the SIU to report on its delay in finalising this investigation, neither has 
it enquired into the remedial action on any of the conclusive findings of corruption in the 
housing programme.
1227
  
 
In questions
1228
 to the  President in 2014 it was asked what action had been taken by the SIU 
regarding the investigation into alleged corruption in the allocation of housing in Esselen 
Park.
1229
 Although this matter refers back to 2007, the President replied in 2014 that the SIU 
did not have a proclamation that authorises them to investigate these allegations and therefore 
the pre-investigation was stopped and referred to the department, as any such investigation 
would have been ultra of the provision of the SIU Act. Without a presidential proclamation to 
date, nothing further has been done regarding allegations of corruption in the housing 
programme in Esselen Park.  
 
Judging from the preliminary reports submitted the SIU has done a sterling job of forensic 
investigations in uncovering corruption in the social housing programme. A serious damper 
on their work is that finalisation is still pending since, 2014. The Unit also uncovered 
corruption in procurement and services at the Department of Correctional Services and has 
reported on this to Parliament.
 1230
 There have been recommendations for prosecutions and 
disciplinary action which are to still be pending even though the investigations have been 
finalised.  
 
The presidency acknowledges  in the  Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2014-
2019 that the country faces intolerably high levels of corruption within the public and private 
sectors and that corruption undermines the rule of law and impedes government’s efforts to 
                                                                                                                                                        
alleged to have been involved in an RDP house-selling scheme, which community members’ claim resulted in 
double allocation of houses. 
1227See chapter 6 discussing the Indian judiciary’s maverick stance in holding government to account in this 
regard. 
1228
Motau S C (DA) asked the President of the Republic:  the President's replies to Parliamentary Questions for 
written reply, in the National Assembly 7 Oct 2014 available at http://www.gov.za/presidents-replies-
parliamentary-questions-written-reply-national-assembly-0 (accessed on 10 April 2015). 
1229
This is a low-cost housing suburb in Gauteng. Prior to 2007, the SIU carried out a pre-investigation scoping 
exercise to ascertain the facts regarding to certain complaints by the residents of Esselen Park relating to the 
incorrect allocation of public housing. 
1230For further successes see ‘Special Investigations Unit findings on investigation into the Department of 
Correctional Services’ available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/11105/ (accessed on 24 August 2016). 
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achieve its socio-economic development and service delivery objectives.
1231
 Despite this 
statement, the President confirmed that the NATT has scored visible successes and 
government looked up to it to work even harder to assist in rooting out corruption.
1232
 
Regrettably, despite these very innovative measures, the scope of malfeasance that was 
allowed to take place in the public housing programmes as per the SIU reports negates real 
measures of success in the application of anti-corruption measures.  
 
Furthermore, cognisance should be taken of the fact that the Public Service Special Anti-
Corruption Unit, was established to enhance and consolidate the fight against corruption in 
the public service and to fast-track the processing of the disciplinary cases within the public 
service. In essence, the pending disciplinary hearings that the SIU recommended should 
receive the scrutiny of this anti-corruption Unit. Needless to say that the success in stunting or 
reducing corruption is not an attribute that can easily be earned by the SIU, due to it being 
dependent on a presidential proclamation to provide any meaningful contribution.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Society should remain conscious of its responsibility towards realising human rights and 
governments should take the lead in morality in pursuit of delivering human rights. The effort 
that is spent on anti-corruption measures indicates that government has the moral 
consciousness to deal with the scourge. However, admittedly the concealed nature of 
corruption makes it difficult for the anti-corruption agencies to perform at their best. But in 
effect all too often the plethora of laws and instruments employed to deal with corruption 
serve to mask corruption rather that giving  any clout to the anti-corruption measures. The 
SIU Reports show pertinent evidence relating to inadequate project monitoring, reporting 
mechanisms and non-compliance with contractual obligations by service providers. This is 
symptomatic of the lack of accountability and oversight insofar as economic resources in the 
realisation of social housing is concerned.  
 
Although pertinent evidence of non–compliance and malfeasance was reported to Parliament, 
this has not prompted the institution to inquire into the status of the sanctions recommended 
by the SIU. Therefore Parliament is lacking in its role as representative of the people by 
                                                 
1231
 Presidency News 2015.   
1232
 Presidency News 2015. 
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tolerating the abuse of economic resources reserved to realise housing to impoverished 
communities.  
 
According to the SIU preliminary reports, it can be deduced that corruption is a grave 
problem in the public housing programme that threatens its vitality and international 
credibility. The by-passing of procurement and PFMA laws is reprehensible and recourse on 
this can only include sanctions under the various statutory measures, chiefly the Corruption 
Act. Whether it is called fruitless, wasteful or irregular expenditure, it all boils down to the 
fact that these are state funds that have been earmarked for specific public housing projects 
which did not materialise thereby leaving the rights-holders at a loss. The oversight role of 
the OCPO leaves much to be desired in that procurement irregularities are happening on its 
watch and there are no recorded ‘victories’ which shows its usefulness. 
 
The problem lies with many unconscionable public officials tasked with handling public 
resources. On account of weak enforcement of legislative measures in government these 
officials are able to by-pass lawful measures and thereby abuse state resources. Despite the 
democratic processes in place on how to mind public spending, some public officials exercise 
their power in an authoritarian and avaricious manner instead of following the laws and 
processes in place. Therefore the good efforts made by the government on the anti-corruption 
front are dwarfed by those who act unethically. 
 
Nonetheless government should apply the anti-corruption measures more rigorously against 
public officials, despite their rank, in the hope to create a deterrent to those hoping to engage 
in corruption.  To succeed in this, independent anti-corruption machinery must be sourced, to 
effectively bring relief against the scourge. The victories of the SIU in uncovering corruption 
in housing is commendable but a damper on the powers of the SIU is that it is doing 
investigations and producing reports but without tangible legal outcomes. In essence the Unit 
is unable to institute any investigation without a proclamation by the President and this leaves 
this Unit with no liberty to act on corruption as they see fit. The Esselen Park investigation is 
a case in point.  
 
The unwillingness of government to curb corruption has needlessly (criminally) delayed 
access to housing. As such South Africa lags in its obligations under the UNCAC to measure 
and fight corruption generally, but particularly so in public procurement. The next chapter 
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explores the judicial and other measures employed by India to enrich SERs and combat 
corruption in government.  
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Chapter 6 
 
The Role of the Court and Other Stakeholders in Addressing Corruption and Ensuring 
Accountability in Realising Socio-Economic Rights: the Indian Experience Lessons 
for South Africa 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The means and methods of keeping governments in check and accountable for their decisions 
continue to be an on-going concern. Violations of fundamental rights occur in the exercise of 
state power, either by commission or omission. Therefore, combating repression of the people 
and government’s disregard of statutory duties should be minimised at least and eradicated at 
best. As depicted in the previous chapters, South Africa is grappling with housing the 
impoverished on the one hand and curbing corruption in public housing, on the other. The 
link between corruption and human rights shows that the omnipresence of corruption deprives 
the rights holder from much needed housing.  It is for this reason that this chapter delves into 
the jurisdiction of India to explore how this populous nation copes with the realisation of 
SERs and state accountability in keeping the economic resources of the state, safe from 
malfeasance.
 1233
 
 
Why compare India and South Africa?
1234
 Historically, India and South Africa have much in 
common insofar as discrimination and deprivation of economic power are concerned, leading 
to both jurisdictions seeking to ease poverty and realise housing and SERs in general. Being 
one of the older well-established democracies a comparative study with India can prove 
useful because India has gained valuable experience over decades spanning from 1947 when 
India became independent from British rule.  Both countries boast Constitutions as their 
supreme law that recognise traditional diversity and SERs. The Constitution of India is a 
product of the post-World War II era dating back to 1950 when the development of human 
                                                 
1233
India is the seventh largest and the second most populous country in the world after China. India is a 
multiparty federal, parliamentary democracy with a bicameral parliament and a population of approximately 1.2 
billion. India is a federal state with central powers at federal level and decentralised constitutional units called 
states, similar to provinces as in South Arica with a similar co-operative governance structure. 
1234Also see Risbud N ‘Urban Slums Reports: The Case of Mumbai, India Case Studies for the Global Report on 
Human Settlements’ 2003 available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/pdfs/Mumbai.pdf 
(accessed on 20 August 2015).  Singh R 'India and the Universal Periodic Review 2012’ (2013) 1 J. Nat'l L. U. 
Delhi 135. 
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rights was in sharp focus. India is one of the oldest democracies occupied with realising 
housing and has been challenged to curb corruption in its massive public service since the 14
th
 
century.  
 
It is significant that the Supreme Court of India (SCI) the apex court has been pro-active in a 
progressive manner in nudging the government to deliver on SERs.  It is this progressive 
attitude of the court that this chapter will highlight as well as the strides taken by this 
progressive approach in realising SERs. This chapter will draw from the Indian experience of 
judicial activism
1235
  by examining social action litigation (SAL) so as to highlight the 
different approach of the SCI in the adjudication of SERs and in keeping government in 
check on anti-corruption measures. To give credence to this there is a comparison of the 
judicial approaches in India and South Africa. 
 
The importance of the available economic resources in the realisation of SERs is indisputable 
and therefore government should be pro-active in its duty to provide feasible anti-corruption 
measures to protect the resources against abuse by public officials.
 1236
  Due to its enormous 
economically active population the economic resources available for public spending in India 
are larger than most developing countries, including South Africa. Political corruption in 
India is a perennial problem and judicial activism attempts to stymie the scourge. In keeping 
with this, this chapter narrates the way the SCI holds the anti-corruption agencies to its duties 
in the fight against corruption in the public service. Furthermore, the rich culture of civil 
society activism through NGOs and the media collaborating with the judiciary in SAL are 
explored. The role of this active citizenry is examined to illuminate how the pro-active civil 
society in India has assisted the judiciary in the realisation of SERs whilst playing watchdog 
in keeping corruption in check in the public sector. This role of civil society was formalised 
and gave rise to the Lokpal ombudsman. 
 
                                                 
1235
Judicial  activism involves enunciation of new ideas and techniques perhaps not even urged at the Bar, which 
are in no way necessary to the instant decision but relevant, and in some cases decisively so, for the future 
growth of the law. 
1236
The argument that corruption in India is more endemic and different from the rest of the world is fiercely 
contested by authors on the subject who also refute that corruption in India is in context with its culture and 
religion. See ‘Real Drivers of Corruption in India and the Rest of the World’ Knowledge @ Wharton University 
of Pennsylvania 23 Mar 2012 available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/real-drivers-of-
corruption-in-india-and-the-rest-of-the-world/ (accessed on 10 August 2015). 
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6.2 Constitution of India and socio-economic rights 
 
As was the case in the South African constitutional drafting process, the architects of the 
Indian Constitution were very aware of the vast inequalities that existed in wealth, education, 
health care, access to land and housing in Indian society.
1237
 Both jurisdictions have adopted 
written constitutions that embrace dignity and equality. The Constitution of India was adopted 
by the Constituent Assembly on 26th November, 1949 and came into force on 26 January, 
1950.  
 
The Constitution of India provides the legal framework for the guarantee of human rights 
through the Fundamental Rights Chapter 
1238
 consisting of civil and political rights and the 
Directive Principles
1239
 which include the SERs. Through it, the Directive Principles, the 
Constitution
1240
 of India indirectly protects SERs which include shelter, education and health. 
The constitution-drafters were of the view that these Directive Principles placed specific 
duties on the legislature and the executive and therefore the judicial branch was not directed 
to enforce them.
1241
 These Principles are more expansive than the SERs provisions in the 
Constitution of SA in that they set out a wide-ranging SERs programme for the state.
1242
  
Whereas the enumerated BoR
1243
 that the Constitution of SA boasts of, directly protect SERs 
but the implementation programme is separately legislated as it is with housing.
1244
  
 
The Constitution of SA gives a more holistic approach that guarantees the right to access 
housing and not just a right to adequate housing as is the case in India.
1245
 In India the 
enforceability of the right to housing has been made through cumulative use of the 
                                                 
1237
See Reddy O The Court and the Constitution of India: Summits and Shallows (2008) for a summary of the 
Constitutional drafting process. 
1238
 Part III 
1239
 Part IV. This includes art 21 the right to life and art 14 the right to equality. Noted is that India did not have 
a charter of enforceable rights under the colonial constitutional structure. 
1240Article 38(1) ‘The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as 
effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the 
institutions of the national life.’  
1241
Article 37 of the Constitution provides that the Directive Principles shall not be enforceable by any court, 
though they are fundamental in the governance of the country. See Austin G The Indian Constitution: 
Cornerstone of a Nation (1966) on the drafting history and background to the fundamental rights and Directive 
Principles for a summary of the Constitutional drafting process. 
1242De Villiers B ‘Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights: The Indian Experience’ (1992) 8 
SAJHR 32-3. 
1243
 Sections 7-39. 
1244
 See Housing Act and National Housing Code discussed in chapter 3. 
1245
 See Vijayashri  S ‘Constitutionalism in India and South Africa: A Comparative Study from a Human Rights 
Perspective’ (2007) 16  Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L 49. 
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Fundamental Rights, the Directive Principles and International Law.
1246
 Moreover the 
unenforceability of the Directive Principles has been progressively diluted by a judicial 
restatement of the right to life under article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
 1247
 It is therefore 
trite law that the provisions of the Constitution of India must be read to give meaning to a 
variety of rights including SERs (housing), in order to constitute the meaning to the right to 
life. Robinson aptly summarises that although the Constitution did not provide the SCI a 
mandate to enforce SERs through the Directive Principles, the Court gradually interpreted 
this to be its role.
1248
  There is no doubt that courts worldwide have a vital role to play in 
mandating the observance of human rights in an economic, social and cultural context.
 1249
  
 
6.3 The Supreme Court of India the practice of judicial activism 
  
The SCI is the highest judicial forum, the final court of appeal and the highest constitutional 
court, with the power of constitutional review binding all courts in India.
 1250
  The SCI uses 
the standard of ‘fair, just and reasonable’ when adjudicating on SERs, much like South 
Arica’s CC does. In India there have been far-reaching judgements in enforceability of SERs, 
in respect to housing, health, livelihood and education and thereby the SCI enjoys significant 
public support.  
 
In Golaknath v. State of Punjab
1251
 the SCI clarified that constitutional amendments by 
Parliament are subject to fundamental rights review.
 1252
 However, in retrospect of this review 
the powers of the SCI were severely hindered during the Indian State of Emergency (1975-
1977)
1253
  insofar as the Habeas Corpus case.
 1254
 In this case the SCI agreed that the 
                                                 
1246
 Recognising and giving effect to international obligations such as the UDHR and the ICESCR, the directions 
in articles 38, 39, 46 of  the Constitution of India, the Housing Scheme for allotment to poorer people was made. 
1247
See Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India (1980) 2 SCC 625 para702 where the court recognised that the 
Directive Principles which embody a commitment to SERs are reflective of human rights norms, just as the 
fundamental rights embody human rights of a civil and political nature. 
1248Robinson N ‘Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court’ (2009) 8 Wash. U. 
Global Stud. L. Rev. 42. 
1249
Also see Chandrachud D Y ‘Constitutional and Administrative Law in India’ (2008)36 Int'l J. Legal Info 337. 
1250
Consists of a chief justice and thirty justices that sit in bench panels of two or three judges in most cases, and 
in panels of five or more judges in constitutional benches. Also see Neuborne B ‘The Supreme Court of India’ 
(2003) 1 Int’l. J. Const. L. 476.  
1251
1967 SCR (2) 762. The Court declared that from this date (27 February 1967) Parliament has no power to 
amend any provisions of Part III of the Constitution in removing or curtailing the fundamental rights therein. 
This was a property rights case in which the Court declared that property, as a fundamental constitutional right, 
was immune from any amendment process. 
1252
See Constitution of India art 368 Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefore. 
1253
The Emergency regime passed several constitutional amendments seeking to restore parliamentary 
sovereignty. The most controversial was the 42
nd
 Amendment which fortified the powers of the central 
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constitutional rights of imprisoned persons were to be curtailed by unrestricted powers of 
detention. This compromised the basic-structure doctrine of the Constitution in that 
Parliament had amended fundamental rights. This doctrine forms the basis of power of the 
Indian judiciary to review and strike down amendments to the Constitution of India. This 
basic structure of the Constitution is inviolable and cannot be amended through legislation 
enacted by Parliament that conflicts or seeks to alter this doctrine. 
 
The basic structure doctrine is outlined in the landmark decision of the SCI in Kesavananda 
Bharati Sripadagalvaru and Ors v State of Kerala and Anr. 
1255
 Protecting the basic structure 
of a constitution may very well be the best way for the judiciary to protect fundamental rights.
 
1256
  Issacharoff describes the work of the SCI as the best jurisprudential account of striking 
down constitutional amendments that threaten the basic underpinnings of fundamental 
rights.
1257
  In South Africa the limitation clause in the Constitution
1258
  allows for 
amendments to any provision including the BoR.
1259
 
 
The proactive approach of the SCI is seen by some as replacing the doctrine of separation of 
powers with a form of judicial supremacy which emphasises the judiciary as final protector of 
the Constitution.
1260
 However, the Indian judiciary has rather interpreted the checks-and-
balances duty more widely by arguing that there is no real difference between judicial review 
                                                                                                                                                        
government by authorising government to dissolve the state governments; attacked judicial powers by barring 
judicial review of the 1971 election. For more on the emergency period see Rudolph L I & Hoeber R S ‘To the 
Brink and Back: Representation and the State in India’ (1978) 18 Asian Survey 379. 
1254
Additional District Magistrate of Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla (1976) SCR 172 popularly known as 
the Habeas Corpus case, during the Emergency, the SCI had to decide if the Court could entertain a writ of 
habeas corpus filed by a person challenging his detention. The High Courts had already confirmed this in the 
affirmative. But the SCI went against the unanimous decision of the High Court and upheld the right of Indira 
Gandhi’s government to suspend all fundamental rights during the Emergency including suspending Article 21 
the right to life, which precluded the Court from considering the constitutional validity of any preventive 
detention laws.  
1255
(1973) 4 SCC 225.  Also see  I.R.Coelho (Dead) By Lrs v State Of Tamil Nadu & Ors AIR 2007 SC 861  
where it was found that any law infringing on fundamental rights is found to be violating the basic structure 
doctrine and should be invalidated by the court; Mate M ‘State Constitutions and the Basic Structure Doctrine’ 
(2014) 45 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 442;  The basic structure doctrine used in India can be traced to 
the German Constitutional traditions where the Constitutional Court could  invalidate constitutional amendments 
that altered or changed the basic law. 
1256See Seervai H M ‘Fundamental Rights Case at the Cross Road’ (1973) 75 Bom.L.R. J. 47; Mehta P B ‘The 
Inner Conflict of Constitutionalism: Judicial Review and the Basic Structure’ in Hasan Z et al (eds)   India’s 
Living Constitution: Ideas, Practices, Controversies (2002). 
1257Issacharoff  S ‘The Democratic Risk to Democratic Transitions’2014 Constitutional Review 18. 
1258
Section 36. 
1259
See Constitution s74 for procedures to amend. 
1260
The Indian Constitution can be amended by a simple majority. See Somnath C ‘Separation of Powers and 
Judicial Activism in India’ (2007) 35 Indian Advocate 1. 
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of normal legislation and judicial review of a constitutional amendment.
1261
 Thus the basic- 
structure doctrine acts as a manifestation of the checks and balances which are central to 
India’s interpretation of the separation of powers. Although the CC 1262 in 1996 argued that 
there was no absolute separation between the different spheres of government, the judiciary in 
South Africa has a less liberal interpretation of separation of powers which prompts the 
judiciary in favour of deference to the executive when dealing with SERs matters.
1263
  
 
Following the state of emergency the SCI redeemed itself, after the unfortunate judgement, in 
Habeas Corpus, 
 
by taking a SAL approach to the enforcement of fundamental rights.  The 
SCI was in search of a new kind of constitutional litigation and it transformed public interest 
litigation (PIL) to the more appropriate SAL to give effect to the Directive Principles.
1264
 The 
judiciary adopted an activist approach by giving legal force to several SERs in Part IV of the 
Constitution, that were previously thought to be unenforceable, by bringing them within the 
sphere of  Fundamental Rights.
1265
  
 
Although PIL has its origins in US, since its inception in India it has undergone significant 
developments and has now acquired legitimacy. Singh highlights that this unconventional 
way of making judicial services available to the vast number of people in the country, is 
thanks to primarily a few enlightened judges of the SCI.
1266
  They developed ‘traditional 
individualism’ to the ‘community orientation’ of PIL which relaxed the technical and 
procedural formalities of the judicial process.  Therefore SAL is accompanied by procedural 
innovations, such as letters to judges which are treated as petitions and commissioners are 
judicially appointed to verify facts.
 1267
 Unlike South Africa where the President traditionally 
                                                 
1261
See Van Schalkwyk C ‘The Basic Structure Doctrine: A Basis for Application in South Africa, or a Violation 
of the Separation of Powers? Litnet 17 July 2015 available at     
http://www.litnet.co.za/the-basic-structure-doctrine-a-basis-for-application-in-south-africa-or-a-violation-of-
the-separation-of-powers/ (accessed on 28 August 2015). 
1262
Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly of the Republic of South Africa: in re Certification of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) - the First Certification judgment. 
1263
See chapter 4 for discussion on the judiciary. 
1264Baxi U ‘Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India’ (1985) Third 
World Legal Studies 116. Some scholars prefer the term 'social action litigation' to 'public interest litigation' in 
the Indian context as the former includes 'many attributes of a social movement, such as mobilising community 
activists and the press as well as courts' see Munger  F 'Inquiry and Activism in Law and Society' (2001) 35 Law 
and Society Review 12. 
1265Singh G ‘Group Actions and the Law: A Case Study of Social Action Litigation and Consumer Protection 
(1995) 18 India Journal of Consumer Policy 26.  
1266
 Singh G (1995) 26. This was during the tenure of Chief Justices Ray and Beg after 1973. 
1267
See Sathe S Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits (2002) for a detailed 
description of the procedures for PIL. 
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appoints commissions of inquiry.  In following this approach, in the 1980s the SCI witnessed 
a dramatic increase in the number of public-interest claims that were filed. 
1268
  
 
Members of SAL can be NGOs, institutions or any public spirited individual including a 
journalist. Justices of the Supreme Court, notably Iyer and Bhagwati, began converting much 
of constitutional litigation into SAL through a variety of techniques of juristic activism.
1269
  
The SCI also suo motu introduced SAL to the Court instead of relying on an aggrieved party 
or another third party. In other words the initiative to institute litigation also came from the 
judiciary.  The judiciary took advantage of the Constitution
1270
  of India that proffers to 
protect and deliver prompt social justice with the help of the law and directly links the public 
with the judiciary. Through SAL, the court seeks to ascertain the underlying principles of the 
Constitution and to give effect to them through a non-traditional approach. 
 
The court initiated the idea of socio-legal commissions of inquiry whereby the court engages 
social activists, teachers and researchers to visit particular locations for fact finding on 
violation of fundamental rights and to submit quick but complete reports containing 
suggestions and proposals.
1271
 These commissions operate under court orders and are 
financed by the state.
 1272
  The SCI has also used the services of its own officials or those of 
the high court to engage in these socio-legal enquiries and asked judges to not merely 
ascertain the facts but to also monitor the implementation of the various directions given by 
the court.
 1273
 Thus SAL promotes the supervision of court orders as part and parcel of 
judicial oversight. Judicial oversight was not an option that the CC adopted in the Grootboom 
case in South Africa. The result of which is that housing the most desperate in South Africa 
remains a serious challenge because the executive has not fulfilled the Court’s 
recommendations. In essence the minister of Human Settlements feels no obligation to 
implement the CC’s recommendation. 
 
                                                 
1268
The Supreme Court Registrar officially started tracking the total number of letter and writ SAL petitions in 
1985. In that year, the Court received over 24,000 letter petitions, and an average of over 17,000 letter petitions 
between 1985 and 2007. Since 1985, the Court has logged an average of 159 SAL writ petitions per year. Also 
see ‘Guidelines for Letters/Petitions in Public Action Interest Litigation’ 29 September 2003 available at 
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/circular/guidelines/pilguidelines.pdf (accessed on 17 September 2015). 
1269
Baxi U (1985)115. Also activist judges such as Chinnappa Reddy, D.A. Desai, and R.S. Pathak, handed 
down many of the landmark decisions. 
1270
Articles 32, 39A. 
1271
Baxi U (1985) 125 Justice Bhagwati has initiated the idea of socio-legal commissions of inquiry. 
1272
Baxi U (1985) 125. 
1273
Baxi U (1985) 125. 
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In its liberal approach, the SCI in collaboration with public spirited lawyers, community 
action groups, social workers and journalists, initiated or participated in judicial activism 
strategies to litigate on behalf of the poor, illiterate, exploited and oppressed.
1274
 This gave 
rise to justices of the SCI converting much of constitutional litigation into SAL, through a 
variety of techniques of juristic activism including relaxing locus standi rules.
 
 The SCI found 
that the traditional Anglo-Saxon strategies were woefully inadequate in their effective 
realisation of collective social rights.
 1275
 India, plagued by poverty, illiteracy, housing-, 
health- and other grave injustices, prompted the judicial protection of human rights taking on 
a desperate urgency.  By facilitating popular access to the court for the indigent the SCI fulfils 
the constitutional aspirations of the downtrodden by abandoning technical and conservative 
procedural rules of locus standi.  This is done by expanding the conventional boundaries of 
standing to empower the disadvantaged and underprivileged to access the court, through 
ordinary letters instead of formal writ petitions. Effectively, this led to the expansion of the 
frontiers of fundamental rights and natural justice. 
1276
  
 
The Constitution
1277
 of South Africa promotes access to court for everyone, but this access is 
underpinned by several barriers when it comes to standing. Therefore the judiciary in this 
jurisdiction is criticised for not being sufficiently transformed to give credence to the 
transformative constitution. In South Africa the impression is created that the judiciary does 
not want to be ‘stepping on the executive’s toes’ insofar as delivering on social ideals which 
are majorly still lacking in the country and this is symptomatic of the untransformed nature of 
the judiciary. 
 
It was in the landmark  SAL  S. P. Gupta v Union of India 
1278
 where the Court  said  that the 
traditional rule regarding locus standi,  where judicial redress was available only to the person 
who has suffered legal injury due to violation of  legal rights, had its origins in an  ‘ancient 
                                                 
1274
Also see the  following important cases: Azad Rickshaw Pullers v Punjab 1 S.C.R. 366 (1981); Fertilizer 
Corp. Kamgar Union  Sindri v Union of India 2 S.C.R. 52 (1981); Municipal Council Ratlam v Vardichand I 
S.C.R. 47 (1981); R.K. Gargy v Union of India  A.I.R. S.C. 2138 (1981).  
1275
 Bhagwati P N ‘Social Action Litigation: The Indian Experience’ in Tiruchelvan N & Coomaraswamy R 
(eds) Judiciary in Plural Societies (1987) 2. 
1276
 Baxi U (1985) 129. 
1277
 Section 35. 
1278
 AIR 1982 SC (149) 185. Proceedings for PIL are all in terms of article 32 which are writ proceedings for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights. For more literature on PIL in India see Bhagwati P N ‘Judicial Activism and 
Public Interest Litigation’ (1985) 23 Colum J. Transnt’ll L. 561; Peiris G l ‘Public Interest Litigation in the 
Indian Subcontinent: Current Dimensions’ (1991) 40 Int’l & CoMP. L.Q. 66; Sorabjee S ‘Protection and 
Promotion of Fundamental Rights by Public’ (1993) 31 Rev. Int’l. Comm’n of Jurists 5. 
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vintage’ period  which preceded public law. The SCI believed if breach of public duties was 
‘allowed to go un-redressed by courts on the ground of standing, it would promote disrespect 
for the rule of law and furthermore lead to corruption and encourage inefficiency’.1279 In 
addition such a breach might create possibilities for the ‘political machinery’ itself becoming 
‘a participant in the misuse or abuse of power’.1280 This kind of abuse of public power visited 
the shores of South Africa through the misuse of public funds by no lesser person than the 
President of the country.
1281
 
 
It was in the spirit of providing judicial redress to a vast number of people that the SCI started 
to invite letters and telegrams from complainants and conscientious individuals. Thereby, it 
relaxed all procedural technicalities and developed equitable and remedial powers and 
procedures that enabled new monitoring oversight and policy-making functions.
1282
 The 
judiciary invited members of the public to bring notice of violations of basic human rights as 
embodied in the Constitution for suitable judicial action and thereby extended the scope of 
the law of locus standi in constitutional litigation. Members of the public in South Africa are 
not at liberty to approach the CC by bending locus standi rules.  This perpetuates the 
contention that the judiciary is aloof and needs to adopt  a more transformed approach by 
finding new ways to accommodate the impoverished in holding government to account on its 
slow delivery of housing the most desperate. 
 
In India these procedural developments took place alongside the ‘right to life’ in article 21 of 
the Constitution which was interpreted by the court to include SERs guarantees.
1283
 Activist 
judges of the SCI imposed a positive obligation on the state to take steps in ensuring to the 
individual a better enjoyment of life and dignity. Thus the Indian judiciary is willing to 
protect and promote the realisation of SERs through judicial action that is judge-induced and 
judge-led through would-be unorthodox remedies. Perhaps this is the judicial transformation 
that the South African people expect to accelerate the realisation of their right to housing in 
sync with the promises of the transformation envisaged by the Constitution of South Africa. 
 
                                                 
1279
 Baxi U (1985) 119. 
1280
 Baxi U (1985) 119.  
1281
See chapter 4 for discussion on this abuse and its affect on the available resources 
1282
 Singh G (1995) 27. 
1283
.See paragraph 6.3.2 for case law on this. 
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Bhagwati elucidates that for helpless victims of an exploitative society who have no access to 
justice, the SCI will not insist on regular writ petition by the public spirited individual seeking 
relief for such victims.
1284
 Initially SAL focussed primarily on ‘state repression, governmental 
lawlessness, administrative deviance and exploitation of disadvantaged groups including 
slum-dwellers and pavement dwellers.
 1285
 However in essence much of SAL focuses on an 
exposure of repression by the agencies of the state so as to ensure that authorities of the state 
fulfil the obligations of law under which they exist and function.
 1286
  
 
According to Baxi what is distinctive in the contemporary position of SAL is that the SCI is 
empowered and some would say rather obligated to duly consider such action.
1287
 The author 
maintains that SAL compels judges and lawyers to take human suffering seriously and 
therefore ‘taking rights seriously’. 1288  Thereby the SCI is taking a proactive stance on how 
the state reacts, by prompting it in the direction of its duty towards realising SERs. This will 
be a useful approach in South Africa if the judiciary shed their cloak of passivity by relaxing 
standing and inviting beleaguered citizens to approach the CC with their housing anguish. 
 
The SCI basically reignited judicial activism after the passivity that followed its deference to 
the executive during the Emergency period. It morphed from being an institution serving the 
executive to being an institution which serves its solemn constitutional responsibility with 
zeal.
1289
 Mate argues that the SCI, through its activism and assertiveness, has emerged as the 
most powerful court in matters of governance and policy-making.
1290  
 
6.3.1 Is judicial activism key in accessing socio-economic rights? 
 
Justice Bhagwati states: 
                                                 
1284
 S. P. Gupta v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC (149) para 189. 
1285
 Bhagwati P N (1985) 569.  
1286
 Baxi U (1985)119. 
1287
 Baxi U (1985) 119. 
1288
 Baxi U (1985) 120. 
1289
See Krishnan J 'Scholarly Discourse, Public Perceptions and the Cementing of Norms: the Case of the Indian 
Supreme Court and a Plea for Research' (2007) William Mitchell Legal Studies Research Paper Series Working 
Paper No. 77 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1003811 (accessed on 30 August 
2015). 
1290
 Mate M ‘Rise of Judicial Governance in the Supreme Court of India’ (2015) 33 B.U. Int'l L.J 171. 
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‘The law which we are now administering is the . . . law of a social welfare state which 
is moving in the direction of socialism, law which is designed to serve the interest of the 
weaker sections of the community including peasants and workers.’1291  
 
The justice maintains that judicial activism was motivated by the desire to uplift the poor by 
expanding the public interest jurisdiction of the SCI.
 1292
 Moreover, the entire culture of the 
judicial process in India is  geared to social justice in line with the Constitution, irrespective of 
whether politicians fulfil this objective or not.
 1293
   In other words where the politicians may 
fail to implement social justice objectives the courts are obligated to step in. This underscores 
the notion that social justice is derived from the social economic imperative which 
characterises the Indian Constitution.  The quest of the SCI to uplift the poor and not tolerate 
political tardiness in this regard elevates judicial oversight to another level.  
 
The transformation that impoverished South Africans envisaged was a judiciary that would 
not hesitate to call government to account insofar as its duties to the realisation of housing are 
concerned. Hence it was expected that the judiciary would call government to account on its 
time-frames of housing the most desperate as they ordered in Grootboom, more than 16 years 
ago. However, this situation prevails in South Africa due to the fact that the judiciary does not 
mero motu venture into the terrain of holding the government to account but instead adopts a 
wait and see approach which leads to deference to the executive.  By contrast in India, the 
SCI’s assertiveness in certain domains of government reflects the judiciary’s intellectual 
worldviews, policy values and development, post 1990.
 1294
 That is, this judiciary puts the 
plight of the impoverished, the vulnerable and the desperate ahead of due process, since 
experience has shown that the latter tends to stunt the progression of realising SERs to these 
groups. 
 
The SCI is lauded as being innovative and far-reaching, but there was mixed reaction to the 
activist approach of the court and the legacy of SAL.
 1295
 The contention was that the SCI’s 
approach to SERs adjudication was marred by inconsistency, and that there were few formal 
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1292
Mate M (2015) 214. 
1293
 Desai D A (1984) 31. 
1294Mate M (2015) 217. Also see Shankar S & Mehta P ‘Courts and Socioeconomic rights in India’ in Gauri V & 
Brink D (eds) Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing 
World (2008) 146. 
1295
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checks on the manner in which judges fulfilled their constitutional obligations. Even the more 
successful examples of judicial involvement in widening access to SERs, such as the right-to- 
food campaign, were plagued by the time-consuming, costly nature of litigation in Indian 
courts and the non-implementation of court orders.
 1296
 
 
Furthermore the SCI has come under criticism by government regarding the law of evidence 
in that the cases that SAL activists petition, in which they themselves are not victims but 
public citizens, rely upon what is stated in the press.
1297
 Baxi defends the relaxation on 
evidence in which media reports are used and he supports the view that the press is a fertile 
setting for drawing attention to what is often regarded as ‘petty instances of injustice’. 1298 
Relaxing the rules of evidence in South Africa’s courts, would require a herculean effort to 
convince the courts to intervene on their own initiative by accommodating the efforts of 
investigative journalists to acquire locus standi. In 2014 the CC did adopt a more nuanced  
stance when it overturned the SCA on what the latter considered frivolous and petty 
‘irregularities’ in the public procurement process for social security.1299  
 
Further positive strides in India are that the SCI by accommodating SAL became more of an 
assembly of individual judges and ceased to be merely an institution.
1300
  However, how a 
court should make any state fully liable for deprivations or denials of fundamental rights is a 
moot point but it remains true that in the case of India the task of the SAL petitioners is to 
ensure that SERs shortcomings are addressed to accomplish the desired results.  
 
The positive influence of judicial activism serves to outstrip the cynics.  Khosla argues that 
the SCI takes a conditional social-rights approach which exhibits a rare private law model of 
public law adjudication, instead of a systemic one such as is the case in South Africa.
1301
 The 
Indian approach focuses on the implementation of social rights instead of relying upon time-
frames adopted by the state. In doing so the SCI could step in when the government fails to 
                                                 
1296
Krishnan J (2007). 
1297
 Baxi U (1985) 129. Also see Agarwala S K Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critique (1985; Desai A 
and Muralidhar S ‘Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems’ in Kirpal B et al (eds) Supreme but not 
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1298
 Braxi U (1985) 117. 
1299
 See chapter 4 for discussion on this case. 
1300
 See Baxi U The Future of Human Rights (2002). 
1301
Khosla M ‘Making Social Rights Conditional: Lessons from India’ (2010) 8 Int’l J. Const. L742. For an 
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perform in its duties towards SERs. Whereas in South Africa the systemic approach merely 
inquiries into the nature of government action and defers to the executive for 
implementation.
1302
  To this extent the CC has shown how SERs can be made justiciable but 
without providing for an individualised remedy or content to, the right to housing. 
 
In the meantime the SCI rules through interim directions and orders and thereby, it seeks to 
improve the public administration by making it more responsive than it had been before to 
constitutional ethics and law. To this effect Protective Homes for Women began to steadily 
improve through interim administrative orders.
 1303
 Moreover, locus standi expansion has 
been attained. This gave rise to the whittling down of access to the range of documents which 
government may claim as privileged. These documents are relevant to determine the violation 
of fundamental rights and/or inhibition for potential recurrence of rights-violations.
 1304
  
 
Khosla posits that constitutional lawyers both in India and elsewhere have failed to notice the 
distinctive fashion in which the Indian judiciary has made social rights attainable when the 
state fails in its duty.
1305
 The author commends the Indian judiciary for its unique approach in 
that it informs our views on the varied ways in which justiciability operates. The SCI thus 
recognises its social obligations more acutely than occurs in other jurisdictions.
1306
 Given that 
the CC in South Africa has the powers to initiate investigations by commissioning organised 
civil society to report on findings, but it does not.  It is all the more lamentable that it does not 
use these powers in accelerating the realisation of SERs. In short, acting in such a way as to 
benefit society at large and not merely cater when called upon to do so by entities that have 
the funds and/or locus standi to engage in litigation. In India the enactment of these powers, 
namely to initiate litigation has in no way diminished the separation of powers.  
 
The SCI can pass judgement on the state’s performance by directing the executive in pointing 
out the ever increasing costs of non-performance.
 1307
 This approach helps to ensure that 
social justice unfolds timeously and does not fall into the trap of the ad infinitum approach 
which prevails in the South African jurisdiction. Through its judicial activism the rhetoric of 
                                                 
1302
Also see 
 
Sunstein C R 'Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa' in Designing 
Democracy: What Constitutions do ... (2001) 17 SAJHR 226. 
1303
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the SCI shames the Indian state by illustrating struggles concerning the relative power of 
institutions and their claims to democratic legitimacy.
 1308
 This is made easier through the SCI 
being a court of first instance under article 32 of the Constitution of India. This provision 
makes the SCI perhaps the most accessible Supreme Court in the world.
 1309
 People can 
approach the Court directly to address failures on behalf of the state even though they 
themselves may have suffered no violation of a legal right. Thus, as distinct from South 
Africa, in India the petitioner is typically not required to establish any relationship between 
herself/himself and the person’s whose right has been violated. By allowing petitioners direct 
access to the SCI, the matter receives immediate attention which makes it subject to public 
scrutiny and this facilitates the supervisory role that the Court observes.
 1310
 
  
Green argues that, until the other arms of India’s government become more responsive, 
judicial activism is likely to remain an important weapon in the progressive movement’s 
armoury.
1311
 To some degree, this perceived wisdom of SAL continues to exert a strong 
influence on perceptions of Indian constitutional law today. 
1312
 Constitutional lawyers at 
home and abroad see the SCI as a fiercely independent guardian of constitutional principles 
against governmental misuse.  In this regard the SCI grants supervisory relief on the basis of 
declared guidelines and the execution and enforcement are left to the executive. The Court 
has evolved certain innovative tools by way of constant monitoring so as to ensure that its 
guidelines in terms of SERs are fulfilled. The South African apex Court eschews constant 
monitoring for fear of transgressing the separation of powers doctrine. Therefore the court 
blithely defers to the executive in the hope that the latter will do the right thing and fulfil its 
obligations in terms of social justice. 
 
                                                 
1308
 Khosla M (2010) 763. 
1309
 Epp C R The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective (1998) 
81. 
1310
 Cunningham C D ‘Public Interest Litigation in Indian Supreme Court: A Study in the Light of American 
Experience’ (1987) 29 J. Indian Law Inst.  501. 
1311
 Green D ‘How Change Happens in India – Via the Supreme Court and Judicial Activism’ Oxfamblogs 
(2012) available at http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/how-change-happens-in-india-via-the-supreme-court-and-
judicial-activism/ (accessed on 15 August 2015) blogs that ‘the Supreme Court is the most effective arm of 
government on social policy. I’d been talking to government for years on homelessness without result. I wrote a 
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Ahmadi contends that the SCI’s activism is not a case of over-reach, but rather a natural by-
product of citizens raising important constitutional and policy issues, not addressed by the 
central government.
 1313
 Whilst it is not customary for the Court to assert itself in executive 
and legislative matters, the judiciary felt it necessary to intervene to fill a lacuna in 
responsible governance by engaging in judicial activism. Verma confirms that by and large 
the judicial decisions in India have influenced the judicial trends of neighbouring countries 
and other common law jurisdictions.
 1314
 This is indicative that India is on the right path and 
there is reason to hope for its continuity under the vigilant public eye.
 1315
   
 
Furthermore the social rights adjudication in India plays a vitally expressive role and pushes 
the state towards delivering social services.
 1316
 Vijayashri agrees that the SCI must continue 
to remain at the forefront of enforcing human rights.
1317
 This Court deserves to be richly 
commended in characterising the right to life in harmony with the raw realities of the Indian 
socio-economic environment.
 1318
 Judicial activism has been used as an instrument for 
securing socio-economic justice for the underprivileged and has become one of the 
outstanding developments in the contemporary Indian legal world.
1319
 This judge-led 
revolution has resulted in a profound transformation for social justice by peaceful means 
which has come to stay and has acquired deep roots in the Indian legal system since its 
inception in the 1970s.  
 
6.3.2 Social action litigation case law on SERs: the right to life encompasses the right to 
housing 
 
We are familiar with judicial review as the most powerful remedy against state arbitrariness 
and protection of fundamental rights.  For about three decades prior to the 1970s the SCI had 
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not been willing to consider that the Directive Principles were enforceable.
1320 
 The Court was 
reluctant to read the Fundamental Rights and the Principles together although article 37 
espoused that these Principles are ‘fundamental in the governance of the country’. 1321 
 
Eventually in 1981 the SCI adopted an expansive interpretation of the right to life under 
article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
1322
 This right was extended to include under 
fundamental rights, the right to a basic education, housing, livelihood and health.  The change 
came when the SCI found a new meaning for the word ‘life’ in Francis Coralie Mullin v 
Union Territory of Delhi 
1323
 where Bhagwati stated:  
 
‘We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that 
goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, 
clothing and shelter over the head…’  
 
In 1985 Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation 
1324
 was one of the first and most 
prominent housing-rights cases to go to the SCI. This case, for the first time, extended the 
right to life in article 21 to include the right to livelihood and shelter. This SAL was filed by a 
concerned journalist, Tellis, acting on behalf of the pavement dwellers of Bombay city, in the 
Bombay High Court.
1325
  In her affidavit Tellis said that ‘government has not put to the best 
use the finances and resources available to it.’ 1326 
 
The Petitioners argued that they could not be evicted from their shacks on the pavement 
without being offered alternative accommodation.
1327
 They argued that eviction would result 
                                                 
1320
See Kothari J ‘Right of Housing: Constitutional Perspective on India and South Africa’ (2001) Lawyers 
Collective 1. 
1321
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by law.’ Also see Constitution of South Africa s11; International Covenant art 6 and UDHR art 3 embody the 
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in depriving them of their livelihood because they lived near their place of work.  In true SAL 
fashion, the Bombay High Court appointed an official to hear and investigate the findings of 
the Municipal Commissioner to the effect that pavement dwellers constituted an obstruction 
to traffic on the road. The SCI ordered that no demolition of their homes may be made 
without this investigation. By expanding the right to life to include shelter near access to 
livelihood, the pavement dwellers were allowed to stay until alternative accommodation was 
found, and which do not interfere with their livelihood.
1328
  It is significant to note that the 
Court did not confirm resettlement, but rather said the eviction had be delayed until after the 
Monsoon rains and those with census cards may be resettled.
1329
 
 
This was the first time that article 21 was interpreted to include the right to livelihood. Olga 
Tellis has come to be regarded by some as a ground-breaking judicial confirmation that the 
right to life includes the right to a livelihood as part of a right to shelter. However, the Court 
was quite clear that there was no positive obligation on the state to provide people with 
shelter or an adequate means of livelihood. 
1330
 Nonetheless, this case must be seen in terms 
of the procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of a fundamental right and unfair 
and unjust procedure would attract unreasonableness which vitiated the prescribed 
procedure.
1331
 In essence, that which alone makes it possible to live must be deemed as an 
integral component of the right to life.
1332
  
 
Although the state was not compelled to provide adequate means of livelihood to citizens, 
anybody deprived of the right to livelihood through a process that is not just and fair could 
challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life as conferred under article 21.
1333
 
Moreover, rights were taken to mean not only to benefit individuals, but to secure the largest 
interests of the community.
1334
 The SCI clarified that the eviction of the pavement dwellers 
would lead to deprivation of their livelihood and consequently the deprivation of life.
1335
 This 
case has been criticised for its failure to provide for the right to resettlement in that it 
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provided the obligation to provide natural justice before eviction, but it did not provide an 
automatic right to resettlement under the Indian Constitution. The SCI
1336
 raised an 
interesting fact in that ‘common sense, which is a cluster of life experience can often, be more 
dependable than the rival facts presented by warning litigants. This point to the fact that 
common sense should be observed without being arbitrary when considering the right to 
housing and livelihood as being essential to life. The complacency prevailing in the South 
African legal system has a deleterious effect on the delivery of SERs.   
 
The right to shelter was further guaranteed through Shantistar Builders v Narayan K Totame,
  
1337
 and Chameli Singh v State of UP & Anr. 
1338
 In these cases the SCI declared that the right 
to shelter should be deemed to have been guaranteed as a fundamental right and extended the 
same right to include reasonable accommodation which informs the right to dignity and 
equality all of which was deemed a necessity in the development of man into a cultured 
being. The SCI suo motu placed extensive reliance on the ICESCR in elaborating on the right 
to housing.  In Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v Nawab Khan Gulba Khan & Ors 
1339
 the 
Court pointed the state to its constitutional duty to provide shelter and thus to make the right 
to life meaningful. 
 
There have been some judgements which attracted public outcry and were regarded as 
setbacks in contrast to the progressive approach of the above judgements. In Narmada 
Bachao Andolan v Union of India,
1340
 the issue was the construction of the Sardar Sarovar 
Project dam and its significant impact on both the environment and the displacement of 
thousands of tribal people.
 1341
 The government’s resettlement and rehabilitation programmes 
for these people were proven to be inadequate. Regardless of this, the Court turned its back 
on all the jurisprudence in the area of housing rights and its prior decisions by displaying a 
complete disregard for both fundamental human rights and India's obligations under the 
ICESCR by allowing the displacement under these circumstances to take place. This, 
                                                 
1336
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In Re: Sant Ram (1960) 3 S.C.R. 499. The Court said that  ‘ the  impugned action of the State Government and 
the Bombay Municipal Corporation is violative of the provisions contained in arts 19(1;(e), 19(l)(g) and 21 of 
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notwithstanding  the court’s previous rulings, namely that the upholding of the right to shelter 
related to the right to life.
1342 
 
 
 In contradiction of the right to housing and livelihood in Olga Tellis, the Bombay High Court 
heard a petition filed in 1995 by the Bombay Environmental Action Group to ‘remove 
forthwith’ informal settlement dwellers (as `encroachers') adjacent to the Sanjay Gandhi 
National Park in order to protect ‘the environment and all its aspects’. The Court directed the 
authorities to evict the people, thereby depriving them of their homes and livelihood.
 1343
 
Evidently this action by the Court retrogresses from the Olga Tellis decision, namely that 
evicting people must be underpinned by reasonable procedure and fairness. This Sanjay 
Gandhi National Park ruling left vulnerable and marginalised groups in India exposed to 
arbitrary resettlement which obviously negates the right to life and to live near their place of 
livelihood. 
 
Whilst there may have been controversy over SAL, it has done more good than harm, 
especially in the areas of human rights and corruption without usurping executive authority 
but instead safeguarding civil liberties.
1344
 Without the Court’s sensitivity to the harsh 
realities of Indian society the landscape of human rights would have been all the poorer. In its 
contribution as social auditor, the SCI took ‘suffering seriously’ and thereby contributed to 
the meaningful protection of human rights in India.
 1345
 All in all, due to the proactive stance 
of the judiciary, the right to life was been interpreted by the courts to be broad enough to 
encompass all those facets that make life meaningful.  Needless to say, SAL is made effective 
through judicial precedent, thus there should be no reason why the SCI should forsake its 
activism and revert to a restrained and passive role.  The progressive stance of the SCI has 
proliferated into SAL that inquires into the progress on corruption investigations of public 
officials including politicians, which in turn directly affects the available resources for 
SERs.
1346
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6.4 The South African experience in public interest actions 
 
Essentially the CC acts on relatively restrictive rules of locus standi. Generally, those that 
have standing are the party seeking relief from harm suffered, to a right in the BoR.  The 
Constitution through section 38 proffers locus standi for anyone acting in the public interest 
in alleged violation of such a right. In Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 
1347
 the 
CC confirmed that the category of persons empowered to bring a constitutional matter to a 
competent court of law is broader. 
1348
 Accordingly there is opportunity to act on behalf of an 
unidentifiable class of people to enforce their rights. 
1349
  
 
According to the South African Law Commission (SALC) public interest actions are part of 
the worldwide movement to make access to justice a reality.
1350
 In 1998 the SALC 
recommended to the minister of justice to review the law in terms of public interest actions 
and class actions by introducing legislation and procedures to rules of the courts. The 
Commission proposed the following definition: 
 
‘Public interest action means an action instituted by a representative in the interest of the 
public generally, or in the interest of a section of the public, but not necessarily in that 
representative’s own interest. Judgment of the court in respect of a public interest action 
shall not be binding (res judicata) on the persons in whose interest the action is brought.’  
 
To date, although Public Interest Actions (PIA) is given expressed recognition in the 
Constitution, nothing has been done to regulate it. The courts thus address the issue in the 
exercise of its inherent power to protect and regulate its own process and to develop the 
common law in the interest of justice. Significantly, the recommendation by the SALC 
                                                 
1347
1996 1 SA 984 (CC) paras 162- 167, this case was on standing in terms of s7 (4) (b) (v) of the Constitution 
1993 to challenge the constitutionality of the particular section in the Companies Act of 1973 in the public 
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regarding public interest action does not make any reference to the benefit of this action in 
realising SERs.  
 
In Ngxuza and Others v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, 
And Another 
1351
 the Court found that there can be no proper justification for a 
restrictive approach to locus standi in public law litigation. The aim was to make it 
easier for the poor and vulnerable to approach the court, to ensure that the public 
administration adhered to the constitutional principle of legality and that the exercise of 
public power had the requisite beneficial effect on the development of democracy in 
South Africa.
 1352
 In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Prut NO 
1353
 the HC allowed standing 
for the applicant because it was acting in the public interest. The Court reiterated that 
courts should be slow to refuse to exercise jurisdiction where public interest questions 
are decided and may put an end to similar disputes.
1354
 It must be noted that the CC in 
2016 did not deem it to be in the interest of justice to hear a public challenge on the 
multi-billion rand arms deal.
1355
 This is despite the allegations of massive fraud 
perpetrated in the procurement of the arms deal which was widely publicised in the 
media and received massive outcry by the public. Several court challenges to standing in 
the public interest could have been avoided if Parliament had taken the recommendation 
of the SALC to enact legislation to define the process. 
 
The CC depends on NGOs and human rights activists to approach the Court on behalf of 
others for alleged impairment of SERs. Despite this the CC does not adopt the relaxation of 
rules as does the SCI. This has limited the scope of substantive constitutional development 
and thereby confined the CCs role in the development of fundamental rights.
 
A richer 
                                                 
1351
2001 (2) SA 609 (E) (hereafter Ngxuza) These applicants were a group of persons receiving social grants 
under social legislation. The grants were suspended or cancelled by the respondents. The applicants sought a 
declaration that the cancellation or suspension of their grants had been unlawful and claimed that the grants 
should be reinstated retrospectively. 
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Ngxuza para 629. 
1353
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November 2016 available at  
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constitutional development for SERs could have been developed through a more active 
judiciary raising such matters mero motu.  
 
The historic deprivation in terms of housing in South Africa, calls upon the CC to take a more 
aggressive approach in holding government to its promises of delivery. Taking the Indian 
approach the judiciary could inquire through the SAHRC
1356
 on the status of housing the most 
desperate, at least. For example in a situation such as Blikkiesdorp in Cape Town
1357
 where 
impoverished people were moved to a temporary location area (transit camp) with the 
promise of more permanent housing soon. This was supposed to be a short-term housing 
solution but eight years later the residents still lived under undignified conditions and the 
local government had again asked them to move due to development of the airport in Cape 
Town. The residents have again been assured of permanent housing, soon. There have been 
numerous reports by the media on the ungodly conditions these vulnerable and impoverished 
people are enduring.
1358
  It is this kind of media attention that in the Indian context would 
have been found useful to assist in the quest of good spirited individuals seeking relief 
through SAL on rights that are infringed. Thus in order to pronounce on what is in front of 
them, the CC does not need to sit and wait for a person with proper locus standi to approach 
the Court. The CC can be pro-active as custodian of the Constitution and move out of its 
comfort zone to inquire as to the status of at least the desperate and those living in intolerable 
conditions. It is because of the deferent stance of the CC, that the right to housing continues 
to be undermined by the tardiness and indifference of government thus delaying access to 
people such as those living in Blikkiesdorp. This action does not gel with reasonableness or 
with progressive realisation and even less with security of tenure. 
                                                 
1356Section 184 (2) ‘The South African Human Rights Commission has the powers, as regulated by national 
legislation, necessary to perform its functions, including the power-   
(a) to investigate and to report on the observance of human rights; 
 (b) to take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been violated; 
 (3) Each year, the South African Human Rights Commission must require relevant organs of state to provide the 
Commission with information on the measures that they have taken towards the realisation of the rights in the 
Bill of Rights concerning housing, health care food, water, social security, education and the environment.’ 
1357Blikkiesdorp was built in 2008 for an estimated R32m (£2.9m) to provide ‘emergency housing’ for about 650 
people who had been illegally occupying buildings. Residents claim there are about 15,000 people struggling to 
live in about 3,000 of the wood and iron structures, with more arriving all the time. City officials claim these 
figures are inaccurate and maintain that the site was designed to cater for 1,667 families in total, see The 
Guardian ‘Life in Tin Can Town' 01 April 2010 available at  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/01/south-africa-world-cup- (accessed on 19 September 2015). 
1358See Van Minnen  B ‘This is the Blikkiesdorp Situation’ Politicsweb 10 June 2015 available at 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/this-is-the-blikkiesdorp-situation--cape-town; Gerbi G ‘Blikkiesdorp 
residents long for dignity’ Western Cape Anti-eviction Campaign  22 March 2011 available at 
https://westerncapeantieviction.wordpress.com/tag/delft/ (all accessed on 19 September 2015). 
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In Joe Slovo the CC ordered relocation of the residents without considering how this would 
affect their livelihood.
1359
 However, the Court issued a supervisory order stipulating feedback 
on implementation be given, meaning that the parties were obliged to make presentations to 
court at intervals.
1360
 Through the supervisory order the CC could monitor the progress of 
government and when this did not materialise the Court ordered the suspension of the 
eviction order until further notice.
1361
 This active involvement on the part of the judiciary 
proved to be the best way of keeping a sluggish government to its time-frames. Thankfully, 
the Indian jurisprudence in Olga Tellis was emulated in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties (Pty) Ltd
1362
 where the CC read the importance of 
location in relation to employment, into the right to housing.
1363
 Of importance is that the 
earlier Joe Slovo ruling did not take into account proximity to employment as important to the 
right to housing. 
 
The CC was also pro-active in TAC
1364
 where it stated that, ‘when it is appropriate to do so, 
courts may – and if need be must – use their wide powers to make orders that affect policy as 
well as legislation’. In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security, 1365  the CC pronounced that 
courts must order relief that ensures the rights enshrined in the Constitution is protected and 
enforced.
 
 To this end the Constitution urges the judiciary to make any order that is just and 
equitable.
1366
 Thus there are various indications that the CC can be more pro-active and less 
deferent when dealing with PIA.  
 
Therefore the Court’s reluctance to exercise continued oversight over cases on the delivery of 
SERs, is regrettable. In Blue Moonlight
1367
 the Court’s reluctance to adopt a supervisory role 
                                                 
1359
 More than 20 000 people were to be displaced. 
1360
 Paragraph 16. 
1361
 On 24 August 2009 the Constitutional Court quietly issued an order suspending the evictions until further 
notice. 
1362
2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) (hereafter Blue Moonlighting) this was an application brought by 86 desperately poor 
people living in a disused industrial property Johannesburg. The CC ordered the City of Johannesburg to provide 
alternative accommodation through meaningful engagement with the residents. The City ignored this order and 
had to be compelled through another court order two years later. See chapter 4 for elaboration on this case. Also 
see Zulu and Others v eThekwini Municipality and Others 2014 (4) SA 590 (CC); Liebenberg S Socio-Economic 
Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 424 for an analysis of the power and potential 
of supervisory interdicts. 
1363
 See CESCR General Comment No 4 The Right to Adequate Housing (1991) para 8. 
1364
 Paragraph 113. 
1365
 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 19. 
1366
 Section 172(1) (b). 
1367
 See chapter 4 for elaboration on this case  
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and its refusal to provide any substantive content to the right to housing left, the residents 
with problematic choices of accommodation that infringed on fundamental rights such as  
dignity and privacy.
 
 In it deferent approach the Court elected to trust that the municipality 
would do the right thing, but the order of alternative accommodation and meaningful 
engagement was ignored by the local government which forced the applicants to approach the 
court again to compel the City to implement the Court’s orders. For example if the CC 
ordered a continuous mandamus as adopted in SAL in India, to monitor the City’s 
implementation of the court order, the protracted litigation could have been avoided.
1368
  
 
Reluctance by the CC to provide long-term oversight or structural interdicts means that 
litigants cannot rely on the CC to enforce or vary its own orders.  Dugard recommends that 
the CC along with other courts adopt a new approach to structural interdicts and reconsider its 
stance on the content of SERs.
1369
 Budlender et al maintain that from 2000 to 2010 there was 
a major shift in the nature of PIA with greater focus on SERs but this was not sufficient given 
the critical importance these rights play in addressing the persistent concerns of the poor.
1370
 
This is due to, insufficient monitoring, awareness-raising and advocacy initiatives.
 1371
 In this 
regard a more progressive approach is found in the Indian jurisprudence where the judiciary 
does not hesitate to mandate its own commission of inquiry where the right to housing is 
threatened as in Olga Tellis. The CC’s oversight could eliminate the manifestation of non-
compliance by government to execute court orders which is a problem that the judiciary 
grapples with in South Africa.
1372
 
 
The Indian judiciary is followed by the Colombian Constitutional Court which has embraced 
the substance of SERs in an explicitly public way. Young argues that the Columbian Court 
has redrawn the government’s list of health entitlements to award claimant’s access to health 
treatments which had previously been denied to them.
1373
 It has dictated which aspects of 
health care must be supported in the government’s scheme.  Moreover this Court has also 
                                                 
1368
This case appeared tree times before the CC due to government’s reluctance in executing the court orders. 
1369
Dugard J (2014) 278. 
1370Budlender S Marcus G & Ferreira N ‘Public Interest Litigation and Social Change in South Africa: 
Strategies, Tactics and Lessons The Atlantic Philanthropies (2014) 9 available at 
http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Public-interest-litigation-and-social-change-in-
South-Africa.pdf (accessed on 20 September 2015). 
1371
Budlender S et al (2014) 9. 
1372
See chapter 4 for a discussion on this. 
1373See Young K & Lemaitre J ‘The Comparative Fortunes of the Right to Health: Two Tales of Justiciability in 
Colombia and South Africa (2013) 26 Harvard Human Rights Law Journal 179. 
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gathered information, prepared large-scale public hearings, dictated policy and managed 
resources.
 1374
 Thus the Columbian Court has not shied away from pronouncing on how the 
executive must use resources. The allocation of resources was a contention that the CC did 
not want to deal with in Grootboom because the Court felt this was best left to the executive. 
Instead the CC could have ordered and not just asked, in passing, the SAHRC to inquire and 
report back, into the cost to have the dignity of the applicants restored through temporary and 
eventually permanent social housing. 
 
As Budlender et al put it, to ensure that litigation leads to maximum social change the most 
significant aspect is follow-up, ie requiring government to report back to litigants or to the 
court as to the steps taken in fulfilment of an order.
 1375
 The author believes that surprisingly 
the court is beginning to shed their reluctance to grant such orders, as demonstrated by the CC 
in 2014, by granting a supervisory order in context of a tender dispute which had the potential 
to affect millions of people living on social grants.
 1376
 Declaratory orders have failed to 
produce adequate social change.
 
Therefore for South Africa to be forward looking there must 
be greater implementation of broad rules of standing, relaxation of evidentiary rules and 
opportunities for interventions by amicus curiae.
 1377
 
 
Grootboom shows that excessive deference by the court gives rise to orders that do not 
compel the state to act and address the unconstitutionality the court points out and thereby 
render its orders less effective, if effective at all. Despite having one of the most progressive 
constitutions in the world, South Africa continues to face massive inequality characterised by 
large scale poverty which by its very nature suspends the right to adequate housing. The idea 
is to broaden standing by making it possible for person not having a direct interest in the 
relief claimed, to institute an action in the public interest with less rigid procedures. 
1378
 
Moreover PIA assists in enhancing judicial decision in two ways: listening to interveners 
which in turn exposes the judges to the plight of people and also lends urgency to the need to 
                                                 
1374
See Cepeda-Espinoza M J ‘Transcript: Social’ and Economic Rights and the Colombian Constitutional 
Court’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 1699. 
1375
Budlender S et al (2014) 47. 
1376
Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd & Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African 
Social Security Agency & Others (No. 2) 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC). 
1377See for example: Kameshni Pillay K ‘Implementing Grootboom: Supervision needed (2002) 3 ESR Review 
16. 
1378
SALC Report (1998) 25. 
 
 
 
 
229 
 
preserve human dignity and self-respect.
 1379
 De Vos argues if the locus standi barrier were to 
disappear there would be no other real obstacles to approach a court in SERs litigation.
1380
 
 
The PIA proposed by the SALC is not as liberal as the SAL that the Indian judiciary engages. 
The SALC recommendation for PIA is that it should include civil action that does not only 
include a right in issue. The approach of SAL is aimed at expanding on SERs and holding 
government to account in the manner in which it delivers on the rights by engaging a less 
formalistic approach to the rules of evidence relating to alleged hardship in the realm of social 
rights.
 1381
  
 
The manner, in which the SCI has approached the protection of SERs by giving easier access 
to the court in developing these rights, could prove vital for South Africa. One of the ways in 
which the implementation of these rights is monitored, is by means of the SAHRC annual 
Economic and Social Rights Reports. These reports have been presented to a non responsive 
Parliament as shown to be the case in Grootboom where the executive remained unmoved by 
the court’s orders.  The aim is for the CC to assess these SAHRC reports in order to establish 
the degree to which the Reports contribute to good governance in the delivery of SERs in 
South Africa.
1382
  The CC did not retain jurisdiction over the Grootboom order therefore the 
use of the SAHRC was ineffective because it was not required by a court order to report 
back.
1383
 
 
The CC practises a form of PIA, but nowhere as liberally and progressively as the SAL with 
which the SCI engages. In India the judges are proactive in bringing cases to court instead of 
waiting for NGOs and human rights activists to do so. In South Africa, judges must do more 
than merely applying the law; they must develop it and thereby shadow action by government 
                                                 
1379
 SALC Report (1998) 23. 
1380
 De Vos W ‘Reflections on the Introduction of a Class Action in South Africa’ 1996 (4) Journal of South 
African Law 642. 
1381
 Epp C R (1998) 205 submits that despite the activist judiciary and generous Constitution, the ideal 
environment for a rights revolution has not happened in India. 
1382
 General Comment No 10 of 1998  states that  national human rights institutions have, according to the 
CESCR, a potentially crucial role to play in promoting and ensuring the indivisibility and interdependence of all 
human rights and  attention is to be given to SERs in all of the relevant activities of these institutions.  
1383
Grootboom CC para 97 The report filed by the SAHRC mentions that there was no attempt by any of the 
three spheres of government to coordinate efforts and reach consensus on what the Grootboom order required, 
nor on the manner in which it had to be implemented to ensure housing policies’ and programmes’ consistency 
with the requirements of section 26, see SAHRC 14 November 2001, Letter addressed to the CC in the matter of 
Grootboom. 
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to ensure that the progressive realisation of housing does not mean that there are no time-
frames to house the most desperate.  
 
This study highlights that the only time court attention is given to SERs is when victims of 
violations of these rights are able to access the court through human rights lawyers assisting 
them.  The pertinent provision in the Constitution of SA for PIA has not necessarily led to a 
more liberal approach to standing in SERs litigation. The time is more than ripe for the CC to 
take an aggressive approach in holding government to reasonable time-frames in the 
realisation of housing by relaxing standing rules and let social spirited people assist the court. 
This is a way to access social justice for the poor and vulnerable, by the court adjudicating 
and enforcing SERs through developing PIA to the point where it is as effective as SAL.  
 
In South Africa since 2011 there has been an annual gathering of PIA practitioners and social 
movement leaders focusing on networking and sharing knowledge on the topic. However the 
desired transformation has not occurred.
1384
 Greater judicial transformation in line with the 
Constitution would lead to a higher success rate in cases relating to SERs.
 1385
 Therefore the 
Constitution must be used and interpreted to bring about the enduring amelioration of social 
conditions and that is the privilege of the judiciary.
1386
 This can only be done through CBOs 
or NGOs actively collaborating with the judiciary in fighting for the realisation of SERs. This 
is the most effective way for the indigent to be heard.  
 
6.5 The Supreme Court of India holding the state accountable on enforcing anti-
corruption measures 
 
Vijayashri argues that although the SCI is not the sole agency to safeguard the advancement 
of human rights, it is nonetheless a crucial agency in the light of a corrupt and errant 
government. 
1387
 To further the quest to a better life for the indigent, the SCI also took 
initiative in pursuing alleged political corruption. The Court felt that equality would remain 
unattainable, if accountability were not enforced by dealing with corruption in public life, 
                                                 
1384
See PILG available at https://publicinterestlawgathering.wordpress.com/ (accessed on 20 August 2015). 
1385
See Davis D M ‘Adjudicating the Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitution: Towards 
Deference Lite’ (2006) 22 SAJHR 314. 
1386
 Epp C R (1998) 205. 
1387
Vijayashri S  (1997)136. See chapter 4 on the role of the South African judiciary in combating corruption. 
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effectively.
 1388
 The SCI reinterpreted article 32 of the Indian Constitution to expand the 
standing doctrine for SAL claims against the illegal conduct of the government and its 
failures.  The Court also relaxed its formal pleading and filing requirements and developed 
equitable and remedial powers and procedures that enabled it to assert new monitoring, 
oversight, and policy-making functions. Thereby it asserted an expanded oversight and 
accountability functions, through which it would subsequently expand its power in reviewing 
the power of the elected branches of the central government.  
 
The Constitution of SA allows for judicial oversight but supervisory orders are rarely 
included in their rulings. This is criticised because it smacks of ‘deference to the executive’ 
and is does not meet the transformation goals of the Constitution.
1389
 More importantly, the 
CC has still to make a proactive link between the delay of SERs and corruption.
1390
 Due to 
the fact that this challenge has not been brought in application to the CC it has not been asked 
to make such a connection. 
 
In India the Court was concerned with good governance and protecting the rule of law, 
therefore it addressed mal-governance in state governments, local governments and 
bureaucratic agencies. This was aimed at addressing critical governance failures in particular 
corruption, accountability and human rights.
1391
 Thus, recourse was sought for the poor and 
disadvantaged through the judiciary. This process was aided by the national media and civil 
society groups playing a key role in exposing corruption in the central government. 
According to Baxi, the news media played a critical role in focusing national attention on 
government’s flouting of the law and the repression of human rights. 1392 Although the media 
in South Africa is robust in reporting on corruption in government, this does not necessarily 
serve as credible evidence in public corruption. As noted previously the media exposed 
irregularities in the security upgrades at Nkandla the President’s private home, but this had no 
                                                 
1388
Verma J S (2001) 578. Also see Khosla M ‘Addressing Judicial Activism in the Indian Supreme Court: 
Towards and Evolving Debate’ (2009) 32 Hastings Int’l & Comparative Law Review 55. 
1389
 See chapter 4 for discussion on the transformative Constitution. 
1390
 See chapter 1 for discussion on the link between corruption and the deprivation of enjoying human rights. 
1391Also see Chadda M ‘India Between Majesty and Modernity' in Johnson R A (ed) The Struggle 
against Corruption: A Comparative Study (2004). 
1392
Baxi U (1985) 114. 
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effect until a complaint was brought to the PP.
1393
 Moreover Parliament also failed miserably 
in holding the executive to account in this regard.
1394
 
 
In India one of the main stream SAL in public housing was the uncovering of the Adarsh 
Housing Society scam.
1395
 This petition was filed by a journalist seeking court direction for 
the CBI, to produce a final investigation report on the steps taken to prosecute the ex-housing 
minister, who was forced to resign amidst the uncovering of the said corruption.
1396
 This 
petition arose out of the slow pace of the investigation over two years. This led to the minister 
being charged together with other politicians and bureaucrats and when the CBI petitioned the 
Bombay High Court, it refused to drop the charges leaving the case pending under the 
Prevention of Corruption Act.
1397
  
 
The closest example to this action in South Africa is in Glenister 
1398
 where the CC was 
petitioned by a private individual in question of whether the national anti-corruption body, the 
Hawks was sufficiently independent.
1399
 The distinction is that in India the action was 
petitioned through SAL which relaxes standing and evidentiary rules, and the SCI does not 
shy away from entering the arena.  In retrospect, if the Glenister application had not being 
raised by a private individual, the CC would not have raised this question pertaining to the 
national anti-corruption body. This is despite the wide media attention the case received due 
to the Hawks’ doubtful independence from political influence. The omnipresence of 
corruption in government begs for the building of strong independent anti-corruption 
institutions to control, prevent and pre-empt corruption in the public service.  The CC can do 
                                                 
1393
See chapter 4 for discussion on the CC compelling the President to repay abused available resources spent on 
Nkandla. 
1394
See chapter 4 discussing how parliamentary oversight failed in the Nkandla matter. 
1395
Land allotted by the chief minister of Maharashtra in 2002 for the construction of a cooperative society called 
the Adarsh Housing Society. This is a posh, 31 storey building constructed on prime real estate in 
Colaba, Mumbai, for the welfare of war widows and personnel of India’s Ministry of Defence. Over a period of 
several years, politicians, bureaucrats and military officers allegedly conspired to bend several rules concerning 
land ownership, zoning, floor space index and membership get themselves flats allotted in this cooperative 
society at below-market rates The scam was unearthed in November 2010 available at 
http://research.omicsgroup.org/index.php/Adarsh_Housing_Society_scam     accessed (accessed on 3 October 
2015)  
1396
Chavan resigned as the Chief Minister in 2010 in the wake of revelations that two of his family members 
owned flats in the building. The CBI filed a charge sheet in the case which named him and 12 others. 
1397See Bas B ‘Adarsh Housing Society Case: Court Refuses Relief to Former Maharashtra CM Ashok Chavan 
Indian Business Times 14 March 2015 available at http://www.ibtimes.co.in/adarsh-housing-society-case-court-
refuses-relief-former-maharashtra-cm-ashok-chavan-625223 (accessed on 3 October 2015). 
1398
See chapter 5 for discussion on this case. 
1399Kende M S ‘Corruption Cases and Separation of Powers in the South African Courts and U.S. Supreme 
Court’ (2015-2016) 60 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev 185. 
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more than waiting for a social spirited individual to raise concern as to the government’s 
commitment to root out and stymie corruption which inevitably affects the budgets due for 
realising SERs. The approach of the Indian judiciary shows how the CC can enforce oversight 
over political corruption and SERs without compromising the separation of powers. 
 
In 1993 the SCI was petitioned in Vineet Narain v. Union of India
1400
 to further investigate 
cases of corruption in government where nothing had been done, to command performance of 
the duty under law to properly investigate an accusation of corruption in the public sector. 
The primary issue here was ‘(w) ether it is within the domain of judicial review and if it could 
be an effective instrument for activating the investigative process which is under the control 
of the executive?’ 1401 The Court responded in the affirmative by invoking the Indian 
Constitution which allows the Court to depart from the traditional adversarial proceedings for 
the enforcement of fundamental rights. 
1402
  In this regard the Court accepted a writ petition 
by a journalist who filed a SAL on corruption, exposing the ‘Hawala scandal’.1403 This was 
termed as the biggest political scandal in the world involving politicians and bureaucrats of 
the Indian government in bribery and corruption.   
 
This petition alleged that government agencies such as the CBI had failed to perform their 
duties and legal obligations to properly investigate matters arising out of seized 
documents.
1404
 The SCI was not concerned with the merits of the accusations but with the 
performance of the legal duty by the government agencies to fairly and  thoroughly 
investigate the accusations against the individuals in order to take final action according to 
law. The Court was asked to compel the CBI to duly perform their legal obligations and 
proceed against all persons involved, irrespective of the office the person held. The Court 
                                                 
1400
(1998) 1 S.C.C. 226 (also known as the Hawala case). Also see Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India 
(2012) 3 S.C.C. 1 (court cancelling 122 telecom licenses); Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principle Secretary (2014) 9 
S.C.C. 516 (India) (court cancelling approximately 200 licenses for coal blocks for mining granted since 1993). 
1401
 Sondhi S (2000) 47. 
1402
 Article 32; Also see art 142  right of the Supreme Court to issue orders enforceable throughout the country 
for ‘doing complete justice’.  
1403 
It was a US$18 million bribery scandal that implicated some of the country's leading politicians. Hawala 
Scam was bigger than Watergate, Iran-gate, Bofors, Harshad Mehta, Tehelka and Lockheed scams. See van de 
Bunt H  ‘A Case Study on the Misuse of Hawala Banking’ (2008) 35 International Journal of Social Economics 
691 – 702; Kapoor S  Bad Money, Bad Politics: The Untold Hawala Story (1996); Desai A V ‘The Economics 
and Politics of Transition to an Open Market Economy: India’ OECD Working Paper 155 (1999) available at 
http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5lgsjhvj7bg1.pdf?expires=1440162081&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=
8E86766C75ACDB17889B24DD2CA35DAD (accessed on 20 August 2015). 
1404
 The raid led to the discovery of financial support to politicians, bureaucrats and criminals, by clandestine 
and illegal means, using tainted funds obtained through ‘Hawala’. 
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directed the CBI to charge those who had prima facie evidence against them.  In addition the 
CBI was ordered to report to the Court from time to time on the progress of the investigation 
until the charge-sheets were filed in the appropriate courts.
 
 It is clear that the Indian example 
illustrates how effective the court can be in dealing with corruption without encroaching on 
the executive’s terrain.  This approach in the South African setting would see the CC 
inquiring from the SIU as to its progress on finalising its investigation into malfeasance in the 
delivery of social housing. This inquiry by the court could initiate the prosecutions of those 
found to be in contravention of the law. In effect, what is happening in South Africa is that 
the CC and by extension the judicial system has rendered itself rather toothless as regards 
SERs. 
 
The SCI took over governance and policy-making functions that were once in the exclusive 
domain of the central government bureaucracy, the executive (Prime Minister and Council of 
Ministers), and Parliament. Thereby it assumed supervisory responsibility over the CBI’s 
investigation by issuing directives to make the CBI more autonomous by having severed its 
links to the political establishment.
1405
 The Court asserted the power of continuous mandamus 
which provided continued jurisdiction to monitor the CBI. In addition, it ordered that the 
CVC be given a supervisory role over the CBI, ordering them to report to the Court on the 
progress of the investigation into the politicians involved in the ‘Hawala’ case. 1406 The Court 
insulated the investigation from extraneous influences including the controlling executive.
 
This intervention by the Court into the CBI investigations resulted in the filing of charge-
sheets against 54 persons including leading cabinet ministers and other government 
officials.
1407
 Nothing of this magnitude can be attributes to South Africa’s judiciary. 
 
Further investigations into state housing fraud saw the CBI arresting the housing finance chief 
executive and seven others from the public sector Life Insurance Corporation and state owned 
                                                 
1405
The Court relied  again on arts 32 and 142 of the Indian Constitution. 
1406
Hawala case paras 246-51. In compliance with the SCI’s directives the government enacted the new The 
Central Vigilance Commission Act 45 of 2003 (India) that confers statutory status on the CVC. 
1407
Hawala case  paras 226, 230-31.  Despite the Court’s vigilance and progressive approach, after many years 
the case was closed without any convictions due to lack of evidence. 
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banks for taking bribes to secure loans.
1408
 The CBI investigations into the Commonwealth 
Games scam have seen the secretary of a political party, forced to resign.
1409
 The SCI also 
invalidated the single directive protocol which required the CBI to receive prior ministerial 
authorisation before investigating high-ranking government officials.
 1410
 Where the executive 
and Parliament have failed to satisfy their constitutional obligations the SCI became more 
assertive in safeguarding and protecting the rule of law. The Court opined that it was the duty 
of the executive to fill the vacuum by executive orders and where there is inaction by the 
executive the judiciary must step in to exercise its constitutional obligations.
1411
 The wait-
and-see approach of the South African CC has left the executive and Parliament to its own 
time-frames in investigating corruption. In its observance of the separation of powers the 
judiciary (like the citizens) in South Africa remain passive bystanders witnessing the flagrant 
abuse of state resources which delays the realisation of housing and various other deliverables 
in SERs. This is demonstrated by the conclusive uncovering of corruption by the SIU which 
rests on paper and thereby leaving those public officials found errant, to continue to hold 
positions in public office. This is an example of where the court should have stepped in 
because the other two branches of government have proved to be unaccountable and 
complicit in the presence of malfeasance. 
 
The SCI’s activism was not a case of over-reach but rather a natural by-product of citizen’s 
raising important constitutional and policy issues that were not being addressed by central 
government. The Hawala case created judicial precedent which elbowed the anti-corruption 
agencies into action where they lacked enthusiasm to investigate senior public officials. The 
judiciary in India has proven that without infringing on the separation of powers, the court 
can be pro-active when government does not act or dallied when required to act against errant 
high-ranking public officials. Indecisiveness by the executive and Parliament in South Africa, 
                                                 
1408
Housing scam: CBI arrests top officials of PSU banks, financial institutions Economic Times 24 November 
2010 available at  
 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-11-24/news/27590728_1_arrests-maninder-singh-johar-
corporate-loans (accessed on 13 October 2015). Roa M ‘CBI arrests CEO of LIC Housing Finance and 7 others 
in Mumbai, unearths housing finance racket’ available at  
http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-cbi-arrests-ceo-of-lic-housing-finance-and-7-others-in-mumbai-
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1409‘Delhi Commonwealth Games organiser arrested in corruption investigation’ The Guardian 25 April 2011 
available at  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/25/delhi-commonwealth-games-organiser-arrested (accessed on 
10 October 2015). The Fraud Watch: Commonwealth Games scam January 2011 available at  
http://www.ey.com/IN/en/Services/Assurance/Fraud-Investigation---Dispute-Services/Fraud-Watch---
Commonwealth-Games-scam (accessed on 10 October 2015). 
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saw the President succeeding with abusing millions of rands of the available resources of the 
state.
1412
 
 
Through judicial activism the SCI brought to book a number of cases involving corruption in 
public office.
1413
 The apex Court has upheld cases against political and administrative 
functionaries at the highest levels which illustrates the rescue of the rule of law against those 
custodians of the law themselves.
1414
 The SCI performed an unprecedented action in 2006 
when it directed a sitting minister to be jailed for one month for contempt of court.
 1415
 This 
action is unheard of in South Africa where court orders are often ignored by state officials 
without any repercussion from the court that issued such orders.
1416
  
 
Although there have been several reports on corruption in the social housing programme in 
South Africa, no sitting minister has claimed responsibility, neither has any senior accounting 
officer under whose watch these corrupt activities happened. The corruption of public 
housing funds has delayed the right to housing to those for whom the housing is earmarked. 
This means progressive realisation failed due to malfeasance by public officials. The 
historical and contemporary hardship still suffered by the homeless dictates for an active 
judiciary. This will be a judiciary that mero motu raises the issue of passivity in finalisation of 
investigations into corruption and compels the SIU to complete its investigations and 
recommend that the guilty parties be charged and trialled.  By adopting this approach the CC 
would be placing a legal focus on how the government should perform in curbing corruption 
in the state and moreover, how government is faring in its duties to realise public housing. 
                                                 
1412
See chapter 4 for discussion on the abuse of state funds by the President. 
1413
Bangaru Laxman a minister, resigned in disgrace. He was convicted by a special CBI Court on 27 April 2012 
for taking bribe under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 s9. This is also the first time in Indian 
history that a senior politician has been convicted for corruption based on evidence gathered in a 
sting operation conducted by a media organisation;  Prasad Yadav was forced to resign his office 
pending major corruption inquiries into what is known as the fodder scam see Dr. Jagannath Mishra, Lalu 
Prasad v The State Of Bihar 1999 (1) BLJR 347. Minister Satish Sharma was forced to resign for a similar 
patronage exercise in 1995 following severe constraints passed by the Supreme Court  see Tummala K K 
‘Combating Corruption: Lessons Out of India’ (2009) 10 Int’l  Pub. MGMT. Rev. 34, 42. 
1414
 Sondhi S (2000) 20. The former chairperson of the Delhi Electricity Board was suspended and charged with 
amassing assets almost a hundred times more than his known resources of income. India’s telecommunications 
minister resigned after he was found to have committed fraud see  India’s 2G Telecom Scandal Spans the Spectrum of 
Abuse 2010 Knowledge @ Wharton available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/indias-2g-telecom-
scandal-spans-the-spectrum-of-abuse/ (accessed on 20September 2015). 
1415
The Supreme Court awarded one-month jail term to Maharashtra Transport Minister Swarup Singh Nayak 
and Additional Chief Secretary Ashok Khot for giving licence to six sawmills in 2004 despite a ban on the same. 
See The Hindu 11 May 2006 available at http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/article3131665.ece (accessed 
on 20 September 2015).  
1416
 See Chapter 4 for discussion on contempt of court by the South African government. 
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Through this action a link would be created between malfeasance in the state and the delay in 
delivery of public housing.  
 
The current state of affairs proves that South Africa will only succeed in tackling corruption 
when the anti-corruption agencies are insulated from political interference and when the 
politically powerful are held accountable.
1417
 A case in point is the handling of the Nkandla 
matter that saw Parliament failing in its oversight duty by finding the President’s abusive 
behaviour of state funds acceptable.
1418
 This is despite the fact that the PP found that the 
President had abused the available resources of the state whilst there was a desperate need for 
resources to deliver on social housing. The executive and Parliament ignored that the PP’s 
action was binding, until the CC compelled these branches of government to accept the 
remedial action and recommending the reimbursement of the abused funds to the fiscus. 
 
The Indian judiciary has linked corruption with the retardation of SERs, and thereby 
awakened inquiry into the corrective action against public officials found to be corrupt. 
Vijayashri states that ‘constitutional law appropriately exists for those situations where the 
representative government cannot be trusted’.1419 The SCI’s liberal approach in holding the 
politicians accountable should be seen as a breakthrough in the pursuit of clean governance.   
 
The judiciary in South Africa would be well served to soften the adversarial rules in favour of 
enforcing fundamental rights. This is particularly important where the executive and 
Parliament are found to be derelict in their constitutional duties and obligations, in curbing 
the scourge of corruption. Therefore the judiciary should direct the safeguarding and 
protection of the rule of law. To assist in this the CC can employ any of the anti-corruption 
agencies
1420
 and the SAHRC in continuous oversight and report on how the realisation of 
housing is protected from corruption of the budgets that must realise the right. This would 
constitute be the makings of a judiciary that does not tolerate regression through corruption 
insofar as the right to housing is concerned. This would not amount to a judiciary crossing the 
                                                 
1417
Tamukamoyo H ‘Is South Africa Really Complying with the Anti-Corruption Protocols it has Ratified? 9 
July 2013 ISS available at https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/is-south-africa-really-complying-with-the-anti-
corruption-protocols-it-has-ratified (accessed on 29 September 2015). 
1418
 See chapter 4 for discussion on this matter. 
1419
Vijayashri S (1997) 26. Also see Das C V ‘Judicial Checks On Government’  President, Commonwealth 
Lawyers Association, Paper presented at a Workshop on ‘Accountability, Scrutiny and Oversight’ organised by 
the Commonwealth Secretariat and held in Canberra, Australia, from 23 to 25 May 2001 Commonwealth Law 
Bulletin 583. 
1420
 See chapter 5 for discussion on the various anti-corruption agencies. 
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lines in separation of powers, but rather a case of enforcing fundamental rights as behoves its 
constitutional duty. 
 
6.6 The deferent stance of the South African judiciary- does it assist in addressing 
political corruption?  
 
Bilchitz critiques that the CC uses a variety of ‘avoidance techniques’ which often place 
emphasis on ‘political enforcement’ by trying to give effect to SERs through existing 
legislation and executive action.
1421
 This technique gives expression to a vision of ‘inter-
branch’ comity which is a formalistic approach that privileges procedure over substance. 1422 
This procedure-over-substance approach is what the Indian judiciary tries to avoid through 
the relaxation of standing and evidentiary rules in SAL.  
 
Ackerman has termed the CCs approach as ‘constrained democracy’ where the court attempts 
to justify its decisions with the text of the Constitution in order to protect its institutional 
independence by deferring to the government.
1423
 Through SAL this deferent stance can be 
developed into an oversight that holds Parliament and the executive to account on not only 
the progressive realisation of housing but also on how the anti-corruption agencies fare in 
protecting the resources for housing   against malfeasance. In essence the judiciary should not 
separate its oversight of the state’s obligations insofar as realising the right to housing from 
how the available resources so earmarked are protected against malfeasance.  Without this 
said oversight the executive in effect has complete control over how successful its anti-
corruption measures are and indeed the losses suffered due to errant behaviour has been 
amply  demonstrated by the executive’s disregard of the SIU reports. A situation whereby the 
executive is its own arbiter has shown to be a breeding ground for malfeasance. The 
assistance of the court in enforcing its oversight on state obligations insofar as curbing 
corruption, in particular cases such as the SIU investigations, becomes essential in protecting 
the limited available resources for housing, against malfeasance. 
 
                                                 
1421David Bilchitz D ‘Avoidance Remains Avoidance: Is it Desirable in Socio-Economic Rights Cases?’ (2014) 
Constitutional Review 297. 
1422
Bilchitz D (2014) 298. 
1423Ackerman B ‘Meritocracy v Democracy’ London Review of Books (8 March 2007) available at available at 
http://www.lrb. co.uk/v29/n05/bruce-ackerman/meritocracy-v-democracy (accessed on 9 September 2015) 
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The court’s deferent approach is serving the doctrine of separation of powers but this should 
not be at the expense of keeping government in check on abuse of state power. A ‘highlight’ 
of the CCs efforts to combat corruption was in Glenister where the Court found that the 
Constitution of SA contained an implied governmental obligation to establish an effective, 
sufficiently independent anti-corruption unit. According to Kende, Glenister shed light on 
how the judiciary had policed corruption. The author maintains that higher courts have been 
brave and that judicial credibility does not yet seem too fragile to confront corruption in 
South Africa.
1424
 Moreover, the author argues that the judiciary in South Africa supersedes 
the US in having created greater judicial authority by adjudicating cases opposed to labelling 
them as political question or dismissing on standing grounds.
1425
 Furthermore Kende 
maintains that the CC’s reliance on international law bolstered the judicial battle against 
corruption in Glenister and showed that SA courts were taking significant risk.
 1426
  
 
Although Kende lauds the judiciary in Glenister as an example of how influential 
international law is and for bemoaning the negative influence of corruption on this 
jurisdiction, the case does not necessarily show that South African courts are taking any risks 
at all in exposing political corruption.  It should be noted that the CC would not have inquired 
into the independence of the Hawks if a public spirited individual had not shown initiative in 
approaching the CC.  The Nkandla matter has suffered the same fate of the court’s wait-and-
see approach, despite a frenzy of media reports. Enquiring into political corruption is not an 
easy task and the judiciary can be labelled as overstepping the boundaries of separation of 
powers. However, where such corruption affects fundamental rights, the judiciary is within its 
right to do such inquiry at the behest of the Constitution it serves. 
 
In its attempt to address corruption, the Chief Justice in South Africa highlighted steps that 
departments and bodies in the criminal and civil justice systems had taken to consolidate 
efforts to fight corruption.
1427
 In this regard the judiciary formed the National Efficiency 
Enhancement Committee in 2012 to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the broader 
justice system and thereby contribute to the eradication of corruption and crime.  Justice 
Kruger submitted that the prosecution of corruption cases is problematic because of the 
                                                 
1424
 Kende M S (2015-2016) 185. 
1425
 Kende M S (2015-2016) 195. 
1426
 Kende M S (2015-2016) 195. 
1427‘Judges address corruption’ DeRebus 32 March 2013:7-8 available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/32.html  (accessed on 15 May 2016). 
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reluctance to report and testify on corruption matters.
 1428
 Criticism has been levelled against 
the judiciary for not being overtly transformative in a bid to complement the Constitution of 
SA.
1429
  Reflective of this is the CCs wait-and-see approach whilst witnessing the distressed 
calls of the citizenry against corruption in housing which was left to the PP to investigate 
(Nkandla) and that this office might perhaps brings it to the court’s attention. 
 
The CC is the best hope for reform against corruption, but its jurisprudence on combating 
public corruption does not reflect broadly. In order to widen its approach the CC needs to 
embrace new monitoring and oversight functions and act with less deference to the executive. 
This action would reveal a judiciary willing to transform and prod the government in its duty 
to realise housing and eschew corruption which bedevils the realisation of SERs. 
 
6.7 Civil society:  a key player in containing corruption in the public sector in India 
 
The combating of corruption is not just a matter of making anti-corruption laws and creating 
institutions. There is a definite role for civil society to play in raising awareness of public 
corruption and thereby acting as a watchdog in alerting society to what the government is 
doing to stem this scourge.
1430
 Civil society organisations have a vested interest in the 
realisation of housing and the minimising of corruption. These organisations play a key role 
in creating pressure for policy reform, improved governance and monitoring the state’s action 
in fighting corruption and maladministration. Through this action civil society put pressure on 
the will of the state to operate in an accountable, transparent and responsive manner.  
 
Sondhi maintains that civil society is to be considered as the realm of association between the 
household and the state.
1431
 Therefore the role of NGOs, CBOs and particularly the media 
should not be underestimated in containing corruption by reporting allegations of corruption 
and thereby keeping government in check. These kinds of associations fulfil functions that are 
essential for aggregating and expressing societal interests and promoting democratic 
values.
1432
 Moreover, these associations have been pivotal in the SAL approach that the 
Indian judiciary promotes in combating corruption and realising housing. 
                                                 
1428
 ‘Judges address corruption’ DeRebus 32 March 2013:7-8. 
1429
 See chapter 4 for discussion on transformative judiciary. 
1430
 See chapter 1 for discussion on civil society’s role in general in promoting SERs and combating corruption. 
1431
 Sondhi S (2000) 22. 
1432
 Sondhi S (2000) 22. 
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The vibrancy of civil society in India is no surprise. Organised civilisation has existed in 
India since at least 2500 B.C.
1433 
The 1990s example of India brought about a renewed 
interest in civil society as an important vehicle to cover increasing gaps in social services in 
developing countries.
1434
 In this jurisdiction civil society has evolved for the joint pursuit of 
shared interests in that the Chambers of Commerce, professional association and various 
forms of NGOs have become players to monitor government in its delivery of sound 
governance.
 
In a study on protest movements Singh found that civil society activism has 
renewed and revitalised democracy in India by mobilising groups of people uninvolved in 
politics.
1435
 The rising popularity of CBOs is largely in response to the widespread 
disillusionment with the performance of the public sector in developing countries.
1436
  These 
shifts by civil society are demanding a need to revisit and rethink how we engage with 
politics, social action, and the very meaning of democracy.
 1437
  
 
These activist movements do not want to tear down an authoritarian regime but rather bring 
issues of neglect and inadequate representation, into the political arena. This is pretty much 
what the aspirations of civil society organisations in South Africa are. By following the 
Indian example of SAL civil society organisations in South Africa could acquire a more 
zealous approach, within rules that are relaxed in bringing matters to the CC, as collaborators 
with the judiciary in seeking relief for the poor in housing. Civil society could thus be 
reinvigorated because the SAL approach holds more promise of success than does the current 
PIA approach. 
 
                                                 
1433
Carothers T (1999).  
1434
India has an estimated 2 million NGOs; this is just over 1 NGO per 600 Indians available at 
http://scroll.in/article/657281/cbi-estimates-that-india-has-one-ngo-for-every-600-people-the-number-could-be-
even-higher (accessed on 14 October 2015). 
1435Singh R ‘New Citizens’ Activism in India: Moments, Movements, and Mobilisation an Exploratory Study’ 
2014 Centre for Democracy and Social Action available at https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/study-new-
citizens-activism-in-india.pdf (accessed on 1 October 2015). There has been a wave of global citizen’s activism 
unfolding since 2010 These have been—the Arab Spring that brought down dictatorial regimes, to protests in 
London, Chile, Spain, Russia, food riots in Brazil, protests for access to housing in Tel Aviv, the ‘Occupy’ 
movement in US and beyond. 
1436
Ghaus-Pasha A ‘The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Governance’ 6th Global Forum on Reinventing 
Government towards Participatory and Transparent Governance (24 – 27 May 2005) 9 available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan019594.pdf (accessed on 4 October 2015). 
1437
Singh R (2014) 3. The anti-corruption movement was a non-violent movement, which used the fast-unto-
death stratagem (popularised by Gandhi, and often used as a method of protest in the Indian context) as its key 
method. 
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The traditional uneasy imbalance of the omnipotent state that towered over civil society has 
been diluted by civil society advancing as a relevant player in India’s political landscape.1438 
Aiding and abetting this progressive stance is the mainstream media and social media, in 
highlighting the issues under scrutiny by civil society. India against Corruption (IAC) brought 
the issue of corruption to the fore and compelled government to a joint parliamentary session 
to acknowledge corruption.
 1439
 This redefined the citizen-civil society-state relations whereby 
civil society fills in the democratic vacuum in the state.
1440
 These activists want to bring 
social change by ‘any means’ and ‘in any direction’. 1441 This is done through active citizenry 
movements that break with the status quo by changing the rules of engagement as in the SAL 
approach, in the quest to protect and promote SERs. More citizen action is noted through non-
violent protests arranged by Transparency International (India) against political corruption 
and in favour of honest and efficient governance.
1442
 This organisation also organises 24 hour 
relay fasting (hunger-strike), concurrently with the sessions of the Parliament to remind 
government of their failure in their duty to the country, to take effective steps in eliminating 
corruption in their ranks. 
 
The NGO, Common Cause in Delhi has engaged in SAL which dragged corrupt officials to 
the courts. 
1443
 Complementing this is the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan in Rajastan which 
has exposed instances of bureaucratic corruption.
1444
 The Report Card methodology 
developed by the Public Affairs Centre in Bangalore in collaboration with civil society is an 
innovative instrument that tracks down and exposes corruption in the public services. This 
innovative process has proven successful in raising awareness of corruption through periodic 
application of its evaluation of local government by the citizenry. This has given rise to the 
government of India integrating public policies with public participation.
 
 
 
In May 1997 the Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Service used the reaction 
from civil society at large, through officials, experts, voluntary agencies, citizen’s groups and 
                                                 
1438
Singh R (2014) 3. 
1439
Singh R (2014) 30. A number of initiatives had been launched by the IAC available at 
http://www.indiaagainstcorruption.com/ (accessed on 3 October 2015).  
1440
Singh R (2014) 30. 
1441
Singh R (2014) 3 
1442
Established in 1997, the Transparency International-India has been playing a significant role in fighting 
corruption through Gandhian methods of non-violent mass mobilisation.  
1443
See Guhan S & Paul S (eds) Corruption in India: Agenda for Action (1997). 
1444
Sondhi S (2000) 24. 
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the media to evolve an ‘Action Plan on Effective and Responsive Administration’. 1445 This 
was strengthened by a core group that formulated and monitored the Citizen’s Charter on the 
performance of ministers.  
 
Since January 2000 the CVC uses an interactive website in keeping civil society informed 
and involved in the framing and implementation of anti-corruption strategies. Through active 
citizenry the CVC is pursuing a proactive three-point operational strategy to fight corruption 
in India. The three points are: simplification of rules and procedures, greater transparency and 
empowerment of the public through participation and effective punishment.
1446
 Sondhi is 
positive that the overwhelming civil society participation in fighting corruption is set to reap 
positive results in combating corruption in India.
1447
  Public participation promotes a better 
balance between prevention and enforcement measures in addressing corruption, particularly 
insofar as the limitations on the rule of law are concerned.
 1448
 Furthermore, empowering of 
the public on anti-corruption strategies is a more nuanced approach to gain public confidence. 
 
Good governance has recently been accorded a central place in the discourse on 
development.
1449
 Civil society is ultimately the stakeholder and the ultimate affected party of 
corruption and therefore must be engaged constructively to influence the necessary reforms.
 
Countries that are supportive of civil society bodies through hearing arrangements have 
enabled organic evolution of policies.
 1450
 Thereby the necessary policies and institutional 
changes become viable and sustainable. Without engaging civil society government will 
remain opaque. Ghaus-Pasha sees civil society as an increasingly important agent for 
promoting good governance such as transparency, effectiveness, openness, responsiveness 
and accountability.
1451
 Their role can further good governance by policy analysis and 
monitoring state performance and behaviour of public officials.
 
 
 
There is a robust civil society in the South African arena, but engagement by government has 
not reaped the desired results because often government does not take such engagement 
                                                 
1445
See Subhash C K (ed) Crime and Corruption to Good Governance (1997). 
1446Vittal N ‘Applying Zero Tolerance to Corruption’ available at http://cvc.gov.in/vscvc/note.html (accessed on 
13 September 2015). 
1447
Sondhi S (2000) 26. 
1448
Sondhi S (2000) 27. 
1449
Ghaus-Pasha A (2005) 28. 
1450
Sondhi S (2000) 23. 
1451
Ghaus-Pasha A (2005) 28. Also see Desai V Community Participation and Slum Housing - a Study of 
Mumbai Sage Publications New Delhi (1995). 
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seriously and does not dispatch senior public officials to such meetings.
1452
 As noted above 
there have been PIA in this jurisdiction whereby CBOs have represented the poor in SERs 
matters, but in South Africa there has been no relaxation of locus standi   and evidentiary 
rules. Whereas in the example of the Indian judiciary access to a wider base of public spirited 
individuals to represent the poor has been aided by the relaxation of standing and evidentiary 
rules.  
 
Horsten argues that oversight in South Africa could be embellished by greater participation of 
civil society and NGO’s collaborating in the drafting of the SERs reports by the SAHRC 
thereby ensuring the maximum degree of public participation which is one of the cornerstones 
of good governance.
 1453
 Kothari agrees that the process of enforcement of all human rights is 
the legitimate concern of the Human Rights Commissions. 
1454
 Thus the SAHRC could also 
be more proactive in keeping government in check on its anticipated time frames in 
delivering housing.  In India the SCI used the better capacity of the National Human Right 
Commission (NHRC) to directly monitor performance of institutions to aid its function of 
issuing directions in appropriate cases.
1455
 Gowda argues that ‘The way scams are exposed 
suggests that there are enough self-correcting features in the Indian system, even if they work 
in a less predictable manner, there is hope yet.’1456 Moreover, the most crucial element in 
combating corruption is the social attitude towards reporting corruption because legislative 
measures will not change attitudes in government whilst society remains tolerant. Therefore 
civil society, including a vibrant media plays a central role in combating corruption, which 
should be recognised, encouraged and intensified. 
1457
 In order to get their plight heard on 
corruption, civil society in India hungered for an ombudsman, discussed next. 
                                                 
1452
See The Community Law Centre, Black Sash and various other NGOs have been engaging with government 
regarding ratification of the ICESCR since 1994 and government only ratified the Covenant in January 2015. In 
the engagement process government would often make last minute changes to their representative which often is 
junior staff unable to take the discussion any further available at Community Law centre available at 
http://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/ (accessed on 30 August 2015). 
1453Horsten D ‘The Role Played by the South African Human Rights Commission’s Economic and Social Rights 
Reports in Good Governance in South Africa’ (2006)2 PER 14. 
1454
Kothari J (June 2001) 10. 
1455
The NHRC also engaged  in  SAL activism in  National Human Rights Commission v State Of Arunachal 
Pradesh & Another 1996 AIR 1234 SCC (1) 742 in protection of refugees. Also see Singh D K Stateless in 
South Asia: The Chakmas between Bangladesh and India 2010. 
1456
Capital Plight: What Drives Corruption in India? available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/capital-plight-what-
drives-corruption-in-india/ (accessed on 14 October 2015). 
1457ECOSOC ‘ Corruption and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights, in particular, economic, social 
and cultural rights Progress report submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Christy Mbonu available at 
file:///C:/Users/Soraya/Downloads/Economic%20Social%20and%20Cultural%20Rights%20-
%20Corruption%20and%20its%20impact%20on%20HRs%20Progress%20report.pdf (accessed on 14 October 
2015) 
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6.7.1 The Lokpal Act: civil society’s demand for an anti-graft ombudsman 
 
At the heart of the anti-corruption movement in India was the demand by civil society for 
anti-corruption legislation creating an ombudsman. 
1458
 The result of which was the  Lokpal 
and Lokayuktas Act 2013
1459
 which created the office of an anti-graft ombudsman with 
powers to investigate and prosecute corruption at any level against public officials including 
the prime minister, ministers and members of parliament. The Lokpal have suo motu powers 
to initiate action or receive complaints of corruption from the general public under the 
Prevention of Corruption Act.
1460
 Similarly to the judiciary and the Elections Commission, 
the Lokpal staff is supposed to work independently, and be devoid of influence from 
politicians and bureaucrats. Moreover the orders of this ombudsman are recognised as court 
orders and bear the same consequences for contempt of orders. Thus if the Lokpal 
ombudsman’s orders are not implemented, public officials so responsible would face arrest in 
contempt of court.  Thus unlike the PP in South Africa, there is no need for the Lokpal 
ombudsman to ask the court to confirm its orders. 
 
The concept of a constitutional anti-corruption ombudsman was first proposed in the early 
1960s; 
1461
 the Lokpal
1462
 was coined as far back as 1963 and the first Jan Lokpal Bill was 
proposed in 1968.
1463
 This is an anti-corruption bill drafted by civil society activists in India 
seeking an independent body to investigate corruption in the public domain. 
1464
 Some 52 
years later after its first introduction, the Bill was enacted on 18 December 2013. It aims to 
effectively deter corruption and compensate citizen grievances. Exemplary of this Act is that 
corruption cases must be investigated swiftly, within one year and corrupt public officials 
                                                 
1458See Nigam A ‘Anti Corruption Phenomenon: Its implication for Democracy, Civil Society and Policy 
Making’ 13 September 2011 available at https://www.boell.de/sites/.../study-new-citizens-activism-in-india.pdf 
(accessed on 20 July 2015) 
1459
Assented by the President on 1 January 2014 and came into force from 16 January 2014. Developed on the 
model of the Ombudsman of Sweden. Also referred to as the Citizen’s Ombudsman Bill. 
1460
For any act of corruption, the punishment shall not be less than six months of rigorous imprisonment and 
may extend up to imprisonment for life see Chapter XII, Clause 23. Also see Sharma R & Shrivastava A ‘Jan 
Lokpal Bill: Combating against Corruption (2012)1 International Journal of Social Sciences & Interdisciplinary 
Research 1-9. 
1461
 by Law Minister Ashok Kumar Sen in the early 1960s 
1462
The word Lokpal is derived from the Sanskrit word ‘lok’ meaning people and ‘pal’ meaning protector or 
caretaker.  
1463
'Lokpal Bills' were introduced in 1971, 1977, 1985, again by Ashok Kumar Sen, while serving as Law 
Minister in the Rajiv Gandhi cabinet and again in 1989, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2005 and in 2008, but they were 
never passed. 
1464See Kozlowski M T ‘A Monsoon in Delhi Anna Hazare, the Lokpal Bill, and the Future of India (2011) 8 Pitt 
Political Review for an in depth discussion on the various activist activities engaged by Anne Hazare to get the 
bill tabled. 
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shall face jail within two years, with the loss caused to the fiscus, recovered at the time of 
conviction.  
 
This ombudsman is similar to the PP in South Africa whose office has been very active in 
unearthing corruption in the public service.
1465
 However, although the PP’s findings are 
binding its recommendations are often ignored by government which makes this office less 
effective than if it had powers to prosecute and sanction errant public officials.
 1466
 Perhaps it 
is time that South Africa considers an independent anti-corruption ombudsman with powers 
akin to the Lokpal to see corruption cases investigated and corrupt official facing jail time 
within a specified time, and losses such as those enumerated in the SIU Report, recovered to 
the fiscus. The Corruption Act should be the main legislation under which such an 
independent anti-corruption ombudsman in South Africa labours. 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 
Realising the right to housing is as important as keeping the funds to realise those rights safe 
from malfeasance. A corruption-free society may seem like an illusion, but minimising the 
scourge to protect the realisation of housing and other SERs can be a reality. The SCI has 
demonstrated that the poor and desperate need the constant eye of the judiciary to oversee 
government’s progress in delivery of social housing and SERs at large. This caretaker 
approach by the court includes oversight on how the anti-corruption agencies are faring in the 
investigations of alleged abuse of state funds.  
 
Some would argue that the judiciary is not the monitor of the working of democracy, but it is 
the only forum that can order or compel government to fulfil its duties insofar as SERs are 
concerned and can impose criminal sanction on a recalcitrant government. Moreover, the CC 
should be more proactive in holding government to account on its progress on housing by 
issuing supervisory interdicts which compel government to report back to the court on how it 
is faring. This practice of supervision has enabled the SCI to hold the Indian government to 
account in its arbitrariness towards the right to housing and its inaction to investigate 
                                                 
1465
See chapter 4 discussing the landmark Nklandla case on the abuse of the state’s economic resources by the 
President, which was investigated by PP. 
1466
The Lokpal has sweeping powers to investigate and punish corruption, including the dismissal of government 
workers; to blacklist firms; to issue search warrants; to subpoena witnesses; and to imprison the convicted for 
terms ranging from seven years to life imprisonment. 
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corruption. Despite India’s challenges in providing housing1467 and dealing with corruption, 
its judiciary is exemplary of action that can advance access to court, to litigate on alleged 
violations of SERs and encourage government to be more accountable in its approach to 
delivery.
 
 
 
Looking through the prism of human rights, the judiciary and anti-corruption agencies have a 
responsibility to protect the realisation of housing against government complacency and 
arbitrariness on the one hand and graft in the state on the other. It is insufficient for the South 
African courts to merely confine itself to being a watchdog, merely waiting for civil society 
to access the court to litigate on infringements in SERs. As it is, with its reasonableness 
approach the CC mistakenly expects that government is applying the economic resources in 
the manner it should, but government does not.  
 
Currently in South Africa the courts are in the unenviable position of having to practise 
constraint in their discretion in order to uphold the doctrine of separation of powers. This is a 
balancing act where the court has to vindicate rights and thereby need to defer to other 
branches of government regarding political and policy decisions. However, we should guard 
against judicial passivity, as this does not blend with enforcement of SERs in a country 
dealing with the legacy of deprivation and insidious corruption.  It is the history on 
deprivation of SERs that should caution South Africa’s apex Court to be more pro-active in 
its quest to match the transformation promised by the Constitution. Therefore the CC could 
adopt a less constrained form of access. To give effect to this, the judiciary should shed it 
formalistic legal approach and adopt a more socially engaged and aware  approach that 
relaxes standing and evidentiary rules to increase access and thereby keep check on 
government’s progress in realising basic housing. 
 
This will be best served through supervisory orders which include the SAHRC monitoring 
government’s progress (or not), in order to report back to the Court, much like the approach 
that the judiciary in India employs. The idea is that the existence of a socially engaged 
                                                 
1467
See Kothari  J (June 2001) 1 who maintains that millions of people are still living in sub-human conditions 
on pavements, in squatter settlements, basties, jhuggies or unauthorized slums and are in constant threat of being 
evicted. 
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judiciary would encourage government to keep better time in delivering the basics of SERs 
and thereby prove to be more cautious in protection of the economic resources that must 
realise these deliverables. 
 
The relative failure of the anti-corruption agencies to stem corruption in the public service in 
South Africa places an unreasonable onus on civil society to be more proactive in holding 
government to account. Taking a SAL approach the SAHRC could approach the court to 
inquire from government on the outcome of the SIU reports and on the steps to be taken in 
dealing with the public officials found to be corrupt. This kind of synergy between the SCI 
and the NHRC has made institutions more effective in the enforcement of SERs in India.
 
Notwithstanding this Parliament in South Africa could also flex its oversight muscle and call 
the executive to account on its progress in housing and the way in which it deals with 
corruption. 
 
Citizen action is crucial in holding government to account and corruption in check. Therefore 
the role of NGO’s, CBOs and the media should not be underestimated in containing 
corruption. Civil society interaction together with an active judiciary such as is the case in 
India, could hopefully lead to the realisation of housing at a more urgent pace for the most 
desperate. South Africa needs a venerable government set on realising the right to housing 
and thereby should cleanse itself of public officials that sully the government with corruption. 
This should become a focus collective of civil society, the judiciary and the SAHRC in order 
to speed up the housing of the poor.  Complementing this should be honourable and ethical 
governance by all spheres and branches of government to deliver housing and other SERs 
effectively. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
7.1 Available resources 
 
It is precisely the inclusion of the right to housing in the Constitution that excited the 
impoverished in South Africa. This was amplified by political promises of providing homes 
for those thus deprived during apartheid. It is the realisation of this promise that those in 
continuous desperate situations, deprived of basic shelter, are still yearning for. 
 
The history pages of the UN underscore the importance of available resources to the 
realisation of the right to housing. As agreed upon in the ICESCR and other Human Rights 
Conventions, states have the duty to devote the ‘maximum available resources’ to ensure the 
realisation of SERs. These treaty obligations demand that the branches of government pay 
closer attention to the implementation of international obligations in their own jurisdiction. 
The government of South Africa provides complex reasons for not having fulfilled the right 
to housing. The lack of funds is the most favourite escape hatch that the government uses 
when questioned on the slow pace of delivering houses to the poor. However, the optimal use 
of available resources for the realisation of social housing is compromised in many cases due 
to the absence of proper oversight and accountability in government. The AG in his 
2015/2016 Audit Report berated the government for its reprehensible oversight over the 
state’s financial resources that have been grossly abused to the tune of billions. 
 
 This dereliction of oversight of the financial resource has perpetuated the paucity of basic 
shelter for the homeless and the most desperate and thereby deprived enjoyment to the right-
holders. Contributing to the plight of these vulnerable groups is the fact that the three 
branches of government do not display any compassion when it comes to the observation of   
minimum core which encompasses the minimum basic shelter. 
 
7.2 Progressive realisation and minimum core obligations 
 
Progressive realisation is underpinned by the minimum delivery of core SERs over the 
shortest period of time. A housing programme underscored by the minimum core will be a 
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reasonable programme. The fact that there are still  shack-dwellings without the basic 
services provided as on the outskirts of South Africa’s major cities, dating back to before 
constitutional democracy,  is an indication of an unfulfilled duty by government insofar as 
progressive realisation of the minimum of adequate housing is concerned. In this regard 
government is not fulfilling core obligation as per the ICESCR and General Comment 3.  
 
Although progressive realisation has no particular time-frame, the prescripts of treaty laws 
place an obligation on jurisdictions to implement SERs as rapidly as possible. In keeping with 
treaty obligations South Africa could and should have made far more progress to house 
people adequately. Instead the broad mass of society is condemned to live in squalor, 
deprived of even a humble home. This is an indictment of the South African government 
which has at its disposal a progressive Constitution but which instead has allowed itself to 
regress in its duties towards the delivery of basic housing. This again is in breach of its treaty 
obligations and makes a lie of its claim to strive towards progression in the delivery of 
housing. The plethora of legislative guidelines on how to achieve the constitutional 
imperatives shows that legislation is on track but realisation remains woefully protracted.  
 
7.3 Corruption  
 
The unfortunate link between corruption and the realisation of human rights should have 
alerted the government to institute effective oversight of the measures to curb corruption at 
source. Despite having signed the UNCAC and the implementation of South Africa’s own 
domestic anti-corruption measures, the country remains saddled with a government in crisis 
in the dealing with corruption. Moreover corruption is bedevilling the timeous realisation of 
social housing and puts blight on South Africa’s hard-earned constitutional democracy. 
 
There is a flagrant disregard for the preservation and prudent use of available resources for 
housing. This is evident in the fact that the highest office, the President, has shown blatant 
abuse of the state’s fiscal resources and that the usage of the maximum of the available 
resources for housing is not a priority. In this regard the President is tainted by having 
transgressed procurement regulations through having being a recipient of undue benefits in 
the upgrade of his private home, Nkandla. Hence, the self indulgence by the President has 
seen the available resources squandered to aid an opulent life style. Thus the very custodian 
that swore allegiance to the Constitution and assented to anti-corruption legislation, notably 
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the Corruption Act, has been found to be impervious to the need to be compliant with the 
relevant legislation.  
 
The acts of corruption in the procurement of housing fall squarely in the frame of the 
Corruption Act which resonates with the UNCAC.  The public procurement laws, regulations 
and the PFMA are deliberately ignored, for personal gain and to acquire undue benefits. The 
fact that the President also abused available resources of the state for personal gain, places 
irregular activities at the highest office in government. Following this trend are the public 
officials who flagrantly disregard compliance of procurement measures in the public housing 
programme, as reported by the SIU. The irregular dissipation of funds through corrupt 
activities has grievously undermined the enjoyment and the full realisation of the right to 
housing.  The most desperate bear the brunt of this deprivation. The executive, particularly 
the minister of Human Settlements has the responsibility to take decisive steps in good faith 
to deal with officials found to be illegitimately diverting the available resources for housing. 
The recommendations of the SIU are a case in point. The bottom line is that acts of corruption 
by public officials see the available resources for housing diverted for personal gain. This 
behaviour delays or stunts the  realisation of  housing and  thereby deprives the rights-holder 
of fulfilment of this right. 
 
A state that cannot protect its economic resources against malfeasance by errant public 
officials is a state failing in its constitutional imperatives of oversight, accountability and 
ethical governance. The tripartite typology of respect, protect and fulfil requires government 
to stymie acts that deprive individuals of their rights under the Constitution and the ICESCR. 
To fulfil this obligation, states should observe a fiduciary duty over the economic resources 
for SERs to ensure core deliverables, which in turn benefit the most vulnerable and desperate 
in society. To turn the corner on successful development of SERs, would depend on the 
government’s willingness to recognition the link between corruption and the implementation 
of human rights and to take cognisance of the devastating scourge corruption causes to the 
realisation of SERs. At the heart of the problem is that ethically challenged public officials 
are testing the public service and no amount of anti-corruption measures will cure this 
negative behaviour which stunts the development of SERs.  To put it more plainly public 
officials are taking the public service for a ‘ride’ and see their positions primarily as an office 
for gain as argued by Aristotle and see the delivery (if at all) of SERs as purely incidental. 
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Ethically inflexible, is the kind of public official that will best serve the people of South 
Africa, with the Constitution as their moral compass. This is what the public service should 
strive for, namely accountability in the application of the available resources by public 
officials who feel duty bound to have the best interests of the rights-holder at heart. Thus the 
safe-guarding of the available resources should be uppermost in the mind of the public 
official entrusted to oversee public fund for social housing. Precarious and selective 
prosecutions will not remedy dishonest behaviour, nor act as a deterrent. Moreover, the most 
efficient way to hold states accountable is through proper enforcement- and monitoring- 
mechanisms which function as a collective effort between the branches of government in 
order to promote universally applicable standards.
 
 
 
7.4 The branches of government 
 
It is trite that the realisation of housing requires the collective effort of all three branches of 
government. In this regard the executive has perhaps delivered on legislative and other 
measures but failed to realise the spirit of these measures. A good starting point would be to 
revisit the Grootboom order. The CC ordered that the most desperate should be seen to first, 
but government has not relieved the plight of those living in intolerable conditions at least in 
Cape Town where the community of Grootboom lived. To do this, government must ring-
fence housing budgets in such a way that it is applied to bring the most desperate on an equal 
footing with those who enjoy adequate shelter. Moreover, Parliament is to exert its oversight 
function and call a tardy executive to order on its non-delivery of court orders such as 
Grootboom where the most desperate begged for help and do not receive it. 
 
The time and resources spent on the SIU investigations into social housing corruption, is a 
let-down in that there has been no action against perpetrators despite the stark findings of 
corruption in the Report. It is a matter of justice delayed is justice denied.  The overdue 
finalisation of the SIU Report and the lack of implementation of its recommendations is a 
travesty of justice. This can be remedied through parliamentary oversight, in that Parliament 
should inquire to the SIU as to the completion of the investigations. This should be succeeded 
with an inquiry into the progress of the recommendations of the SIU. That is, government 
should be compelled to implement the disciplinary hearings and the NPA should be asked to 
report on its progress in prosecutions. This is what is expected of a parliament that fulfils its 
constitutional obligations of oversight and which implements the mandate of the people. 
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Moreover, the judiciary cannot stand idly by and watch the other two branches of government 
being ineffective in their duties. The judiciary cannot continue to be a nigh passive bystander 
to the unnecessarily prolonged plight of the desperate and vulnerable in accessing housing. 
The long awaited and promised transformation has to be at the heart of the inquiry when the 
judiciary is faced with government’s slow pace of implementation and negligence towards its 
duty to fulfil the realisation of housing. The abuse of state resources earmarked to deliver 
housing should not be tolerated and the judiciary needs to play a more active role in the 
protection of these resources. The liberal approach of the Indian judiciary comes to mind. 
That is to say, the judiciary could inquire from the SAHRC as to the progress of 
investigations of corruption into housing.  A more transformed judiciary should aspire to 
fulfil its obligations as interpreter of the Constitution and voice of the poor and thereby place 
itself under pressure to adopt a more progressive response to government and its retrogression 
in the delivering of housing.  The judiciary should take cognisance of the social realities that 
prevail in South Africa and not shield itself under the guise of the separation of powers 
doctrine. Seeking refuge in legal niceties is not an option for the judiciary given the urgency 
of the need for social emancipation. The different approach of the Indian judiciary through 
SAL is an avenue that could be explored. Sufficiently progressive transformation by the 
judiciary requires a break from the norm that did not produce the required results over the 
past 20 years, insofar as SERs. To complement the Constitution the judiciary must move out 
of its ‘wait-and-see’ approach and adopt a different approach, perhaps the Indian approach, in 
raising issues of SERs, meru motu. This thesis would argue that transformation in the lower 
courts is dependent upon transformation of the higher courts particularly the CC in it has the 
final say when faced with an appeal from the lower courts.  Therefore the apex Court should 
be leading transformation in order to fulfil the constitutional endeavours. 
 
For the judiciary to remain with the same jurisprudence of the reasonableness test is akin to 
running on a treadmill. That has been the fate of South Africa over the past two decades, 
namely a government that seems to deliver pockets of success in housing but has to spend as 
much money to rectify poor delivery or non delivery arising out of the lack of proper 
oversight which in turn allows corruption to flourish. The envisaged transformation of the 
Constitution begs for an approach that would bring about dignity and prosperity for the 
impoverished. 
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The reasonableness test is not a defence against the tardiness of government in the delivery of 
housing, when there is evidence of pervasive malfeasance in the programme. What should 
pass as ‘reasonable’ is minimum core deliverables within the ‘maximum available resources’ 
allocated for the delivery of housing. In other words the interpretation of the word reasonable 
should be ‘revisited’.   
 
The resilience of the law in South Africa, particular insofar as the Nkandla matter is 
concerned, is comforting. The action of the CC against the President confirms, at least 
notionally that even the highest office cannot do as it pleases with the available resources of 
the state. Moreover, it underscores the idea that there should be consequences for behaviour 
that flouts constitutional obligations. The more effort government puts in obeying alternative 
dispute-resolution measures, such as the PP, the less pressure there would be on the judiciary 
to compel compliance. Alternative dispute measures are put in place precisely to relieve the 
court and afford access for the impoverished and vulnerable. Thus these measures are 
important for quicker access to resolve matters of corruption and housing fraud. Perhaps it is 
time to empower the PP to deliver orders akin to those of the court similar to the powers of 
the Lokpal ombudsman in India. Thus if such orders are ignored criminal sanction would 
ensue.  
 
Regrettably the executive, the President and Parliament are found to not adhere to their own 
legislative measures, including the Constitution. These two branches of government should 
refrain from second guessing legitimate remedial measures. This behaviour by government 
leaves the CC as last option to enforce the will of the people and act against a recalcitrant 
government. The realisation of the right to housing needs no less than, obedience to court 
orders, no irregular or abuse of expenditure and no undue benefits in government. These are 
the attributes of sound corporate governance in a government befitting a constitutional 
democracy and South Africa should heed this call.  
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